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
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Vol. I

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The
VEDĀNTA OF ŚĀṆKARA
A METAPHYSICS OF VALUE

BY
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JAIPUR

4627

VOLUME I

149.90954

Ram

मुक्त्यवस्था हि सर्ववेदान्तोपबेकरूपवाच्यमन्ते । अद्वैतः हि मुक्त्यवस्था तद्व्यसाध्यं
नित्यमिद्वैतभावमेव विशदयिगम्यते । S. B. III. 4. 52



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Śaṅkara, born at Kaladi, a village in the Malabar district in South India, in 788. Father's name was Śivaguru and mother's name Aryambā. Became the pupil of Govinda Bhagavatpāda at an early age and was formally initiated by him into Sanyāsa. Travelled widely and established maths at Śringeri, Dwarakā, Puri and Badarikāshram. Died in 820 at the age of thirty-two.

३३

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं
यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।
तं हं देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाश
मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥

Svet. VI. 18

DEDICATION

At the Feet of the Masters who showed me the
light when it was all dark around me
and gave me strength when
despair stared me in
the face.

ॐ नमो ब्रह्मादिभ्यो ब्रह्मविद्यासंप्रदायकृद्भ्यो
वशरूपिभ्यो नमो गुरुभ्यः ।
श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामात्मन्यं करुणालयम् ।
नमामिभगवत्पादं शकरं लोकशंकरम् ॥

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PREFACE

Śaṅkara is the central thinker in the history of Indian Philosophy. In him all lines of thought converge : idealism and realism, pragmatism and rationalism, naturalism and mysticism, agnosticism and faith-philosophy. For this very reason his philosophy is difficult to characterize. This fact also explains the divergent interpretations that have been put upon his teachings. But Śaṅkara binds together the different strands of thought present in his writings with the help of the unique point of view from which he looks at the problems of philosophy, namely, the standpoint of Value. The present work is an attempt to make explicit this point of view and give an account of his teachings in the light of it. Every line that Śaṅkara has written bears the stamp of this point of view and I believe its discovery and adoption have enabled me to clear up some of the major tangles left by the previous interpreters, tangles which seriously affected the unity of Śaṅkara's thought and which refused to be resolved from any other point of view.

The relation of value to being, the ontological status of value, this is the question to which Śaṅkara is driven; and it is in connection with the working out of the relation of "value" to "reality" and of "value and reality" to "existence" as a whole that the more original features of Śaṅkara's philosophy are to be found. That the metaphysical notion of "reality" is the notion of "value" is the fundamental contention of Śaṅkara; and in consonance with this very viewpoint he develops his doctrine of ontological predicates which brings out the value character of the predicate of reality, emphasizes that cognition is valuational, affirms that valuation has something of the noetic in it, determines the character of the spatio-temporal world as representing at once the duality as well as the oneness and inseparability of value and existence (*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyatva*), and finally reiterates, after the Upaniṣads, the identity of the most supremely "real" and the most supremely "good", both these being but forms of "value". According to Śaṅkara, the duality of value and existence is the most persistent of all dualities and the final paradox of philosophical thought; in the words of Windelband, the "sacred mystery" marking the limits of

our nature and of our knowledge. But Śaṅkara also believes that there is a point where value and existence come together and meet and fuse in one. That point is what he calls Brahman; or Atman or Mokṣa. But this point cannot be experienced without "trenching on the mystical". Thought can have access only to the "axiom" of the oneness and inseparability of value and existence and not to their "identity". Life alone is capable of it, a life of Brahma-bhāva. This is the meaning of Śaṅkara's repeated insistence that "knowing" Brahman and "being" Brahman are the same.

In pursuance of the above fundamental truths, Śaṅkara comes to grips with the rival systems of thought treated of in the Tarkapāda. His complaint against them is that either the notion of "reality" with which they work is not the notion of "value" or there is a wilful dissociation of "reality" from what they conceive to be the highest "value." This is the case with the Nirvāṇa and the Self of Buddhism, the Prakṛti and Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya, the matter of the Cārvākas and the God of the Naiyāyikas. This explains the anxiety on the part of the dualistic systems to find out a complementary something which will make up the deficiency in the conception of "reality" with which they start on their philosophic enterprise. It is one of my cardinal contentions that the Vedāntism of Śaṅkara is not inspired by Buddhism and it is unconstructive to affiliate it to Idealism and Nihilism of the Buddhist type. Behind this eagerness to draw parallelism between Vedāntism and Buddhism lies the tendency to view Śaṅkara as an arch-rationalist. But Śaṅkara's so-called rationalism is at every step suffused with mysticism; and this mysticism should be read as part and parcel of his metaphysical views. "In ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from logic to religion." But every page of Śaṅkara's works bears witness to the belief in their identity. Śaṅkara deliberately accepts the position of an orthodox Vedic thinker and believes that "a philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith does not illuminate may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the latter an alien to faith". The fact that Śaṅkara appears before us in the role of a commentator lends

a peculiar interest to his writings, making them a vehicle of the traditional cultural spirit of Hinduism. But Śaṅkara also rises above it and refuses to be content with a literal repetition of the past. I have based my interpretation upon Śaṅkara's own writings and not upon those of his followers, whether they happen to be his commentators or writers of independent works on the Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself is his best commentator, and any one who is not content with stray "selections" from his writings will bear out this truth. I have avoided working upon the assumption that the original ācāryas of a particular system preached exactly the same doctrines as their later followers, and the latter simply make explicit what was implicit in the work of the original master, more intelligible what does not appear to be sufficiently clear in the founder's own teachings. It will appear to the reader that this is a reversal of the method consciously adopted by Dr. Dasgupta and unconsciously by the medieval ācāryas, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara being the more prominent among them. I do not share Dr. Dasgupta's view that the interpretations offered by Śaṅkara's followers are nowhere in conflict with his doctrines. The development of the philosophy of Śaṅkara in the hands of his followers exhibits both progression and retrogression. One can easily discover in this later development instances of parasitism, of degenerate development, of foreign excrescences and outgrowths, of what Professor Arthur Thomson calls "the tape-worm in its inglorious ease". These are "as much an outcome of evolution as the lark at heaven's gate". In any interpretation of Śaṅkara's meaning we must look at his doctrine as a whole and the details ought to be interpreted as elements in such a whole. Many of the expositors of Śaṅkara have allowed themselves to be carried away by stray passages in his writings and have tried to squeeze out of them a system of philosophy. I have joined issue with such expositors and have contended that these isolated passages are not able to bear the weight of a whole system.

In the preparation of this work I have found the writings of Thibaut and Deussen, Ranade and Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar and Dasgupta, Hiriyanna and Kokilashwar Sastri, B. L. Atreya, S. K. Das, and A. C. Mukerjee, Swami Madhvananda and Ganganathi Jha, very helpful. Had these works not

been written before and their interpretations already in the field, perhaps the idea of the need of a fresh attempt to understand Śāṅkara would never have suggested itself to me. Hence I must not be thought ungrateful or wanting in respect because I have criticised them at places, nor must it be supposed that I am unmindful of those obligations which I have not expressly acknowledged. My formulation of the notion of Value has been chiefly determined by the teachings of Windelband, Pringle-Pattison and Urban, and a careful reader of the book, especially the second and third chapters wherein I have tried to explain the exact sense in which Śāṅkara's notion of Reality is that of value, will discover their influence.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude which I owe to my teachers, Professor P.B. Adhikari, Dr. S.K. Maitra, Pt I. D. Tiwari, and Dr. B. L. Atreya, at present University Professor of Philosophy and Chief Warden, Birla Hostel, Banaras Hindu University, at whose feet I had the privilege to sit as a student at the University of Banaras. I am glad to mention especially the name of Dr. S.K. Maitra and acknowledge the constant and ungrudging help and the many valuable suggestions which I received from him in the final preparation of this work for the press, especially on points connected with the problem of value. My thanks are due to Dr. D.M. Datta of Patna University who was good enough to favour me with his critical comments both in private conversation and through correspondence.

The completion of the work owes not a little to Mr. J. C. Rollo and Dr. G. S. Mahajani whom the young University of Rajputana was fortunate to have as its first University officer and first Vice-Chancellor respectively. They have introduced a "liberal" and a "human" atmosphere in the University which is the very soul of University life and which will most likely continue to determine the future "go" of events. And certainly in a University it is the life which is "lived" that counts and not the tables of stone on which the statutes and ordinances are engraved and which require to be periodically broken up. The work would not have been completed but for the increased facilities for research work which were provided to us in the college for the first time in its history by

the Jaipur Government largely as the result of Mr. Rollo's efforts when he came to stay with us as its head. This liberal atmosphere owed not a little to Sir Mirza Ismail and Sir V.T. Krishnamachari, Prime Ministers of Jaipur, and Pt. Devi Shankar Tiwari, Education Minister, Jaipur, who were at the helm of affairs during the most fateful years when a wave of idealism had swept over Jaipur and it was witnessing a renaissance.

But for the generous grant-in aid of Rs 1500 made to me by the University of Rajputana towards the publication of the work, the liberal offer of Messrs Dwarika Das and Madho Das, proprietors of the Bharat Publishing House, Jaipur, to defray the remaining expenses and undertake its publication during these difficult, almost trying, times, and the constant vigilance and anxiety of Mr S. L. Jain, Manager, Modern Art Printers to finish the printing of the work in as short a time as possible, the work would not have seen the light at so early a date. I am grateful to the University for this grant-in-aid and have to thank the publishers and the printer for their generous co-operation. My thanks are also due to Rai Bahadur Madan Mohan Varma, Registrar, University of Rajputana and and to my friend and colleague Professor R. K. Shukla, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, for their valuable advice in connection with the printing of the work.

There are three debts of a more or less personal nature which I owe to Dr. B. L. Atreya, to Professor R. D. Ranade, formerly Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University, and to Mr. J. C. Rollo, Special Education officer, Jaipur. It was under the supervision of Dr. Atreya that I first began my systematic study of the Vedānta as an undergraduate student at the University and since then everything about him and his life has been an inspiration to me. My association with Professor Ranade has widened my intellectual horizon and deepened my faith in the value of spiritual life; it inspired me at a time when research was taboo in Jaipur. His love and reverence for Śaṅkara and all that Śaṅkara stood for always drew me nearer him. To Mr. J. C. Rollo I owe a lasting debt. At great personal inconvenience and as a pure labour of love he went through the whole of the book in manuscript, revised it carefully and suggested distinct improvements in expression.

I hope my readers will not feel the absence of a biographical sketch in the book. In the case of master minds their work is the best commentary on their life; and few, I hope, will be reluctant to allow that Śaṅkara is a master mind and deserves "a place among the immortals"

If this book succeeds in persuading some of the readers to take up afresh a study of the works of Śaṅkara and thus acquire some of the respect and admiration for him which has grown upon me the more. I have examined his work, I shall have reason to feel, in the words of Paton, that my long and at times depressing labours have not failed to find an appropriate reward.

Maharaja's College,
JAIPUR

R. P. Singh.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A. U. S.	Allahabad University Studies.
B. B.	Bhāskara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra.
B. S.	Brahma Sūtra.
Belvalkar.	English Translation of Brahma Sūtra Adhyāya II, Padas 1 and 2 by S. K. Belvalkar.
Brhad.	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Chand	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
D. S. V.	Deussen's System of the Vedānta.
History.	Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy.
I. P.	Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan.
Mand. S. B.	Śaṅkara's commentary on Māṇḍūkya Kārika by Gauḍapāda.
Mund.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
P. R.	Process and Reality by Whitehead.
R. B.	Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra.
S. B.	Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra (If the abbreviation is used along with the name of an Upaniṣad, it denotes Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on that Upaniṣad)
Taitt.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
Thibaut.	Thibaut's Introduction to his "Translation of Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra", Vol. I.
Upadesa.	Upadeśasāhāsrī by Śaṅkara.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
CONFLICTING ESTIMATES

Śaṅkara is one of the greatest systematic thinkers that India has produced; his "Advaitism is a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety"¹; his doctrine "is from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil"²; his system, "equal in rank to Plato and Kant, is one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in its search for the eternal truth"³, and has won him "a place among the immortals".

But the student who cares to know something definite about Śaṅkara's philosophy is bewildered by the contradictory views which have been taken of it. Śaṅkarian interpretation is, to borrow the words of Professor Paton which he said about Kantian interpretation, "an inevitable welter of conflicting opinions." Kant and Śaṅkara are the two greatest thinkers which Europe and India have respectively produced. As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Śaṅkara. The greatness of these two thinkers lies not only in the fact that both of them gave us a system of philosophy which is a rare and wonderful specimen of the creative activity of the human mind but (and this is more important) in that their thoughts had a potentiality which continued to inspire philosophical reflection in Europe and India long after their death, which process has not ceased even now.

Śaṅkara has played a very important part in contributing to the growth and development of philosophical thought in India. Professor Whitehead, speaking of Plato, says that "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to

1 Radhakrishnan : I. P. Vol. II, P. 445.

2 Thibaut : P. XIV.

3 Aspects of the Vedānta, P. 120.

Plato." Professor Whitehead's meaning is that Plato's writings are an inexhaustible mine of suggestion, containing as they do a wealth of general ideas.

In this sense, it may be said of Śaṅkara without any fear of exaggeration that philosophical development in India after him consists of a series of footnotes to him. Any one who cares to read the history of the growth of post-Śaṅkara philosophic thought, not only within the orthodox Advaita fold, but outside also in the rival Vedāntic Camps of Bhedābheda-vāda, of Viśiṣṭādvaitism, Dvaitism, and Śuddhādvaitism, will realize that philosophy in India owes an incalculable debt to Śaṅkara. The universality of his mind was never allowed by him to be obscured by excessive systematization, and a spirit of catholicism, which is not mere eclecticism, pervades his writings. It is no wonder that even the enemies of Śaṅkara have drawn upon his writings and their works bear the unmistakable stamp of the informing spirit of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara, more than any other single thinker, inspired and quickened philosophic thought in India. Advaitism, the foundations of which were laid by Śaṅkara, in its growth assumed several forms and its history is yet in progress. He was followed by a host of illustrious thinkers who developed his system in different directions. Suresvara and Padmapāda, Vācaspati Miśra and Sarvajñātma Muni, Vidyāranya and Appayadīkṣita are names which would be a matter of pride to any history of thought. Śaṅkara's influence did not end here. His views served to provoke controversy with the rival schools of Vedānta, and the philosophical systems of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha owe their inception and development not a little to their conflict with Śaṅkara's Vedānta.

In spite of the important position thus occupied by Śaṅkara and Kant in the history of Indian and European philosophy respectively, it is to be much regretted that the interpretations of their philosophies should be an "inevitable welter of conflicting opinions." Even today Śaṅkarian interpretation is in very much the same position as Kantian

interpretation. Professor Lindsay, speaking of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, says, "Ever since it has been published it has been commented on, and the process of commenting on it has produced different schools of interpretation. Kantian interpretation is in very much the position in which Kant describes metaphysics to be. It has certainly not reached 'the sure path of Science,' and, as one dogmatic interpretation of what Kant meant is opposed by another, the place of both is taken by a scepticism which says that the book is so muddled and confused that it is not worth understanding." These words of Professor Lindsay exactly describe the state in which Śāṅkarian interpretation finds itself today.

His Advaitism is regarded as a system of great speculative daring and logical subtility. It is represented as having a self-satisfying wholeness characteristic of works of art, expounding its own presuppositions, being ruled by its own end, and having all its elements in a stable, reasoned equipoise;² yet it is believed, on the other hand, that, in an endeavour to preserve continuity of thought, Śāṅkara attempted to combine logically incompatible ideas and this has affected the logical rigour of his thought, so much so that the theory of *Māyā* which is "the chief characteristic of the Advaita system"³ and the "orthodoxy" of which was established by Śāṅkara, merely serves as a cloak to cover the inner rifts of his system.⁴ It is said that at the centre of Śāṅkara's system is the eternal mystery of creation; but the very explanation which is offered by Śāṅkara to resolve this mystery, his doctrine of *Māyā*, is asserted to be a "Buddhistic element" which was incorporated into the Vedānta philosophy of Śāṅkara.⁵

Śāṅkara is described as a man of "illustrious personality" having "illustrious followers"; his works, it is said, abound in "subtle and deep" ideas which have rightly attained wonderful celebrity.⁶ But, on the next page, we are told that

1 Kani, P. 37.

2 Radhakrishnan: I. P. Vol. II, P. 446. 3 *ibid.* P. 565.

4 *ibid.*, PP. 471, 472.

5 *ibid.*, P. 471.

6 Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 429.

Śaṅkara was a hidden Buddhist himself, that he and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists, and that his philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upanisad notion of the permanence of self superadded.¹ Many of the doctrines peculiar to Śaṅkara "were anticipated by the idealistic Buddhists, and looked at from this point of view, there would be very little which could be regarded as original in Śaṅkara."² While on the one hand it is agreed that Śaṅkara was a hidden Buddhist himself, it is admitted on the same page that Śaṅkara tried as best he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhistic traits found in the exposition of Gauḍapāda and to formulate the philosophy as a direct interpretation of the older Upanisad texts, and in this he achieved remarkable success.³ While it is held that Vijñānabhikṣu was right in his accusation against Śaṅkara that the latter was a hidden Buddhist, it is at the same time recognized that "his influence on Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine person or an incarnation."⁴

Śaṅkara is extolled as a thinker equal in rank to Plato and Kant, and his system of the Vedānta is recognized as one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in its search for the eternal truth;⁵ yet it is believed that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which alone can render it possible for metaphysics to attain its content only through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, and consequently we find that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara "helps itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge."⁶ It is acknowledged that the tenets of Śaṅkara are true, but it is pointed out that he is not able to prove them; he has grasped the metaphysical truth by intuition, but he does not know the "way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof", and in this respect Vedāntism is "defective."⁷

1 Ibid., PP. 431, 432.

2 Dasgupta : Indian Idealism, P. 195.

3 Dasgupta : History, Vol. I. P. 437.

4 Ibid., P. 437.

5 Deussen in Aspects of the Vedānta, P. 120.

6 Deussen : System of the Vedānta, P. 90.

7 Aspects of the Vedānta, P. 127.

It is asserted that the doctrine advocated by Śaṅkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil, and that neither the other Vedāntic, nor the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with it in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation.¹ But it is again pointed out that it has not had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India, that it is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which does not rejoice "to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite", that its absolute Brahman is inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies; that its substitute, the Lord, is a "shadowy lord"; and that as a religion, it is a mockery, because "the very breath and spirit" of religion which consists in devotion to Lord who lends a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper, is conspicuously absent from it.²

While, on the one hand, it is held that Śaṅkara's Advaitism is "a great example of a purely philosophical scheme"³, and that Śaṅkara himself is not a theologian, and his arguments are all logical and philosophical and the references to the Vedas are only meant to support the conclusions of his independent thought, on the other, there are others who say that "Śaṅkara was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upaniṣads"; that he does not prove the Vedānta to be a consistent system of metaphysics complete in all parts; and that reason with him occupied a subordinate place and could be used either for the "right understanding of the revealed scriptures" or "for the refutation of other systems of thought."⁴ I will conclude by mentioning what a modern Buddhist missionary and scholar, the Rev. Rahula Sankrityayana, who has attracted the notice of learned Indologists very recently and is held in very high esteem by them, says about Śaṅkara. The judgement, however, which he passes on Śaṅkara gives evidence of more heat than light in him. The following is a free translation of what

1 Thibaut, P. XIV

2 Ibid. P. cxxvii

3 Radhakrishnan: I.P. Vol. II P. 445.

4 Dasgupta: History, Vol. I, PP. 434, 435

he says about Śaṅkara in the introduction to his Buddhacaryā, written in Hindi: "The truth is that Śaṅkara was a man of great genius and learning. He wrote his commentary called the Śārīraka Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra. Though this commentary was unique of its type and contained discussions about several philosophical systems, yet it was not a work of a very high quality for the age which saw the rise of thinkers like Dīnāga, Udyotakara, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti..... The scholars of Northern India who really constituted the learned assembly of that age did not recognize Śaṅkara as an Ācārya until VācaspatiMiśra, who was learned in all the sacred lores and whose pre-eminence as a philosophical thinker was unrivalled in Mithila, then the seat of philosophical learning and scholarship, wrote his commentary on the Śārīraka Bhāṣya and brought into bold relief the truths which even Śaṅkara's genius had failed to see. To speak the truth, the reputation which Śaṅkara enjoys today he owes to Vācaspati, who advocated his cause before the learned minds of India. Had Vācaspati not written his Bhāmāṭī on Śaṅkara's commentary, the latter would have long been neglected and lost in oblivion."

II

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

The following summary account of the different interpretations of Śaṅkara's philosophy will reveal to us that Śaṅkarian interpretation even today is a "welter of conflicting opinions:"

(A) — General estimate:

1. Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of (Vi)jñāna-vāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism, and he borrows his dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. (Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Dasgupta and Belvalkar).
2. His philosophy is most aptly described as Māyāvāda. (Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Belvalkar, Dasgupta, Hiriyanna, Radhakrishnan and Thibaut.)

3. His philosophy is unrivalled in boldness and depth of speculation (Radhakrishnan, Thibaut). But he has incorporated certain Buddhistic elements, and Buddhism exercised a far-reaching influence on Śaṅkara. (Radhakrishnan).
4. He sometimes combines incompatible ideas and contradicts himself. (Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar).
5. Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which is required by philosophy. He fails to attack the philosophical problem by having recourse to natural means of knowledge, and constantly substitutes a theological for a philosophical means of knowledge. He knows the way of intuition but not of abstract reasoning and scientific proof. (Deussen).
6. Śaṅkara's religion has no influence on the masses, and is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart. (Thibaut).
7. Śaṅkara's reputation is more due to Vācaspati's commentary on his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* than to anything which is intrinsically his own. (Rahula Sankrityāna).

(B)—Metaphysical position :

1. Brahman is pure, undifferentenced, perfectly indeterminate homogeneous Being. It is Nirguṇa or Śuddha Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Hiriyanna, Belvalkar, Rāmanuja and Bhaskara).
2. Brahman is pure, undifferentenced and homogeneous Being, but it is not an indeterminate blank. (Radhakrishnan).
3. Brahman, being pure Being, is the same as Non-Being. (Dasgupta)
4. Brahman is both Nirguṇa and Saguṇa, Transcendent and Immanent; neither purely Immanent nor purely

Transcendent. The same truth can be expressed by saying that Brahman is the Efficient as well as the Material cause of the world. (Kokileshwar Sastri).

5. Brahman is not a "differenceless Being" Brahman contains its other, its opposite, its negations within it. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
6. Brahman does not unfold, express, develop, manifest, grow. It cannot, therefore, be said to be the creator. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.)
7. Brahman is the creator. It differentiates itself into the multiplicity of names and forms. The world is produced out of Brahman. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
8. Creation proceeds from Brahman in association with Māyā and not from the Śuddha Brahman. Brahman in association with Māyā is technically called the "Īśvara," the "Māyā-Śābala Brahman." Īśvara is the lower, the Apara Brahman; the empirical Brahman. It is an inferior principle. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar and Hiriyanna.)
9. Brahman (Nirguṇa Brahman) and Īśvara (Saguṇa Brahman) are different. (Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Thibaut, Deussen, Belvalkar and Hiriyanna.)
10. Brahman and Īśvara are not different, but one and the same. Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. Īśvara is not an inferior principle (Kokileshwar Sastri).
11. The concept of Īśvara as put forward by Śāṅkara is that of a creator. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Hiriyanna, Belvalkar and Kokileshwar Sastri.)
12. But from the true point of view creation is illusory, a magic show and unreal, and so the creator, i. e., Īśvara, also is illusory and unreal. Jiva, Īśvara and the world are illusory impositions on Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Belvalkar, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.)

13. Īśvara is not illusory and unreal (Radhakrishnan and Kokileshwar Sastri).
14. Īśvara is real in the empirical sense (Radhakrishnan).
15. Īśvara is real in all possible senses (Kokileshwar Sastri).
16. Īśvara is phenomenal, not above time, but subject to time. He belongs to the empirical world. He is the Saguna Brahman or the conceived Brahman. (Radhakrishnan).
17. Īśvara is not phenomenal; nor is he illusory or unreal. He is not the lower or the empirical Brahman. He is Brahman conceived as the creator. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
18. The world is not only unsubstantial but a magic-show of illusion, and is falsely imposed upon Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Daussen, Belvalkar, Ramanuja and Bhāskara.)
19. The world is phenomenal but not illusory. (Radhakrishnan, Kokileshwar Sastri).
20. External objects are merely phases of the perceiver's consciousness, are momentary, and without essence. (Bhaskara).
21. (a) Īśvara is the first cause, the creator. Creation and destruction are real movements in the life of God. Maya is the śakti of Īśvara, the unmanifested principle of multiplicity and basis of all evolution.
(b) But, again, Śaṅkara supports the theory of ajāti or non-evolution. The world is not evolved or produced but seems to be so on account of limited insight. (Radhakrishnan).
22. Śaṅkara does not accept the view of Parināma. He endorses Vivartavāda. (Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, Hiriyanna, Rāmanuja, Bhāskara and Daussen).
23. There is no conflict between Parināmavāda and Vivartavāda according to Śaṅkara. (Kokileshwar Sastri)

24. Śaṅkara's doctrine of casuality is Satkāryavāda. (Kokileshwar Sastri). The ultimate view endorsed by Śaṅkara is not Satkāryavāda, but Satkāraṇavāda (Dasgupta, Belvalkar).
25. Śaṅkara says nothing definite regarding the relation of māyā or avidyā to Brahman (Dasgupta).
26. Māyā is a power of Brahman, is neither being nor non-being. It is a principle of illusion. It is an unreal principle, is of a non-intelligent nature, but at the same time the upādāna of the world (Thibaut).
27. (a) Māyā is the śakti of Īśvara; the unmanifested principle of multiplicity and basis of all evolution.
- (b) Māyā expresses that the relation between the real Brahman and the unreal world is indefinable through logical categories.
- (c) Brahman and the world are non-different and so the relation between the two is an inadmissible one.
- (d) Māyā is neither real as Brahman nor unreal as the flower of the sky (Radhakrishnan).

Such are the divergent estimates in which Śaṅkara has been held and the different ways in which he has been understood. The views which have been taken of him do not all seem to do justice to him. The hidden Buddhist summarising the pages of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhistic works or the eclectic incorporating the Buddhistic doctrines and establishing their orthodoxy, seems hardly the sort of man to set all India in a philosophical ferment and to initiate a series of movements whose repercussions are far from having ceased even at the present time.

III

THE MISSING TRUTH

The one great truth which has escaped the attention of the interpreters of Śaṅkara who have consequently found in his

works a system of pure and undiluted rationalism is that it is primarily and pre-eminently a philosophy of Value. This ignorance of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy has resulted in an unconscious reduction of it to an existential system. This existential bias has paved the way for the affiliation of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara to systems of Buddhistic idealism and nihilism, thus rendering plausible all those interpretations which have to do in some way or other with the forgetting of the value-side of Śaṅkara's system. The critics of Śaṅkara proceed upon the assumption that he is taking what may be called the "existential" view of the universe. Their arguments derive plausibility from their confusion of "existential" and "axiological" categories. Śaṅkara's philosophy concerns itself with the problem of "appearance and reality" only in so far as this is necessary to bring out in bolder relief the value-side of the universe. For Śaṅkara the truth of the universe is constituted by the value it possesses. This aspect of his philosophy must not be lost sight of in any attempt to understand his meaning.

Rāmānuja interprets Śaṅkara's Brahman as "mere" i.e. nondifferenced Being. This notion of Brahman as Being is interpreted as Existence merely after the fashion of spatio-temporal existences. It is argued on behalf of Śaṅkara that creation, so diversified in nature, cannot be ascribed to Brahman, which is without differences. It is but the natural consequence of the existential standpoint unconsciously, but in all seriousness, attributed to Śaṅkara, that a reality which is non-differenced cannot be harmonized with a reality which is made of differences and differentiations. This, in all conscience, is putting Brahman and the world of existence or the spatio-temporal order on the same level, treating Brahman, which is more than, and the source of, all existence, as existence merely. The same existential bias reflects itself in Rāmānuja's repeated assertion that the advaitin proves the non otherness of the effect from the cause by proving the falsity of the effect. The reality of the effect is believed by Rāmānuja to consist in its existence. He equates reality with existence. This very standpoint determines the attitude of Bhāskara towards Śaṅkara's system in general and his

conception of the universe in particular. Bhāskara, not being able to realize the value character of the categories used by Śaṅkara, interprets him as denying even existential status to the objects of name and form. External objects, fire, earth, etc., says Bhāskara, have, according to Śaṅkara, no existence. The same existential prejudice leads Bhāskara to the view that the unity of Brahman and the diversity of the phenomenal world are opposed to each other like heat and cold. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, makes it clear that unity and plurality are contradictory only when applied to the self, which is eternal and without parts, but not to effects, which have parts.¹

The modern interpreters also, while recognizing that Śaṅkara's philosophy is based on an idea of value, are not able to realize that it is out and out a Value philosophy and that his notion of reality itself is that of value, value and reality being identical in his system. They admit that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is ruled by the idea of a highest Good, a Summum Bonum, a perfection which it is the great business of life to attain, and they try, in their own way, to define this Good after Śaṅkara. But they are not able to see that this Good is not merely ethical or religious good but is identical with what the metaphysicians call the highest reality. Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara describe Śaṅkara's Brahman in such a way that it is reduced to mere Existence in spite of their intention to the contrary. But this reduction is inevitable unless it is realized from the very beginning that reality for Śaṅkara is nothing but value and this is the only notion of reality to be met with in Śaṅkara. Dr. Dasgupta in describing Śaṅkara's Brahman as pure being and identifying it with non-being or the Śūnya of Nāgārjuna reduces it to mere Existence. His difficulty that it is difficult to distinguish between "pure being" and "non-being" as a category defies solution only so long as we persist in conceiving absolute reality, which is what Dr. Dasgupta means by "pure being", after the manner of objects which exist in space and time. Pure being appears as non-being because we want to catch it in its fulness by means of our sense-organs,

1 Brhad. S. B. II 1. 1.

which are meant to reveal objects which are differentiated. When the sense-organs fail us we think there is no such thing as pure being and its notion is that of a non-entity or non-being. The description of the world as an illusion or a magic show is connected with the forgetting of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy and, with it, of the instrumental or intermediary function of the universe.

Thibaut also interprets Śaṅkara's Brahman as "pure being" which is the Absolute Reality for him. But from the way in which Thibaut's further characterization of Brahman proceeds it is clear that he is not able to shake off what we have called above the existential bias, and fails to draw and maintain the subtle and much-needed distinction between the notions of 'reality' and 'existence'. When Thibaut attributes to Śaṅkara the view that the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence but in so far as the latter is associated with Māyā, he is surrendering the claim of the Absolute Reality to absoluteness and admitting that the non-intelligent things are foreign to Reality or Brahman. This is tantamount to presenting a section of the whole reality as the whole. To identify reality with a section is to place it on the level of other existents. This is a prejudice, the existential prejudice, as we have said above. If the concept of "reality" is treated as an existential concept, and not as one of value implying the notion of degrees of value, and if existence is equated with space and time and spatio-temporal objects, and if in the highest state of realization this type of reality is not to be met with, there is nothing else for the existential consciousness but to say, as Thibaut does, that "the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of pralaya than during the period of its subsistence" and that it is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake in the rope.

All the interpreters speak of the world as neither "existing" nor "not-existing", as neither "being" nor "non-being", as neither "real" nor "unreal", without suspecting in the least that the notions of "reality" in the sense of "absolute being" and of "existence" are not interchangeable. They

lapse into the existential standpoint when they say that "only unity exists; plurality does not exist."¹ It is an *adhyāsa* between the axiological and existential standpoints and the categories appropriate to them to assign "existence" to the Absolute and the spatio-temporal world in the same sense. The examples and illustrations adduced by Śaṅkara have frequently been misunderstood by his unsympathetic critics precisely because it has never struck them that the axiological standpoint is organic to Śaṅkara's system.

IV

VEDĀNTA THE BASIC CULTURE OF INDIA
ŚAṅKARA'S CONTRIBUTION

The root of the whole difficulty about the interpretation of Śaṅkara's teaching is that his true position in the history of Hindu thought has been missed. His philosophy is an embodiment of the cultural spirit of Hinduism and he appears before us as an exponent and as guardian of this cultural spirit. The system of thought which he has bequeathed to us is an attempt to supply the philosophical foundation on which the superstructure of Hindu culture rests. The interpreters of Śaṅkara do not realize this sufficiently and his critics do not seem to be aware of it.

Śruti is a repository of the truths realized by the ṛṣis, truths which constitute the very life-blood of the Hindu race. The history of Hinduism from the very early times when Manu and Vyās, Buddha and Śaṅkara, appear on the Indian soil, down to our own age, the age of Tagore and Gandhi, of Aurobindo Ghosh, Bhagavata Das and Radhakrishnan, has been the history of the reaffirmations and fresh declarations of those eternal truths and of attempts to embody them in the social, religious and political institutions of the race. Śaṅkara associates himself with the long line of Vedic seers and emphasizes the traditional way of looking at things. But in insisting upon tradition he does not forget that no generation can merely reproduce its ancestors. Tradition for him is life and movement and perpetual re-interpretation.

1 Deussen: *System*, P. 270.

The preservation of this cultural spirit which is permanent and abiding and the defence of it are the tasks which Śaṅkara's philosophy imposes upon itself. The preservation of this spirit which is the spirit of the Vedas means the preservation of Brāhmaṇatva. Śaṅkara's philosophy is an exposition and also a defence of that supreme Reality and supreme Value from which Brāhmaṇatva gets its meaning and its justification. The Vedic religion has always stood for the truth that there is an Eternal Good, an Absolute Value, a Supreme Perfection, an Infinite Life, a Universal Existence. What "exists" here and now draws its substance and its value from this reality which the Vedas call Brahman. Brahman is the most perfect Reality and the most supreme Value. In it value and what appears to us mortals as bare "existence" meet and fuse in one. But the duality of, which also means the discrepancy between, Value and Existence is an inalienable feature of finite life. There is a gulf between the Ideal and the Actual. Hence all willing and striving on the part of man who is aware of the Ideal and also of the distance which divides the Actual from the Ideal. Hence the striving to know also. Hence all the problems man has to face in his life. Hence also the problem of all problems which philosophy has to solve, the problem, namely how Reality, Value and Existence are related to each other and how they are to be comprehended in the unity of a system. The story of the way in which Value, Reality and Existence are to be conceived as related is the story of the development of the different speculative systems of Hindu thought. These systems recognize that there is a supreme Reality. They have an unshakable faith in the reality of a supreme Good without which human life is as naught. They admit that there is a spatio-temporal order of existence and there are finite individuals struggling their way to a region where the fetters of time fall away and time becomes "the moving image of Eternity". The systems firmly believe in these. And how could they not? Do they not derive their inspiration from the Vedas? But when it is a question of preparing an intellectual scheme which will supply the philosophical foundation of the triple faith of the *ṛis*, faith in Reality, in Value and in a world of spatio-temporal existence, the different systems diverge.

Śaṅkara's philosophy is an attempt to show that Brahman is the supreme reality and also the supreme value and the spatio-temporal world which represents the duality of value and existence is finally rooted in Brahman; and the individual self which at present finds itself to be part and parcel of the world of existence is, in substance, one with Brahman. Śaṅkara criticizes the different systems of thought which claim to be Vedic but which, in Śaṅkara's view, are not so either because they ignore the ultimacy of Reality or dissociate Reality from Value. Sāṅkhya and Yoga do not find favour with Śaṅkara. The Puruṣa which is the supreme Value lacks the fullness of reality; it is not the source of any thing. The Prakṛti which is the type of all reality has in it no trace of intrinsic value. The insistence on the atomic, instead of the divine, constitution of the world in the Nyāya & Vaiśeṣika systems detracts from the full reality of God. Both these systems offer a conception of the supreme Value which is just the opposite of that with which the ṛṣis make us familiar. The only absolute value for the seers is the absolute Life in which the Self is reconciled to the world and the world to the Self. Śaṅkara expresses this by saying that Brahman is the Ātman and the expanding universe nothing other than Brahman. There is no anātmavastu, no not-self. What appears as the not-self is really the Self. The Self thus becomes the supreme value and the centre of every other value. The Universe is substantially one with us—this is the fundamental contention of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

This truth is the imperishable insight of the Vedic seers. This insight is the true religion. Philosophy is a reflective activity. It did not have its birth so long as there was an inexhaustible faith in the reality of the vision and in the whole cosmic process having its end in that vision. The Vedic mantras represent this stage of Hindu culture. When there was a slackening of faith, the spirit of enquiry which is what is meant by philosophy had its birth, and the task which it found as already assigned to it was to prepare an intellectual scheme in which these imperishable insights of the ṛṣis could be preserved and harmonized in the unity of a system. Śaṅkara belongs to this age of philosophical construction.

He shares the faith of the ṛṣis that there is something which man recognizes as the greatest value when his life is fullest and his soul at its highest pitch. He feels that his existence cannot be abstracted from it and his life is as naught without it. It is Value par excellence; but it is also Reality par excellence. The relation of value to being-this is the key problem of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

That the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara is primarily a philosophy of Value is the fundamental contention of the author; and the whole work is one long-drawn argument in support of this claim. It is a long neglected truth and its revival has been long overdue. Ignorance of that truth has tended to lead writers on Śaṅkara to affiliate his Vedāntism to Idealism and Nihilism of the Buddhist type. But from the contention that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of Value follows as a natural corollary the repudiation of the view that "Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavāda. Buddhism with the Upaniṣad notion of the permanence of self superadded." Śaṅkara's conception of the Self or Ātman as the supreme value and as the supreme reality has nothing in common with the Buddhist view of the Self as a perpetual flux of sensations & thoughts.

It is high time that we learned to distinguish between Vedāntism and Buddhism. And this we shall not be in a position to do unless we realize with Urban that the problem of reality in order to be solvable at all must be turned from a merely existential or logical problem into an axiological problem. This is exactly what Śaṅkara has done. He has impressed upon us that the metaphysical notion of Reality is the notion of Value. Buddhism starts with the conception of Self as an aggregate or saṃghāta of certain factors. It occupies no privileged position in the world of facts; it is itself a fact among other facts. Accordingly Buddhism ends by offering a notion of the highest Good which is no more than disappearance once for all of the constant procession of the fivefold aggregate which is the self according to it. The starting point of the Vedānta is Brahman or Ātman which is the supreme Value and Reality in a world of facts,

with a claim "to be" in its own right. The highest Good for the Vedānta is not the attainment of the "heaven of nothingness," not "blowing out" or "becoming cool" but the regaining of the absolute life by man which is his own intrinsically. It is this insistence on the profound significance of human life and of the self as a value and a centre of value, which distinguishes the Vedānta of Śaṅkara from Buddhism; for "the man to whom his own life is a triviality is not likely to find a meaning in anything else." History has yet to show how the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara came to be confounded with Buddhistic Idealism and Nihilism. If the truths about Śaṅkara's philosophy which I have tried to bring out and emphasize in this work are realized, it will be seen that his philosophy has sufficient vitality to provide the philosophical foundation of a world religion and a world culture which are today in the process of evolution. For there is no uncertainty that the religion and culture of tomorrow is neither going to be an eclecticism nor is it going to be built up around the personality of any especially chosen prophet or divine. Man's awareness of a world of Value from which his own life is inseparable and an inherent and insistent craving to "conserve" value are sufficient guarantee for the reality of religion and culture and their power to promote human happiness.

CHAPTER II.

ŚAṆKARA AND THE NOTION OF REALITY AS VALUE

I THE NOTION OF VALUE

It has been said above that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of Value. But the word value has been used in so many different senses and now carries with it so many divergent implications that, without a word or two of explanation as to what the word exactly stands for, the reader may not have a definite idea of the sense in which we can speak of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy. What the modern philosophic consciousness calls axiology represents for Śaṅkara a specific point of view from which he looks at the ultimate problems of philosophy. His insistence on this point of view means making the evaluational consciousness ultimate and subordinating the claims of logic and the scientific understanding to the more pressing demands of the former. The formulation of the exact concept of value in the light of which Śaṅkara's whole philosophy will be understood is a necessary prolegomenon.

The category of, if not the word, value is as old as philosophy itself. From Plato to Hegel add from the Upaniṣadic thinkers down to Vidyāraṇya, the deliberate and reiterated identification of being and value has been the hidden spring of traditional thought. Even when the thinkers think of their philosophies as systems of existences, and regard Being or Reality as the goal of true knowledge, they always recognize the value character of the predicate of reality, and never think of "being" in abstraction from value. This conception of intrinsic value as the clue to the ultimate nature of reality has been, as Pringle-Pattison says, the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophy since Kant's time. Reality must be what the ethical, aesthetic or religious consciousness demands. For Kant the universe is essentially what the moral consciousness of man implies-what

ought to be: the real world must be a spiritual realm, a kingdom of ends. Fichte's world-view is similar to this. Lotze, too, is guided in his thought by the conception of the good; for him "the whole sum of nature can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of the Good".

But, in another sense, as Urban says, the realm of values is new to exploration. In the words of Münsterberg, "through the world of things shimmered first weakly, then ever more clearly, the world of values". Against the rationalistic view it is pointed out by the value philosophers that the logical impulse has not the primacy over the demands of our moral, aesthetic or religious nature, & no explanation of reality can be said to be adequate and complete if it does not do justice to them all. The characteristic problem of philosophy, then, is to ascertain the relation between what seems to us men the highest value and existence. Philosophy becomes the reflection upon those permanent values which have their foundation in a higher spiritual life above the changing interests of the times.

The modern philosophy of value has been inspired by the second Critique of Kant, wherein he subordinates the claims of "pure" reason to have a determining voice in the final make-up of the universe to the demands of the "practical" reason. Kant's second Critique is a protest against what it takes to be "the usurpation of authority by the pure intellect". But if value is set in opposition to reason it must inevitably appear, as Pringle-Pattison points out, as a subjective and arbitrary judgment, implying a dualism and a conflict between two sides of our nature. He, therefore, wants us "to avoid the tendency to slip into an anti-intellectualistic and irrationalistic mode of statement in expressing the principle of value." The principle will be true only when taken as inherent in our experience as a whole. Accordingly the word value should be taken as standing not only for the a-logical values of utility, goodness and beauty but also for the logical or the theoretical values of existence, truth, etc. In other words, we must also recognize the value character of the theoretical itself.

The problem of the definition has presented some difficulty, and consequently there are in the field many

alternative conceptions of value. The crucial issue, so far as the definition is concerned, lies between those who define value in relational terms and those for whom it is ultimately indefinable either because it is a unique quality or essence, cognizable through a unique type of cognition, namely feeling and emotion, or because it cannot be reduced to non-value terms and its nature cannot be grasped by such general propositions as express scientific truths.

The relational definitions of value view it as a complex derivative, and imply that it can be reduced to simple entities or relations of such entities. Thus Perry defines value in terms of interest. It is the fulfilment of desire. It is attached to anything and to all things in which we feel interest. It is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object." Anything, what-so-ever, acquires value when it is desired. Perry, therefore, also defines value as "that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it." The object acquires this special character only after it enters into relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. It is interest (feeling and desire) which creates values. Value is sometimes defined as an adaptation to environment, a relation between the organism and its environment. It consists in the fulfilment of the biological tendencies and instincts which lie behind all desire and feeling. Others again offer a more objective cosmological conception of value. It is conceived by them to be a relation of universal harmony. Values arise in relationships. The more fundamental and the more completely integrated the relationships between the individual and the world the more comprehensive will be his experience of values. Value is the sense of this harmony which unites within itself the entire universe.

All these definitions, in so far as they are relational and attempt to define value in terms of something which is a non-value, are really circular in character. Instead of accounting for value they all presuppose value. When value is defined as fulfilment of desire or interest it is assumed that fulfilment of desire or interest is good, that the interest itself is worthy of being satisfied. The value concept is already

this essence has on existence. It is "worth existing" or "ought to be." This unique relation to being constitutes the essence of value. In the case of value *its being is its validity*. Values are real and objective, but the status of this objectivity cannot be described in terms of mere ontological predicates, such as "existence" or "subsistence." The value judgment does not predicate 'being' in this sense, but only in the sense of "worthiness to be" or "ought to be." Therefore, the predication of value is different from the attributive predication of existence also.

The very test of that which is existent or non-existent, real or unreal, true or false is precisely an acknowledgment of the values involved in and the validity of the value judgments and distinctions. These distinctions depend upon, presuppose, and will not be possible without the ideals and norms of truth and reality. To realize the value character of the ontological predicates is to recognize that reality and value are one and inseparable, that to separate reality from value becomes meaningless, that the question, "What is the real?" is futile question if being is abstracted from value, for as Urban points out, the question "How ought I to conceive the real?" is logically prior to the question, "What is the real itself?" To say all this is to say that the notion of Reality is that of Value. From this standpoint the truly ontological judgments are the axiological and the contrast between judgments of reality and value judgments in any absolute sense will break down. We shall cease to separate ontology from axiology and, instead, we will have an axiological ontology and an axiological epistemology.

II

THE NOTION OF REALITY AS THAT OF VALUE

It is at this point that we realize the greatness of Śaṅkara and the uniqueness of his contribution to philosophic thought. The relation of value to being—the ontological status of value as we have defined it above—this is the question to which Śaṅkara is driven and it is in connection with the working out of the relation of "value" to "reality" and of

value and reality to existence as a whole that the more original features of Śaṅkara's philosophy are to be found. We have said above that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of value, but from what we have said there about the nature of value and of reality it will appear that we do not mean to suggest that his philosophy does not concern itself with "reality". For Śaṅkara Being or Reality is the goal of true knowledge, and philosophy a well-trodden path which takes us to the gates of the Real, having prepared us for that vision of it which is the consummation of the process of knowledge. The ontological motive has been the constant driving force of his philosophy. But it has been so because he has always recognized the value character of the ontological predicates, and has never allowed himself to forget that for an ultimate reflection value and reality must be one. For Śaṅkara Axiology would be a collective name for a group of problems—epistemological, ontological and cosmological; and the entire group of problems is focussed by him into one—the metaphysical status of value. The two fundamental theses of Śaṅkara's Axiology are (i) that the philosophical notion of reality should be that of "value" and (ii) that the ens realissimum is also the summum bonum, the possibility of realizing the true nature of reality being also the possibility of attaining the highest good. These two theses are, according to him, bound up together.

Philosophy for Śaṅkara is Brahṃavidyā. Śaṅkara indifferently formulates the problem of Brahṃavidyā as "inquiry into Brahman", "inquiry into Ātman", "inquiry into Liberation (Mokṣa)", "inquiry into the highest Good" (Nirṇṛeyasa).² This statement of the problem of philosophy in different modes by Śaṅkara is not the result of any carelessness or want of insight on his part; it is the fruit of his intellectual maturity. Śaṅkara is here striking out a new path and making a singularly bold and strikingly original attempt to write idealism in an entirely new language. In asking "What is the highest value?" and "What is the most truly real?", Śaṅkara is raising a very momentous issue the solution of which is of perennial interest

1 S. B. I 11.

2 S. B. I 14

to philosophy. This issue is regarding the metaphysical status of values, i.e., the relation in which the eternal values can be conceived to stand to the most truly real. By this conscious recognition of the centrality of the value problem in philosophic thought, Śaṅkara has brought about an extraordinary change, the importance of which has not at all been realized by his interpreters, whether ancient or modern. But this is the key to many a perplexing problem connected with the right interpretation of Śaṅkara's real meaning; and it is this alone which clears up many of the major tangles which, in the eyes of many interpreters, disfigure Śaṅkara's philosophic enterprise. It is Axiology which constitutes the heart of Śaṅkara's philosophy; and by assigning it its central place in the scheme of philosophy, he has altered the entire philosophical perspective. "It expresses an entirely new situation", so far as systematic Indian philosophic thought is concerned. Śaṅkara undertakes to *discuss* an entirely new question; new, because it had not been put, from the point of view at which he put it, by any ancient or modern; and according to him, there is no rest for the philosophic mind unless it has found an answer to this New Question: "How are the highest value and the most truly real related to each other?". Śaṅkara throughout his works adopts the standpoint of value. The driving force of his thought is never merely ontological, but rather axiological; and to think that Śaṅkara's real intention was to expound any strict form of rationalism is to miss the true inwardness of his thought. As the question is an entirely new one, so is the answer that Śaṅkara gives to it. It is that "Reality and value are one and inseparable; Brahman is the highest value and the most truly real." Brahman is the param Atman and the param Nitya, and the notion of Atman itself, which is the very type of reality, according to Śaṅkara, is the notion of value as we have defined it above. Those who, like Professor Dasgupta, are disposed to trace "the roots of a very through-going subjective idealism... in the writings of Śaṅkara himself"¹ fail to see that the centre of gravity of Śaṅkara's philosophical thought has shifted from being to value and the problem of reality or a world-whole has turned in his hands "from a merely existential or logical problem

1 History. Vol. II, P. 48.

into an axiological problem". Śaṅkara's entire philosophy is a philosophy of value, and we shall now proceed to learn what he has to say regarding the nature of values, their metaphysical status, and the relation in which they stand to the world of existence.

Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four sūtras contains in a nutshell the essence of his entire philosophy of value, and the rest of his work on the Brahma Sūtra is but an elaboration of this. Here in we meet with the unique contribution made by him to Indian philosophy by insisting that thinkers must shift the centre of gravity of their thought from mere being to value, by making them realize that philosophy deals with meaning and value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from meaning and value, by reminding them that there is some eternal "Good" which can actually be experienced and which should be the supreme object of the philosopher's study.¹ Likewise it contains his famous pronouncement regarding the oneness and inseparability of the highest value and the highest reality; his explanation why Brahman should be regarded as the most truly real and also the most supremely valuable; and, lastly, his deep-rooted conviction regarding the nature of the "eternal values", a conviction born of an intimately personal realization through a life dedicated to the pursuit of values. Śaṅkara's commentary on the catuṣṣūtrī since the time when it was written, has been regarded, and rightly so, as a work complete in itself, needing an after only when this "after" is to take the form of a ratiocination to substantiate the thesis outlined in it. His commentary on the first sūtra contains the thesis that the presupposition of an ultimate reality is the a priori of intelligible thought, this being one of those presuppositions whose denial refutes itself. Atman is this foundational reality and Brahman is the ātman. *This notion of Brahman as reality, which is a value notion in the hands of Śaṅkara, is further developed in his commentary on the second sūtra, wherein he points out that the notion of ātman*

1 S. B. I. 14. अमलद्वन्द्वं यम्येयं विज्ञाना प्रस्तुता S. B. I. 11 ब्रह्मावगतिर्दि
पृथगर्थः ।

is the notion of ultimate ground or cause, and Brahman is the source of everything only in being the self or Ātman of everything. Herein he also mentions that a complete account of reality will conceive it not only as Consciousness but also as Bliss. The notion of Brahman as the ens realissimum which is the notion of reality as value is further elaborated in his commentary on the fourth sūtra, wherein Brahman is identified with the Summum Bonum. The thesis of the first two sūtras is amplified and substantiated, and the supreme principle of reality shown to be one with the supreme principle of value in the sense of summum bonum also, the principle of both of reality and value being the principle of wholeness, completeness, or sarvātmabhīva. The highest principle of value is the nature of reality itself. In order to get a true and complete insight into the metaphysical position of Śāṅkara, his comments on the three sūtras should be read together, and the statements made at one place understood in the light of statements made at another. But this is exactly what his interpreters, both ancient and modern, have not done. There prevails today a host of incorrect opinions about his real position.

Śāṅkara is in acute disagreement with those modern value philosophers who insist upon drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the realm of value and that of reality and keeping them absolutely distinct. For the majority of the modern value philosophers reality and value are strangers to each other. This contrast has been given different names by different value philosophers. It is the contrast between "Essence and Fact," between "Philosophy and Science," between "History and Nature", between "Value and Reality." If facts have monopolized the name "reality," these value philosophers are prepared even to call the region of values unreal, rather than admit any kinship between value and fact. The metaphysical systems of these value philosophers are haunted by an irreconcilable dualism between value and reality; and their endeavour to overcome this opposition by uniting them in a third something which is neither the one nor the other has resulted in an abandonment of the standpoint of value and a consequent return to the standpoint of existence.

Munsterberg tries to unite value and reality in a higher principle which he calls the Overself. He begins by defining value as satisfaction; but after stating that value is satisfaction, he asks the question "Whose satisfaction?" and gives the answer, "Satisfaction, of an Over-Person or Over-Self." But in doing so he makes a return to the standpoint of existence and becomes, as Dr. Maitra points out, "an existential philosopher."¹ "Whose" belongs to the dimension of existence and satisfaction to the dimension of value, and there cannot be any definition of the latter by the former.² Likewise Rickert, first having created a gulf between value and reality, tries to make a synthesis of them in some higher totality *which is not a value, with the consequence that reality* in his system is degraded to the level of a mere existence, beyond any hope of restoration to its original position unless the standpoint of dualism is abandoned. Rickert gives us a four-fold realm composed of the Real, the Value, the Subject and the Absolute or the World-Whole which is the ultimate unity of the Real, the Value, and the Subject. Value is not Rickert's ultimate. It is not even his penultimate. It is one of the two regions of which the world of experience (*Erleben*) is composed. A similar dualism marks the system of Husserl. He makes a contrast between Essence and Fact, just as Rickert makes one between Value and Reality. So wide is the gulf between Essence and Fact that Husserl even calls Essence unreal exactly as Rickert calls Value unreal. Essence is Husserl's name for a value.

Śaṅkara does not believe in a dualism of value and reality. Śaṅkara's position is similar to that of Hegel and Plato, for the former of whom the ultimate value is the absolute, just as the ultimate reality is the absolute; and for the latter of whom the Good is not only the supreme value but also the transcendent source of all the reality and intelligibility of everything other than itself, the *ens realissimum* of Christian philosophy. He is opposed to all attempts made by modern value philosophers to unite the kingdom of Being and the kingdom of Ought, the realm of Reality and the realm of Value, in something which is not a value. Śaṅkara

¹ Review of philosophy and Religion, Vol. vii, No. 1, P. 25.

² *ibid.*

does not consider the priority of the "Sollen" over the "Sein" as Rickert does. Value is not external to Being for Śaṅkara. He puts aside the concept of absolute transcendence of value, unrelated to any form of being and consciousness, as inherently absurd. Likewise he does not favour the view that metaphysic which, according to Aristotle, is the science of Being qua Being, can be defined as the science of real being in the sense that it is concerned with value-free existences. As Śaṅkara finds it difficult to think of value without implying some kind of reality and without giving it some form of being; so he holds that thought is not oriented towards "pure being", being abstracted from value, but towards absolutely valid values of which being is a form. The principle of all value in the universe is also the principle of all order and existence; and the problem of the totality of existence or the world-whole is not a merely logical or existential problem for Śaṅkara. For him values are real, they alone possess reality; but for him reality also is a value. It is neither an "existent" nor a "subsistent". The ontological status of this value of reality, as of all other absolute values, cannot be described in terms of predicates borrowed from the world of existence.

The relation of value to being—the ontological status of value—this is the ultimate metaphysical question to which Śaṅkara is driven. It is the central and ultimate problem of his Advaita Vedānta. How can it be said at the same time that the notion of reality is that of value and that values are real?—this is the question of which Śaṅkara's metaphysics constitutes the solution, and upon a right understanding of this solution will depend the place which will be assigned to him in the history of human thought by the historian of tomorrow.

III.

REALITY AN ULTIMATE NOTION

The establishment and solution of the philosophical problem, as Hoffding says, is determined by the consistency with which initial assumptions are laid down and maintained. Like Descartes, Śaṅkara raises the question: Where shall I get a fixed foundation for my knowledge? Descartes was of the

opinion that since in all knowledge, whatever be its object, we use our understanding, it is of the greatest importance to inquire closely into the nature of this. For Śaṅkara our thought or intellect is the only means of comprehension of the real nature of truth and falsehood.¹ His answer to the question whether there is anything foundational in our experience is that the presupposition of an ultimate reality, of an ens realissimum, is a necessary presupposition of intelligible thought. Nothingness, the absolute negation of being, is the negation of thought. Our thought refuses to conceive of an absolute non-existence, and a philosophy which is self-conscious and alive to its ideal and its mission feels itself unable to work with such a slippery concept as that of nothingness. The first deliverance of human reason is that the affirmation of "being" is immanent in every act of judgment. The concept of an ultimate reality is the a priori of intelligible thought and its communication. There is an essence to everything, and this essence cannot be the subject of doubt or denial.

Śaṅkara says that we can think of the complete annihilation of the entire universe and the extinction of all life in it, but we cannot think of "reality" itself as ceasing to be or being reduced to empty nothing. Nihilism refutes itself; it ultimately rests on Realism, Realism of the absolutely real. This presupposition of an ultimate reality, of ens realissimum, is called by Śaṅkara "astitvaniṣṭhā"; "sadbuddhiniṣṭhā," and rational thought, for which this acknowledgement is a necessity, is "satpratya-yagarbhābuddhiḥ" for him.² Even the rank nihilist has to be a satvādin.³ It is impossible to live a rational life, either of thought or feeling or activity, without first being convinced that the notion of an absolute reality is one of those a priori notions which render life itself meaningful and intelligible. This "sat" or reality is Brahman. It is the "great reality", mahadbhūtam according to Śaṅkara.⁴ "It is

1 Kotha. S. B., II. 3. 12, बुद्धिः हि नः प्रमाणं सदसतो याथात्म्यावगमे ।

2 Ibid. कार्यविलापनस्यास्तित्वं निष्ठत्वात् । तथा हीदं कार्यं सक्षमतारतम्यपार-
म्ययेणानुगम्यमानं सदबुद्धिनिष्ठामेवावगमयति । येदापि विषयप्रविलापनेन प्रविला-
प्यमाना बुद्धिः तदापि सा सत्प्रत्ययगर्भेव विलीयते ।

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12; S. B., II. 3. 9, सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म ।

mahat, great, because it is greater than everything else and is the cause of the ether, etc.; reality, for it never deviates from its nature."¹ It is the essence of Śaṅkara's criticism of Buddhistic Nihilism that, in its very attempt to make its position secure, it undermines the very foundation upon which it bases itself. Non-being cannot explain existence or being, whatever be the order or level of reality belonging to this existence or being.² We cannot deny existential status to the objects of our experience; the minimum that we must say about them is that they *exist*, they *are* in some sense. But if they are, they *are* by virtue of being grounded in reality. The notion of reality is an ultimate notion and this ultimate notion is the notion of an absolute reality.³ "Brahman" is the word used by Śaṅkara to designate this "reality" which is the bed-rock of all certainty, the presupposition of all intelligible thought, the foundation of all law and order.⁴ The reality of Brahman is thus implicated in the very possibility of there existing anything. Existence is grounded in a reality to which it bears testimony in every act of mind's awareness of it.

IV

ATMAN, THE ABSOLUTE REALITY.

An alternative way of giving expression to the above truth is that Atman cannot be denied, nor can there be any doubt about its reality. It has to be acknowledged even in the course of doubting or denying. To say that Brahman is Sat is to say that Brahman is the Atman of everything. Śaṅkara's conception of the Atman is the conception of the essence, of that which makes a thing what it is, that without which a thing cannot be. This essence is the Atman.⁵ The notion of

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12.

2 S. B., II. 2. 26, नाभावाद्भाव उत्पद्यते ।

3 S. B., II. 2. 6. सर्वस्य च वस्तुनः स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण भावात्मनैवोपलभ्य मानत्वात् ।
Katha. S. B., II. 3. 12, मूलञ्चेज्जगतो न स्यादमदन्वितमेवैदं कार्यमसदित्येवं
गृह्येत । नत्वेनदस्ति । सत्सदित्येव गृह्यते । यथा मृदादि कार्यं घटादि मृदाद्यन्वितम् ।
तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः ।

4 Talit. S. B., II. 6. 1: तस्मादस्ति ब्रह्म तस्मात्सदेव ब्रह्म ।

5 S. B., I. 1. 6, आत्मा हि नाम स्वरूपम् । Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 7, यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणग्रहणं यस्य तस्य तदात्मत्वमेव लोके दृष्टम् ।

reality becomes the notion of the Ātman. This Atman cannot be denied, for to deny it would be to deny the very essence which makes a thing what it is. The notion of the essence is logically prior to and presupposed by the notion of the thing. If there could be things without there being an essence to them, non-existence would explain existence and non-being would render being intelligible.¹ The irrefutability of the Ātman, the doctrine of an absolute reality, or of the absoluteness of reality, is alike forced upon us by the very logic of our thought, says Śaṅkara, whether it moves along the negative way of denying everything outright or follows the saner path of discovering the essence, the truth, the quintessence of things. Both the pathways lead us back to reality, to the Ātman. We have shown how, according to Śaṅkara, nothing is nirātmaka, and things are real only by virtue of having their root in reality and their resting place in it, by participating in it and having their consummation in it.² But the negative logic also, such as was employed by the Buddhists, takes us to the same reality. In the very denial of the postulate of reality he who denies it also affirms it. All denial presupposes a positive background which must be affirmed.³ Atman has not to be proved, it is to be acknowledged. Its reality is a self-evident axiom.⁴ The following passage from Śaṅkara, summing up his classic argument against the soundness of a nihilistic philosophy, and laying at the same time the solid foundation of the doctrine of absolute reality, is worth quoting: "Just because it is the essence (Atman), it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. The essence of a thing cannot be looked upon as adventitious; it is rather self-established..... It is impossible to refute such a self-established entity. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essence; for it is the very essence of him who

1 S. B., II. 3. 7, तथा च शून्यवादः प्रसज्येत ।

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 8. 7, सदाख्येनात्मना आत्मवत्सर्वमिदं जगत् ।

Kaṭha. S. B., II. 3. 12. तस्माद ज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्ति ।

3 S. B., III. 2. 33, कंचिद्धि परमार्थमालम्ब्यापरमार्थः प्रतिपिध्यते ।

4 S. B., II. 3. 7, स्वयसिद्धत्वात् ।

attempts the refutation. The heat of fire cannot be refuted by the fire itself."¹

Śaṅkara's notion of the Ātman is the notion of the cause. In his system the concept of cause, in its metaphysical use, is identical with the concept of the ātman or self. The cause is the very Ātman, the very essence, the very self of the effect; and as essence and existence are not separable, either by time or by space, the effect is not separate from the cause and, being derived from it, is not other than it.² The concept of the Ātman is the concept of the highest substance (sat), as well as the supreme source and ground of everything. Śaṅkara whole-heartedly agrees with Hegel that in speculative knowledge "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well."³ According to Hegel, the truth that substance is essentially subject is expressed in the idea which represents the Absolute as Spirit; according to Śaṅkara, in the idea which represents Brahman as the Ātman. As the notion of the cause is identified with the notion of the Ātman, causality for Śaṅkara is not a case of temporal sequence between events; and to have recourse to spatial and temporal ways of explaining the relation between the two is to misunderstand his treatment of it. What have been generally regarded as the Cosmological and Ontological proofs of the existence of God are but slightly different ways, according to Śaṅkara, of bringing home to our mind the truth that the assumption of the Ātman is an indispensable assumption for metaphysics. The argument for a First Cause in Śaṅkara's philosophy turns out, on close examination, to be an argument for the recognition of an absolute reality as the very a priori of intelligible thought and as the final explanation of existence. Brahman's causality is implicated in its substantiality. To say that

1 S. B., II. 3.7, आत्मत्वाच्चात्मनो निराकरणं शक्यं नुपपत्तिः । न हि आगन्तुकः कस्यचित् स्वयंमिद्वत्वात् ।.....आगन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियते न स्वरूपम् । यैव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम् । न हि अग्नेरोष्णमग्निना निराक्रियते ।

2 Chand. S B., VIII. 4.1, कारणं हि आत्मा । S. B., IV.3.14, विकारेणापि विकारिणो नित्यप्राप्तत्वात् ।

3 Phenomenology, Translated by Baille, P. 80.

Brahman is Sat is to say that it is the original ground of everything.¹ Looked at from this point of view, the controversy among the interpreters as to whether the second sūtra (Janmādyasya Yataḥ) is a definition of the Nirguṇa or Saguṇa Brahman, of Nirviṣeṣa or Saviṣeṣa Brahman, of Brahman as such or of Īvara, will appear to be an idle controversy which draws its inspiration from ignorance of the truth that the notion of the Ātman in Śaṅkara's metaphysics is also the notion of the cause.

But what is the nature of the world in whose existence is involved the reality of the Ātman or Brahman as foundational to it, and what does the nature of the world say about the character of this foundational reality? The picture which Śaṅkara has before his mind when he begins his philosophical inquiry is the picture of a world cannot correctly, or even with a show of correctness, be described as consisting of atomic dances or shiftings of cosmic dust. It is not a scheme of mathematical phenomena, and it cannot be handled as a geometrical problem is by the geometrician. The central feature of the universe is the presence within it of conscious centres of experience, who not only take note of the fact of its being there in a cold, dispassionate and impersonal way which has a ring of indifference about it, but who also enjoy its many riches and whose attitude towards it is always one of appreciation. The existence of such living centres, capable of feeling the beauty and grandeur of the world and tasting its manifold qualities, is what is really significant in the world. All processes in the world have their being in consciousness, and their consummation in consciousness.² This is not all. The living souls are always striving after the attainment of ideals which are present and operative in their life, and which are drawing them on and on. Human experience is not limited to the mere "is". It is in its nature always to look beyond till it is in possession of something which will give it

1 Tatil. S. B., II. 1. Introduction, एवं सदेव सत्यमित्यवधारणात् । अतः सत्यं ब्रह्मेति । अतः कारणत्व प्राप्तं ब्रह्मणः । . . कारणस्य च कारकत्वं वस्तुत्वात् ।

2 Gita. S. B., ix, 10. जगतः सर्वा प्रवृत्तिः इत्याद्या अवगतिनिष्ठया अवगत्यवसाना ।

complete satisfaction, will satisfy its whole being. The attainment of this will be the attainment of *summum bonum*.¹

If this living experience, steeped in feeling and instinct with action, both inspired by the presence of the ideal within it, from which ideal we should draw our criterion of reality and our conviction of the nature of the system in which we live, is the real fact in the universe, a philosophical doctrine of reality cannot be satisfactorily based upon a "contemplation of the works of nature merely, that is to say, of the order and adjustment of the material system to the exclusion of human nature and human experience". But a purposive conscious experience which is itself a centre of value cannot have its explanation in a reality which is blind and, by its very nature and constitution, incapable of being in any way aware of the presence of what is termed goal, purpose, end, or ideal. "An unconscious something cannot be the self or essence or *Ātman* of a conscious entity."² The individual soul who carries on the reflective activity of understanding the meaning of the world and the significance of the world-process is a "conscious entity".³ For a human philosophy written by an intelligent human being, the search for the essence or reality is the search for a principle which constitutes the truth or essence or reality of his own self. It is doubtful if the essence or *Ātman* of a conscious and also self-conscious entity, as that of the enquirer who starts the philosophical investigation (*Brahmajī jñāśā*), can be found in an unconscious reality. Brahman which is the self or *Ātman* must not only be *Sat* but also *Cit*.⁴ A reality which is merely *Sat* and not also *Cit* may very well explain the inanimate order of reality, but it cannot be adequate to account for one which is animate and conscious and from which what is merely "*Sat*" draws its significance and value.

But perhaps for a reality which is merely *Sat* the philosophical problem would never arise unless it were to deve-

1 S. B., I. 1. 7. चेतनस्य श्वेतकेतोमेक्षितव्यस्य, etc.

2 S. B., I. 1. 7. न हि चेतनस्त श्वेतकेतोरचेतन आत्मा संभवति । S. B. I. 1. 9. न च चेतन आत्मा ऽचेतनप्रधानं स्वरूपत्वेन प्रतिपद्येत् ।

3 S. B., I. 1. 6. जीवो हि नाम चेतनः शरीराध्यक्षः प्राणानां धारीयता ।

4 S. B., III. 2. 21. कथं निरस्तचेतन्यं ब्रह्म चेतनस्य जीवस्य आत्मत्वोपदिश्येत् ।

lop consciousness with power of reflection. How the essence or reality and its nature would be conceived by an inanimate atomic particle, or whether it would be able to form any notion of it at all, we cannot even guess. Perhaps it would not be able to give us any philosophy, even a philosophy of materialism. For man, for whom the universe and all its processes exist only as an object of experience which has not only its cognitive side but also its feeling-aspect, the significance of the universe consists in being an object of whole-hearted enjoyment by a conscious mind. The human mind does not view the universe merely as a fact of interrelated facts existing in its own right; its awareness of the world is the awareness of something which has meaning, which is intelligible. Meaning, intelligibility, presupposes a conscious life appreciative of value. Accordingly, for Śaṅkara, the problem of the discovery of the essence, the self or Ātman of the universe is the problem of discovering the self of the conscious individual from whom they draw their substance, their meaning. Therefore, when he identifies Sat and Ātman and regards Brahman indifferently as the "reality" and as the "self", by self or Ātman he especially means the conscious self, and Ātmavidyā for him is the inquiry into and the knowledge of the "self" or Ātman of the conscious individual.¹ Likewise Brahmanavidyā is an inquiry into the nature of the pratyagātman.² As the pratyagātman is a conscious entity, and the notion of the self or Ātman is the notion of the ground or essence, Śaṅkara designates his system as Cetanākāraṇavāda.³ This use of the word Ātman to mean especially the conscious self, however, does not cancel the general meaning of "essence" or "self" applied to the word Ātman. Śaṅkara speaks of the earthen pot having for its self the earth, and vāk or sound in general as the Brahman or self of all names from which they derive their substance.⁴ We shall subsequently develop the line of argument

1 S. B., I. 1-7. तस्मान्चेतनविषय एव मुख्य आत्मशब्दः । S. B., I. 1. 10. आत्मशब्दश्च चेतनवचन न इत्यवोचाम ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 1. एवं प्रत्यगात्मा ब्रह्मविद्याविषय ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 21: 1-10. समानेय हि सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु, चेतनकारणावगतिः ।

4 S. B., IV. 3. 14. न हि घटो मृदात्मतां परित्यज्यावतिष्ठते । Brhad. S. B., I. 6. 1. यत्ते एतरेषां वाक्शब्दवाच्यं वस्तु ब्रह्मात्मा ततो हि आत्मनामो नाम्ना ।

followed by Śaṅkara to prove that Brahman is the self of the whole universe.

Brahman is the Ātman or self of every conscious being. "Every one is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks 'I am not'." If the existence of the self were not an ascertained fact every one would think 'I am not'.¹ Of this Ātman it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; it is the self, and that the self is cannot be denied, for it is the self of that very person who might deny it.² The reality of the Ātman is a self-evident axiom. It is the basis of all epistemological enquiry. The reality of Ātman cannot in any way be proved by having recourse to any process of reasoning or any special means of knowledge; for all operation of the means of knowledge, whether pratyakṣa or anumāna, all thinking and reasoning proceed on the assumption that the self is. Even the self cannot prove its own existence. It provides the possibility of any proof and its process taking place, without itself being the object of such proof or process of thinking. The fundamental condition of all thinking and reasoning cannot be conditioned by such thinking and reasoning. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that the Ātman is svayamsiddha, svataḥsiddha, self-evident or self-established.³

V

ATMAN AND THE VALUE CHARACTER OF THE PREDICATE OF REALITY.

Śaṅkara has been able to find a fixed foundation for our knowledge in the reality of the Self or the Ātman, or in the acknowledgment of an absolute Reality which for him is Brahman. The primacy of the Ātman seems inescapable, whatever turn or twist of thought we take. But it is just at this point when we have been assured of the objectivity of the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4. आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।

3 Gita. S. B., II. 18., आत्मनः स्वतः सिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धे ह्यात्मनि प्रमातरि प्रमित्योः प्रमाणान्वेषणं भवति । S. B., II. 3. 7. स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् । न हि आत्माऽऽत्मनः प्रमाणमप्यस्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि अप्रसिद्धप्रमेयं सिद्धये उपादीयन्ते । आत्मा तु प्रमाणादिव्यवहारव्ययत्वात् सिध्यति । न हीदृशस्य निराकरणं संभवति ।

Ātman and its essential irrefutability even by the most dam-
 natory logic of nihilism, that the crux of the whole difficulty
 about the reality of the Ātman appears. Ātman is, Reality is
 But what is the sense in which Ātman or Reality is ? What
 is the status of the objectivity of the Ātman? What should we
 exactly understand by predicating reality in an ultimate sense
 to anything? What should be the character of the ontological
 predicates for an ultimate reflection? The problem of the
 sense in which Ātman is has been, and continues to be, the
 great problem of philosophy. This was the great problem of
 Śaṅkara's philosophy also, and it continues to be the press-
 ing question for his interpreters as well, and upon a right
 solution of this question depends the insight we shall have
 into the essentials and the essential greatness of Śaṅkara's
 contribution to constructive thought. In the acknowledge-
 ment that Ātman is and that it cannot be denied without at
 the same time affirming its reality in the very act of denial,
 there is involved a knowledge of the Ātman. But when we
 predicate reality to the Ātman, what is the sense in which we
 do so? Do we predicate reality to the Ātman in the same
 sense in which we predicate reality to the "jar" or to the
 "cow" or to the "mountain", or, for the matter of that, to any
 differentiated object existing in space and lasting through
 time? The jar, the cow, the mountain are real objects; they
 are characterized by objectivity; their *esse* is not merely
percepti. They are, in the words of Śaṅkara, *bhūtavastus*,
 already existent realities. They are not to be made. They have
 a coercive nature and compel recognition. But their reality
 is not absolute. With the destruction of the jar and the
 mountain and the death of the cow, they cease to possess
 any reality. We do not then say—we cannot do so—that
 these objects have a right to independent and eternal exis-
 tence, that they can exist in their own right, no matter what.
 To say that the reality of an object is not eternal and absolute
 that it is an object which cannot justify its own existence, is
 to admit that the object has an existential status only, that it
 is something whose reality consists in its characterization by
 spatio-temporal differences and its relation to a sentient
 experience which has awareness of it. Any value which is
 attributed to it is derived from its relation to the conscious

life and its needs and requirements. It is not a self-justifying end.

But when we say that the "Ātman is real", that "Brahman is", though the verbal form by means of which reality is predicated to the Ātman or Brahman is the same, there is a real difference in the mode of predication not brought out by the verbal expression. When we predicate reality to the Ātman and emphasize its absolute objectivity, we mean to bring out the truth that Ātman is "worth existing", that Ātman is "what ought to be." The status of the objectivity of the Ātman is not describable in terms of ontological predicates such as existence or subsistence. Its ontological status can be described in terms of a value predicates only, or, as Urban puts it, "in terms of a validity." In the case of the Ātman, as in the case of value, its being is its validity, its "worthiness to be." For some realists value is an indefinable quale analogous to sense-data, and for them there is a unique type of cognition of these essences, namely, through feeling and emotion. The awareness of the Ātman is not like the perception or awareness of a quale or of an existent something. The predication of reality to the Ātman is not like the predication of a quality to a thing, for instance, sweetness to sugar or redness to stone. It is different from the attributive predication of existence, for instance, when we say, "there is a cow", "there is a pot." It is Ātman's "worthiness to be" which constitutes its validity and confers upon the Ātman the status of an ens realissimum and an ultimate value whose denial results in contradiction. When we judge that "Ātman is Sat" we not merely bring the subject and the predicate together as we do in the judgment "fire is hot". The latter is an existential judgment; but the former is a value judgment, in which, in addition to the act of bringing together the subject and predicate, there is the further act of acknowledgement that "Ātman ought to be" that "it is worthy to be". It is this act of acknowledgement that brings out the value character of the reality of the Ātman and also of the judgment in which Ātman's nature as a value is embodied.

By emphasizing the impossibility of the denial of the Ātman, Śaṅkara intends to bring out the value character of

the predicate of reality. When he says that the reality of the Ātman cannot be denied, that it is self-established, and that it is the basis of all epistemological inquiry and the presupposition of the operation of the *pramāṇas* or means of right knowledge, that it is *aprameya*, what he wants to impress upon our mind is that there are certain absolute values which must be acknowledged as such in any attempt to offer a rational explanation of the universe, and "reality" is one of these absolute values.

Man's experience, according to Śaṅkara, is not limited to the mere "is". Ideals are present and operative in man's life. Reason in him demands not merely the "is" of bare fact but the "ought-to-be", the "deserves-to-be" of absolute value. He puts in the fore-front of his philosophy this value of "reality" which explains every other thing but is not itself explained by anything. He is not content to take the universe as a fact or set of interrelated facts, and philosophy for him does not fulfil its mission in merely "giving us a theoretic scheme of the world" or a "necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be explained". The philosopher, in him, does not seek mere intellectual coherence. Śaṅkara is of Pringle-Pattison's mind that the most perfect realisation of unity in variety is as naught if there is nowhere anything to which we can attach this predicate of value, or of which we can say that it is worth existing, that it ought to be. The value of "being" or "reality" is an absolute value for him. This is why he says that "Brahman, whose very essence is being, cannot be suspected to have been derived from anything else."¹ Without acknowledging the absolute value of reality our thought will be moving in a vicious circle. Brahman or Ātman is this absolute value of *Sat*.²

We have explained the sense in which, according to Śaṅkara, Ātman *is* or is real. But the sense in which Ātman is largely connected with the question of the awareness of the Ātman. The Ātman is the object of a unique form of

1. S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म । न खलु ब्रह्मणः सत्तात्मकस्य कुतश्चिदन्यतः संभव उत्पत्तिराशङ्कितव्यः ।

2. 1. *id.*

knowledge. The knowledge process is intuitive as well as judgmental. Being the *pratyagātman*, the inner self, it is not known as an existent something is known. *Ātman* is known as the "knower" in every act of knowledge, never as an object "known". It is also known as the fundamental condition of the knowing process itself. In this awareness of the reality of the *Ātman* the distinction, involved everywhere else in every process of knowledge, between the knower, the known, and the knowledge, is non-existent.¹ The noetic character of the awareness of the *Ātman* can be described only as the "recognition of or assent to a form of objectivity". The word acknowledgement (*svayamsiddha*, *svataḥsiddha*) brings out this aspect of the awareness of the *Ātman*. Accordingly, for Śaṅkara, the *Ātman* is neither "something to be rejected nor something to be accepted even"; it is neither *heya* nor *upādeya*.² One can reject something other than oneself; there is also no intelligible sense in which one can speak of "accepting" oneself. Perhaps the best we can say (alike the least and the most) is that "every one is aware of his own existence", and this is mere assent to or recognition of the objectivity of the *Ātman*.³ The noetic, according to Śaṅkara, has something of the valuational in it, namely, that no knowledge is possible without acknowledging that *Ātman* is, that there is a foundational reality as the basis of all epistemological inquiry and all knowledge.⁴ While recognizing the valuational character of cognition itself, Śaṅkara is careful to draw our attention to the fact that the valuing involved in the awareness of the *Ātman* is not an operation supplementary to knowing as Sellar holds it is. In being aware of the *Ātman* in acknowledging an absolute reality, we have the consciousness that it is a value, that it is something which "deserves to be" or "ought to be", that it is worth existing, that it is something which cannot but be. Valuing is part and parcel of the

1 S. B., I. 1. 4. नहि शास्त्रमिदं तथा विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपपादयिषति । किं तर्हि प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्या कल्पितं वेद्य-वेदित्यवेदनादिभेदमपनयति ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 *ibid.*, आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः । *Upa.*, II. 16. 41, अनुपात्तं स्वरूपं हि स्वेनात्यक्तं तथैव च । *ibid.*, II. 7. 2; S. B., I. 1. 1, सर्वो हि आत्मास्ति त्वं प्रत्येति ।

4 *Gita*. S. B., II. 18, नहि पूर्वं इत्थं 'अहं इति' आत्मानं अप्रमाय पश्चात् प्रमेय परिच्छेदाय प्रवर्तते । न हि आत्मा नाम कस्यचित् अप्रसिद्धो भवति ।

cognitional process. This is the doctrine known in contemporary Value philosophy as the doctrine of the value character of the theoretical. Not only is valuation noetic; cognition itself is valuational.¹

The Ātman, the conception of which is put forward by Śaṅkara as central to his metaphysics, is not the conception of an All-knower who, by knowing or being aware of things, maintains them, so to speak, in existence. *The Ātman is not the pramāṇī or the veditī. It is the absolute reality, which maintains and supports the knower, knowledge, and the known. It is the supreme value, which lends significance to the knower, the act of knowing, and the object which is known.* Śaṅkara recognizes the fallacious character of any argument which passes from the conditions of knowledge to the presence of an All-thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought. The conception of the Ātman as the knower belongs to a stage of thought where the duality of value and existence has not been overcome and the opposition between the ideal and the actual is unreconciled. Such a halting principle is not adequate to explain the being and becoming of the universe. It cannot be viewed as the absolutely real. The conception of the Ātman as the pramāṇī belongs to the region of Avidyā where the Self is opposed to the Not-Self, the Ideal to the Actual, and Ought to Is.² Brahman or Ātman is the Supreme Reality and Value upon which the universe with its distinctions ultimately hangs. It is hardly correct to think, as Deussen does, that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara "pushes aside everything objective, and relies on the Subject only"³. Much of the misunderstanding which has gathered round the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is due to the ignorance of the fact that his idealism takes its stand on the essential truth of the objectivity of our judgments of value, and the fundamental contention of his idealistic philosophy about the objectivity of the Ātman is really a contention about the objectivity of

1 Gita. S. B., II. 69, न हि आत्मनः स्वात्मनि प्रवर्तकं प्रमाणपेक्षता आत्मत्वादेव तदन्तत्वात् च सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वस्य । स्वात्मविषयत्वात् आत्मज्ञानस्य ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 1, न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन्नस्ति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते ।

3 D. S. V., P. 213.

value. Śaṅkara's approach to the problem of reality is neither subjective nor objective, as Professor Radhakrishnan points out; it is rather an axiological approach which is neither purely epistemological, nor purely ontological. He inquires into the nature of the Ātman not as the knower, but as the ground and source of all the reality and intelligibility of the universe. In this sense his approach is entirely objective. Ignorance of the valuational standpoint of Śaṅkara's philosophy has led the critics to put fanciful interpretations upon his utterances, and to view his system as a species of Subjective Idealism. If we once begin to believe with Deussen that in the state of liberation all plurality is annihilated, and "only the knower in us and therefore the Ātman remains as the unit", then naturally his system will appear to us as nothing more than a variety of Subjective Idealism or Mentalism.

Śaṅkara's philosophy is definitely concerned with the repudiation of all such views as insist upon regarding the Ātman as a definite "this" or "that". It is no doubt true that occasionally, in establishing the reality of the Ātman, he speaks of it as the *pramāṇī*, and argues that only when the Ātman, the knower (*pramāṇī*), has been determined as real, is any inquiry on the part of the knower with a view to obtaining right knowledge possible, that "without determining the self — 'I am I' — none seeks to determine the knowable objects".¹ But he never allows himself to forget that this conception of the Ātman is relative to the standpoint of finite experience, which experience, in its turn, is ultimately dependent upon the Ātman, which is above the duality of the subject and the object. The Ātman which is the central topic of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is the Ātman which is the Absolute Good, and the attainment and realization of which results in the enjoyment of infinitely blissful and eternally real existence. It is the Ātman which is the goal of the operation of the varied means of knowledge, and the comprehension of which annuls all empirical dealings implying objects and means of knowledge. It is this Ātman which is the bedrock of certainty, and upon which Śaṅkara builds his edifice of Advaitism, which, in words

¹ D. S. V., P. 214.

² Gita. S. B., II. 18.

borrowed from Platonic metaphysics, may be said to be the Monism of the Good.¹

There is not much in common between the argument put forward by Descartes and the conclusion drawn therefrom regarding the existence of the self as an indubitable certainty, and the insistence on the part of Śaṅkara, that the reality of the Ātman, which is the essence, the ultimate value, the basis of all epistemological inquiry, is a matter of acknowledgement, as it is one of those acknowledgements without which the rationality of the universe will be seriously affected. The approach to the problem of the self through the gateway of axiology is foreign to Descartes's system. This also explains the difference between the conceptions of self to which both Descartes and Śaṅkara are led by their thoughts. Descartes's logical argument leads him to the reality of a Self as a thinking being. But the Self of whose reality Descartes is indubitably certain through an immediate intuition is not able to bear the weight of his epistemological speculation and metaphysical construction. He is led, instead, to appeal to theology in order to get a sure foundation for the reality of his knowledge. The singularly bold attempt, on the part of Śaṅkara, to lay the foundations of a sound theory of knowledge with the help of the principle of the reality of the Self or Ātman has nothing in common with Descartes's attempt to provide a theological foundation for the validity of our knowledge. The Self which is the presupposition of all knowledge and the sure foundation of its validity, and whose reality is affirmed in the very act of denying it, has, according to Śaṅkara, an absolute existence and possesses all the characteristics which an absolute reality ought to possess. According to Śaṅkara, if the reality of the Self is accepted, the validity of the theory of knowledge requires no theological guarantee, and the epistemological application of the concept of God becomes superfluous.

In Śaṅkara the concept of God blends with the concept of the Self or Ātman. "Ātman is Brahman and the Brahman is Ātman."² Throughout his works Śaṅkara uses the words

¹ Gita. S. B., II. 69.

² Chand. S. B., V II. 1., S. B., I. 1. 1.

Ātman and Brahman interchangeably, and he takes special care to draw our attention to this use of the words.¹ Nor does he omit to explain the significance which attaches to his alternative use of the words to designate one and the same entity. In equating Ātman with Brahman Śaṅkara has two classes of readers in mind, one consisting of those who are of Descartes's way of thinking and hold that the self of which we are indubitably certain is a finite and imperfect being, convinced of his finitude and imperfection by his doubts and his desires; the other made up of those who are like the deists in thinking that the self and God are entirely different realities belonging to different orders. Against the former Śaṅkara points out that the "Self" is not a finite and limited being in its essential nature; to the latter his rejoinder is that the God or Brahman who should be the proper object of religious devotion is not something other than the Self. The metaphysical truth as well as the religious ideal is summed up in the formula "Ātman is Brahman." The same truth is revealed to us whether we look back or direct our gaze forward.² By emphasizing that Ātman is Brahman Śaṅkara does away with the necessity, felt by Descartes, of adding what is merely a superfluous theological sanction to his doctrine of the absolute priority and indispensability of the Self or the objectivity of the absolute value of "Sat" or "reality." Had Descartes been consistent in developing the implication of the foundational character of the awareness of the Self he would have been led to revise his conception of it as a finite being in favour of a conception of the Self as a continuous, all-embracing unity of existence and consciousness in which everything that possesses reality must find a place and for which it must exist.

VI

ŚANKARA'S DOCTRINE OF ONTOLOGICAL PREDICATES

Śaṅkara's notion of reality as that of value gives us a clue to his doctrine of ontological predicates. As for him reality

1 Brhad S. B., I 4. 10. इति सहस्रसो ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः समानाधिकरण्यादेकार्थत्वमेवेत्यवगम्यते । *ibid.* II. 1. 20, सर्वश्रुतिषु च ब्रह्मण्यात्मशब्दयोगात् ।

2 Chand. S. B., V. II. 1, 'आत्मब्रह्मशब्दयोरितरेतरविशेषणविशेष्यत्वम् 'ब्रह्म' इति अध्यात्मपरिच्छिन्नमात्मानं निवर्तयति । 'आत्मा' इति च आत्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य आदित्यादिब्रह्मणः उपास्यत्वं निवर्तयति अभेदेन आत्मा एव ब्रह्म ब्रह्मवात्मा ।

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and value are one and inseparable, the predication of reality to a thing in the metaphysical sense has a value character, and the distinctions between truth and falsity, between reality and unreality, and between reality and appearance, turn out in his hands to be distinctions of value, presupposing certain ideals and norms of truth and reality. In order to understand fully Śaṅkara's views about the value character of the predicate of reality, we must learn to distinguish between the words "reality" and "existence", which are of frequent occurrence in contemporary philosophical discussions. The two concepts of "reality" and "existence" should not be identified. There are things which are real but do not enjoy the same, or even a similar, status of objectivity as is enjoyed by many other objects. There are realities whose nature cannot be defined in spatial and temporal terms, and whose peculiar character cannot be completely characterized by their determination as mere "being" or "existence". There are, on the other hand, many things for whose description a spatial and temporal idiom is the only proper idiom. With a view to avoiding confusion of thought and misunderstanding and attaining clarity and consistency, the two concepts of "reality" and "existence" should be distinguished; and this can be done by using the word "existence" in the narrower sense, i.e., by equating existence with "position" in "space" and "time". In this sense of the word, things whose nature is neither definable nor communicable in spatial and temporal terms will be said "to be real" but not "to exist". Likewise there may be many things which exist but are not "real", the word "real" and its corresponding noun "reality", being for us axiological concepts, and their proper use being only in a metaphysical reference.

For Śaṅkara "Sat" and "Asat" are value concepts and the distinction between them is a value distinction. In their metaphysical use they are not existential concepts, and when employed to describe the ontological character of reality they are not meant to convey any idea to the reader about the existential status of the object which is the subject-matter of reflection. "Sat", for Śaṅkara is "what always maintains its nature", "what is true no matter what", "what ought

to be", "what must be acknowledged".¹ In this sense of the word Sat, the Absolute Reality alone can be said to be Sat, for the notion of such a reality is one of those fundamental notions whose acknowledgement is a necessity of rational thought. This intelligible thought, by the very nature of the case, is a form, not of the factual or existential, but of the evaluational consciousness. The factual consciousness never makes—it can never make—any demand; it is not in its nature to do so. The demand for an absolute reality (Sat), which is the demand for an absolute value, has its source in the value consciousness, which enjoys the prerogative of legislating even for the factual consciousness.² The notion of the Asat is the notion of something about which it cannot be said that "it ought to be no matter what". The "pot", the "cow", the "horse" are, in this metaphysical sense of the word, Asat, because of them it cannot be said that they cannot be dispensed with, what they ought to be. But the case with Brahman or Ātman is different. It is its essence to be "Sat". It is the very nature of reality to maintain and affirm itself. With the destruction of the cow, the horse and the elephant, reality is not destroyed; on the contrary, it alone renders any notion of extinction or destruction possible. For an ultimate philosophical reflection the distinction between reality and unreality is a value distinction, and for Śaṅkara the same is the case with the distinction between the concepts of Sat and Asat and the corresponding consciousnesses, namely the sadbuddhi and asadbuddhi.³ Avyabhicāra, which is the test of reality according to Śaṅkara, is a value notion in his metaphysics.

But Śaṅkara knows that to deny reality to a thing is not to deny existence to it, and a thing may be actual without possessing reality. Śaṅkara's statements in his works about the unreality of the world (in the axiological sense) are cons-

1 Gita. S. B. II. 16, यद्विषया बुद्धिः न व्यभिचरति तत् सत् ।

2 ibid., XIII. 14, सदास्पदं हि सर्वं सर्वत्र सद्बुद्धयनुगमात् । न हि मृगतृष्णिकादयः अपि निगम्यता भवन्ति ।

3 Gita. S. B. II. 16, सर्वत्र बुद्धिद्वयोपनन्देः सद बुद्धिः असदबुद्धिः । सदसद्विभागे बुद्धि तन्नेस्थिते । घटादिवुद्धि विषयः असत् । व्यभिचारात् । न तु सदबुद्धिः विषयः अव्यभिचारात् । घटे विनष्टो घटबुद्धौ व्यभिचरन्त्यां सदबुद्धिरपि व्यभिचरति इति वत् । न । घटादौ अपि सदबुद्धि दर्शनात् । विशेषण विषया एव सा सदबुद्धिः ।

tantly punctuated by references which purport to confer at least existential status upon it. Sat and asat are words which are also used by us in our ordinary everyday discourse without our intending to burden them with any metaphysical significance. When so used, they are merely existential concepts and have reference to our factual consciousness, to the mere sense-perceptive aspect of our experience in abstraction from its value aspect. The import of our judgments, then, is not axiological but only existential. Śaṅkara has "to think with the learned" but occasionally "to speak with the vulgar", and we find him using the words sat and asat in an existential sense also. But he does not keep us in the dark about this, and the ways in which he speaks of the things leave no room for doubt about the exact import of the words, unless we deliberately forget that his standpoint is the standpoint of value. A sensible reality which is the object of affirmative factual consciousness is known as sat; and one which is the object of negative consciousness is asat.¹ It is this existential import which Śaṅkara intends to convey when he says that the "created effects" are apprehended "as existing, as existing", that the "external objects" are cognized as external to the experiencer, that the pot is made out of the clay that even when the effects are mere name and form the clay is real.² "Grhyate", "Upalabhyate" are the words used by Śaṅkara to express this factual awareness. They do not carry either any axiological significance or any metaphysical association.

The reality of value is not to be understood after the fashion of the reality of objects existing in space and time. The real is sometimes regarded as equivalent to the actual or the existent. In this sense of the term, value cannot be said to be existent or real according to Śaṅkara. Brahman is not, in this sense, sat, for it is not a sensible reality.³ This is the inner meaning of Śaṅkara's insistence on characterizing reality by

1 Gita. S. B., XIII. 12. यत् हि इन्द्रियगम्यं वस्तु घटादिकं तत् अस्ति बुद्धयनुगतप्रत्यय-
विषयं वा स्यात् नास्ति बुद्धयनुगतं प्रत्यय विषयं वा स्यात् । Chand. S. B.,
VII. 17. 1. इन्द्रियविषयापेक्षं सच्च त्यच्चेति सत्यमित्युक्तम् । उक्तं

मत्यत्वं श्रुत्यन्तरे विकारस्य, न तु परमायपिक्षमुक्तम् ।
2 Katha. S. B., II. 3. 12. मत्सदित्येव तु गृह्यते यथा मृदादिकार्यं घटादि मृदाय-
न्वितम् । Taiit. S. B., II. 6. 1; S. B., II. 2. 28; II. 3. 9.

3 Kena. S. B. II. 1, अनीन्द्रियमात्मतत्त्वम् । Gita. S. B., XIII. 12.

means of what he calls *viśaṃpratiṣedha*, i.e., by denying to it all finite characteristics. *Viśaṃpratiṣedha* means that the nature of value is not describable in terms of an existent or a subsistent. But Śaṅkara warns us against thinking that Brahman is wholly unreal. It is true that it is not apprehended as a particular "this" or "that", but we cannot call it *asat* absolutely.¹ Brahman represents a non-existent form of objectivity. Śaṅkara cannot think of a value which is not real. The position of a pure norm, the absolute ought, the transcendent "sollen", the concept of a value in itself divorced from every form of being, is untenable according to him. Value may be real but it may not exist. Difference from "being" or "existence" does not mean absolute nothing. As against Rickert, he would say that we are not justified in calling value "unreal"; in fact, he avoids the mistake committed by Rickert in identifying existence with reality. It is this identification of the two which has led Rickert to accept the position that values are unreal. By saying that Brahman is not *sat* Śaṅkara is simply disclosing to us a sphere of reality whose nature is describable only in a non-spatial and non-temporal idiom.

It is the reality or unreality of the absolute values which is the fundamental issue dividing the *Āstika* from the *Nāstika*. According to Śaṅkara, the *Āstitvavādin* is one who believes in the absoluteness of the intrinsic value of Reality.² The *Nāstikavādin* is one who has no faith in the reality of the absolute values as the foundation of all law and order in the universe, who argues that there is no *Ātman*, the source of this universe, and believes that all this effect is not connected with any cause and is finally dissolved into nothingness.³ In this sense of the word *Nāstika*, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* cannot be regarded as an *Āstika* system of thought, because it refuses to have anything to do with that very principle which for

1. Tait. S.B., II. 7. 1. न पुनरत्यन्तमेव असत् । न हि अज्ञतः सङ्गममस्ति । Gita. S. B., XIII. 12. न तावत् न अस्ति, नास्तिबुद्धयविपर्ययात् । *ibid.* IX. 19. न पुनरत्यन्तमेवासत् भगवान् काशंभारणं वा सदमती ।

2. Katha. S. B., II. 3. 12. जगन्मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपपन्नव्ययः । अस्तीतिबुद्धयोरित्येववादिनः ।

3. *ibid.* नास्तिवादिनि नास्तिजगन्मूलमात्मा निरन्तरमेवेदं कार्यमभावन्तं प्रविशोयते ।

Śaṅkara is central to it. It is one of the contradictions of history that the Advaita Vedānta for which reality is the absolute value came to be viewed as a Nistika system of thought by some of the later writers.

VII

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As the notion of the Ātman is the notion of the Absolute ground or cause, and Ātman is the Absolute value of Reality, the categories of cause and substance, in their metaphysical use, are axiological categories and belong to philosophical intelligibility as distinct from scientific description and explanation. The category of cause is an embodiment of the value of reality or sat. In the same way it is impossible to develop and communicate the value of "Sat" without the concept of substance. Brahman, the supreme value of Sat, is the highest substance as well as the supreme source of everything.

Thus have we been led to acknowledge reality as an absolute value, or, if we are to talk plain ontological language, to recognize Brahman as the absolute reality. That is the True.¹ The text "tattvamasi"—That art Thou—sums up the value of reality as constituting the essence of the universe.² There appears to be little justification for Deussen's remark that the Indians were never ensnared into an ontological proof.³ Professor Radhakrishnan rightly points out that so far as any logical proof of Brahman is available in Śaṅkara's writings it is undoubtedly the ontological proof. But as in Śaṅkara being is inseparable from and the same as value, the ontological proof is really the axiological proof which asserts the absoluteness of the values not merely of sat but also of cit and inanda. The "new proof" for the existence of God of which Deussen speaks and which he calls "the psychological", in which the concept of God blends with the concept of the soul, is but an unintelligible variation of the axiological

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 16. 3. नन्गत्यम्

2 161 l. सदात्मभावमपदिशति ।

3 D. S. V., P. 213.

proof, which is the only proof we meet with in Śaṅkara, and the essence of which is that Brahman, as the supreme value, is the "Self" of everything, nothing being without a Self. It is because Deussen misses the truth that the standpoint of Śaṅkara is axiological, that he interprets the Sūtra II.3.9 and Śaṅkara's comments thereon as containing the substance of the "cosmological proof".¹ This sūtra merely aims at bringing out that the acknowledgment of the value of Sat and its absoluteness is the first demand which an intelligible philosophy, which knows its business, must concede. "There is no origin of that which is (i.e. Brahman) on account of the impossibility (of such an origin)".²

Brahman is Sat. It alone can explain existence. Non-existence cannot account for existence. This Absolute Reality is Brahman for Śaṅkara; and the concepts of the Absolutely Real, the Original Ground or Source, the Pare Brahman or Ātman, the First Cause and the Ultimate Substance, are interchangeable concepts.³

VIII

THE ABSOLUTE REALITY AS EXISTENCE-FOR-ITSELF (SVĀRTHA)

We have explained above how, according to Śaṅkara, for an ultimate reflection the notion of reality must be that of value, and intrinsic worth or absolute value must give the clue to the nature of what can be regarded as ultimately real. Śaṅkara develops further the implications of this axiological ontology, and argues that intrinsic worth or absolute value must belong to what can be called an end-in-itself. It is only a self-justifying end that can be said to possess inherent worth. The demand for an absolute reality is the demand for what is an end-in-itself, what exists-for-itself, what Śaṅkara calls "svārtha".

The line of argument followed by Śaṅkara is as follows. The svabhāva or nature of a thing, and it alone, is eternal

1 *ibid.*, P. 124.

2 असंभवस्तु सत्तानुपपत्तेः ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म 'कथमसतः सज्जायेत्' (छां ८।७।१)

मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदत्र च नो ब्रह्म ।

because it is not made. A thing can never give up its nature and become other than what it is. Fire, for instance, can never part with its natural light or heat. The truly real has a conservative nature¹. All means of knowledge concur in establishing this². This principle is, for Śaṅkara, an axiomatic principle, for to deny the truth of this is to accept that the thing can be itself and other than itself. But this would be to deny the very principle of thought without which no intelligible reflection about any intelligible reality is possible. The principle is frequently stated in his writings, and is always implied in his utterances and his reflections³. "The Sun cannot be both bright and dark, for these are contradictory features."⁴ Similarly it would be a flat contradiction to say that "a woman is one-half young and one-half old" or that "fire is both hot and cold"⁵.

If the real always maintains itself and can never give up its nature and become other than itself, it is because the *svabhāva* or nature of a thing is not made and is not the result or effect of activity. Śaṅkara is of Lotze's mind that to ask the question how being is made is to ask an absurd question. "The heat or light of fire surely is not a consequence of the activity of fire; it is a contradiction in terms to say that they are, and yet that they are the natural properties of fire".⁶ "As the heat of fire lasts as long as the fire, so is the witness, the self immortal, and because of this its vision too is immortal; it lasts as long as the witness does."⁷ Only that which is not made, which is natural, which has not been produced by action can be said to be absolutely real and also eternal. It alone is real, because it is not relative to and is independent

1 *Mind*. S. B., II. 3. 9. स्वभाववैपरीत्यमनं सर्वप्रमाणविरोधात् । *ibid.* III. 21,

प्रकृतेः स्वाभावस्यान्यथाभावः स्वतः प्रच्युतिर्न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ।

2 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 3. 20, न हि स्वाभाविकस्योच्छितिः कदाचिदप्युपपद्यते । सवितु-
र्बोष्णप्रकाशयोः ।

3 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 3. 7; II. 1. 20; I. 4. 10; S. B., II. 2. 29; *Upadesa*, I. 2. 45,
स्वभावस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्; *ibid.* I. 2. 89, न हि यस्य यत्स्वरूपतत् तद्वचमिचारि-
दृष्टम् ।

4 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 10.

5 *ibid.*, III. 2. 1; II. 1. 20; I. 4. 10.

6 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 4. 6.

7 *ibid.*, IV. 3. 23.

of any activity or any operation extraneous to itself. The real is what is self-existent.¹

What is not relative to anything is a reality which exists for itself, which is an end-in-itself, which is its own justification. In the spirit of Kant Śaṅkara writes that intrinsic worth or absolute value can belong to an end-in-itself, to what is a self-justifying end. "Svārtha" is the word used by Śaṅkara to indicate this self-justifying end which for him is identical with the absolutely real. What is svārtha is also svataḥstddha, self-established for him; its being is also its validity.² What exists for the sake of another can but possess a derivative being and a deficient value. It cannot be its own justification. Its own measure and its own value. Only a reality which is svārtha can be so.³

In offering this as the test of all reality and the measure of all value, Śaṅkara intends to guard us against the validity of any attempt to give a relational definition of value. If the real is what does not exist for another but for itself, and in existing thus not only maintains itself but also renders itself an end-in-itself, the possibility of defining the nature of value in relational terms is ruled out once for all. Value cannot be the effect of any possible combination of factors; its life cannot be said to consist in a net-work of relations.⁴ But we should also be on our guard against misunderstanding the above test of reality offered to us by Śaṅkara. When he says that the real is what does not give up its nature, what does not change, what maintains itself, he is not attempting to identify the "real" with any of the 'particular ontological prejudices', such as the prejudice in favour of the "permanent" or the prejudice

1. Taill. S. B., II. 8. 5. द्वयस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया परानपेक्षत्वात् । विक्रिया न तत्त्वम् परापेक्षत्वात् । न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वम्यदि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वस्य तत्त्वस्य तत्त्वम् यदप्यापेक्षं न तत्त्वम् अन्यथाऽभावेऽभावात् ।

2. Upad. I. 2. 91. स्वतःसिद्धयभावोऽद्वैतस्य । चैतन्यस्वरूपस्य तु आत्मनः स्वतःसिद्धेः अग्यानपेक्षत्वं न केनचित् नागवितुं शक्यम् ।

3. Ibid., I. 2. 70. न च तपोः स्वार्थता युक्ता ।; I. 2. 56. संहृतत्वात् परार्थत्वं अनित्यत्वं च वशस्तम्भादिवदेव ।; Brhad S. B., IV. 3. 7.

4. S. B., II. 2. 29. न च यो यस्य स्वतो वर्णो न संभवति सोऽप्यस्य साधर्म्यात् तस्य संभवति ।

in favour of the "changing", the prejudice in favour of the "dynamic" or that in favour of the "static", of which we hear so much in contemporary European philosophy. The real is what is eternally true, the *kūlasthanitya*, and, being so, explains both permanence and change. In itself it is above both. It is always itself but renders possible what appears to be other than its own self.¹

For Śaṅkara the above principle, which, as we have said, embodies the conservative nature of reality has no other implications. To think that the formula of this principle is "A is A", and to interpret it to mean that only identity is real and differences are illusory, that the Ultimate Reality is a purely indeterminate analytic unity, altogether free from determinations and exclusive of difference, and all plurality a mere unsubstantial show, is to misunderstand the true import of the law. It undertakes neither to affirm nor to deny that Brahman is a creative reality or that it is a perfectly indeterminate pure existence devoid of the principle of differentiation. It neither says the one nor the other. The principle cannot compel reality to evolve, if it is not the nature of reality to be a self-communicating Life; nor can it prevent reality from so doing, if it is its nature to be self-fulfilled as well as self-fulfilling. Any attempt so to interpret it as to make it say something either for or against the creative aspect of reality is to misinterpret it.

Accordingly, to contrast this principle of Identity with the Hegelian principle of Identity-in-difference or of opposites is to institute a false contrast. They are incomparables and so do not admit of being contrasted. Śaṅkara's principle speaks of the formal character of reality only. The Hegelian principle states a truth about the material constitution of reality. The one simply affirms that a thing can never give up its nature; the other seeks to assure us that all difference presupposes a unity and is indeed an expression of that unity, that the real is a real which expresses itself in differences and at the same time overcomes those differences. The

1 S. B., II, 1 27. यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिः भूयत एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते ।

principle of Identity-in-difference is an embodiment not only of the conservative but of the creative aspect of reality also; Śaṅkara's principle of Identity confines itself to the conservative aspect. Śaṅkara's principle neither stands in the way of Brahman's revealing itself nor does it compel Brahman to do so, if it is not its nature to be creative. It only says that if it is the nature of reality to be a self-consistent unity and ever to realise this unity, it can never give up its nature of thus being a self-consistent unity in realizing itself or cease realizing itself in being a complete unity. In other words, it affirms that the revelation of name and form cannot tamper with the unity of reality and its power to reveal and to overcome differentiation, if the Real is essentially of this nature. That the real is essentially so, that the Ātman is infinite and perfect consciousness which is eternally aware of its infinitude is a truth which this principle does not profess to embody according to Śaṅkara. That Brahman is creativity is an independent truth which has its rationale in Brahman or Value being identical with the Ātman which is Consciousness, as will be explained later on. Śaṅkara's principle of Identity is not meant to say anything about this aspect of truth. The Hegelian principle of Identity-in-difference is constructive and constitutive. It says that the real is not abstract identity but a unity which is a complete process of differentiation and integration. The differentiation being an expression of the unity, all differences *return* into the unity.

IX

ABSOLUTE REALITY AS ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS
OR SELF.

Brahman as Sat is that which exists eternally, which is independent of any other condition, which is the same at all times and for all men. Only what fulfils these conditions can be said to be absolutely real. But Śaṅkara further maintains that the concept of a value in itself, without any reference to consciousness, is inconceivable. He puts aside the absurd concept of the absolute transcendence of value, which, as Aliotta has pointed out, is the bane of some of the

modern systems of value philosophy, especially that of Rickert. Śaṅkara goes much further and maintains that the concept of an absolute reality which is not also an absolute consciousness is an unintelligible concept. Such a reality lacks the fulness which it would possess if it realized eternally and uninterruptedly its absolute being. For Śaṅkara, then, absolute reality is also absolute consciousness. Brahman is not merely Sat but also Cit. Like Sat, Cit also constitutes the very essence of Brahman, its very svarūpa.¹ Brahman is caitanyamītram. It is alike throughout its structure, and has no difference either within it or without it. "As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, similarly the Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of consciousness. That means that the Ātman has neither inside nor outside any other nature except consciousness; consciousness eternally constitutes its essence, just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste."²

Brahman is indifferently described by Śaṅkara as Samītram and Cinnātram, because Sat and Cit are identically the same for him.³ True to the standpoint of the oneness of reality and value he maintains, unlike Rāmānuja and others, that Brahman and Consciousness are neither distinguishable nor separable. The logical category of Substance and Attribute is inadequate to express the relation between Brahman and Consciousness, because the former is not a separate and independent something which somehow owns and possesses the attribute of consciousness, or in which this attribute inheres. Consciousness, being the essence of Brahman, is not separable from it either in time or in space, just as the light and heat of fire cannot be abstracted from fire itself. We speak of Brahman and of Consciousness, of Sat and of Cit, because thinking and reflection belong to a region which is marked by the duality of value and existence or of essence and fact. It is a necessity which is characteristic

1 S. B., III. 2. 16. चैतन्यमेव त निरन्तरमस्य स्वरूपम् ।

2 Ibid.

3 S. B., III. 2. 21. सत्तैव बोधो बोध एव च सत्ता । S. B., II. 3. 9: B. had. S. B., II. 4. 7.

of our thought. The Absolute life as lived is the life of infinite awareness of its infinite being.¹

Consciousness, which, like the light of the sun and the heat of fire, is the inseparable essence of Brahman, is, if we are to use human language, which always retains the associations of time, coeval with divine existence. It is eternally present with Brahman. Consequently Śaṅkara says that there is no intelligible sense in which we can speak of Brahman as knowing or being aware of itself. If Brahman ever knows itself it is superfluous to distinguish between awareness and unawareness, and there is no sense in maintaining that it knows itself. Such a view would be tenable if ever there was the possibility of Brahman not knowing itself. In the case of Brahman the distinction between knower and knowledge is non-existent. "The knower is eternal knowledge only. The knower and knowledge are not different as they are in the philosophy of the Naiyāyikas."² The knowledge of which Brahman is the object is non-different from Brahman, as is the heat from the fire. The essence of the Self, which is the object of knowledge, verily knows itself by means of unborn knowledge which is of the very nature of the Ātman. Brahman, which is of the nature of one homogeneous mass of eternal consciousness, does not depend upon another instrument of knowledge "for its illumination, as is the case with the sun, which, being of the nature of continuous light, does not require any instrument to illumine itself."³

The Self being of the nature of consciousness, is the witness of all things existing and non-existing and of all the changes that take place during the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. "The consciousness owing to whose presence you deny (the existence of things in deep sleep) by saying 'I was conscious of nothing' is the Knowledge, the Consciousness which is your Self."⁴ It never ceases to exist even when the objects known by it are in course of

1 S. B., II. 3. 18; II. 3. 29.

2 Upadeśa, I. 2. 79.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 25; III. 34., S. B., II. 3. 29.

4 Upadeśa, I. 2. 94.

(§ X.) THE DUALITY OF SELF AND NOT-SELF: VALUE AND EXISTENCE

constant flux. When everything else changes and also ceases to be the Self persists as eternally immutable.¹ One's own nature is never seen to cease to persist while one is persisting. This is the inherent character of what is absolutely real. The Self or Consciousness is "free from change and perpetually the same."² If the Self were changeful it would not simultaneously know all the modifications and the objects of its knowledge. "As Pure Consciousness, the Self, never ceases to exist, it is self-existent and no one can prevent its independence of other things."³ Its eternal immutability is self-evident and does not depend on any evidence; for an object of knowledge different from the self-evident knower depends on an evidence to be known, but the self, being of the nature of pure knowledge, does not depend on an evidence to prove that it exists or that it is the knower.⁴ The Self is, therefore, of the nature of eternal and self-effulgent knowledge.⁵

X

THE DUALITY OF SELF AND NOT-SELF:
VALUE AND EXISTENCE

Śaṅkara calls this Atman Saccinmātram, Being-Consciousness, reminding us that the absolute reality is also absolute consciousness.⁶ If our awareness of the world-fact presented to us only conscious selves, the above argument combined with the one outlined in the preceding pages, which bases itself upon the impossibility of finding the essence of a conscious entity anywhere else except in Consciousness, would have been sufficient to justify Śaṅkara's demand for Consciousness as the foundational reality. But our experience presents to us something other than our selves. My self is confronted with a not-self; the Atman finds an anātmavastu; consciousness is called upon

1 S. B., II. 3. 7.

2 Upadeśa, I. 2. 91.

3 *ibid.*, I. 2. 91.

4 *ibid.*, I. 2. 94.

5 *ibid.*, I. 2. 101.

6 *ibid.*, II. 17, 13.

to adjust itself to something other than itself. This duality of Ātman and anātman, or Self and not-self, is the most persistent of all dualisms and the final paradox of philosophical thought. As the notion of the Ātman is the notion of value, which is identical with reality, we may call it the dualism between value and something which is not a value but which may possess it or between value and existence. This dualism at once sets up a problem, namely, the problem of reconciling the self and the not-self, the Ātman and the anātman. If the self is faced with a not-self which it simply cannot ignore, how can the self be said to be the absolute reality and the absolute value? But this dualism also introduces the note of interpretation, and gives the hint of a solution in revealing that the not-self gets its meaning from, and is valued only in relation to, the Self. Śaṅkara's celebrated commentary on the Brahma Sūtra opens with the exhibition of the dualism between the Self and the not-self, the Ātman and the anātman, value and fact, and ends with the revelation that they are not strangers to each other, that the not-self is an expression of the self, the anātman of the Ātman, fact of value, and that the not-self, the anātman and the fact, while they are not themselves values, possess value which is derived from the Ātman, the 'Self, which is the supreme reality and the supreme value.

The problem of the reconciliation of the Self and the not-self is not a merely epistemological problem, nor is Śaṅkara's solution a merely logical solution. The problem of the nature of the totality of the world itself is not a merely logical or existential problem for Śaṅkara. In his hands it has turned into an axiological problem. Accordingly, the solution also is an axiological one. This demand for the reconciliation of the self and the not-self is the demand, not of the cognitive faculty, but of the total self, of the living individual as a whole. The knowing faculty can make no demand. It is the will, the willing individual, which demands, and for willing the duality of Self and not-self is an indispensable condition.

To say that there *is* something other than the Self, something other than Brahman, is to admit that "that other thing" has a right to independence existence. It is tantamount to

setting up another world in opposition to the world of Brahman, which is the realm of values, whatever be the name we give to this other world, whether we call it the world of "existence", or of "fact" or the world of "Not-Self". This other world will be a non-value world in any case. If the world of Self or Brahman is the world of supreme value, the world of not-self cannot be said to possess inherent worth, unless we regard it as identical with the former; in which case the distinction between the two will vanish. With the disappearance of the distinction between the two will disappear all activity on the part of man. Human experience presents a very intriguing situation according to Śāṅkara; it implies not only a discrepancy between value and existence, between Self and not-self, but also a confusion between the worlds constituted respectively by them, a confusion between the world of value and the world of existence, the world of Self and the world of not-self. This confusion is what Śāṅkara calls *adhyāsa*, and without this *adhyāsa* no practical activity on the part of man is possible. Human experience is essentially conative according to Śāṅkara: perception, reasoning, desiring, knowing, etc., are all activities because they are *puruṣātāntra*, relative to the man. Activity is pragmatic in character, always directed towards the fulfilment of certain human needs and desires. When a man strives to know something, to attain some end, to possess some object—in short, when he entertains any desire—his desiring presupposes not only that the object of desire possesses value for him, but also that it possesses *greater value* than his present self. This means the subordination of his present self with all its accumulated past to the object of his desire which he regards as "good", thus virtually acknowledging that the object desired possesses greater worth than the present self.

But the same act of desiring implies that our love for objects is secondary, since they contribute to the pleasure of the self and are liked only in so far as they are in harmony with the nature of the Self. Our love for the Self alone is primary. It is a fact that the self does possess greater value than any object of desire. "All processes of the world arise by way of forming an object of experience such as 'I shall enjoy this', 'I see this', 'I hear this'. They have

their being in experience and their end in experience."¹ Thus, "It is not for the sake of the husband that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife that she is loved, but for one's own sake that she is loved. It is not for the sake of wealth that it is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved".² Ultimately the Self alone possesses value; but when an object is desired, it is implied that the not-self is intrinsically valuable and the Self has only a derived worth. This is the confusion between the world of value and that of fact, and this is the basis of all the practical dealings of life. Where this duality is absent and consequently the confusion between the world of value and that of existence, between the Self and the not-self, is not possible, as during the state of Liberation where everything becomes the Self and the Ideal and the Actual fuse in one, or, relatively speaking, as during the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*), where all the sense-organs are merged in the Self, and the Self shines in its purity, alone and without another, *adhyāsa* is not possible because the conditions appropriate for it are not present. But according to Śaṅkara, there is an experience, which may be called integral experience, where in all distinctions, which constitute the very life-blood of finite existence fall away, the distinction between fact and value, value and existence, the Self and not-self, the *Ātman* and the *anātman*. This experience is nothing other than *Mokṣa* and this *Mokṣa* is for Śaṅkara the same as Brahman, the highest reality as well as the greatest value. This is the meeting-point where the ideal and the actual come together and fuse in one. The highest reality or, what is the same, the highest experience, transcends the distinction, which is sometimes treated as absolute between what is and what ought to be. The meaning of the finite experience is that there is a gulf between the ideal and the actual, with a tendency in the actual to move up to the ideal. In the sphere where there is complete absence of duality between the two, there can be no will, and no event. There is nothing which is unattained; what ought to be is an eternally realized fact, and what is is nothing other than what ought to be. Knowing, desiring,

1 Gita 5. B., IX. 10.

2 Brhad. S. 4.5.

willing, thinking, reasoning, philosophizing, speculating, theorizing, these are all human activities, It is the nature of activity that it involves an unrealized end towards the attainment of which it is directed. The activity lasts so long as the end is not achieved, and the attainment of the end marks the extinction of the activity. Activity implies a distinction between the man who owns the activity, the end which his activity involves, and the means to the realization of that end. The consciousness for which value and existence are identical is a matter of direct experience (Anubhava). Anubhava guarantees its reality and logic demands its actuality. Śaṅkara points out that we can know it though only "by trenching on the mystical." This identity of value and existence, of the ideal and the actual, is not attainable for thought and logical understanding, because for the latter their duality is a necessary prerequisite. But the logical intellect, when consistently followed, does lead to the conclusion that value and being cannot be separated from each other, that they are one and identical. Brahman is the same as the Highest Self, the same as the Absolute Good, the same as Mokṣa, the same as the Supreme Reality. In other words, the "axiom" of the inseparability of value and reality is thus attainable. Śaṅkara's own experience and that of the seers recorded in the Upanisads bear direct testimony to its reality.¹ It can be grasped by direct vision and apprehended by the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight. During this state of realization one perceives one's identity with the Highest Reality itself and with all; and this is but another name for liberation. One enjoys perfect Being, perfect Awareness, and perfect Bliss. One sees oneself in everything and everything in one's own self.

The above way of formulating the philosophical problem embodies the demand of the spiritual life also, and is peculiarly Indian in colouring. How to reconcile the world to the Self and the Self to the world—this is the great problem of life and of the living soul who has awakened to the needs of that life. An intensely religious soul, like that of Śaṅkara, who is keenly conscious of the distance which divides him from

¹ S. B., IV. 1. 15.

his Ideal self, craves for that meeting-point where the Ideal and the Actual fuse into one. Human life, as the craving soul finds it, "is not free, sacred, immortal." It "must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be one".¹ This way of expressing the problem has much to do with the personality of Śaṅkara. The personal element, as Hoffding says, is of greater significance in philosophy than in any other department of science. Its presence, he points out, is often a condition for the arising of a problem; there are thoughts which can only spring up on a particular psychological soil. It is the sense of discord between what the self really is and what it appears to be, this "sacred mystery" as Windelband calls it—which has determined the characteristically religious way in which Śaṅkara raises the problem of philosophy.

The great merit of Śaṅkara's approach to the problem is that he is looking at everything, the whole universe and the entire totality of existence, from the standpoint of the Atman or Self, which he has discovered to be the foundational reality. In what relation can the rest of the universe be conceived to stand to the Self? The rest of the universe appears to be an *anātmavastu*, a not-self. But the *Ātman* is the supreme reality and the supreme value. It must, then, be the measure of all reality and of all value. How are the two to be brought together? The claims of the Self, whose very negation proves its reality, cannot be surrendered. It must be the *ens realissimum*. Śaṅkara, it must be noted, does not lay emphasis on the manyness or oneness of the universe; for him the pressing problem is not how the experienced world can be both "one" and "many". To think that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is preoccupied with determining the numerical strength of the ultimate constituents of the universe is to miss the true inwardness of his thought. To think that the terms 'advaita' and 'dvaita' in his system signify quantitative concepts is to open the door to a series of misunderstandings. The important question for Śaṅkara is: How does the world appear to be other than myself? Is it independent of the Self? If so, why does my self appear

1 Hoffding: *Types of philosophy*, P. 450.

anxious to reconcile itself to the world and the world to itself, to bring everything in the unity of one world ? The fundamental philosophical problem assumes the following form for Śaṅkara: What specific form should my awareness of the world-fact, of the not-self, of the *anātmavastu* take ? What is the most intelligible way of giving expression to my consciousness of it ? This, in other words, is the question about the metaphysical status of the Self in a world of meanings and values, the question, namely of the measure of reality and value.

XI

THE IDEALISTIC SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY: CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXISTENCE-FOR-ITSELF

The test of reality, the notion of which is the notion of value for Śaṅkara, is that it must exist for itself, be an end in itself. It must be *svārtha*. What exists for another, what is not self-existent, what is *parārtha*, is not real in the metaphysical sense. Keeping this test in mind, Śaṅkara says that Consciousness or Self alone exists for itself; it alone is *svārtha*. Everything else in the world, the world itself and the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth, exists for the sake of another, namely the self and is *parārtha*. This is the nerve of Śaṅkara's idealism. In insisting upon the necessity of recognizing consciousness as central to our notion of reality and the impossibility of banishing it from any conception of an intelligible world, Śaṅkara is aligning himself with the great idealists of all times. But this consciousness, whose foundational nature is the fundamental tenet of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and the recognition of the central character of which turns his creed into a creed of Idealism, is not merely a more refined kind of fact for Śaṅkara. Nor is the consciousness which is aware of itself a factual consciousness. The whole idealistic argument of Śaṅkara turns on his view of consciousness or self as not merely a "bearer" of the ideal values of which there is human awareness, but as essentially evaluational in character and constitution. The Self or Coconsciousness is the supreme value; it is worth existing; its being is its validity.

This "Cit" which is said to be svārtha by Śaṅkara is not bare awareness which has facts for its objects, as was the case with Berkeley's "consciousness", upon whose perceptions the whole world was made to rest by him. The consciousness which Śaṅkara puts in the forefront of his philosophy and which supplies the pivot of it is the self or Ātman which in being aware of itself, is aware of it as something which cannot but be there, which ought to be, whose being is its validity, and whose existence is its own justification and its own law and order. It is neither to be rejected nor to be endeavoured after, it is neither heya nor upādeya. It is the centre of all reference and so the centre of all value. The consciousness in which the whole material world is grounded according to Berkeley is a consciousness which derives its explanatory value solely from its character as perceptual awareness. If the esse of a thing is its percipi, the esse of mind or consciousness is its percipere. But in mere perception of heat or cold or of roughness or smoothness or of colour or smell or size or shape, no valuation is involved. The character of the self's awareness of its reality is not describable, according to Śaṅkara, as any kind of perception, intuition or apprehension of a quale or mere existence. The status of the Ātman's objectivity can be described only in terms of a validity or value.

Consciousness alone can be said to exist for itself, and only a self-conscious reality can be said to be absolutely real.¹ This is the supreme idealistic principle of reality and value, and when made ultimately determinative in a philosophical reference it gives us, as Pringle-Pattison says, an intelligible world which sets limits to the exclusive pretensions of the world of sense-perception, and defines the mode or degree of reality which belongs to that world in the total scheme of things. The distinction between svārtha and parārtha is fundamental for Śaṅkara's philosophy, and is expressly drawn not only in his Upadeśasāhasrī but also in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad.² It is implied in all

1 Upadeśa, I. 2. 71. एवं तर्हि स्वायंस्त्व चित्तिमत्त्वात् । *ibid.*, I. 2. 90, अस्वार्थस्य स्वतः सिद्धिभावात् ।

2 IV. 3. 7.

the important discussions in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* and other *Upaniṣads*¹ It alone justifies his distinction between what is *pratipīḍya* and what is mere *anuvāda*.² In conformity with this distinction between *svārtha* and *parārtha* Śaṅkara proceeds to define the mode or degree of reality which belongs to the world of not-self. The whole world of not-self is for the sake of the Self, which alone is eternal, self-existent and thus an end-in-itself.³ Śaṅkara's meaning is that existence apart from value is an artificial abstraction. The spatio-temporal order of events in its ultimate nature implies a Mind or Spirit as foundational to it.

According to him Spirit is the *terminus ad quem* of nature; the world of not-self, the *anātmavastu*, gets its meaning, its significance, its value and its justification from spirit or consciousness, of which it becomes an object. There is nothing in the world of not-self which fulfils Śaṅkara's test of reality. The reality of the world of things consists in its forming an object of experience for the conscious self. "The sun and other lights" are spoken of by Śaṅkara as *parārtha*, existing for another; and even the body and organs, being unconscious are not said to be *svārtha*, to be self-existent or end-in-themselves. The Self, the *Ātman*, alone is the light that exists for itself.⁴ An unconscious entity, according to Śaṅkara, cannot exist for itself.⁵ Nor again can it be said that two unconscious things exist for each other; wood and wall do not serve each other's purpose.⁶ Consciousness, therefore, is the centre of all value and the source of all reality, as everything is to be reconciled to the Self and measured in terms of the same Self.

If Śaṅkara puts consciousness in the centre and insists that apart from it everything is non-existent, it is because he

1 S. B., I. 4. 14; II. 1. 14; II. 6. 27; *Altareya*, II. 6. 6; *Mand. S. B.*, III. 65.

2 S. B., I. 3. 19; III. 2. 29; *Mand. S. B.*, III. 14.

3 *Upadesa*, II. 16. 43, आत्मार्थत्वाच्च सर्वस्य नित्य आत्मैव केवलः ।

4 *Brhad. S. B.*, IX. 3. 7, आदित्यादि ज्योतिषां परार्थत्वात् कार्यकरणसंघातस्या-
चैतन्ये स्वार्थानुपपत्तेः स्वार्थज्योतिष आत्मनोऽनुग्रहाभावेऽयं कार्यकरणसंघातो न
व्यवहाराय कल्पते । *Upadesa*, I. 2. 105.

5 *Upadesa*, I. 2. 71, अचित्तिमतोऽचित्तिमत्त्वादेव स्वार्थसम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः । *ibid.*, I.
2. 105

6 *ibid.*, I. 2. 71.

offers a conception of it which turns it into an absolute and intrinsic value. For him the philosophical interest of consciousness lies in its being the supreme value, and not merely in its existing as a fact among other facts. Śaṅkara cannot be said to believe that things are changed by giving them Greek names, and he is far from subscribing to the view that the philosophical position of Materialism is altered by infusing, as it were, into each occurrence a drop of consciousness. Consciousness is not presented by Śaṅkara as a mere running accompaniment of every material object. It exists as one setting up an ideal, a standard, to which everything must submit; it makes itself felt as a law which is sufficient unto itself; it is conscious of itself as a self-justifying end, an end-in-itself. In other words, Consciousness or Self, for Śaṅkara, is essentially evaluational. But there are specific forms of consciousness which are merely factual in character, according to Śaṅkara. Sense-perceptive awareness is of this kind. But this is a merely sectional consciousness. Pure Consciousness, Consciousness as such, which is *saccinmātram* or *cidrūpam* according to Śaṅkara,¹ and which is identical with Brahman or Ātman, is above all sectional divisions and differentiations. It is non-dual and homogeneous in nature, and abides in its purity in the midst of all flux that seems to accompany and sometimes to overwhelm it. Pure consciousness, which is the same as the Self and which may be said, in the plain man's language, to belong to the self, is the very essence of the seer; as heat and light are of fire. Being the very essence of the Self, it has neither beginning nor end.² But pure consciousness assumes different forms on account of the various adjuncts; and "when it performs the function of living, it is called the vital force; when it speaks, the organ of speech; when it sees, the eye; when it hears, the ear; and when it thinks, the mind."³ "The powers of seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, thinking, knowing and so on, though of the nature of pure consciousness, differ on account of adjuncts."⁴ These specific forms of consciousness may be

1 Upadeśa & II, 17 54.

2 Brhad, S.B., III. 4.2,

3 ibid, I. 4,7,

4 Upadeśa. II. 17,54,

enlivened and infused by the evaluational consciousness, but in themselves they are merely factual in nature and "incomplete". They do not "express the entity of the Self as a whole."¹ Pure consciousness is the whole, and being the whole it is not merely a fact but the reality, the supreme value, which affirms itself as valid.

It is of this pure consciousness that Śaṅkara has said that it exists for itself. Being an end-in-itself, "it cannot exist for the sake of another having no consciousness." Śaṅkara, true to the principle which he laid down, developed the idea of Self as essentially one with God, and the realization of its own nature as the goal of human endeavour and the perfection of its achievement. Kant lags behind, and falls short of the greatness of the principle which he, in common with Śaṅkara, laid down, namely the principle that the rational self is an end-in-itself. Kant, on account of the deistic habit of thought which characterized the age he lived in, was prevented from developing fully the implications of the fruitful idea of the rational self as the author of moral legislation with which he opens his second Critique. He is unable to offer us a better conception of God than that of a paymaster who brings about the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to the virtue that there is in a man. If the Self is a rational self and is competent to lay down a law not only for a particular individual but for all rational beings, the question arises whether such a Self can be treated as an isolated individual and whether metaphysics can be content with viewing Self and God as standing in the more or less external relation in which Kant put them. The whole Vedānta of Śaṅkara is a prolonged protest against such a conception of the self and the external tie which binds the self to his God. "As Pure Consciousness, the self, is self-subsistent, no one can prevent its independence of other things inasmuch as it never cease to exist."²

Therefore "the Self is of the nature of eternal and self-effulgent Consciousness."³ This is Śaṅkara's idealism, and it

1 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

2 Upadeśa. I. 2.91.

3 ibid., I. 2.1

is value which constitutes the nerve of it. Śaṅkara never allowed himself to be obsessed by the epistemological discussions which occupy so central a place in contemporary English and American philosophy. Epistemological idealism or realism—this was not the fundamental issue before Śaṅkara. The issue was a much deeper one, namely, the relation in which Reality, Consciousness and Value can be consistently conceived to stand to each other—certainly a question which is one "of life and death for metaphysics". If Śaṅkara were present in our midst he would have been the first to point out that "the truths for which Idealism has stood are not bound up with particular epistemological theories"; that "the nerve of Idealism is not to be found in the egocentric predicament"; that Idealism is not another word for Subjectivism, Mentalism, and Solipsism. Śaṅkara was in a very important sense always above the battle which has been so keenly fought between epistemological idealism and realism in modern times. He frankly made it clear that the Idealism for which he stood had nothing in common with the view that "the object and the sensation are the same" or that the "esse" of a thing is its "percipi".¹ He rejects Subjective Idealism, and in his rejection of it is as sincere and vehement as any of the modern Realists, and in exposing its follies as outspoken as the more modern Perry or Moore. His idealism is essentially objective or absolute. It rests upon the objectivity of consciousness as supreme value.

Unconscious of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy, Dr. Dasgupta has been led to discover "the roots of a thoroughgoing subjective idealism" in his works. But this is to miss the true inwardness of Śaṅkara's thought. Śaṅkara does speak of the "incomprehensibility" as well as "impossibility" of the existence of things apart and in abstraction from the Self or Consciousness; but this is true of the intellect which, by its very nature, is oriented towards value. The intellect oriented towards the "Good" finds the world, taken by itself and without any reference to values which give it meaning and significance, to be a senseless

1 Selections from Berkeley' by Frazer, PP. 34, 36; Principles, Sections, 3 and 5.

spectacle, a vicious circle of existence, quite unintelligible and incomprehensible.² But so far as the factual consciousness is concerned, Śaṅkara is far from subscribing to the view that the world depends upon the perceiver for its existence. The perception of man only reveals that a thing is there and possesses particular qualities; it cannot explain the presence of the thing itself. Śaṅkara's appeal to Prajñānam or to Ātman in order to explain the very being of the world-fact is an appeal to a principle whose very being is its validity and whose awareness constitutes its reality. At any rate, the argument in favour of Consciousness being the foundational reality does not proceed upon the principle "*esse est percipi*", and its validity is not bound up with the disappearance of the world for the perceptual consciousness.

The Buddhist Idealist holds that nothing can exist independently of the mind; everything that can be said to exist in any way is an idea or sensation in the mind. Every object exists only in relation to an act of perception on the part of the mind, and it is this act of perception on the part of the mind which sustains the object. Śaṅkara joins issue with the Buddhist Idealist, and, in reply to him, points out that things exist independently of their being perceived by a mind; it is not the acts of perception which make up the object. It is rather the objects which make the acts possible, and in the absence of these the act itself would be absent. It is not because we perceive it that the object exists, but it is rather because the object exists that we perceive it. Śaṅkara does not believe that the world is his idea. 'In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist—That the outward thing exists apart from perception has necessarily to be admitted, and this on the ground of the nature of perception itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall thinks that the perception itself is the post or the wall; on the contrary all men are conscious of the post and

2 Bṛhad. S.B., II. 4.6; II. 4.11.

the wall and the like as objects of their perception."¹ Śaṅkara knows that the perception has the same form as the object, but he points out that "this is no reason for denying the object. For were there no objects there could not be a similarity of form; and that the object exists follows from the fact that we perceive it as external."² Thus the nerve of his idealism is to be found not in the ego-centric predicament but in the presence of a value-centric situation.

Buddhism, like Human empiricism, treats the Self as a fact merely and hopes to catch it in its fullness by having recourse to introspective observation; and it is no wonder that the "existential" standpoint adopted by it and the introspective method incidental to this standpoint enable it only to "stumble on some particular perception or other—of heat or cold, love or hatred, pain or pleasure". Buddhism is never able to catch the self as a stable entity and becomes content with a fluid self. It is not able to do so because it seeks it where it cannot be found and tries to know it in a way which is foreign to its nature. The Self is a value. Buddhism is not able to grasp the metaphysical status of Self or Value in a world of Facts. This difference in the axiological and existential standpoints adopted respectively by Vedāntism and Buddhism explains the difference in their watchwords. The watchword of Buddhism is: *sarvamanātmam*, all this is non-self; that of Vedāntism is: *ātmatvedam sarvam*, all this is Self. Buddhism, no doubt, offers us a notion of the highest value; *nirvāṇa* is this supreme value and it is similar in some respects to Vedāntic *Mokṣa*. But Buddhism dissociates this supreme value from reality and does not show how value and reality can be brought together in the unity of one Self. For Śaṅkara *Mokṣa*, Self and Brahman are identical. The supreme value is the supremely real also. *Ātman* is both.

Ātman or Self has been shown to be the supreme reality and the supreme value, and what appears to be an *anātmavastu* or not-self has turned out to be an entity which has its self in the *Ātman*.³ In a more modern idiom, according to

¹ S.B., II.1.18.

² *ibid.*

³ *Trist.* S.B., II. 6.1.

Śaṅkara existence is grounded in value, and when dissociated from it becomes an artificial abstraction, possessing no status, not even the existential. We cannot legitimately speak of any reality which belongs to the anātman *in itself*; for it has its self in another, in the Ātman or Brahman. Therefore, when we look at "existence" as having its self in Brahman or Sat, which is the reality, there is no other option before us except to recognize its reality, but it is so because "existence" gives up its "existential" character and becomes an involution of Brahman's life, a mode or form in which Brahman exists.¹ Śaṅkara does not mean to say that existence *is* value; but, he says, existence possesses value, the world is brahmāt-maka. The value which belongs to existence is derived from Brahman. But the nature of value cannot be understood in terms of existence.² Existence has its self in Brahman, the supreme value. But if we persist in holding that existence has its self in itself, that it is svārtha, an end-in-itself, and is self-explanatory, Śaṅkara would say that our experience does not present any such reality.³ If Ātman is the highest reality, the highest experience is the one which the Ātman has. For the Ātman, the Pure Consciousness, there is nothing like a not-self, an anātmavastu, separated from it in time or space or having in any way any independent subsistence.⁴ Whatever can be regarded by us as constituting an "other" for the Ātman is felt by the Ātman as itself, as its own life and its own glory. For such an Experience, there exists no "auxiliary force", as there is nothing other than the Ātman, no "second reality" like the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya or the Atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas, completing that "Absolute Experience" and itself being completed by it; with the denial of the "anātmavastu", the "vastvantara", the "sahkāraṇam dvitīyam" by its reduction to the Ātman, the Ekam, the Advitīyam, the laying of the foundation-stone of the superstructure of Advaitism is over.⁵

1 Chand. S. B: VI. 3. 3. सदात्मना सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्त्वत्वम् ।

2 Talit. S. B. II. 6. 1. न ब्रह्म तदात्मकम् ।

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 3. स्वतस्त्वनृतमेव । सतोऽन्यत्वे चानृतत्वमिति ।

4 Talit. S. B: II. 6. 1. न ह्यात्मनोऽन्यदनात्ममूर्तं तत्प्रतिभक्तदेशकालं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टभूतं भवद्भुविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ।

5 Chand S. B: VI. 2. 1. Atareya, S. B., I. 1. 1; Brhad. S. B., III. 5. 1.

Śāṅkara's dissatisfaction with the systems considered in the Tarkapāda is rooted in his conviction about the impossibility of the denial of the absolute values and the utter irrationality in which a wilful dissociation of reality and value will ultimately result. The value of Reality or Sat is the first value which we are forced to acknowledge both by the logic of our thought and the logic of our life. The inner movement of the same logic brings us to the conviction that Reality and Consciousness are inseparable, and the Self which is one as well as the other becomes the centre of reflection and the goal of true knowledge. Buddhism does not find favour with Śāṅkara, because it either reduces both Self and not-self to non-being, to an airy nothing, or dissolves the Self, which is the only reality which can be said to be an end-in-itself according to Śāṅkara, into a series of passing states which only exist for the Self. The Vijñānavāda Buddhism puts the two types of realities, the parārtha and svārtha, on the same footing as regards their reality and their value. Materialism is rejected for putting the cart before the horse. For Śāṅkara, it is the Self which explains the not-self and not vice versa. The fault from which these systems of Monism suffer is that their notion of reality is that of an existent and not of a value. Even when the Buddhist Idealism makes consciousness the sole and central explanatory principle, its conception of consciousness is that of a fact or at most that of a deed, never of a value, certainly not of an eternal and absolute value. The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, and the Vaiśeṣika systems recognize a supreme value and reality either in God or Puruṣa, but they always have to fall back upon a not-self as the complementary reality. The result is that the systems end by introducing a dualism which is their lasting weakness. While recognizing God or the Puruṣa as the supreme value, they suggest, by accepting another constitutive stuff in the form of Prakṛti or the Atoms, that their principle of value is not also the supreme principle of reality. Śāṅkara would say that the reality which they recognize is blind, and the Value which they give us is barren. But a blind reality and a barren value—this cannot be the last word of constructive metaphysics. Śāṅkara gives a reality which is the supreme consciousness and the supreme value. The dualism of the systems criticized is replaced by the

monism of the Self which is also the monism of the Good. This is the Ātmādvaita of Śaṅkara. This Ātmādvaita is both an Axiological and a Creative Monism.¹

XII

THE ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS AS ABSOLUTE BLISS

A slightly different, but substantially the same, way of expressing the truth that Ātman is advaita is to say that Ātman is Ānandam, pure and perfect bliss. In insisting upon the non-dual nature of the Ātman, in emphasizing that besides the Ātman there is no anātmavastu, in repeatedly pointing out, wherever there is occasion to do so, that apart from the Ātman nothing has any being or value, that Ātman is the measure of all reality and all value, Śaṅkara intends to bring out that the supreme principle of reality and value is "wholeness", "completeness", "individuality"; anything which falls short of this can possess but deficient value and deficient reality. The principle is called by different names. It is known as the principle of Sarvātmabhāva, Brahmātmabhāva, Advaitabhāva or Sarvabhāva. The principle is most beautifully laid down at one place in his commentary on one of the Upaniṣads: 'This (universe) is myself who am all—this identity with all is his highest state, the Ātman's own natural, supreme state'.² This is the nirupādhika svarūpa of the Ātman according to Śaṅkara, and describes it as it is in its essential nature.³ This is the principle of absoluteness or wholeness, or of Bhūmā as the Upaniṣads call it.⁴ This "wholeness" is identified with Bliss.⁵ The Ātman's own nature state of being pure, absolute Consciousness which exists for itself and is an end-in-itself—this is what is known in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara as

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- 1 Chand. S.B., VI.8.7, एतेन सदाख्यनात्मना आत्मवत्सर्वमिदं जगत् ।
Altareya. S.B., I. 1.1. सर्वज्ञो देवः आत्मानमेव आत्मानतरत्वेन जगद्रूपेण निमित्त-
मीत ।
- 2 Brhad. S.B., IV, 3. 20. अहमेवेदं सर्वोऽस्मीति मन्दते । स यः सर्वात्मभावः
सोऽस्यात्मनः परमोलोकः परम आत्मभावः स्वाभाविकः । Ibid. IV. 3. 21. सर्वक-
त्वमेवास्य रूपम् । Ibid. V. 1.1. यत्स्वरूपं पूर्णत्वं परमात्मभावम् ।
- 3 S. B., I. 1. 12.
- 4 Chand., VII. 23. 1; Brhad. IV. 3. 33.
- 5 Chand., VII. 23. 1.

Bliss. This Bliss is the supreme reality as also the supreme value. Knowledge cannot aspire after any reality which is more complete, more coherent, more expansive and more all-inclusive, in short, which has better claim to be an End-in-Itself. Will cannot hope for the attainment of an end which represents, in a better and more perfect way, the realization of our most sustained purposes and the satisfaction of our deepest and most permanent need, namely the need for liberation. This alone is fit to be an end-in-itself; and this alone is fit to be the end of a perfect Being, if we are permitted to extend the use of human language, which always retains the associations of time, to the timeless also.

The absolute consciousness which is called *Bhūmā* the great, is the consciousness which sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, except itself, for everything is its own self and "otherness" has no meaning for it. It is of the nature of the absolute consciousness to live an absolute life. *Ānanda* is another word for such a life with such a consciousness. The absolute consciousness, *Śaṅkara* points out, may be viewed as being "without any limiting adjuncts," as all the limiting adjuncts are its own expressions and a reality cannot be limited by its own self; it may alternatively regard itself as the self of all and identify itself with all as its limiting adjuncts, and thus be all.¹ Both the ways of expressing the principle of reality and value, according to *Śaṅkara*, mean the same, and are equally necessary and significant, as our judgments are always double-edged and both affirm and deny. Both the ways of characterizing the *Ātman* keep their eye on the truth that everything is the *Ātman*, that the so-called *anātman* is an expression of the *Ātman* and so, properly speaking, not an *anātman* at all. The principle of *Sarvātmabhāva* means that *Ātman* is *nirupādhiḥ* as well as *sarvopādhiḥ*.² It means that "I" am the "Self" of the entire universe in the same way as "I" am the "Self" of this particular body. To view the Self in this way is to view the Self in its "*nrvṛtṣeṣa*" form.³ Everything that does not stand the

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, II. 5. 15.

2 *ibid.*

3 *Ioa. S. B.*, 7.

test of wholeness, completeness, or individuality, or, in the words of Śaṅkara, falls short of the principle of Sarvātmabhāva or Sarvabhāva or Pūrṇatva, which for him is identical with the principle of Svārtha, is "little", is "mortal", i. e., imperfect, and possesses only a degree of reality and value. Brahman, which is the whole, the perfect, the sampūrṇam, is the reality itself, as also the supreme value. Of this it is not proper to say that it possesses reality or value.¹

Śaṅkara's principle of Sarvātmabhāva invites comparison with Bradley's principle of "inclusiveness", "harmony", or "internal coherence". The principle as treated by Bradley is a formal and abstract principle, purely intellectualistic in nature. The principle gives us no guidance as to the mode in which the harmony is realized in the Absolute Experience, because Bradley wants to define the Absolute on the basis of an empty principle of inclusiveness and harmony apart from our experience of the concrete worlds of morality, beauty, holiness, etc. Śaṅkara's principle of Sarvātmabhāva or Pūrṇatva is not an empty form of totality, and it does not represent a merely intellectualistic criterion. The principle is an embodiment of the nature of reality as it reveals itself to us in our own selves. Brahman is the pratyagātman, the inner self of every one of us, and it is this in its completeness and wholeness; and its absolute, non-dual, perfectly harmonious, and complete nature can be immediately experienced also. It is our Self. Bradley tries to extract from his logical principle of non-contradiction much more than it seems capable of yielding, and this he is able to do only by turning his logical principle into a metaphysical principle of perfection. Bradley uses "harmony", "non-contradiction", and "satisfaction" as alternative terms. Reality for him is not merely an internally coherent whole, it is *perfect* in every respect; it satisfies our whole being. But this metamorphosis of a logical principle into a principle of perfection is based on an act of faith for Bradley. He writes, "It is, after all, an enormous assumption that what satisfies us is real and reality has got to satisfy us." Śaṅkara is not required to base his metaphysics on any such "assumption" or act of

1 S. B. I. 1. 12.

faith because the principle of reality and value which he lays down expresses the very nature of the self, which represents for him the very type of what can be regarded as perfectly real and supremely valuable. This being the nature of the Self, the Self alone can satisfy itself, but only when it becomes *ātmaratīḥ*, *ātmakridaḥ*, *ātmamithuna* and *atmānanda*.¹ Bradley's passage from the definition of the real as internally coherent and harmonious to its conception as satisfying our whole being is based upon the assumption that "what satisfies is real." But this assumption is ultimately made to rest by Bradley on another principle, namely, "that the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole feels and wills and knows itself within us". This principle is the starting point of Śaṅkara's metaphysics, Brahman is to be realized as the *pratyagātman*, and only thus can it be known.² The merit of Śaṅkara's starting-point is that he begins with a principle about which there is the greatest logical certainty and axiological necessity and makes this the centre of reference in all further discussions. The Self is the *sarvam*, the *pūnam*, the test of all other reality and the measure of every other value. The Self in its infinite nature is *Ānanda* itself.

Just as heat and light constitute the very essence of fire and the sun, so Bliss is the very essence, the very *svarūpa*, of Brahman. Śaṅkara, agreeing with the Upaniṣads, says that Bliss is Brahman. The texts "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman"³, "Bliss Brahman"⁴, describe the very nature of Brahman. That very knowledge of Pure Intelligence which has been described above as Brahman is also Bliss.⁵ There is nothing in Śaṅkara to support Deussen's view that "besides Existence as the only positive quality of the esoteric Brahman, remains intelligence".⁶ Śaṅkara takes seriously that passage of the

1 Chand., VI. 25. 12.

2 Kena. S. B. II. 4. अतः प्रत्यगात्मतया विदितं ब्रह्म यदा तदा तन्मतं तत्सम्पन्नं नम् । Ibid., I. 4. आत्मानमेव निविशेयं ब्रह्म विद्धि ।

3 Brhad. S. B. III. 9. 28. 7.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 12. 1.

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 28, 7.

6 D. S. V., P. 212.

Upaniṣad in which everything is declared to come out of Bliss, to rest in it, and finally to dissolve in it. This Bliss, again, is not merely a negative something, as Deussen thinks. Bliss is the Absolute value and is also the Absolute reality. It is a state of perfect existence whose reality is not dependent upon the fulfilment of any other extraneous condition and derived from a source foreign to itself. This Bliss or Ānanda is the same as Mokṣa or Muktyavasthā. Śaṅkara rejects the Buddhistic conception of Mokṣa which consists in the extinction of consciousness. "This bliss which is the highest reality and which is characterized by the knowledge of the Ātman is centred in the Self. It is all peace. It is the same as liberation... It is unborn, because it is not produced like anything resulting from empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn which is the object sought by Knowledge. The knowers of Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brahman, as it is identical with that Reality which is omniscient."¹

In this Bliss the distinction between value and existence, is absent. This Bliss transcends the duality which is a characteristic feature of the world of finite existence. For it the distinction between the knower of the bliss and the bliss itself, which is valid everywhere else, loses all significance. As Brahman is advaita, non-dual, the oneness of value and fact, it is ill described as Ānandin in which ānanda inheres. Rāmānuja and others who insist upon viewing Brahman as Ānandamaya and also as Ānandavān are not able to give up the standpoint of the duality of value and reality. Śaṅkara takes care to point out that as bliss constitutes the very essence of Brahman, which is also eternal consciousness, "there is no sense in maintaining that it cognizes its own Bliss."² It is superfluous, he adds, in this case to distinguish between awareness and unawareness. If it is constantly aware of this bliss, then that is its nature. The above mode of stating the fact would be justified, if ever there was the possibility of its not knowing that Bliss, as for instance, a man knows himself

1 Mend. S. B., III. 47.

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 28, 7.

and another (by an act of will). Hence Brahman is Bliss itself, and not the owner or cognizer of it.¹

XIII

BRAHMAN AS SACCIDĀNANDA

The universe is thus grounded in the supreme values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda; it has being by participation in divine life, divine wisdom, and divine bliss. It is an involution of the one life of the Absolute Good. "The subtle essence that has been described as 'Being', the root of the Universe, in that has all this its Self; and not any other belonging to the world...And that in which all this has its Self is what is called 'Being', the cause of the Universe, the True, the Supreme Being. Hence that is the Self of the universe."² The universe has its roots in Being, it rests in Being, and is ultimately resolved into Being. Things are sanmūlā, sadāyatanā, sadāśryā, satpratiṣṭhā.³ Brahman is Satyasya Satyam. Brahman is not only the Being which sustains everything; it is also the Light which illumines the universe.⁴ The universe lives on particles or fractions of the supreme Bliss. "The lower degrees of Bliss have only emanated from the supreme bliss in the dual form of subject and object."⁵ In the supreme bliss all differences cease; even the distinction between bliss and its possessor vanishes; the anandin becomes one with ānanda itself.⁶

Brahman is thus Saccidānanda and as such is the very Self or essence of the universe, which is grounded in the absolute values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss. That passage of the Upaniṣad which speaks of Ānanda as the highest reality and, as such, the source of all existence, is quoted by Śaṅkara as the final word (nirṇayavākya) regard-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 33, आनन्दानन्दिनोरभेद निर्देशाच्चाप्तिरभूत्, etc; Taill. S. B., II. 8. 4, स एष परमानन्दः स्वाभाविकोऽद्वैतत्वादानन्दानन्दिनोऽश्वा-विभागोऽत्र ।

2 Chand S. B., VI. 8 7.

3 ibid, VI. 8. 4

4 S. B., II. 3. 22; I. 1. 24.

5 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 33, परमानन्दस्यैवेयं विषयविषय्याकारेण मात्रा प्रसूतेति ।

6 ibid.; Chand. S. B., VIII. 12. 1.

ing the truth about Brahman. "From Bliss these beings are born; by Bliss, when born, they live; into Bliss they enter and become one with it."¹ Infinite Bliss embodies within it perfect Existence and absolute Awareness. Existence is not thinkable except in relation to an absolute Consciousness. Bliss, similarly, will be a word without meaning, unless it is the perfect embodiment of a conscious experience. "The Buddhistic assumption that the extinction of consciousness is the highest end of human life is untenable", according to Śaṅkara.² Brahman, thus, is the oneness and inseparability, in one indivisible and perfect consciousness, of the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. It is Saccidānanda.

Dāussen misses the truth in Śaṅkara when he is led to the view that the characterization of Brahman as Saccidānanda is nowhere found in Śaṅkara's commentary and appears to be as yet unknown to the author; and that this mode of naming Brahman is peculiar to "the later Vedānta."³ Śaṅkara is definite on the point that the scriptural texts which aim at intimating the nature of Brahman ascribe to it various characteristics such as "having bliss" for its nature, being one "mass of consciousness, being omnipresent, being the Self of all; and these characteristics, bliss and the rest, are all of them to be understood in each place wherever Brahman is spoken of."⁴ Accordingly Thibaut's contention that the definition of Brahman as Saccidānanda which is "current" in "later Vedāntic writings" is "of an altogether different type" from what we have when it is defined in the *Brahma Sūtra* as "Janmādyasya Yataḥ, "is without any force."⁵ For Śaṅkara the definition of Brahman as "that from which the origin", etc.,⁶ is only meant to bring out that the value of "Existence" is an absolute and intrinsic value and the category of causality is a development of it. Govindānanda has been able to catch the real spirit of Śaṅkara's thought, when he says that Truth, Consciousness, Bliss, Ātman, and Brahman—these five words are

1 S. B., I. 1. 2.

2 Brhad.S.B., IV. 3.7.

3 D.S.V., P. 212.

4 S.B., III.3.11.

5 P. XCII.

6 S.B., I. 1.2.

always to be understood as going together in any characterization of the real.¹

These values can be directly intuited. Intuition alone can give us a direct, first-hand awareness of the reality and substantiality of these values. To one who had never had an immediate acquaintance with the values of sat, cit, and ānanda, neither Śaṅkara nor any one else could intelligibly convey what these values are, because they can be apprehended only by the most incommunicable and intimate personal intuition. They are grasped by direct vision and apprehended by immediate acquaintance, and not by discursive reasoning.² Anubhava is the only means of knowledge so far as these values are concerned.³

According to Śaṅkara, Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are not qualities or properties which are possessed by Brahman as their substance or substratum. Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṅkara's explanation of Brahman's nature as Saccidānanda misses the truth which Śaṅkara is intending to bring out, namely that in the absolute the distinction between essence and existence is transcended and the latter is inseparable from the former. Rāmānuja attempts to explain the relation between Brahman and the qualities of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda by his theory of viśeṣya and viśeṣaṇa or substance and attribute. According to Rāmānuja the unity of these attributes is not an absolute unity, but one of inherence. Brahman is the substance in which the qualities of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda inhere. There is distinction between the substance and the attributes as well as between the attributes themselves. Brahman, for Rāmānuja, is not jñānasvarūpa merely: it will not do to say simply that jñāna is the very essence of Brahman. Brahman is jñānaguṇāśraya, the substance which supports the attribute of jñāna, the two being different from each other, the substance being the basis and the quality that which depends upon it or inheres in it. For Śaṅkara the reality of a thing consists in its essence and is inseparable from it; the reality of the substance is inseparable from the attributes

1 Ratnaprabha on S.B., III, 3.13.

2 S.B., I.1.2; IV, 1.2

3 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

which are regarded by discursive thought as depending upon or inhering in it. To view the reality of a thing as a substance possessing qualities which are other than it is not to view the thing as it knows itself or would know itself, if it could; it is to impose a distinction upon the real which is foreign to it but which, according to Śaṅkara, the real takes upon itself without giving up its nature. To understand the meaning of this self-imposed distinction is, according to Śaṅkara, to understand the mystery of the process of creation. Accordingly, Śaṅkara regards Brahman not as the underlying substance in which the attributes of Sat, Cit and Ānanda inhere, but as these values themselves in their absolute and inseparable oneness and unity, which unity is not marred by the flux of events and the flow of time. Rāmānuja, while believing that Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are the very essence (svarūpa) of Brahman, and thus virtually acknowledging the position adopted by Śaṅkara, namely, that essence and reality are one and inseparable, is still haunted by the opposite idea of the duality of the two. Rāmānuja's explanation of the characterization of Brahman as Saccidananda is determined and necessitated by the feeling, which he is not able to shake off, that Sat, Cit and Ānanda are, after all, mere values or essences, and need something real to support them or render their actuality possible. The metaphysics of Rāmānuja betrays that he is trying to serve two masters. On the one hand, he tries to persuade himself to believe that in God all oppositions and conflicts are overcome, and all distinctions transcended; in other words, that in Him essence and existence become one and inseparable; on the other hand, he likes to think that He is more real than his essence. There is an unreconciled opposition in Rāmānuja's mind between two rival tendencies of thought. His metaphysics bears the unmistakable stamp of the duality of value and reality; and the word "Viśiṣṭādvaita" sums up the zealous effort on his part to continue to remain faithful to both masters. If Brahman is to be conceived as a Substance possessing quality, the dualistic standpoint has reinforced itself. This unreconciled opposition between value and reality is the bane of all the metaphysical systems discussed and criticized by Śaṅkara in the Tarkapada.

Rāmānuja wrongly thinks that Śaṅkara, in insisting that Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are not the qualities of Brahman but its very essence, is laying himself open to the charge that Brahman becomes characterless. Śaṅkara knows as well as Rāmānuja that everything which is said to be known must have some character by which it is known. We cannot say that things have no natural properties at all.¹ Everything has a nature of its own.² When Śaṅkara says that Brahman is nirguṇa, he does not mean that it is characterless. He simply means that in Brahman essence cannot be distinguished from existence. The ruling idea of Rāmānuja's metaphysics, that things have a definite nature as distinct from their existence, prevents him from appreciating the point which Śaṅkara is endeavouring to emphasize, that essence and existence are one and inseparable. Accordingly his criticism that Upaniṣadic passages like "Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" do not relate to the absolute and unqualified Brahman is wide of the mark. Sat, Cit and Ānanda are the very essence of a thing and the thing itself. Brahman is the same as Brahmanbhāva; the reality of a thing consists in its essence.³ Brahmanbhāva is Mokṣa or Liberation; this Mokṣa is Brahman itself.⁴ The characterization of Brahman as Saccidānanda sums up Śaṅkara's monism of the Good. Far from rendering Brahman characterless, it explains the character of Brahman, so far as it is possible for human language, with its inherent limitations to, do so.

The words Sat, Cit and Ānanda do not merely describe what Brahman is not, as Rāmānuja supposes. These values are realities and as such positive in essence. Rāmānuja understands Śaṅkara to mean that "all things, which are by nature opposed to Brahman, are negated by these three words (Existence, Knowledge, Infinity).⁵ According to him Sat means that Brahman is other than that which is unreal; Cit means that Brahman is other than that which is non-intelli-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 6.

2 *ibid.* IV. 3. 20.

3 Gita. S. B., II. 16. तद्भावाः तत्त्वम् ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 4, ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । S. B., III. 4. 52, ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्त्यवस्था ।

5 R. B., I. 1. 1.

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gent; Ānanda means that Brahman is not of the nature of pain. Śāṅkara does not believe that Brahman can only be negatively described as the other of its own otherness. The values are bhāvarūpa; Mokṣa, which is Brahman itself, the absolute Reality and the absolute Good, is something positive.¹ Śāṅkara anticipates this misunderstanding and takes care to remove it. He is aware that "it may be argued that the words Satyam, etc., are used only as mere negations of 'falsehood,' etc."² His rejoinder is that the words Satyam, etc., are meant to point out the nature of Brahman. The words 'Satya' and "Jñāna" indicate something positive; the word Ananta, of course, is negative, as it purports to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman.³ According to Śāṅkara, Brahman is not to be described in a negative way merely. It can also be positively characterized, as it is an existent reality (bhūta-vastu).⁴ The words "Knowledge", 'Bliss', directly describe Brahman.⁵

XIV

THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE VALUES OF SAT

CIT AND ĀNANDA

The values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are absolute and intrinsic values. Brahman as the embodiment of these absolute values is said to be ananta, infinite, unlimited. According to Śāṅkara the limiting conditions of objects are time, space, and substance. These conditions do not affect the reality of the values, which, on the other hand, are foundational to any conception of a spatio-temporal order of phenomena. Brahman is thus said to be above the distinctions and limitations of space and time; and its nature can be expressed only in a non-spatial and non-temporal idiom.⁶ When he says that Brahman is above the distinctions of space and time, what

1 Tatt. S. B., I. 1. 1. मोक्षस्य भावस्वरूपम् ।

2 Ibid., II. 1. 1.

3 Ibid., I. 1. 1.

4 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 27.

5 Ibid., III. 9. 28. 7.

6 Chond. S. B., VIII. 1. 1. दिग्देशकालादिभेदशून्यं ब्रह्म । S. B., I. 1. 4.

he means to bring out is that the reality of a thing is constituted by its value and the thing is inseparable from the value. At no point of time is it possible to have a real thing which is without its value. Time cannot rend asunder value and existence. That is why, according to Śaṅkara, the essence of a thing is eternal and can never be made; and the essence or *svabhāva* of a thing alone can be said to be eternal. It cannot be the result of activity. Even if we suppose that the real is made at a particular hour and the essence created at some point of time, the intelligibility of our supposition will depend upon the acknowledgement of the value of Existence or Sat. The conception of an individual thing already presupposes the reality of the value of existence. The idea of substance is but a development of this value. Creation, implying the idea of temporal sequence, does not explain existence and render it intelligible. On the other hand, the very rationality of the idea of creation or change and succession is bound up with the acknowledgement of the value of Existence, that is, of a reality which is not subject to change but which renders change possible. Brahman is not explained by time. Time itself stands in need of Brahman. Eternity is not rendered intelligible by temporality. The latter itself stands in need of the former. Change does not explain essence. Essence, on the other hand, is needed to account for change. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that Brahman is not something which is 'effected' or created, and hence it is something which is unlimited in time.¹

The values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda, being the very essence of Brahman, cannot be deduced from anything else. They are irreducible to existential or non-value terms. They are not something which is to be accomplished, but which is eternally real. "Mokṣa (which is the same as Brahman) differs from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state; it is eternal in the sense that it does not undergo any change; it is self-sufficient and not relative to anything."² The absolute value is not something which is derivative; it is not the effect of religious merit. If it were

1 Tatit, S. B., II. 1. 1. अकार्यं च ब्रह्म तस्मात्कालतोऽस्यानन्तम् ।

2 S.B., I. 1.4. अनुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणम् ।

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assumed to be the effect of some action, it would be non-eternal, and the deliverance of consciousness, on the one hand, and the rationality of the intellect oriented towards the Good, on the other, would be set at nought. This absolute Good is not relative to time, place and any special causes.¹ For Śaṅkara the values are solely a matter of acknowledgment. They are realities, and the function of knowledge is simply to reveal them. Scripture cannot create these values; it can only reveal them as they are.

Nor is it within the power and scope of human agency to create them. Values are not *karmasādhya*, says Śaṅkara. They are intrinsic and absolute. Ātman, being the same as Mokṣa or Brahman, is spoken of by Śaṅkara as "akarmaśeṣa".² One who is not able to see that the driving force of Śaṅkara's thought is not merely ontological, but rather axiological, will be bewildered by his statement that Ātman is not the effect of activity. Śaṅkara's language here is made up of a value idiom; and in other passages also we find him speaking the same language. Thus Brahman is said to be *asādhya*, not something to be brought about; it is *nityasiddha svabhāva*, something the nature of which is permanently established; it is *muktyavasthā* itself, the state of final release; it is the *param puruṣārtha*, the highest good; it is *heyopadeyaśunya*, not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after; it is *āśarīratvam*, disembodied state of existence; it is *sarvātma-bhāva*, consciousness of universal self-hood; it is *ānanda*, bliss and *abhaya*, fearlessness.

More generally Śaṅkara makes use of what may be called ontological language, but his essential insight is not darkened by this change in the expression. Brahman is primarily the axiological principle in Śaṅkara, and is ontological only in being the former, because the identity of value and reality is the essence of his Advaitism. Thus on the same page where Brahman's nature is described in a language which derives its idiom from the realm of values, we find Śaṅkara indifferently making use of qualifications and characterizations which

1 S.B., IV 1.13. न देशकालनिमित्तापेक्षो ।

2 Iia S.B., Introduction. तेषामकर्मण्यस्यात्मना यायात्प्रकाशकत्वात् ।

are suited to a reality the truth of which is constituted by substance and not by essence. But in the case of Brahman both the idioms are equally significant and equally necessary. They serve to remind the reader constantly that here we have to do with a reality in which essence and existence or value and fact come together and meet in one. Śaṅkara's commentary on the fourth sūtra is an illustrious example of a style in which both kinds of idioms, axiological and ontological, alternate and mingle and fuse in one. The same Brahman which has been described above in a language which reminds us that it is an essence is spoken of as a bhūtavastu, an existent reality; as the Ātman, the Self of every one; as the Puruṣa, as the Sākṣin, the Witness; as Nityasuddhabuddhamukta Svabhāvam, one who is permanent in all beings, uniform, imperishable, eternally unchanging and pure and free. It is one of the cardinal contentions of Śaṅkara against the Mīmāṃsakas that there is an eternally existent reality and an eternally accomplished good. Brahman is this reality as well as this good. It is the Mukta as well as Muktyavasthā. It is Asādhyam as well as Nityasiddhasvabhāvam. It is Existence as well as the Existent. It is Consciousness as well as the Conscious Being. It is both these, because both are one ultimately.

If this Good or Bliss which is liberation were an effect or modification of something else, if it depended upon the action of body, mind or speech it would be non-eternal, for we observe in life that things which are modifications, curd and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, are noneternal.¹ Śaṅkara is opposed to every attempt to give relational definitions of value. Values, according to him, are presupposed in any attempt to define them or to derive them. They cannot, therefore, be said to be a consequence of human activity. They must then be regarded as eternal, and this must be their inherent nature. Every philosophy of value will have to acknowledge the absoluteness and eternality of it.² This acknowledgement will form the starting point of every philosophic enterprise. Value is not something which is to be acquired, or to be ceremonially purified.

1 Tatit. S.B., I. 1.1. S.B., I. 1.4,

2 S. B., I. 1. 4. नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैः मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

Ceremonial purification will consist either in the accretion of some excellence or the removal of some blemish. There is nothing which can add excellence to the absolute good; all objects in the universe derive the gift of being valued from this absolute good. Our thought and conduct are forced to accept the view, and act upon the conviction, that value is a logically and ontologically primitive concept, and that any attempt to define it by relating it to anything which is not a value is bound to be a failure, because it will already take for granted valuableness as an intrinsic quality.¹ We cannot think of purifying the absolute good by "the removal of some blemish". This definition will likewise be circular in character. Therefore Śaṅkara says that "it is not possible to show any other way in which Liberation could be connected with action; it is impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge".² In one word, Śaṅkara's meaning is that values are intrinsic, absolute, and to be acknowledged as such. The organic relation which Śaṅkara has established between Mokṣa and knowledge is simply another way of expressing the truth that values are solely a matter of acknowledgement. The function of jñāna is only to reveal things and it is only an already existent reality that can be revealed. Jñāna or knowledge alone has relevance so far as the realization of the Supreme Good is concerned. The criticism levelled against Śaṅkara that knowledge alone cannot bring about the attainment of the summum bonum and must be aided by action or karma misses the real truth which he wants to emphasize, namely that Value is not relative to anything and is solely a matter of acknowledgement. His criticism of jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda is really a criticism of the view which is satisfied with a relational definition of value.

Just as Values are not limited by time and defy temporal characterizations, similarly they enjoy infinity in space and in substance also. Spatial relations do not enter into the constitution of the nature of the values, and consequently they cannot render it intelligible. On the other hand, space

1 *ibid.* अनाध्यातृशयस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।

2 *ibid.* ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियायामन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ।

itself presupposes these values. All possible positions in space presuppose the value of Existence or Sat. Values cannot be located in space. The idea of space itself derives its intelligibility from the value of Existence. Brahman is thus the ground and source and presupposition of space. It is, therefore, not limited by it. Living organisms, stellar formations, the building up of cosmos, destruction and catastrophe, all presuppose space, which, in its turn, presupposes Existence as an absolute value. Values are unlimited in substance also, because they are the essence of all individual substances. Beginning with the mineral and vegetable kingdoms, and passing through the animal to the human, we find a progressive embodiment of the values of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. These very values form the essence of other orders of beings, the manes, the celestial minstrels, the karmadevas, the ajānadevas, that is the gods by birth the Virāj, and the Hiranyagarbha. Brahman, the absolute value, is not wholly different from its individual embodiments. It is the existence of a thing different from another which limits this latter thing. Where there is the cognizance of a different thing, there we turn away from that thing. When we turn away from a thing, there is the end of that thing. Since the consciousness of a cow is turned away by that of a horse, the "cow" marks the limit or end of the "horse." But Brahman is not other than anything else, because it is the essence of everything, its very self, and a thing is nothing, apart from its essence. Brahman is thus unlimited in substance also.¹

Brahman, being the cause of space, is unlimited in space; it is unlimited in time, because it is not the effect of a cause; and it is unlimited in substance, because there is nothing distinct from it. Hence also it is pre-eminent truth.² Values are above all distinctions of space and time. They are thus infinite. Being the presuppositions of all rational thinking and living, they are absolute and solely to be acknowledged as such. This is why Śaṅkara says that Brahman is 'free from all limitations of space and time and without a second'; and

1 Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1. वस्तुतोऽप्यानन्त्यम् ।

2 *ibid.*

spatial and temporal differences cannot even be imagined to enter into the supreme Self.¹

The way in which Śāṅkara characterizes Ātman, Brahman and Mokṣa leaves no room for doubt about their identity and their nature as values and not mere existents. Thus Mokṣa is spoken of "as different from all the fruits of action, and as an eternally and essentially disembodied state; eternal without undergoing any change, omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature[it is the same as Brahman, and if it were regarded as supplementary to certain actions and be assumed to be their effect, it would be non-eternal. Release is not something to be ceremonially purified. It is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added.² Ātman is characterized in the same way: "Ātman is not connected with karma or action. The true nature of it consists in its purity being untouched by sin, oneness, being eternal, having no body, omnipresence. Nor is the true nature of the Ātman thus defined, a product, a modification, a thing to be attained or a thing to be refined; nor is it of the nature of a doer or enjoyer so that it may be viewed as connected with action."³ "The Puruṣa which is the subject of the Upaniṣads is not a complement to anything else...It is permanent in all transitory beings, uniform, one, eternally unchanging, the Self of everything. It can neither be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided."⁴ Brahman is spoken of in the same way. "Brahman is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions. Brahman is Release itself. It is the Ātman.⁵ The consciousness of universal selfhood is the very essence of Brahman beyond all the attributes of saṁsāra."⁶

1 Chānd. S. B., VIII. 1. 1; S. B., IV. 3. 14.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 Isa. S. B., 1.

4 S. B., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid.

6 Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1.

Is Value definable? Śaṅkara's answer would be both "yes" and "no". Value cannot be defined in terms of anything else. It can only be defined in terms of itself. If we stick to the traditional view that definition should be per genus et differentiam, values are indefinable. Brahman is not a species which can be referred to a higher class and differentiated from other species included in it with the help of differentia. "Differentia" is what Śaṅkara calls viśeṣaṇa. A viśeṣaṇa is defined by him as a quality which serves to distinguish the qualified thing from all others belonging to the same class.¹ When there are many things of the same class having various attributes, then only has any of these qualifications a meaning, and not when the thing qualified is only one of its class, for in this latter case, there is no necessity of any limitation by way of definition. Satyam, Jñānam and Ānandam are not meant to qualify Brahman; they are not its differentia.² They constitute its very nature. They can, therefore, be regarded as the lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Lakṣaṇa, according to Śaṅkara, serves to distinguish that of which it is a lakṣaṇa from the whole world.³ Though Brahman cannot be defined in terms of a concept or of an existent, it is not true to say that its nature cannot be made intelligible to us. These values constitute the very essence of every one of us, and thus we have an inward awareness of them.

As in Brahman value and being come together and fuse in one, Brahman is said to be advaita by Śaṅkara. Brahman is above all duality, duality of value and existence, of Self and not-self, of ideal and actual, of is and ought.⁴ This is variously described by calling it advaita, nirguṇa, nirupādhika, nirviśeṣa, advayam.⁵ Because it is above all duality, its nature cannot be described in terms of any of the particulars. Its nature is occasionally explained by calling it "neti", "neti", "not this", "not this".⁶ As it is advaita, the supreme value, it is a matter of acknowledgement, and not proof. It

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 *Chand. S. B.*, VII. 24. 1.

5 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, III. 8. 12.

6 *ibid.*, II. 3. 2.

is the basis of all proof. It is aprameya, i. e., not an object of any of the means of knowledge.

XV

THE NINTH-CENTURY DUEL BETWEEN VEDĀNTA AND MIMĀṂSA

"Value cannot be defined in relational terms": this is the essence of Śāṅkara's criticism of the position of the Mimāṃsakas in his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra of the First Adhyāya.¹ The problem was hotly discussed in the history of Indian philosophy as far back as the ninth century. It formed the real issue between the Mimāṃsakas on the one hand and the Vedāntins with Śāṅkara at their head, on the other. The point of controversy between them was the following; "Does Scripture deal with 'action' merely or with 'existing realities' also?" And when it deals with existing realities, does it deal with them as having independent significance or as being connected with and subordinate to injunctions of action?² At first sight the controversy appears to be a barren one, because it centres round a problem which is nothing more than the right interpretation of the texts of the Vedas; and the student of philosophy is not likely to take it seriously, considering it to be a relic of scholasticism. But the point at issue is of the greatest philosophical interest, only its manner of formulation is antiquated. It only needs expression in a more modern idiom before it can make us realize the deep philosophical issue involved.

According to the Mimāṃsakas no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning except in so far as it is related to an action; only Vedic sentences signifying an action have authority as Śabda pramāṇa. A sentence is devoted to an action when it says that a certain thing is to be done through such and such means in a particular way. Injunctions which are defined by them as having "actions" for their objects cannot refer to "accomplished existent things";

¹ तत्तुल्यमन्वयात् ।

² S. B., I. 1. 4.

'hence such terms as the Supreme Self God, Brahman have not the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences'. The Vedānta passages whose purport is not action are purportless; and if they are to have any sense, they should be considered to be either supplementary to the passages enjoining action, or themselves enjoining a new class of actions such as devout meditation. "Existent reality" (bhūta-vastu) is not the subject-matter of the Vedas. And whenever they teach about Brahman, they do so only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. Just as the Agnihoṭa oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so devout meditation (Upāsana, which is a kind of action) on Brahman is enjoined upon one who wants to attain final release. Final release, or Mokṣa, which is the Summum Bonum, is the fruit of "action" implying agent and means. This Summum Bonum is not a thing which is actually existent, but is to be brought about by effort. It is something which is "bhavya" and not "bhūta".

According to Śaṅkara, on the other hand, the Vedas deal not only with "actions" and injunctions and prohibitions in connection with them but also with eternally existing objects. "To say that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things is a mere bold assertion."¹ There are parts of the Vedas which purport to make statements about mere existent things which are not relative to "action"; and these parts of the Vedas are neither an injunction nor a prohibition, nor supplementary to either. There are also prohibitions which have just the aim of communicating the real nature of a thing; there is not the least connection of human activity with them.² Brahman is such an existent thing (bhūta vastu), and it is the same as eternal liberation (Mokṣa). It is the aim of the Vedas to impart instruction about this Brahman. It is not to be brought about but is an accomplished fact, is different from fruits of action, is not subject to time, and is independent of human effort and volition. "It follows that the Śāstra cannot be the means of knowing Brāhman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions; and the doctrine that,

1 S.B., I. 1. 4.

2 Brhad. S.B., I. 3. 13.

on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedānta texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted,¹ is thereby fully established. Hence there is justification for beginning the new Śītra indicated in the First Sūtra, 'Then, therefore the inquiry into Brahman'."

Translated into a more modern idiom, the position of the Mimāṃsakas amounts to this: Value can be defined only in relational terms. Values are to be achieved by effort; they are dependent upon human activity, and are relative to sādhanā. The statement "that no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning except in so far as it is related to action, and that no part of the Vedas deals with 'existent reality' except when it treats that reality as relative to action" is but another way of saying that there is no absolute Value. Value is relative to volitional life of man. It is the fruit of human effort and endeavour. Value is the sādhya; human effort is the sādhana. This relativity of value is expressed in different ways. Value is not an accomplished object;² it is something which has to be brought about; it is relative to activity;³ it is dependent upon human effort and volition;⁴ it is a product,⁵ an effect,⁶ something depending on modification⁷, and a result of meritorious action.⁸ Here Śaṅkara joins issue with the Mimāṃsakas and proceeds to establish his theory that value is a logically primitive concept and cannot be defined in terms of any thing else nor can it be reduced to simple entities or relations of such entities. Śaṅkara's contention is that the halting logic of the Mimāṃsaka does not enable him to see that any definition of value in relational terms is bound to be circular in character. In any such definition the concept of value is already presupposed. A value which is the product of human activity, the result of

1 S. B. I. 1. 4. स्वतन्त्रमयं ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकम् ।

2 मध्य

3 अनुष्ठानापेक्षम्

4 पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्

5 उत्पाद्य

6 विकार्य

7 संस्कार्य

8 धर्मकार्य

meritorious action, cannot but be relative, and therefore unable to stand alone. Therefore Śaṅkara says that there can be no stability in such a value. "Noneternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions"—namely that Release is "something to be effected" or "a mere modification." For Śaṅkara inquiry into Brahman has nothing in common with the inquiry into religious duty. The subject-matter of the one is absolute value, or inherent worth; and the other concerns itself with values which are extrinsic, instrumental, and relative. The "good" which the Mīmāṃsaka points out is the relative good. "The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make themselves felt to body, speech and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the object, and affect all animate beings from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all embodied creatures from man upward to Brahmā....Those who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation (vidyāsamādhiviśeṣāt), on the northern path; while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path."² The main thesis of Śaṅkara in his commentary on B. S. 1. 1. 4. is the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā position that value is relational in character, and the substantiation of his own claim that it is absolute and underivable.

The issue raised here is a very vital one, but it is significant that Śaṅkara's remarks are confined to a review of the Mīmāṃsā position, and he is silent so far as other orthodox system of Hindu thought are concerned. What is the explanation of this? Why is it that Śaṅkara reserves his criticism of these systems for a later chapter? Has Śaṅkara's silence any meaning in it? Or is it the result of an accident? In the Tarkapāda, where he examines the metaphysical position of other systems and finds them wanting, he says nothing

1 S. B., I. 1. 4.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

regarding the position of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Is this omission also the result of chance, or is it deliberate? Śaṅkara's silence in both these places has a significance which it will be impossible to discover unless we remind ourselves that Śaṅkara's whole philosophy is a philosophy of value, and the central question of his metaphysics is the relation between the highest value and the most truly real.

I have pointed out above that in his commentary on the first four sūtras he is giving an outline of his main thesis that value is a logically primitive concept. Value and reality are one and inseparable. All the orthodox systems of Hindu thought criticised in the *Tarkapāda* recognise in some sense or other that there are absolute values which are not reducible to relational terms. There is some absolute good—this is their common thesis. All of them, without any exception, agree in holding that the Vedas deal with "eternally existing realities".¹ So far as their belief in the reality of this absolute good is concerned, Śaṅkara whole-heartedly agrees with them and has nothing to say against it. This is exactly what he himself is endeavouring to establish. There was thus no occasion to introduce a discussion of the philosophical position of these systems at a stage where he was solely concerned with the substantiation of the doctrine of absolute values, and the refutation of the position that they can be defined only in relational terms. *Mīmāṃsā* is the only system of orthodox Hindu thought which does not believe in a value which is real in itself and not dependent upon human effort and volition. The *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* believe in the reality of an order of existence which is nothing but the state of the self in its original and natural purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. *Sāṅkhya* believes that *puruṣa* is eternally free; its bondage is only phenomenal. *Yoga* has a firm faith in the possibility of *Kaivalya* or absolute independence, and its *Īśvara* is an embodiment of this perfection, being beyond both good and evil.

According to Śaṅkara, this is the essence of the entire teaching of the Vedas, and in the realisation of this absolute Good lies the perfection of human achievement. But the

1 S.B., I. 1.5.

task of philosophy does not end with the recognition that there are absolute values; it has also to define the relation in which values should be conceived to be standing to what can be regarded as the ultimately real. What is the relation in which Conscious life stands to this absolute Good? Is there any point where these two come together? Is there a permanent divorce between reality and value; and do they always remain strangers to each other? Śaṅkara merely mentions in his commentary on the Catuṣṣūtrī that value and reality are one; Brahman who is the source of all reality is also that which is most highly valuable. The development of this idea is reserved for the subsequent chapters. Śaṅkara does not agree with the other orthodox systems in their views regarding the relation in which reality and value stand to each other: they, according to Śaṅkara, are always haunted by an irreconcilable dualism between the two, and this is the bane of their systems. They are all systems of dvaita. But the truth is advaita, oneness of value and reality. It is this dualism, a permanent feature of these systems, with which Śaṅkara cannot reconcile himself; and it is this which constitutes the subject-matter of his attack in the Tarkapāda.

Herein he establishes his position by advancing arguments to show that Brahman which is the highest Good is the *cause* of the entire universe of name and form, and is the *Atman* of everything and everybeing. Herein he also demolishes the position of the rival thinkers who, while agreeing with him in admitting the reality of an absolute and transcendent good, differ from him vitally in their insisience that the ultimately real is different from the "Self" of living beings, thus virtually accepting the creed that there is a discrepancy between value and reality, the ideal and the real, which can never be overcome. The Mīmāṃsā system of thought does not believe in the absolute nature of value, and therefore the question of the relation between value and reality does not arise for it. Hence also Śaṅkara's silence in the Tarkapāda about the Mīmāṃsā system, which does not call for any comment because it has nothing to say regarding the problem which Śaṅkara is discussing there, the problem, namely, of the relation between the highest good and the most supremely Real.

CHAPTER III

THE REAL AS THE SUMMUM BONUM

THE GOAL OF HUMAN ENDEAVOUR

As reality or self cannot be denied, its acknowledgement being a necessity of rational thought, similarly it cannot be denied that there is some highest Good towards the realization of which our whole endeavour is directed and in whose attainment consists the perfection of human achievement. According to Śaṅkara there is some supreme value which represents the realization of our most sustained purposes and the satisfaction of our deepest and most permanent desires. "How does a man attain or forfeit eternal salvation?"—this is the central problem of Śaṅkara's philosophy. The earnestness with which an endeavour is made to reach a solution and the seriousness and sincerity with which the whole inquiry is conducted lend to his writings a grandeur and grace which are rarely to be met with in philosophical works. Śaṅkara has himself realized that supreme good, and, animated by that certainty of self-realization, calls upon others to attain it for themselves. It is the one thing in life which, when attained, makes it meaningful, and leaves nothing further to be attained.

This highest good has been variously described by Śaṅkara. It is the summum bonum (*ātyantika niḥśreyasa*); it is the highest human good (*ātyantika puruṣārtha*); it is the eternally supreme value (*nitya niratiśaya śreyasa*); it constitutes the natural and therefore the timelessly real freedom (*svārājyam*); it is the cessation of man's transmigratory existence, and his elevation to a region above human cares and conflicts (*ātyantika saṁsārābhāvaḥ*); it is the realization of Brahman (*Brahmāvagatiḥ*), which is the same as the attainment of Brahman-consciousness (*Brahmabhū*). It is at once the removal of false knowledge and the knowing of the true nature of the self; it is the attainment of what is most beneficial

to man (*hitātama prāptih*); it is the eternally perfect good (*nityasiddha niḥśreyasa*); and the real immortality (*amītatva*). Those who have been able to realize this supreme good in their life bear testimony to the fact that its attainment is accompanied by a state which is one of supreme bliss and perfect peace. It is a state wherein one enjoys the consciousness of undivided existence, undivided from the Supreme Being (*pareṇavibhakta eva*), and of one's own universal selfhood (*sarvātmabhāva*). In short, it is the attainment of a state wherein one sees nothing other than one's own self and thus realizes everything in every possible way; and thus all striving after unattained ideals, all struggle and strife, is brought to a cessation.

For Śāṅkara it is the task of philosophy to give articulated expression to the nature of this supreme good and to point out the means which are best calculated to realise it in the conscious personal life of the individual. Philosophy, when it takes upon itself this supreme task of leading the individual directly to the vision of this good, is entitled to the name of *Paramārthavidyā*, the science of the Highest Good; and for Śāṅkara philosophy is nothing if it does not justify its claim to be *Paramārthavidyā*. Thus conceived, philosophy is indistinguishable from religion, and the highest principles of philosophy are the same as the highest principles of religion. As for Plato, so for Śāṅkara, the Good is the supreme object of the philosopher's study. For Plato it is the function of that ultimate discipline, "dialectic", to lead directly to the vision of the Good; for Śāṅkara the same is the mission of *Brahmavidyā*. For both the philosopher is "the spectator of all time and all existence", who sets his affections on that which really exists. The inquiry into Brahman has for its aim the highest beatitude" (*Niḥśreyasa-prayojana*), and Brahman, which is the object of the inquiry, "is that which really exists, is eternal and does not depend on human energy" (*lihatu bhūtam Brahma jīṇāśyam nityatvānna puruṣavyāparatantram* S. B. 1. 1. 1.)

Complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest Good, since it destroys the root of all evil such as *avidyā*,

seed of the entire transmigratory, existence.¹ It is not the satisfaction of mere intellectual curiosity which constitutes the motive of Śaṅkara's investigation, which has its root in a far more deeply felt need of the spirit, the need for attaining the summum bonum. Śaṅkara's inquiry into the nature of Brahman is really an inquiry into the nature of the Summum Bonum, the Highest Good, the state of Liberation. This is the highest value and this alone possesses intrinsic significance. It is this Liberation (Mokṣa) which is the subject-matter of Śaṅkara's Vedānta.

II

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NOTION OF THE GOOD

In identifying Brahman, Ātman, Nihāreyasa, Mokṣa and Ānanda, Śaṅkara is taking a very momentous step such as was not taken by any systematic thinker previous to him. His is an entirely new way of approach to the fundamental problem of religion and philosophy. Like the Upaniṣadic thinkers, he reduces the problem of the realization of the summum bonum, of the highest good, of eternal beatitude, of oneness with God, which, in short, is the problem of religion, to the problem of knowing the true nature of the Ātman, which is the essence of the individual and the universe; and in doing this he created a revolution in the sphere of Hindu philosophic thought. The possibility of realizing the true nature of the Ātman alone, which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, is the possibility of realizing the summum bonum of life, which is the same as the realization of God or the attainment of Brahman.

This is an entirely fresh and original way of giving expression to the deepest need of the religious life and the philosophic consciousness alike. The essence of the former is the conservation, on the one hand, of conscious life, and, on the other, of those eternal values which have their foundation in that spiritual and conscious life. The demand of the

1 S. B., I. I. I

latter is the recognition of the reality of those supreme values in which the whole universe is grounded. In announcing to us that "the knowledge of Self is the only means of attaining absolute and supreme good"¹, and that "apart from the knowledge of self, there is nothing else that can accomplish absolute and supreme good"², he discloses his most intimate conviction regarding the inseparability of the highest good from the most truly real. The identity of Parmārthavidyā, Ātmavidyā and Brahmaidhyā is but the expression of the deeper identity of the "real" and the "good".

Śaṅkara's method of approach to the problem is essentially different from those of the rival systems of thought. The essence of religion, for Śaṅkara, is the realization of the supreme values of Existence, Bliss and Consciousness by the individual. Brahman is Existence, Bliss and Consciousness; and so the real problem of religion comes to be: what is the form in which the realization of Brahman should take place? Is Brahman to be realized as the controlling or the efficient cause of the world and all that it contains? Is it to be conceived as the divine architect who fashions the universe out of pre-existing materials by bending the recalcitrant nature of that material to his own sweet will by virtue of his superior skill and power? Is it to be regarded as a powerful monarch exercising unlimited sway over human souls, who have no choice but to bend their will to the "lawdry wrappings of his regal pomp"? Is it an indifferent Puruṣa unconcerned with human weal and woe? How, then, can such a God be a matter of human concern? Is he a God who is to be propitiated by offering worship and prayer and who, in return, will grant to the worshipper his choicest gifts and a permanent abode in his kingdom? Is the God of religion something foreign to and substantially different from the worshipper, like Viṣṇu, Īśvara, Indra, Prāṇa? Is he one who can be humoured by performing sacrifices in his name? Is Brahman to be realized as the Upāsya or as the very Ātman of the individual? This, then, is the issue which Śaṅkara raises in his philosophy of religion, and Brahmaidhyā is the

1 Chand. S. B. VIII. 1. 1.

2 ib.d.

discipline which at once contains the attempt to resolve it and constitutes the resolution.

The realization of the supreme good which is possible only in the personal life of the conscious individual is represented by a state of existence or an experience in which everything, even what appeared to be non-self, is fully reconciled to the Self. In the words of the Upaniṣads, it is an experience in which everything becomes the Self or Ātman. This renders the realization of the supreme good dependent on the comprehension of the true nature of the Ātman, and Śaṅkara, accordingly, reduces the former to the latter. *Parmārthavidyā* becomes *Ātmavidyā*.¹ The question: "What is the highest good?" resolves itself into the question: "What is the real nature of the Ātman?"² The rationality of the aspiration and the possibility of its realization are based upon the conviction that reality satisfies our whole being, and this carries with it the further conviction that the real is substantially one with each one of us and the real and the good are, in essence, identical. We cannot know the real except in our own Self, for it is the Self of every one of us.

Śaṅkara formulates the problem of philosophy sometimes as the realization of Ātman and sometimes as that of Brahman. While, in the introduction to his *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, he announces the purpose of the Vedānta to be "to teach the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman" (*Ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye*), in his commentary on the first sūtra of the work he lays down that "the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man. Hence inquiry into the nature of Brahman is desirable."³ The identity of the two vidyās and the oneness of their subject-matter is repeatedly shown to be the truth, and one can find innumerable statements to this effect dispersed throughout his works. (1) "The aim of knowledge and its relation to that aim have been stated in the sentence, 'It knew only itself, as, 'I am Brahman'. Therefore it became

1 S. B., I. 1. 1; Keno. S. B., II. 4; Chand. S. B., VII. 1. 1; *Alitareya*. S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1; I. 3. 19; II. 1. 3; III. 4. 2; Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3; VII. 1. 1; VIII. 11. 3; *Brhad.* S. B., I. 4. 7; II. 4. 1; Keno. S. B., I. 1.

3 S. B., I. 1. 1.

all. Thus it has been mentioned that the inner self (pratyagatman) is the subject-matter of Brahmanvidyā.¹ (2) "Brahman is the Supreme Self. That through which it is known is the Brahmanvidyā. Men think, "through that Brahmanvidyā we shall become all, excluding nothingBrahmanvidyā is sure to lead to identity with all."² (3) "The individual self is no other than the supreme Brahman, and all the Upaniṣads end by giving out this sole meaning."³ (4) "But the cause of that desire to attain the good and avoid the evil, that is, ignorance regarding the Self, has not been removed by the knowledge of the nature of the self as being identical with Brahman (Brahmātmāsvarūpa vijñānena).....Hence this Upaniṣad is commenced in order to inculcate the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmanvidyā pratipattiyarth) which is the very opposite of that."⁴ (5) "The Scripture itself excludes all other means of obtaining the highest beatitude except the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman."⁵ (6) "Liberation follows immediately on the knowledge of Brahman."⁶ (7) "From the knowledge of Brahman as the Ātman, there results the cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest end."⁷ (8) "The realization of the oneness of the Ātman is the culmination of all knowledge."⁸ and "without a comprehension of Brahman, there is no fulfilment of the ends (puruṣārtha) of man."⁹ "Apart from the knowledge of Paramātmā a man cannot attain what is most beneficial to him...It is only the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajñāna) which consumes all works."¹⁰ It is on account of the identity of the two vidyās that Śaṅkara uses the following terms indifferently to indicate one and the same discipline. Philosophy is Brahmanvidyā.¹¹ It is Brahmātmākatvavidyā,¹² Brahmātmākatvavijñāna¹³, Brahmavijñāna.¹⁴ It is likewise Ātmanavidyā,¹⁵ Ātmavi-

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 1.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 9.

3 Ibid., II. 3. 6.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 1.

5 S. B., II. 1. 3.

6 Ibid. I. 1. 4.

7 Ibid.

8 Katha. S. B., I. 2. P.

9 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

10 S. B., I. 1. 28

11 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 1. I. 4. 9., S. B., I. 2. 22., I. 3. 33., III. 1. 4., Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1., Alitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1.

12 Alitareya. S. B., III. 1. 1.

13 S. B., I. 1. 4.

14 S. B., I. 1. 28., III. 3. 1.

15 Kena. S. B., II. 4., Alitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1.

jñāna¹, Ātmaikatvavidyā², Parmātmañjñāna³, Ātmatattva⁴, Parmātmavidyā⁵. It may be called Vidyā alone.⁶ In a corresponding way the Sumum Bonum also is indifferently described in several ways. It is at once Brahmāvagatiḥ⁷, Brahmapratipattiḥ⁸, Brahmabhāva⁹, Brahmātmabhāva¹⁰. It is, likewise, Ātmalābha¹¹, Ātmaikatvadarsana¹², Ātmāvabodha¹³ and Sarvātmabhāva.¹⁴

III

ATMAN AS THE HIGHEST GOAL:

PURPOSE THE TIME-FORM OF VALUE

But it is just at this point, when we are assured that Ātman is the highest reality and the highest good, that a difficulty presents itself. The difficulty is that Ātman has been shown to be an already existent reality, a siddhavastu, which is solely a matter of acknowledgement; and if the summum bonum is identical with Brahman or Ātman, how can it be spoken of as something to be realized or to be attained? The justification of this way of thinking and this mode of speech lies in the fact that human experience, as we find it, presents and is marked by the duality of value and existence, of the Ātman and the anātman. With the consciousness of an "other", distinct and divided from the Self, there is a movement on the part of the self towards the attainment of what is away from and other than the self. The duality of the self and the not-self or of value and existence is the innermost meaning of time and of all forms of willing. Time-experience itself is an expression of unfulfilled craving. If there is no difference between "what is" and "what ought to be", there will be neither any willing nor any desiring. Where value and existence come together, where

1 S.B., I. 1.4., I. 1.12.

2 S.B., I. 1.1.

3 S.B., I. 1, 28.

4 Chand. S.B., VII. 1.1., VIII. 7.3.

5 S.B., III. 3.31., III. 3.34.

6 Kena S.B., III. 12., Chand S.B., VIII. 7.2., S.B., III. 4. 52,

7 S.B., I. 1.1., I. 1.5.

8 Kena. S.B., II. 1.

9 S.B., I. 1.4.

10 Ibid

11 Mund. S.B., III. 2.3.

12 S.B., I. 3.19.

13 Atareya. S.B., II. 1.1.

14 Ibid.

the Self and the not-self fuse into one, there is neither any willing nor any event.

But, as has already been shown in the previous chapter, according to Śaṅkara, the Self, the Ātman, alone can be regarded as ultimately real, as it alone can be said to exist for itself and to possess intrinsic value. Everything else has being in and through the Self. What appears as not-Self, as an anātmavastu, has its being in the Ātman. On account of the duality of value and existence or of Self and not-self, there is volition. As the Self is the only reality, and it is the Self which possesses intrinsic worth, it becomes the proper object of volition. So soon as the Self is valued and becomes the object of volition, it is turned into an end. The Self, which was a bhūtavastu and a matter of acknowledgement, becomes the paraśārtha, the highest end of man's endeavour. What was the supreme value becomes a purpose for the conative consciousness. This purpose is the time-form of value. The Ātman, which is the ens realissimum for the value-charged cognitive consciousness, becomes the summum bonum for the value-charged conative consciousness. The idea of "purpose" or "end", when we divest it of its temporal incidents, will pass into that of value.

The Ātman, which is the absolute reality, and which, being self-existent, is a matter of acknowledgement, becomes an "end" for the finite consciousness. It is the goal of human knowledge as well as the goal of human endeavour. Śaṅkara, therefore, says alternatively that the Ātman is to be known and that it is to be attained, and emphasizes that knowing the Ātman is the same as attaining it. Śaṅkara uses the words "jñāna" and "lābha" in the same sense.¹

In identifying the goal of knowledge with the goal of human endeavour, Śaṅkara has drawn his inspiration from the Upaniṣads, which view the real as a siddhavastu, as an accomplished reality, and also regard it as the sādhyā, one

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 4. तस्मिन्निराशङ्कमेव ज्ञानताभयोरेकार्थत्वं विवक्षन्नाह ज्ञानं प्रकृत्य अनुविन्देदिति । विन्देते ताभाषत्वात् । Mand. S. B. IV. 100; Mund. S. B., I. 1. 5.

to be realized. Brahman or Ātman is presented in the Upaniṣads as an already existent reality as well as something which is to be attained. The view of Brahman as the absolute reality is the view of an absolute value which is the ultimate ground of the universe, and in its cognition consists the highest achievement of the knowing faculty. Brahman is to be seen, known, cognized, comprehended. It is stated to be the knowable.¹ The verbs of which Brahman is made the object in the sentences which purport to describe its nature and call upon us to realize it are verbs which bear the significance of knowing.² The same Brahman is described as the highest good, and is presented as the object of the conative consciousness. In itself a siddhavastu, an already accomplished reality, it becomes the sādhyā for the aspiring soul. Śāṅkara speaks of the attainment of niḥśreyasa and the accomplishment of the good, of niḥśreyasaprāptiḥ and puruṣārtha-siddhiḥ. Brahman becomes the "labhya", as it is also the "veditavya".

The nature of this "good" as something worthy of being attained is expressed in different ways by the Upaniṣads. It is viewed as immortality (amṛtam), as eternal bliss (paramam sukham) and perpetual peace (śāntiḥ śāśvatī), as the final abode (paramam dhāma), as the supreme goal (parā gatiḥ), as the great place of Viṣṇu and the bridge of immortality (viṣṇoḥ paramam padam amṛtasya setuḥ).

Even the most casual reader of Śāṅkara's works, especially his Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya, cannot fail to observe that the knowledge of Brahman is said to be the only means to the attainment of the summum bonum, and, in its absence, there cannot follow the accomplishment of the highest end of man; and this Brahman is repeatedly said to be "the essence of things." He says, "As practical religious duty has to be inquired into, because it is the cause of an increase of prosperity, so Brahman has to be inquired into, because it is the cause of the attainment of absolute beatitude". And Brahman

1 Mund. S.B., III. 1.9; Chand. S.B., VII. 16.1.

2 पश्यति, ज्ञातुम्, मत्वा, वेद, दृश्यते, निबोधत, निवाच्य, ऐक्षत, विदित्वा, जानय, विजिज्ञागस्व, अनुविद्य ।

has been declared to be "that from which the origin. &c., of this world."¹ The inquiry into the nature of Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world, is really an attempt to discover a principle which is the source of all reality, which "holds all things together", and in doing so explains each and all of them. Philosophy is largely an effort to seek that one principle "by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known"², the principle through which, if it is known, all other things become known. This is the great "promise" of the Vedānta; and the fulfilment of this promise is the task which Śāṅkara sets before himself.

IV

TWO-FOLD REALIZATION OF BRAHMAN THE JNEYA AND THEU PASYA

As Brahman is the param Niḥśreyasa and the param Ātman, the truest and consequently the highest type of realization will be one in which the Self is experienced as an embodiment of the greatest good and the intensest reality; a realization in which the otherness of the absolute reality drops out, and the individual becomes one with the universal. The highest realization will be one in which Brahman is experienced as the very essence, the very Self, the very Ātman. But as our life and the world of our experience are marked not only by the oneness of essence and existence, but also by their duality and discrepancy, the realization of the oneness of Brahman and the individual self, or, in other words, the realization of Brahman as our very Self or essence and not something other, does not normally take place. Brahman is experienced and consequently viewed as something other than ourself. This experience of "otherness" embodies itself in different conceptions formed of Godhead and man's relations to it. The Real, which in essence is nothing other than or apart from Self, is experienced and conceived as the creator, the governor, the ruler, and as being wiser, more power-

¹ S. B., I. 4.23.

² Chand., VI. 1.3.

ful and more plentiful. It is worshipped as the Lord, as the Father in the heaven, as the mysterious and unknown Power, as the Law-giver who makes for righteousness. All these conceptions of God and Godhead imply that He is viewed as something other than our Self or Ātman.

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman can be realized in two and only two ways, and the diverse modes of worship and prayer-offering and supplication which are possible within human experience can ultimately be reduced to these two. Brahman can either be realized (i) as our very Self or Ātman, or (ii) as something other than and different from our Self or Ātman. There is no third way in which it is possible for man to have experience of God, and no other mode of experience which does not ultimately resolve itself into one or other of these two. The former mode of realizing Brahman is called Jñāna by Śaṅkara because it consists in experiencing and viewing Brahman as it is; and Jñāna according to Śaṅkara is vastutantram and means self-accordance or the accordance of anything with its real nature, its notion. The Brahman which is the subject-matter of this experience is called by him Jñeya Brahman. The latter mode of realizing Brahman is called Upāsana by Śaṅkara, Upāsana being conceived by him as an activity, and implying an effort on the part of the individual to view Brahman in a particular way, in terms of and with the help of certain qualities and characteristics borrowed from the world of our experience.

It follows from the very nature of upāsana, which is an activity, that upāsana presupposes and is inconceivable without an element of distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, and has meaning only in that sphere which is marked by the duality of value and existence, or, as Śaṅkara says, Self and its other, which, truly speaking, is not quite other. The Brahman which is the subject-matter of this type of experience is called by Śaṅkara Upāsya Brahman. The distinction which he draws between Nirguṇa and Saṅguṇa Brahman is really a distinction between Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, which distinction ultimately rests upon and is bound up with the two diverse ways in which one and the same reality is experienced. One is the way of Intuition, which

gives us an insight into the nature of the reality when we become one with it and experience it as it experiences itself. The other is the way of experiencing the reality in a semi-intuitive way, as particularized by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, which retains the otherness of the real in some sense. The first is the experiencing of Brahman absolutely, that is, as it is in itself, without having recourse to any medium or special form, which, according to Śaṅkara, is supplied by nāma and rūpa, the upādhis of Brahman. The second is the experiencing of Brahman as limited by name and form. The first is the Jñāna; the second, the Upāsanā of Brahman. "One and the same Brahman is taught by the Vedānta as forming an object of meditation or of knowledge, as the meditable or the knowable, according as it is connected with the limiting adjuncts or is free from such connections."

The distinction between Jñāna and Upāsanā is not a distinction between the cognitive experience on the one hand, and the emotive on the other. What Śaṅkara understands by Jñāna is not by its very nature opposed to what later writers mean by Bhakti. The real opposition which is relevant to Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is not the opposition between Jñāna and Bhakti but between different grades of Jñāna or different grades of Bhakti. Parā Bhakti is the same as Samyagjñāna or the Absolute Experience. It is experiencing God as He is. The distinction between Jñāna and Upāsanā is a distinction between absolute experience and relative or finite experience. The latter is grounded in distinction and differentiation, especially the distinction between the Self and the experienced real. This distinction, however, has its roots in the upādhis which are the limiting adjuncts of Brahman; these upādhis, in the last resort, have their genesis in Avidyā or ignorance, which is another word in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara for the creative energy. "Brahman is apprehended in two ways, as qualified by the limiting adjuncts which consist of the differentiations of evolved names and forms and as being the opposite of this, that is,

1 S. B., I. 1. 12, एवमेकमपि ब्रह्मापेक्षितोपाधिसम्बन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धं चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते ।

free from all limiting conditions whatever."¹ The realization of Brahman as the Ātman is not in any way dependent upon or affected by spatial or temporal relations or, in the words of Śaṅkara, by upādhis which consist of the differentiated names and forms. The Upāśya Brahman, the Brahman realized or to be realized as other than our Self, is the object of the act of contemplation and meditation. No mental activity is possible if the otherness of the contemplated or meditated object drops out all together as it does in the case of the realization of Brahman as our very self.

V

BRAHMAN AS THE VERY SELF

A serious misunderstanding exists in the minds of the interpreters of Śaṅkara regarding his conception of the Saguna Brahman which has been viewed not only as an object of meditation but also as a metaphysical reality. The Saguna Brahman of Śaṅkara is merely the Upāśya Brahman and not a metaphysical entity. But to view it as the Upāśya, which means viewing it as other than the upāsaka and greater than it, is ignorance. Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is summed up by him in the following words: "Realize the Self or Ātman as the Absolute Brahman. This is the meaning. Brahman is not what people here worship, such as Īśvara, the Lord, which is other than and different from the Self, and, being conditioned by the limiting adjuncts which consist of the differentiations, is referred to as 'this'.² What is not the Ātman is not Brahman. The conception of Saguna Brahman is the conception of a Reality which is other than the Self. But neither in his metaphysics nor in his philosophy of sādhanā is there any room for any other principle than Brahman. Brahman is the essence of the universe and also the essence of the Self, and it is to be realized accordingly. The duality of the two is the essential feature of the world of experience. To get rid of this duality by overcoming it is the essence of sādhanā. Where there is unresolved conflict between.

1 *ibid.*

2 *Kand. S. B., I. 4.* आत्मानमेव निविशन् ब्रह्म विद्धि । नंद ब्रह्म यदिदं इत्युपाधि भेदविशिष्टमनात्मेन ब्रह्म उपासते ध्यायन्ति ।

the two, here we are in the region of Avidyā. The realization of Brahman as other than the Self, grounded as it is in the consciousness of duality, is marked by ignorance. To realize Brahman as the Creator, Controller, Governor, is to realize it as other than the Self. But this is what upāsana implies. Upāsya Brahman is thus the subject-matter of Avidyā. Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā, on the one hand, does away with the idea of the externality of Brahman, and on the other enlarges the conception of the self by equating it with the cosmic principle, thus bringing it in line with his metaphysics of value. That Brahman is to be realized as the Ātman is but a natural corollary of his principle of the identity of value and reality.

The one idea which Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā constantly repudiates is the idea of the otherness of the upāsya, and the one thought which he unhesitatingly reiterates is the realization of Brahman as the very essence or Self of us. Śaṅkara is familiar with the view that the distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped is foundational to any philosophy of sādhanā, and seeks to controvert it and establish the opposite view that the overcoming of the gulf between the two and their becoming one is the very meaning of sādhanā. He states the opposite view in the following words: "The Ātman, as is well known, being entitled to perform karma and worship, and being subject to births and re-births, seeks to attain Brahmā or other gods or heaven by means of karma or worship. Therefore someone other than the Ātman, such as Viṣṇu, Īśvara, Indra, or Prāṇa entitled to be worshipped, may well be Brahman; but the Ātman can never be, for it is contrary to popular belief. Just as the logicians (tāṅkika) contend that the Ātman is distinct from Īśvara, so the votaries of Karma worship gods as other than the Ātman, saying: "Propitiate this deva by sacrifice", and "Propitiate that deva by sacrifice". Therefore it is only reasonable that what is known and entitled to be worshipped is Brahman, and that the worshipper is other than that." Against this view Śaṅkara insists upon our "realizing this Ātman to be Brahman unsurpassable, known as Bhūmā. The

1 Ibid.

following expressions, 'speech of speech', 'eye of the eye', 'ear of the ear', 'mind of the mind', 'doer', 'enjoyer', 'knower', 'controller', 'governor', 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss', etc., are used in popular language of the unspeakable Brahman, devoid of attributes, highest of all, unchangeable. Disregarding these realize the Ātman itself as the unconditioned Brahman. What is not Ātman is not Brahman."¹ The realization of Brahman as the Ātman is the realization of Brahman as devoid of all differentiations and limiting adjuncts.² This is because existence is nothing other than essence. Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā is a reversal of the philosophy which stands for the distinction between the individual and the universal. It is a repudiation of what Śaṅkara calls bheda darśana.³ He who, deluded by ignorance, thinks "I am other than that Highest Brahman and the Highest is other than I" goes from death to death.⁴

VI

BRAHMAN AS THE UPASYA

But the realization of Brahman as our very Ātman does not take place all at once. Several stages of imperfect realization have to be passed through before the soul awakens to the truth of Brahman being the very essence of it. Before this consciousness dawns, the individual has to tread the path of Upāsana wherein the thought of the otherness of Brahman does not completely drop out, and the individual exists as being circumscribed by the several limiting adjuncts of "name, form, and action". The individual cannot rise higher to a conception of Brahman devoid of spatial and temporal characterizations, and is of necessity tied down to a lower one where Brahman is viewed as "this" or "that". This is the sphere of Upāsana as distinct from that of Jñāna. For the sake of such people who are of "dull intellect" Brahman

1 Ibid. अनात्मनोऽब्रह्मत्वं पुनरुच्यते ।

2 Tatit. S. B., II. 1. 1.

3 Katha. S. B., II. 1. 13.

4 Ibid. II. 1. 10.

5 S. B., IV. 1. 4. कर्तृत्वादितत्त्वसंसारमनिराकरणेन हि ब्रह्मणः आत्मत्वोपदेशः । तदनिराकरणेनोपासनविधानम् ।

is taught under the limitations of name and form. "Though, in reality, the Self-Principle is the sole object of the one true notion of Being, and as such is free from qualities, yet people of duller intellects always look upon It as qualified; hence for the sake of these people such qualities as 'truthfulness of desire' and the like are described in connection with it."¹ Thus Brahman is realized as the Lord of all, being the controller (īśitā) of the entire physical and superphysical universe of differentiations; as Omniscient, being the knower of all beings in their different conditions (sarvajña); as the Inner Controller (antarayāmin), because entering into all it directs everything from within; as the Origin of all, because from it proceeds the entire universe with all its diversity (yonih sarvasya). But this realization of Brahman presupposes the duality of Brahman and the rest of the universe, that is, of the entire aggregate of name and form; and of Brahman and the individual. This is why it is during the state of ignorance alone that the relation of the worshipper and the worshipped exists between the individual self and Brahman. Brahman may thus be realized either as the very Self of us or as our controller or governor according to the degree of light or darkness that is in us.²

This conception of Upāśya Brahman is to be discarded, according to Śaṅkara, as it cannot stand finally, being irreconcilable with the non-dual nature of Brahman or Ātman.³ The conception of Brahman as upāśya is born of ignorance, and this Brahman is called by Śaṅkara "Kṣudra Brahman", or "Jāta Brahman", and the individual who rests in such a Brahman is disparaged by him as "helpless and narrow-minded".⁴ because he knows only a partial aspect of Brahman.⁵ Śaṅkara is not to be understood as ridiculing deity or throwing cold water on the time-honoured institutions of prayer and worship. He simply wants to draw our attention to higher and higher grades of realization, and convince us that the highest

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 1.

4 Ibid., कृपणो दीनोऽल्पकः ।

5 Ibid., क्षुद्रब्रह्मवित्तेनासौ कारणेन ।

type of realization is one in which the highest reality is experienced as the very Self or essence. This experience cannot be expressed in relational terms as essence and existence are not related, being one and inseparable. Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with the form of realization which the word *Upāsana* summarizes is the result of his awareness of a reality in which all duality is overcome, and which is experienced as the very *ātman*. As compared with this type of realization, the realization in which Brahman figures as the Ruler, the Controller, the Governor, the Giver of the fruits of actions, as *Annāda* or *Vasudāna*, as the Light or the Bridge, falls far short of it and is regarded by him as imperfect, deficient, one-sided, and therefore infected with ignorance. But to those who are unable to rise to this highest conception of Divinity, Śaṅkara offers conceptions of Brahman as limited by name and form, through gradual realizations of which an approach may be made towards the absolute truth of the non-duality of Brahman and *Ātman*. The idea behind this is that Brahman, which in reality is absolute Being, one without a second, free from all limitations of space and time, appears to people of duller comprehension to be non-existing, and Śaṅkara thinks, "Let such people come to the proper path; later on we shall make them comprehend the real truth".¹

In this sense *Upāsana* is a necessary stage that has to be passed through on the way that leads to knowledge, i. e., the realization that Brahman is the essence of myself. It seems as if the pilgrim, unable to ascend the heights of Brahman-*Ātman* realization, or unable to remain long in that highly rarefied atmosphere of the realm of pure value, feels and prays:

Keep thou my feet; I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me.

We never find in Śaṅkara a downright condemnation of *Upāsana*, as is generally believed to be the case by those who regard his "Īśvara" as phenomenal and illusory and see in it a "a pinchbeck deity." Śaṅkara has nothing to say against *Īśvara* when he is viewed as the highest *Ātman* and

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

the highest Value. He plainly confesses that his system of the Vedānta does not know of any higher or greater reality than Īśvara. What pains him is the thought that people realize Īśvara not as the very Self but as other than and external to them, and controlling and guiding them from without. Illusory or false is the idea of Brahman being treated as an external something which always retains its otherness. The conception of Brahman as controller or governor (Īśvara, īṣṭṛ, antaryāmin) can never be reconciled with its conception as the highest essence or value, if we assign them the same place in the scale of values. The discrepancy disappears the moment we recognize that there is a regular order of values and upāsanā occupies a lower place in this order, which leads on to the higher and the highest value, this according to Śaṅkara being nothing other than Samyagjñāna or Mokṣa.

Upāsanā cannot be equated with absolute experience or Samyagjñāna. Nor is the man who takes to and rests content with Upāsanā, the "upāsanāśrita", as Śaṅkara calls him in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad Kārikā¹, the embodiment of absolute realization, because his religious life is infected with an unresolved conflict and an unreconciled dualism between "Ātman" and "Īśvara." But Śaṅkara, true to the standpoint of value, to which the idea of degree or gradation is organic, consciously also recognizes that all forms of Upāsanā are not equally valuable, and holds that there are some varieties of it which lead to "gradual liberation" and finally to perfection. "The different modes of Upāsanā lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works; these modes are distinct on account of the distinction of the limiting adjuncts, consisting of different qualities."² Accordingly the scriptural texts speak of 'meditation', the subject of Samhitā, which does not clash with Karma; then they proceed to teach about the knowledge of the conditioned Ātman through the vyāhṛtis, which results in self-realization. Since by these it is impossible to destroy completely the root of transmigratory

1 III. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

existence, the teaching of the knowledge of Ātman, devoid of all limiting adjuncts, is begun with a view to removing that ignorance which is the seed of all miseries.¹ Śaṅkara's discussion of the nature of the upādhis or limiting adjuncts would verge on a farce if he had simply mentioned them in order to condemn them ultimately as mere floating air-bubbles. They, on the other hand, supply the medium through which Brahman's nature is meant to be comprehended. This is the implication of Śaṅkara's statement, that not all the scriptural texts speaking of phenomenal diversity are meant to convey the idea of its dissolution in Brahman. "Where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of devout meditation we have no right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set aside. This is the case, e. g., in the passage "He who consists of mind, whose body is prāṇa, whose form is light", which is connected with an injunction of devout meditation. In passages of the latter kind the determinations attributed to Brahman may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the purpose of devout meditation. These meditations on Brahman as characterized by form have results of their own, either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps."²

Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with Upāsana and with the religious conception of Upāsyā Brahman is due to the one-sidedness of the conception and the form of realization which it embodies. "One unable to realize Ātman, which is both within and without and birthless and therefore believing himself to be helpless through avidyā, thinks, 'I am born, I subsist in the Brahman with attributes, and through devotion to it I shall become Brahman' and thus becomes Kripana (narrow-minded).³ This man is the 'upāsaneśrita', one who belakes himself to devotion as means to the attainment of liberation, and who further thinks that he is the devotee and Brahman is his object of worship. This jīva or embodied being further thinks that through devotional practices, he at present related to the evolved Brahman would attain to the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B. III. 2. 21.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 2.

ultimate Brahman after the dissolution of the body In other words he thinks I shall, through devotional practices, regain that which was my real nature before manifestation, though at present I subsist in the Brahman that appears in the form of the manifold. Such a jīva, that is, the aspirant, betaking itself to devotion, inasmuch as it knows only a partial aspect of Brahman, is said to be of narrow or poor intellect by those who regard Brahman as eternal and unchanging."¹ Thus it is during the state of Avidyā alone that the relation of worshipper and worshipped exists.²

By insisting upon the fragmentariness of the conception of Upāsana as distinguished from that of Jñāna Śaṅkara does not intend to discourage or discard worship and meditation. He simply wants us to move further and not stop with it, move till we realize that Brahman is our very Self and we are one with it. Śaṅkara attempts to restore to man his lost dignity by making him aware of his great origin. It is only he who is not a knower of Brahman "who worships another god, a god different from himself and approaches him in a subordinate position, offering him praises, salutations, sacrifices, presents, self-surrender, meditation, etc., thinking, 'He is one, different from me, and I am another, his subordinate, and I must serve him like a debtor'. "³ Conscious of man's divine ancestry, Śaṅkara hesitates to recommend a form of worship to us, children of the immortals, in which we think, "This Indra and the other gods are different from us and are our masters. We shall worship them like servants through praises, salutations and sacrifices, and shall attain as results prosperity and liberation granted by them."⁴ The logic of the real as well as of religion forbids such a conception of Upāsana as having any finality about it. Nor can it bear the highest fruits of religion.

VII

SAGUNA BRAHMAN AND THE METAPHYSICAL REALITY

The distinction, therefore, which Śaṅkara draws between Nirguṇa and Saguṇa Brahman or Nirupādhika and Sopādhika

1 *ibid.*, III. 1

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 *Brhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 10.

4 *ibid.*

Brahman is a distinction between Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman. Īśvara is not a metaphysical principle in the philosophy of Śaṅkara, sharing the natures of both being and becoming, which accounts for the existence of the world. It is Brahman qualified by the limiting adjuncts of name and form for purposes of meditation and realization. The Saguna or Upāsya Brahman of Śaṅkara is not the Brahman "as indicated or pointed out by the qualifications"; it is the Brahman "as qualified by them". Śaṅkara's philosophy of language should not be confused with his philosophy of Upāsanā. Language can operate in relation to Brahman and Brahman can be made the subject-matter of intelligible discourse only by having recourse to an act of abstraction, or, as Śaṅkara says, by imposing name and form upon the Inexpressible Brahman.¹ This is the minimum which language demands. But the fulfilment of this demand only renders intelligible discourse about Brahman possible. It is not the fulfilment of the requirements of Upāsanā. In imposing name and form it is the Nirguṇa Brahman which is being pointed out. This Nirguṇa Brahman, when it is "qualified" by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, is turned into the Upāsya Brahman.² Śaṅkara rejects the view, "that the Lord is to be meditated upon as pointed out by the aforesaid qualifications, and not as qualified by them", and lays down his own view that "it is the Lord as qualified by the above-described properties of intelligence and the rest, that is to be mediated upon"³. Only when thus qualified does the Nirguṇa Brahman become the Upāsya Brahman. Therefore when Śaṅkara speaks of Brahman as the cause of the universe, because it is the Self or essence of it, as for example, in the Second sūtra (Janmādyasya Yataḥ), he is not to be understood as outlining the nature of the Saguna Brahman. His is simply an endeavour to give expression to the truth that Brahman is the absolute essence of the universe, and this he does by calling it the cause or the source and identifying the cause with the Ātman or Self. It is but *ignoratio elenchi* to think that the Second Sūtra can be accepted only as a definition of Īśvara and then to argue against

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 3. 6.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 Chand. S. B., III. 14. 4.

Śaṅkara "that it is improbable that the sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit."¹

It is not till we come to the end of the commentary on the Eleventh Sūtra of the First Adhyāya that Śaṅkara raises the question of the nature and significance of the Saguṇa or Sopādhika Brahman. In his commentary on the first eleven sūtras he is busy laying the foundations of his philosophy of Value and his Idealism.² "The Vedānta texts exhibited under Sūtras 1. 1 1-11 have shown that the all-knowing, all powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. It has been shown by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view that all the Vedānta texts maintain an intelligent cause."³ It is only after this that Śaṅkara raises the question, 'what reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedānta Sūtra?'⁴ The answer which Śaṅkara gives to this question should be sufficient to demolish the view that Śaṅkara opens his commentary with the definition of Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman, which is an inferior principle. The answer of Śaṅkara, which at the same time reminds us that philosophy in India is a way of life and not merely a way of thought, and that here philosophy and religion do not stand sundered, is that Brahman is realized in two ways, as qualified by the limiting adjuncts of name and form and as free from all limiting adjuncts. "One and the same Brahman is taught as the Jñeya (knowable) or as the Upāśya in the Vedānta, according as it is connected (i e., qualified) by limiting adjuncts or is free from such conditions. This is the special aim of the subsequent portion of the Vedānta Sūtra."⁵ In the whole of the Second Pāda and also in the first Pāda (Sūtras 12-31) Śaṅkara is concerned with exhibiting the truth that Brahman can be realized either as Ātman or as the Upāśya and when as the latter, it is only by qualifying Brahman by name and form that the possibility of it can be thought.

1 Thibaut, P. Xcii.

2 S. B., I. 1. 11.

3 *ibid.*, I. 1. 12.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

This dual way of realizing Brahman's nature is everywhere insisted upon by Śaṅkara, as he, likewise, enlarges upon the theme that the Upāsana of Brahman prepares the way for the "knowing" of it or the realizing of it as the Ātman or the very essence. "Where instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities, there the expression is 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay'. But the Lord, as he is the cause of everything, is taught as an object of meditation and possessing some of the qualities of his effects, as, for instance, in the following passage: 'He who has all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes'. Accordingly he is also spoken of as having a bright beard, bright as gold and so on".¹ "The assignment of a special locality to Brahman is not contrary to reason, because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor is it impossible to assign any place to Brahman for the reason that Brahman is out of all connection with all place. It is possible to make such an assumption when Brahman is connected with certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly scripture speaks of different kinds of meditations (Upāsanaṇi) on Brahman as especially connected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart... Wherever the highest Brahman, which is devoid of all differentiating qualities, is spoken of as the Self (ātmatvena), it is understood that the result of that realization is one only, final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught as connected with distinguishing qualities or outward symbols, there we see all the various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; for instance, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver of wealth'. Everywhere the same idea is reiterated. It is the highest Brahman which is to be meditated upon as qualified by the attributes consisting of mind, etc."² "The passage, 'without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the Pure and Unqualified Brahman. The expressions, 'consisting of mind', 'having breath for its body,' refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, the

1 S. B., I. 1. 20.

2 *ibid.*, I. 1. 24.

3 *ibid.*, I. 2. 1.

highest Brahman is here represented as an object of meditation."¹

"Brahman, although devoid of qualities, is spoken of for the purposes of meditation as possessing qualities depending on name and form. To attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subverts the purpose of meditation and is, therefore, not contrary to reason; no more than to contemplate Viṣṇu in Śālagrāma"². If the Saguṇa Brahman were a metaphysical principle, it could not be the Upāśya Brahman, because Upāśanā is an activity and option is the very life of activity. It is only the object of Upāśanā which can be conceived in this way and also in that way. Where the real nature of an object is concerned, no option is possible and the truth has to be cognized in a single, uniform way. The possibility of the realization of Brahman as Saguṇa is bound up with the recognition of the limiting adjuncts as qualifying the Absolute and Nirguṇa Brahman.

The distinction between Para and Apra Brahman is in Śaṅkara the distinction between Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman, Brahman realized as the very Ātman or self and Brahman realized as other than the Self, and not the distinction between acosmic and cosmic principles. The modern interpreters are far from truth when they insist "that only a saguṇam saviśeṣam, not a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam Brahman can be a creator"³, and "the act of creation...can only be ascribed to the Apram Brahman"⁴. The Apra Brahman is the Upāśya Brahman, Brahman realized as limited by name and form. "As the Apra Brahman is in proximity to the Para Brahman, there is nothing unreasonable in the word 'Brahman' being applied to the former also. For when the Para Brahman is, for the purposes of meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualitiessuch as 'consisting of mind' and

1 S. B., I. 2. 2.

2 S. B., I. 2. 14, निगुणमपि सद्ब्रह्म नामरूपगतगुणैः सगुणमुपासनार्थं तत्र तत्रोपदिश्यते ।

3 D. S. V., P. 102.

4 ibid., P. 460.

the rest...which qualities depend on its connection with certain pure limiting adjuncts, then it is what we call the Apra or Lower Brahman."¹

The following statement of Śaṅkara should once for all put an end to the prevalent view that the conception of Saguna Brahman has been put forward by him as a solution to the metaphysical difficulty of accounting for the evolution of the world from the Absolute Brahman: "Where the texts, negating all distinctions founded on name, form and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as 'that which is not coarse' and so on, the Para Brahman is spoken of. Where again, for the purpose of meditation the texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name, form and so on, using such terms as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prāṇa, whose form is light,' that is the Apra Brahman.....The fruit of such meditation on the Apra Brahman is lordship over the worlds; a fruit falling within the sphere of saṁsāra, ignorance having not as yet been finally removed."²

The words Apra Brahman, Saguna Brahman are used synonymously in Śaṅkara's writings, and they indicate the Upāśya Brahman.³ Upāśanā, accordingly, has reference to Brahman as having revealed itself in name and form. Saguna Brahman cannot be regarded as the explanation of that upon which the formation of the conception of Saguna Brahman itself rests.

VIII

JÑANANIṢṬHĀ, PARĀBHAKTI AND UPĀSANĀ

There is an extremely wonderful unity of thought characterizing all the writings of Śaṅkara. In his commentary on the Gītā the same distinction between Jñana and Upāsanā and Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman meets us everywhere. The difference in the terminology in which this distinction is

1 S. B., IV. 3. 9.

2 S. B., IV. 3. 14. सगुणस्यैवोपास्यत्वात् ।

3 S. B., IV. 3. 7.

expressed is due to the difference in the language of the texts which treat of this distinction and on which Śaṅkara is commenting. True to the role of commentator in which he appears before us, he adopts the terminology of the texts, but he never allows the difference in terminology to hide the identity of thought which it is his endeavour to make explicit. Accordingly in his commentary on the Gītā, Śaṅkara, instead of speaking about Jñāna and Upāsana and Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, speaks of Upāsana alone and its various grades with their qualitative differences. What is called Jñāna in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra is, in his commentary on the Gītā, given the name of Akṣaropāsana, and this kind of Upāsana is identified with Samyagjñāna or Advaitajñāna, which is said to bring about final beatitude; and what receives the name of Upāsana in the former is here called "Īśvaropāsana".¹ The underlying idea behind the distinction which meets us in the commentary on the Gītā is the same. Brahman is to be realized as the very Self or essence of us. Where this is not possible on account of ignorance clouding the soul and its intellect, Brahman is experienced as other than and different from the self, and standing in the relation of the meditable or the adorable to the soul, which regards itself as the meditator or the upāsaka. In other words, Brahman is to be realized as the Ātman or as Īśvara, i.e., Lord or Controller. The former annuls all distinctions; in the latter they are perpetuated, as the traces of Avidyā which divide the Self from Brahman still persist. Nirguṇa jñāna is the same as Upāsana of Akṣara Brahman. This is the worship of the Supreme Self, the Imperishable Brahman, devoid of all limiting adjuncts.² This is the realization of jñeya brahman.³ Those who realize Brahman in this way are called "Akṣaropāsakāḥ" and are regarded as possessing perfect knowledge or Samyagdarśana. Such worshippers of Akṣara Brahman are called by Śaṅkara "Abhedadarśina", those who perceive no distinction between the Lord and the Self.⁴ This kind of Upāsana is distinguished from the

1 Gīta. S.B., XII. 1.; XI'. 12.

2 ibid., XII. 1. परमात्मनो ब्रह्मणः अक्षरस्य विध्वस्तसर्वविशेषणस्य उपासनमुक्तम् ।

3 S.B. I. 1. 12. निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धं ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तोपपदिश्यते ।

4 Gīta. S.B., XII. 1.; XII. 12.

one in which Brahman is worshipped as "the Lord of the universe and as associated with the limiting adjuncts of supreme knowledge and power." The characteristic feature of this kind of worship is that it is based upon a fundamental distinction between Īśvara and Ātman, the Lord and the Self, and, making this distinction the basis of further instruction, the individual is asked "to concentrate thought on the Lord, on the Universal Form, and to perform works for the sake of the Lord".¹

A misunderstanding prevails in the minds of many interpreters of Śaṅkara that in him Jñāna and Bhakti are fundamentally opposed to each other. But the real opposition which is relevant to Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is not the opposition between Jñāna and Bhakti, but one between different grades of Jñāna or different grades of Bhakti. Parā Bhakti, in which God is realized as our very Self, all distinctions of time and space having been annulled, in which the individual "is possessed with the thought that all that he sees or hears or touches is nothing but the Lord Vāsudeva"², is identified by Śaṅkara with Samyagjñāna.³ Parā Bhakti, or the highest devotion, is spoken of by Śaṅkara as consisting in the actual experience of the highest Truth.⁴ Jñāna, as Śaṅkara understands it, is not mere intellectual cognition. It is Experience of Reality, as it is; and because Jñāna, as distinguished from Karma or activity, is under the control of the object of knowledge and being so is uniform and one and represents the real as it is, the absolute experience is called Jñāna by Śaṅkara. By using the word Jñāna Śaṅkara does not at all intend to suggest any thought of pitting the cognitive experience against the emotional, which is generally regarded as constituting the essence of "bhakti". Parā Jñānaniṣṭhā is identical with Parā Bhakti. That state of realization which is marked by the experience of the oneness of the individual with the Supreme Self, and which is accom-

1 *ibid.*, XII, 1. 12.

2 *ibid.*, XIII. 18.

3 *ibid.*, IX. 1; XIII. 10.

4 *ibid.*, XIII. 20, उत्तमां परमार्थज्ञानलक्षणां भक्तिमाश्रिताः ।

panied with the renunciation of all works associated with the idea of distinctions such as the agent, is called *Parā Jñāna-niṣṭhā* by Śaṅkara. This absolute knowledge or experience is also referred to by Śaṅkara as *Parā Bhakti*, "the supreme or fourth kind of devotion as compared with the remaining three kinds of devotion, the devotion of the distressed (*ārta*), etc." "By this supreme devotion the aspirant knows the Lord as He is, and immediately afterwards all consciousness of difference between *Īśvara* and the individual self disappears altogether." This *Parā Bhakti* or supreme devotion is suffused with absolute awareness, and is called by Śaṅkara *Jñāna-Niṣṭhālakṣaṇā Bhakti*.² This absolute experience or awareness is *Mokṣa* itself, for which *Brahman* is but another word. The alternatives presented by Śaṅkara to the individual aspiring after the summum bonum of life are not *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* but (i) *Nirupādhika Jñāna* and *Sopādhika Jñāna*, (ii) *Parā Bhakti* and *Aparā Bhakti*, (iii) *Upāsana* grounded in *Ātmeśvarabheda* and *Akṣaropasanā*, which is done by those who are called by Śaṅkara *Abhedadarśina*.³

It only remains to emphasize that *Īśvara*, according to Śaṅkara, is neither illusory nor phenomenal nor unreal. To continue to marshal an array of arguments to prove that *Īśvara*, in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is real, is to labour an imaginary issue. Pt. Kōkileśwar Sastri is occupied with labouring such an issue in his *Advaita Philosophy*. The truth is that both the classes of interpreters, those who deny the reality of *Īśvara* and emphasize his phenomenality and those who insist upon his reality, are busy answering a wrong question. And as the question is put in a wrong way, the answer which it receives is bound to be wrong. The proper way to defend Śaṅkara's position against the attack of the critics is not to contradict what the critics say in answer to the wrong issue which they raise. The right way of meeting the critic is to point out to him that the question: Is *Īśvara* real? is not rightly put. The proper question would be: 'What is Śaṅkara's conception of *Īśvara*?' The answer to this is that the conception of *Īśvara* is the

1 *ibid.*, XVIII. 55

2 *ibid.*, XVIII. 55

3 *ibid.*, XIII. 12

conception of Brahman as limited by name and form, and as controlling or governing the individual and the universe to which the individual belongs. But the relation between Brahman and the individual is not one of controller and controlled, but of essence and reality. Brahman is the Ātman of every one. This truth cannot be expressed in terms of spatio-temporal relations. Pt. Kokilleshwar Sastri sticks to the view held by the rival interpreters that Īśvara is the creative principle, but rejects the other half of their thesis, namely, that he is unreal. Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman is the Upādhiviśiṣṭa Brahman, Brahman so conceived for purposes of meditation and contemplation, and not any metaphysical reality; and Kokilleshwar Sastri is far from truth when he emphatically asserts that "Śaṅkara has made no distinction between the two—Brahman and Īśvara."¹ The distinction between the realization of Brahman as Ātman or as Īśvara or Īśitr is at the root of Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana. The realization of the summum bonum of life is bound up with the realization of Brahman as the Ātman or essence, as it is in this realization alone that the duality which mars the integrity of the religious life is overcome and subdued. What is wrong or illusory or avidyātmaka is the conception of Brahman as Lord, as Controller, as Governor. When the truth dawns, Brahman is realized as our very Ātman, and as one with us.² But when we are in the region of Avidyā, which is marked by the duality of value and existence, of the ideal and the real, of the Self and the Non-Self, the individual can form no higher conception of Brahman than as "the Lord of all, the Master of all beings, the Guardian of the creation, the embankment that steadies all these worlds so as to prevent their falling into utter confusion."³ But one should not hesitate to call a spade a spade and admit in all frankness that to realize Brahman thus is to realize it in an imperfect way. This is what Śaṅkara means when he tells us that it is during the state of ignorance alone that the relation of upāsaka and upāsya subsists

¹ *Advaita Philosophy*, P. 36.

² S.B., II. I. 14.

³ *Ibid.*

IX

ĀTMAVIDYĀ AND THE SUPREME GOOD

We have thus been led to the view that knowledge of the self is the only means to immortality. "There is no other means of realizing the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the oneness of the Self."¹ "Through the independent knowledge of the Self enjoined in the Vedānt is accomplished the highest end of man."² "Knowledge of the Self is the means to immortality."³ Wealth, incantation, medicine, austerity, yoga, none of these can bring immortality to man; all of them prove ineffective to conquer mortality, because there is no permanence about any of them, and a thing which is itself not permanent cannot be the source of an effect which is permanent. The potency which is born of the knowledge of the Self (Ātmavidyā) flows from the very nature of the Self and not from any other thing. It is the only means, which can overcome mortality, and lead to immortality. "We may study all the vedas, and acquire knowledge of everything else that is knowable, but if we do not know the truth with regard to the Self, our ends will still remain unaccomplished."⁴ Apart from the knowledge of Self (Ātmañāna; Ātmaattva) there is nothing else that can accomplish absolute and supreme good. We read of the divine sage, Nārada, in the Upaniṣads. He had fulfilled all his duties and was versed in all the lore of the time. He knew "the R̥gveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, Atharvaveda, the fourth Veda of the Vedas, the Rites of the Fathers, Mathematics, the science of numbers, the science of portents, the science of Time, Logic, the science of reasoning, Ethics and Politics, Etymology, the Ceremonials and Prosody, the science of the elementals, the science of war, Astronomy, the science of the stars, the science of snake-charming and the fine arts."⁵ But all these endowments could not help him in

1 S.B. II. 1.3.

2 S.B., III. 4.1.

3 Brhad. S.B., II. 4.4; I. 4.7; II. 4.1; Chand. S.B., VII. 1.1; VII. 1.5; VII. 7.3; VIII. 11.3; Kena. S.B., II. 4; Mund.S.B., III. 2.3.

4 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3.

5 Ibid. VII., 1. 2.

attaining the supreme good. He did not know the Self, and "for this reason, having renounced all his pride of excellent lineage, knowledge, conduct and capabilities, like any ordinary person he approached Sanatakumāra for the purpose of attaining supreme good." All that Nārada knew was mere name. But certainly there is "something greater than the name." It is the function of Ātmavidyā to tell us about that "something greater than the name". That is one's own Ātman, and "insight into the oneness of this Ātman is the culmination of all knowledge."¹

Śaṅkara's attitude towards this Ātmavidyā is one of great reverence. Ātmavidyā for him is not only a science among other sciences. It has a dignity of its own²; it is the most shining among the shining things³; it is even higher than the status of Indra, who obtained it only after he had toiled and toiled for it for a full hundred and one years.⁴ It is the benign mother⁵ and the greatest good.⁶ Śaṅkara's passage from Brahmaidhyā to Ātmavidyā, his reduction of the problem of knowing the nature of Brahman to the problem of knowing the nature of the Self, and his formulation of the nature of Summum Bonum indifferently either as Ātmaprāpti or Brahmaprāpti is highly significant. Śaṅkara is impressing upon us his conviction that the problems of reality and value are inseparable, and a metaphysics which, at the same time, claims to be a metaphysics of religion can only ignore these at its own peril.

1 Katha. S. B., I. 2. 8.

2 Chand. S. B., VIII. 7. 3.

3 Kena. S. B., III. 12.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 11. 3.

5 Katha. S. B., I. 3. 14.

6 S. B., I. 1. 28.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY AS PARĀVIDYĀ

ŚĀṆKARA'S BRAHMAVĀDA IS BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is both philosophy and religion. It is a religious philosophy, and is concerned with the interpretation of the religious experiences recorded in the scriptures of the Hindus—the Vedas and the Upaniṣads—with a view to determining the real nature of the universe and man's place in that universe. It approaches the problem of the ultimate reality from the side of religion, and aims at finding out what the values, the existence of which is guaranteed by religious experience, have to say about the constitution of the universe of which man happens to form a part. As a religion Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is a philosophical religion. His investigation into the nature of reality is throughout motivated and guided by the single aim of finding out the supreme and final good for man, knowing and realizing which he may get eternal rest and peace. The principles of such a religion are in perfect accord with the dictates of reason, and in Śāṅkara both reason and revelation join hands to proclaim the truth. It would be truer to say that Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is religion and philosophy in one. In it religion is not separable from philosophy, nor philosophy from religion. Though they are not alienable from each other without doing violence to the integrity and solidarity of his Brahmanvāda, and without robbing it of many of the features but for which it would lose its uniqueness, the one is yet distinguishable from the other if we bear in mind that philosophy is concerned with giving an articulated expression to the nature of the supreme value by intellectually apprehending it, and religion with the realization of that value by actually living it.

Philosophy is a matter of intellectual apprehension and communication, religion one of spiritual comprehension and communion. It is one of the important tenets of Śāṅkara that

(§ I.) ŚĀṆKARA'S BRAHMAVĀDA IS BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

both anubhava and tarka are indispensable for the complete realization of the summum bonum. The bearing of this on his conception of Brahmovāda is that both philosophy and religion as defined above constitute irreducible but inalienable elements of it. "Anubhava" points to the necessity of religion or practical realization and insight, or, what is the same, as actually sharing and partaking of the eternal values; "tarka" lays bare the necessity of a reasoned grasp of the truth so that doubt and error may not assail the aspirant who is treading the path of religion. Thus Śāṅkara's system is a noble and happy blend of religion and philosophy and both these have become "exalted" in this harmonious combination which his genus has succeeded in effecting. In his insistence on the possibility of a direct vision of the supreme good in the transformed life of the individual, Śāṅkara reveals himself as the author of a mystical philosophy and a mystical religion, the beauty and strength of which consist in the fact that his mysticism does not ignore the claims of understanding, and "departs from the standpoint of understanding only in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate".

There is nothing in Śāṅkara's writings to support the view that Śāṅkara has failed to reconcile religion and philosophy, but it has been seriously maintained by several students of Śāṅkara that his attempt to bring the two together has ended in failure. Professor Wadia is disposed to hold the view that in reconciling religion and philosophy, religion has been given the go-by and there is inconsistency between religious worship and Śāṅkara's philosophical convictions.¹ According to him Śāṅkara gives religion a place on sufferance; he regards it as a make-believe, a concession to the masses, a stage in the upward growth of man, something like a kindergarten, and of no more worth than fleeting sense-experience.² The argument for this view is that Śāṅkara identifies the God of religion with Īśvara, who is himself unreal and is in the world of Mayā. The worship of an unreal Īśvara is opposed to the deepest convictions of the truly religious, and therefore Śāṅkara's unreal Īśvara is the merest mockery of

1 Proceedings of the Second Indian Philosophical Congress, PP 400, 410.

2 Ibid., P. 410.

God and his logic regarding Īśvara's unreality altogether unconvincing.¹

The premises on which Professor Wadia bases his conclusion regarding Śaṅkara's failure to bring about a reconciliation between religion and philosophy are themselves not valid. Śaṅkara never identifies the God of religion with Īśvara, and he never recommends the worship of an unreal Īśvara even when he is making a "concession" in favour of what Professor Wadia seems to have in view, worship of a real Īśvara; and his concept of Īśvara symbolizes only a particular view taken of the religious ideal at a particular stage in religious advancement, and epitomizes the specific experience of that stage, namely, the stage where the worshipper "worships another god, thinking he is one and I am another", the stage where ignorance has not been completely removed and the worshipper is still haunted by the idea of a monarchical God who is the creator, the controller and the governor of the jīvas, and the spice of whose life is to command allegiance and obedience from the subject people of his kingdom who, in their turn, must be prepared to suffer for any act of disloyalty.

There can be no possibility of any doubt arising as regards Śaṅkara's attitude towards the relations and inter-relations between philosophy and religion, unless, in the first place, their office is misconceived or, in the second place, a wrong view is taken of Śaṅkara's philosophy of religion. It is true Śaṅkara himself does not make use of these terms; nor does he draw a line of demarcation between the element of philosophy and the element of religion in his system of Brahmanvāda. He does neither, because according to him neither philosophy nor religion can stand alone. The word religion can be used to signify either "the science of religion" or "the fact of communion between the finite individual and the Infinite God, wherein the former is elevated into union with the latter." If it is used in the second sense, it would be absurd to discuss whether Śaṅkara's system of Brahmanvāda is a philosophy or a religion or both; for obviously they cannot

1 *Ibid.*, P. 410.

2 *Bhāṣya* S. B., I. 4, 10; *Taṭtv.* S. B., II. 8. 5.

be treated as the cognate species of a common genus and consequently cannot be used either as conjunctive or disjunctive predicates to a common subject. If it is used to mean the science of religion, the "science of God", it is legitimate to raise a question of this type, but Śāṅkara's answer would be that as the highest principle of religious life is identical with the ultimate base of the universe, religion as the science of God is indistinguishable from philosophy as the science of the ultimate.

For Śāṅkara philosophy and religion alike constitute "tattvajñāna". In his commentary on the Gītā Śāṅkara explains the meaning of the term in the following way: "tat" is the name of Brahman, who is the all (sarvam); Brahmanhood (tadbhāvaḥ), the real nature of Brahman (Brahmaṇo Yāthātmyam) is the "tattvam"; those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of Brahman, the Absolute, the All, "That", are the tattvadarśinas.¹ Tattvadarśana, for Śāṅkara, includes not only the intellectual apprehension of the truth (tattvam), of the real nature of Brahman (Brahmaṇo Yāthātmyam), but also a practical appropriation of it by becoming Brahman. Śāṅkara knows that it is possible to know the truth in an intellectual way, but this knowing may not be accompanied by that practical realization of it in one's conduct, without which true liberation will be impossible. He has this in mind when he says that "some only, but not all, know as well as realize the truth", and recommends the seeker of truth to go to a teacher who not only knows the truth but has realized it himself, for that knowledge alone which is imparted by those who have realized the truth (samyagdarśināḥ)—and no other knowledge—can prove effective."² This gives us an insight into Śāṅkara's repeated insistence on the indispensability of both anubhava and tarka for the attainment of the summum bonum. It is a complete misunderstanding of Śāṅkara's position to say, as Rāmaṇuja has done, that he guarantees the liberation of the soul from the fetters of saṁsāra simply by an intellectual realization of great sayings like "Tattvamasi" and "Aham Brah-

1 Gītā. S.B., II. 15.

2 ib d., IV. 34.

māsmi"¹; and further it is an *ignoratio elenchi* to argue against him that such a means—understanding the meaning of the mahāvākyas—is never seen to produce liberation. Whenever Śaṅkara says that jñāna and jñāna alone is the cause of liberation, he understands by it not only the intellectual knowledge of truth, but also the practical realization of it. Jñāna is not only "knowing", but also "being and becoming" Brahman."² There is no difference between knowing the Great One and attaining the Great One."³ "Knowledge and attainment mean the same thing."⁴ "Knowing is realizing the Selfhood of Brahman."⁵

But if "religion" is used to mean the "realization of the oneness of the Ātman", "the communion of the individual with the universal", adopting Śaṅkara's standpoint we can say that philosophy is "reflection on those permanent values which have their foundation in a higher spiritual reality above the changing interests of the times"⁶; and religion is the practical appropriation of these values by the individual, raising itself to a point where it recognizes its true being as union with the whole, which is infinite being and infinite bliss. If these two aspects of Śaṅkara's Brahmvāda are kept in mind, the discussion of the question whether Śaṅkara's Advaitism is a philosophy or a religion or both, whether it is "matam" or "tattvam", and which of the two, whether philosophy or religion, is better entitled to be called "tattvam" will appear to be a fruitless and an idle one. It is indifferent whether we dub his system as philosophy or religion or both, provided we understand in what sense we use these terms. It would not be open to any objection if we said that Śaṅkara's advaitism is a philosophy of religion.

II

ŚAṅKARA'S ADVAITISM A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

But here we must not allow ourselves to forget the truth of which we are reminded by Professor Schaub, that meta-

1 R.B., I. 1.1.

2 Mand. S.B., IV. 100.

3 *ibid.*, I. 1.5.

4 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

5 S.B., I. 1.4.

6 Windelband quoted in Fringe Pattison's *Idea of God*, p. 39.

physics cannot vindicate its claim to being a philosophy of religion by the simple device of rebaptizing its terms and calling its Absolute God.¹ Philosophy should accept the specifically religious experience as such, and try to interpret it with a view to understanding the true nature and meaning of reality; it must use that experience as the clue to the nature of the universe in which we happen to live, and of which we happen to form a part, and to our status in that universe. This is exactly the task which philosophy as a thinking consideration of things is made to perform in Śaṅkara's system. For Śaṅkara, as for Bradley, there is nothing more real than what comes in religion and "the man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks."² If the religious consciousness and its deliverances were simply "a cloud-cuckoo-land of subjective fancy," philosophy would be ideally futile. Philosophy is thus reasoned knowledge of (vidyā) or reflection on the supreme values.

Though philosophy aspires to arrive at a knowledge of the Universe or reality as a whole, it is peculiarly circumscribed in its adventure inasmuch as it has "to start from some limited section of human experience—from epistemology, or from natural science, or from theology, or from mathematics."³ And as Professor Whitehead further points out, "the investigation always retains the taint of its starting point. Every starting point has its merits, and its selection must depend upon the individual philosopher."⁴ Śaṅkara has selected religious experience and the values of which it gives us intimations as the starting point of his philosophic adventure. If Śaṅkara had approached reality through another avenue, Śaṅkara's philosophy would have taken an entirely different turn. But as it stands, for Śaṅkara, to whom religious values supplied the clue to reality, the solution of the question, "How is everlasting beatitude possible?" was a question of life and death for philosophy, as for Kant, who approached

1 *Philosophy Today*, p. 109.

2 *Appearance and Reality*, p. 449, quoted in P. P. *Idea of God*, p. 252.

3 *Philosophical Review*, 1937, Vol. 4th, p. 185: Remarks by Prof. A. N. Whitehead.

4 *Ibid.*

the problem of philosophy through the gateway of epistemology, the solution of the question "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" was one for metaphysics. Śāṅkara's investigations retain throughout the taint of this starting point, which is visible as much in the manner as in the matter of his thought. It is visible in the prominence which certain aspects of the question receive, and the subsidiary place assigned to certain others. It can be seen in the wealth of detail with which the marshalling of arguments in support of certain theses takes place, no less than in the summary disposal of others. It is, likewise, open to observation in his effort to lift his insight into verbal expression, open to observation in the special language of his metaphysics, in the value-idiom which he constantly employs to express his most incommunicable supersensible intuition of spaceless and timeless realities, and in the categories of explanation and interpretation which he uses. The plastic stamp of this starting-point is traceable throughout the details of his system.

Śāṅkara's conception of philosophy is to be sharply distinguished from all those conceptions which find the essence of philosophy to consist exclusively in framing a hypothesis about the general nature of the universe, or even in "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."¹ Philosophy, for Śāṅkara, will forfeit much of its value and significance for man, if the philosophising instinct in him is not oriented towards the good. It is this conscious orientation of human reason towards the good which saves philosophy from lapsing into a barren intellectual pastime, and invests it with a sacredness which makes philosophy a pilgrimage, and the vision of the Good "the goal of the pilgrimage of the philosophic lover." While the formulation of "a theoretic scheme of the world, a synthesis of the results of the separate sciences, or a scheme harmoniously complete in itself" does not constitute the motive of Śāṅkara's philosophy, which regards as its true problem the inquiry into the nature of the highest value and its relation to existence as a whole, we find that, when we

¹ Whitehead. P. R., P. 3.

have taken stock of all that he has to say on this most momentous problem, none of the above questions remains unanswered. We have before us a system harmoniously complete in itself which can be viewed as giving us "a theoretic scheme of the world," "a necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be explained."

The possibility of the realization of this supreme good is the possibility of a free sacred human life which culminates in the cessation of transmigratory existence and its attendant evils. The reflective human soul finds itself bound up in the meshes of *saṃsāra*, and painfully realizes that human life as it finds it "is not free, sacred, immortal." It "must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be won." Śaṅkara compares this transmigratory human existence to a tree "which has one's actions as its seed and ignorance as the field where it grows"², and lays down that "in the uprooting of it lies the perfection of human achievement."³ Śaṅkara considers the goal of human life to be beyond the hedonistic ideal, and always declares that man, in subordinating the claims of spirit to those of sensibility and following the lead of the latter, is treading a path that leads to darkness, destruction, and death. "The enjoyment of the objects of the senses indeed constitutes pleasure (*sukha*), but not good (*hita*). (The attainment of *summum bonum*) is not only accompanied by pleasure but is also good."⁴ It constitutes according to Śaṅkara the true "health" of the soul (*svasthātā*); ignorance, and pain and misery born of it, are the accompaniments of a diseased soul.⁵ So far as the gratification of lower appetites and cravings is concerned man is in no way better than animals: and he raises himself above the level of beasts and the lower order of creation, when he chooses to lead a life dedicated to the pursuit of the Good and the attainment of the state where ignorance vanishes,

1 Hooking: *Types of Philosophy*, P. 450.

2 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 7.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Mand. S. B.*, IV. 2.

5 *Ibid.* Introduction.

fearlessness follows, and immortality becomes an accomplished fact. The attainment of the summum bonum (niḥśreyasa-prāptiḥ) is the perfection of human achievement (puruṣārtha-parisamāptiḥ). It is a distinctively human concern, and men, "having a special aptitude for this, are especially entitled to the practice of prosperity and liberation. As those seekers think with regard to rites that they would bring sure results, similarly they think that the knowledge of Brahman is sure to lead to identity with all." This makes philosophising a duty on the part of man.

III

PHILOSOPHY A SEARCH FOR THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE

Genuine philosophy is always inspired by a sense of totality or unity. The ideal by which philosophy lives and which is its moving spirit is the discovery of a principle of unification, of integration, of continuity, of totality, of unity and order. Philosophy must be systematic, which means that it must conceive "the entire aggregate of things"¹ as having its origin and subsistence in and through² the system of the universe, and, at the same time, must show that no entity can exist in complete abstraction from this system.³ Philosophy is "a coherent, logical, necessary system" of knowledge, and the realization of this ideal (tatsāadhanāya) is the aim of philosophic inquiry.⁴ To philosophy is thus assigned the task of apprehending the world "as a totality", and then "the attribution of some quality or character" to this totality. This ideal of philosophy appears clearly from what Śaṅkara says in his commentary on B. S. II. 3. 6: "That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known.....this is the promise we meet with in the Vedānta. These promissory statements are not abandoned, only if the

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

2 S. B., II. 3. 6.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., अव्यतिरेकः कृत्स्नस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मणः ।

5 Ibid., चोत्तरे शब्दाः ।

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entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman.....
...This again is possible only if the entire aggregate of things (kṛtsanam vastujātam) originates from (utpadyate) the one Brahman.....This very promissory statement is proved to be true by the instances of clay, etc.....All the Vedānta-texts aim at proving the same promissory statement by means of various instances." The word "non-different" in the above passage, and everywhere when there is an occasion to use it, is employed by Śaṅkara to mean "non-independent of", "not in complete abstraction from."

The problem of philosophy, then, is the determination of the nature of that "One Source" of every thing¹, knowing which all other things become known,² and "highest beatitude becomes an accomplished fact".³ It is its business to tell us about the nature of the "Original Cause", the Root⁴ of every existing thing. The mission of science is confined to the solution of the problem of the nature of the manifested effects (vikāras, the viśeṣas) and the determination of the way in which "phenomena proceed from other phenomena".⁵ It is a regular feature of the spatio-temporal order, the universe of "name and form".⁶ Śaṅkara is fully aware of this. "The bird and the serpent are seen to be born from the bird and the serpent; hence a bird is the origin of another bird; and a serpent of another serpent. In the same way others which are born from the egg are the seed of their own species."⁷ The world presents innumerable other phenomena where we witness the operation of the law of cause and effect and where "phenomena are seen to be proceeding from other phenomena". It is in connection with such phenomena that Science has a useful function to perform by observing the laws of their occurrence. But this is exactly what philosophy is not called

1 प्रतिवेदान्तं ते ते शब्दास्तेन तेन दृष्टान्तेन तामेव प्रतिज्ञां ह्यापयन्ति ।

2 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 3.

3 Ibid.

4 Praśna. S. B., VI. 1.

5 S. B., II. 1. 18, Mulaśārana, Mulaśāraka; II. 3. 9; II. 4. 2.

6 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 1; Katha. S. B., II. 3.

7 S. B., II. 3. 9.

8 Ibid.

9 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 1.

upon to do, and is not competent to do. Its investigation is to be confined to the nature of the First or Original cause, and consequently it can be no concern of philosophy to inquire "how the various stages of progress come to happen in time, in what order or orders they follow, and in each case from what causes".

In saying that it is the business of philosophy to seek that one principle by knowing which every other thing becomes known, Śaṅkara is not taking away from science its right to any independent existence. What we now call science is, according to Śaṅkara, concerned with the nature of the phenomena, the appearances, the names and forms, which are the manifestations of Brahman. The manifestations of Brahman are called by Śaṅkara "vikāra", and these vikāras the manifested effects, constitute the peculiar province of what today goes by the name of "science". The different sciences, like Mathematics, Logic, Ethics, Astronomy, the "science of Snake charming", have to do with the vikāras, i. e. the phenomenal aspect of reality. Consequently Śaṅkara says that the scientist is a "vikārajña"¹ only, i. e., one who has knowledge of phenomena only. Philosophy is concerned with the nature of ultimate reality, which is, at the same time, the highest value. It is therefore Brahmagvidyā and the philosopher is "Brahmagvid", or, what is the same, Ātmavid,² a knower of the Self.

As philosophy is concerned with the nature of the real tattva of the universe, it is called, tattvajñāna. Just as the scientist is a vikārajña, the philosopher is a tattvajña. Because it is the aim of philosophy to know that one principle, knowing which everything else becomes known, the philosopher, when he is able to comprehend that one principle, becomes a knower of all (sarvajña). Knowledge of this principle alone is to be sought for the purpose of attaining immortality; knowledge of the phenomena, of the vikāras, however deep and comprehensive it may be, is not calculated to the realization of the summum bonum.

1 Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*, P. 441.

2 Chend. S. B., VII. 1. 3.

3 *Ibid.*

Truth which Śaṅkara is trying to bring out is this. The finite, the particular, the *viśeṣa* as such has no veritable being. He fully agrees with Hegel that the finite does not exist independently but only as a moment; finitude is inseparable from inclusion within the whole. The "viewing of all things as mere particulars has its source in false cognition—all modifications being a mere name based upon words."¹ Philosophy deals with the whole, the ultimate, the real, the permanent within the flux, the eternal in the temporal, the absolute in the relative. We should not regard this attitude of Śaṅkara as one of downright condemnation of Science. He simply wants us to realize that scientific knowledge is not the type of knowledge which is conducive to the realization of the *sumum bonum* of life. It is only with reference to this that he says that "one knows all these things other than the Self through it, when the Self is known."² It is in the sphere of *sādhana* only that it is true that the knowledge of phenomena, of appearances, of everything other than the Self "does not require a separate knowledge over and above that of the Self."³ It is not his meaning that the knowledge of Brahman would be a substitute for the knowledge of the sciences, like "Mathematics, Logic, Ethics, Politics, Etymology, Astronomy."⁴ *Adhyātmavidyā* is not proposed by Śaṅkara as the panacea for any and every ill that man is heir to, though he has no misgiving that, when man is able to realize the highest end of life, all these ills will cease to have any sway over him, in the sense that he will no more be perturbed by them; nor is it presented to us as the universal key to any and every mystery.

IV

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF THE GOOD: PARĀVIDYĀ

From what we have said above about the nature and ideal of philosophy, it is not difficult to realize the justice of

1 Chend. S.B., VIII. 5.4.

2 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Chend. S.B., VII. 1.2.

Śaṅkara's claim that philosophy is *Samyagdarśana* or *Samyagjñāna*. It is perfect or complete knowledge. But it is *Samyagdarśana* only in so far as it is concerned with the "value" of the universe. The solution of the riddle of the universe lies in the discovery of the relation between the existence of the universe as a spatio-temporal order of events and what is the highest value. To understand its value is to have *samyagdarśana* or *samyagjñāna*, and this type of knowledge alone is calculated to solve the world-riddle. An extension of scientific knowledge, however wide and deep, will never bring us nearer the solution of the problem, for all ultimate explanation must be in terms of value. The words *Samyagdarśana* and *Samyagjñāna* are Śaṅkara's favourite words; and he constantly uses these words to designate his philosophy. Śaṅkara has used these terms not less than 116 times in his different works; they occur not less than 60 times in his Commentary on the *Gītā*, and not less than 47 times in his commentary on the *Brahman Sūtra*, besides finding a place in his other works. It will give us a real insight into Śaṅkara's philosophy and the problems with which it is concerned, if we bring together the numerous senses in which these terms are used by him, all these senses completing and correcting one another.

The following are the different senses of the terms:

- (1) The Intelligent Brahman is both the instrumental and the material cause of the universe.¹
- (2) There is one Self in everything.² There is nothing other than Brahman.³
- (3) I am the Self of everyone.⁴
- (4) All this is Brahman.⁵
- (5) I am that Brahman.⁶
- (6) Brahmanhood is the real nature of *jīva*.⁷

1 S.B., II. 1.11.

2 S.B., II. 1.3; II. 2.10; II. 3.48; *Gītā*. S.B., IV. 29.

3 S.B., II. 3.36.

4 *Ibid.*, III. 3.42; *Gītā*. S.B., V. 7.

5 *Gītā*. S.B., IV. 24; IX. 1.

6 S.B., II. 3.47; *Gītā*. S.B., II. 59.

7 S.B., II. 3.46

- (7) Knowledge of this Tree of Samsāra and its Root¹ is Samyagjñāna.
- (8) Knowledge of kṣetra and kṣetrajña and Īśvara is Samyagjñāna.²
- (9) The kṣetrajña is one with Īśvara.³
- (10) To know the conditioned self as identical with the unconditioned Brahman is samyagjñāna.⁴

It is this Samyagjñāna which is everywhere declared by Śaṅkara to be the immediate and the only cause of liberation or summum bonum. "All those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge."⁵ And as philosophy is Samyagjñāna, one of its ideals will be the reconciliation of diverse forms of religious insight. Śaṅkara does not fail to keep this ideal constantly before him. This is why he repeatedly insists: "ekavākyatvāta sarvaśrutināma". In all his works he is endeavouring to lay down the foundational principles of religion itself, principles which every philosophy of religion should take into account and ignorance of which can only result in narrow sectarianism or blind dogmatism. His philosophy is an exhibition of the universal principles of religion and not of the dogmas of any particular party, creed or church. This is why, says Śaṅkara, there is no chance of his Advaitism coming into conflict with any particular philosophy or religion. "The Vedic philosophy, the cardinal principle of which is the oneness of the Self in everyone, is not opposed to any of these views because it is nondifferent from each of them, just as there is no opposition between one's own self, and one's hands, feet, etc."⁶ Śaṅkara claims that the principles of his philosophy are the only principles which can harmonize the warring creeds by bringing them into the unity of a system and assigning them their rightful and proper places in that system. In basing his philosophy on the Upaniṣads, which are a repository of possible "varieties of religious experience", Śaṅkara

1 Gita. S.B., XV. 1.

2 Ibid., XIII. 2.

3 Ibid., XIII. 26.

4 Ibid., IV. 25.

5 S. B., II. 1. 11; II. 1. 1; II. 1. 3; II. 2. 10; III. 3. 32.

6 Mond. S. B., III. 17.

avoids that "narrowness in the selection of evidence" which, as Professor Whitehead says, is "the chief danger to philosophy."¹

This Samyagdarśana which directly leads to and culminates in the immediate vision of the Good is the same as the Parāvidyā of the Upaniṣads. This is also the same as the Brahmavidyā; and accordingly its subject is the same as that of Brahmavidyā. Following the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara makes the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā, and this distinction which is adopted by him is identical with that which is present in the Upaniṣads. Parāvidyā is concerned with the understanding of the nature of the supreme Good, which is intrinsic, absolute and eternal (Niḥśreyasa); and other intellectual disciplines which concern themselves with the instrumental values, with the goods which are relative and extrinsic, are referred to as Aparāvidyā. Parāvidyā is the higher knowledge as it leads to and culminates in the vision of the Good; Aparāvidyā is the lower knowledge, as its fruit is confined to the relative goods, which are certainly lower in rank than the absolute and intrinsic Good. "The distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation (abhyudaya), the latter to eternal beatitude or summum bonum (niḥśreyasa)."²

This distinction between higher knowledge (Parāvidyā) and lower knowledge (Aparāvidyā) is the same as that between "dharmavijñāna" and "brahmavijñāna" which Śaṅkara makes at the very outset in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. "The results as well as the objects of the inquiry differ in the two cases; the knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit worldly exaltation, and that again is relative to and dependent upon human effort; knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal beatitude and this does not depend on human effort or volition. Religious merit is something to be accomplished, and does

1 P. R., P. 477.

2 S. B., I. 2. 21. परापर विभागो ह्यं विद्ययोरेभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसकलतया परिकल्प्यते ।

not exist at the time when knowledge is sought, because it is relative to human effort. In the Brahman-Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, the object of inquiry is Brahman, and it is something already existent, for it is eternal and is not relative to human volition."¹

Aparāvidyā is also called "Karmavidyā" by Śaṅkara, and is mentioned as a preliminary to the knowledge of Brahman.² It is so called because it deals with good and bad actions, their means and results, and consists merely of mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.³ This kind of knowledge is not at all directed towards the realization of the supreme values of life, and consequently is impotent to remove faults like ignorance, which are the cause of transmigratory existence. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that this "Aparāvidyā is avidyā", and insists upon its removal.⁴ According to him, when one has known all the contents of this Aparāvidyā, one has really known nothing that deserves to be called knowledge of truth (tattvataḥ).⁵ Likewise, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.4.6) he points out that the distinction between Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā is the same as that between Vidyā and Avidyā, the former dealing with "the Good" (Niḥśreyasa), and the latter with "worldly exaltation (Abhyudaya)."⁶ Aparāvidyā is Avidyā because it leads to the attainment of relative values only.

Parāvidyā is also called Parmātmaavidyā by Śaṅkara⁷, according to whom philosophy deals not only with the highest value (Niḥśreyasa, Mokṣa) but also with the highest reality (Parmātman, Akṣara), because the one is inseparable from the other and both are one and the same. Thus in accordance with his belief in the oneness and inseparability of the highest value and the most truly real, he lays down, in entire agreement with the spirit of the Upaniṣads, that "the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 2. 21.

3 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 1.

4 Ibid., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid.

6 अमृतं नि श्रेयसविभागप्रदर्शनेन विद्याविद्याविभागप्रदर्शनेन च ।

7 S. B., III. 3. 31; Mund. S. B., I. 1. 4.

subject-matter of Parāvidyā is that Akṣara-Brahman, also known as Puruṣa, which is the essence of the universe, from which as its immortal source the universe proceeds and into which it is again absorbed, the Puruṣa upon whose being known everything becomes known."¹ "By Parāvidyā is meant that knowledge of the Immutable (Akṣara) which is to be had through the Upaniṣads."² Thus we are led to the same conclusion as we have established previously, namely that philosophy deals not with reality as abstracted from value, but with value of which reality is a form. In Śāṅkara's language Philosophy deals with the nature of Brahman not only as the source of all reality and existence and as the Ātman of everyone, but also as the "param niḥśreyasa", the supreme Good, the eternal beatitude. And philosophy is nothing other than Parāvidyā. Thus we find Śāṅkara formulating the problem of Parāvidyā indifferently in either of these two ways:

1. (a) "The Indestructible is the subject of the higher knowledge."³
- (b) "Parāvidyā is really Parmātmavidyā, i. e., vidyā or knowledge dealing with the nature of the highest Self."⁴
- (c) "The Indestructible, who is the source of all beings and the Self of everyone, is the subject-matter of Parāvidyā."⁵
2. (a) "Parāvidyā deals with the highest Good (Niḥśreyasa)."⁶
- (b) "Mokṣa is the subject-matter of Parāvidyā."⁷
- (c) "Mokṣa, which is the highest Bliss, is the subject of Parāvidyā."⁸

1 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 1; I. 1. 5; S. B., I. 2. 21.

2 Mund. S. B. I. 1. 5.

3 S. B., I. 2. 21.

4 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid., I. 1. 5.

6 S. B. I. 2. 21.

7 Mund. S. B., I. 2. 1.

8 Ibid.

Śaṅkara gives an admirable summary of his distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyās in the following words, in his commentary on the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: "The next text is begun to distinguish between the bondage of Saṁsāra and Mokṣa, the subject-matter of these two kinds of knowledge respectively (i.e. Parā and Aparā). Of these the subject of Aparāvidyā is saṁsāra, which consists in the variety of action, its means such as doer, and its results, which is without beginning or end, and which being misery in its nature, should be discarded by every embodied being. The subject of Parāvidyā is Mokṣa, which consists in the cessation of Saṁsāra, which is without beginning and end, undecaying, immortal, deathless, fearless, pure and clear, of the nature of being centred in the Self, and is transcendent bliss. These, Agnihotra and the rest, enjoined in the Vedas, form the road, the means for the attainment of the necessary fruits."¹ "These ignorant men, regarding the sacrificial and charitable acts as most important, do not know any other help of bliss (i.e., the other called knowledge of Self). Having enjoyed in the top of heaven—the place of pleasure—the fruits of their Karma, they enter again into this world of men or even an inferior world."² "But those who possess the knowledge contrary to that of the persons previously mentioned, the hermits of the forest and the sanyāsins, go through the orb of the sun, through the northern route indicated by the sun, their good and bad deeds being consumed, to Satyaloka, where is the immortal Puruṣa, the first-born undecaying Hiraṇyagarbha. With this end the movements within the pale of saṁsāra attainable through AparāvidyāBut this is not what is meant by Mokṣa.....The consumption of Karma spoken of is only relative; all the result of Aparāvidyā, being of the nature of ends and means and diversified by the difference of acts, means and fruits, and partaking of duality, is only this much which ends with reaching Hiraṇyagarbha."³

Śaṅkara draws exactly the same distinction in almost the same words between the fruits of Karma and Brahma-

1 Mund. S.B., I. 2. 21.

2 ibid., I. 2. 10.

3 ibid., I. 2.11.

vidyā in his commentary on B.S. 1.1.4,¹ and lays down that Mokṣa, which is the same as Brahman, is not something to be effected by having recourse to means. It is not the result of meritorious action, but is "asādhya" and "nityasiddhasvabhāva." And at another place in the same work² he identifies Aparāvidyā with Karma-vidyā, and Parāvidyā with Brahma-vidyā. Paravidyā is also called simply "Vidyā" and Aparavidyā receives the name of Avidyā.³ There is nothing in Śaṅkara's writings to lend support to Deussen's view⁴ that the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā, as outlined by him in his commentary on the Brāhma Sūtra, is different from that found in the "Introduction to Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad." This view misrepresents Śaṅkara's position. According to Śaṅkara the basis of the distinction between Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā is their competency to lead to the realization of the summum bonum; the first succeeds in this mission, the second fails. This is the only view entertained by Śaṅkara in all his works. Aparāvidyā includes "Karma" and "Upāsana". Both of these fail to bring about eternal beatitude. 'Action (sacrifices), together with a full comprehension of the duties of Prāṇa and the rest, is a means to the attainment of Brahmaloḥa by the road known as 'Light' &c. Action by itself (without a knowledge of Duties) is a means to the world of Manes by the road known as 'Smoke' &c.....But in neither of these two roads is there an absolute accomplishment of the highest end of man. And hence that which is independent of Action, the knowledge of the secondless Self, ought to be explained. Apart from the knowledge of this secondless Self there is no absolute attainment of eternal beatitude."⁵ Paravidyā is this very knowledge of the secondless Self.

In his commentary on the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the same distinction is present; there it appears as the distinction between Vidyā and Avidyā. The basis as well as the essence of the distinction is the same: Vidyā leading to "Niḥśreyaśa",

1 तत्तुमन्वयात् ।

2 S.B., I. 2. 21.

3 Ibid., I. 4.6.

4 D.C.V., p 131.

5 Chand. S.B., I. 1.1.

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Avidyā to "Abhyudaya." The former is the absolute good, the latter merely instrumental and relative good. Avidyā presupposes the distinction of action, its factors and results; Vidyā teaches the non-difference of the universe from Brahman, and points out that diversity is ultimately false. A comparison of the following statements with Śaṅkara's utterances in his other works will confirm this:—

"The inner Self is the subject-matter of Brahma-vidyā. But that of ignorance is relative existence, which consists of the ends and means of rites with five factors, which again depend on the division of men into four castes, e'tc. It is by nature alternately manifest and unmanifest like the tree and the seed, and is made up of name, form and action. This relative existence has been dealt with in the passage beginning, 'He (who worships another god thinking) he is one, and I am another, does not know', and concluded in the passage, 'This indeed consists of three things: name, form, and action'." One aspect of it is in accordance with the scriptures and makes for progress, leading up to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha; while the other aspect is not in accordance with the scriptures and causes degradation down to the level of stationary objects."

"Rites with five factors, such as wife, son and wealth, are the subject-matter of avidyā because they do not lead to the attainment of the Self.....They have been prescribed in the Śruti as means to the attainment of the world of men, of the manes and of the gods, not as means to the attainment of the Self. They have been mentioned as producing those specific results." "The whole universe of action, its factors and its results, beginning with the Undifferentiated, comes within the category of Avidyā. And the supreme Self, which is beyond the Undifferentiated, does not consist of name, form and action and is the subject-matter of Vidyā."¹

Parāvidyā is also called Nirguṇāvidyā by Śaṅkara, and to Aparavidyā is given the name of Sugūṇāvidyā.² "In the

1 Brh. I. 3. 8., II. 4. 1.

2 Ibid. I. 3. 2.

3 S. B., III. 3. 31; IV. 1. 13.

case of *Saguṇāvidyā* there exists such an injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin..... We, therefore, conclude that the fruit of this *vidyā* is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the destruction of all sins. In the case of *Nirguṇāvidyā* there is no corresponding injunction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the knowledge that our true Self is not an agent.¹ The fruit attached to the *Saguṇāvidyā* is the same as that belonging to *Aparāvidyā*, namely worldly exaltation and acquisition of lordly power. There is no doubt that *Saguṇāvidyā* is regarded by Śaṅkara as *Avidyā*, and is possible only during the state when ignorance envelops the individual soul; for, says Śaṅkara, *Upāsana*, worship, implies a distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, and this feeling lasts only so long as the realization of the selfhood of Brahman does not take place.² As this worship of Brahman is tainted with ignorance, it cannot lead to the highest good. Its highest result is worldly exaltation. "The going on the path of the gods is connected equally with all those *Saguṇāvidyās* which have exaltation as their fruit Not by faith and austerities alone, unaided by knowledge, can that path be attained. Through knowledge they mount to that place from which all desires have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge."³

Parāvidyā is philosophy of value, one may say, eternal value, *par excellence*. *Aparāvidyā* falls far short of it. *Parāvidyā* is to *Aparāvidyā* what light is to darkness. When Śaṅkara calls *Aparāvidyā* *Avidyā* and regards it as "*nindanīyā*", as "*nirakartavyā*", he is not to be understood as giving vent to passion or prejudice. His dissatisfaction with *Aparāvidyā* is the result of his awareness of something which is the most perfect embodiment of the highest value and the greatest reality. It is a reality in which all contradictions and conflicts are resolved. It is possible for man to realize this state; or, to change the expression, to become this reality.

1 *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 13.

2 *S. B. I.* 1. 12.

3 *Ibid.*, III. 3.31

And when man attains it, the universe appears to him to be a necessary expression of Divine Life. God is reconciled to the universe and the universe to God. This something is Mokṣa, which is perfect Bliss, perfect Awareness, and perfect Being. Accordingly, Śaṅkara has no hesitation in giving expression to his deep-rooted conviction that "everything other than Mokṣa is the subject-matter of Avidyā".¹

V

DEUSSEN'S INTERPRETATION OF ŚAṅKARA'S
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARĀ AND APARĀ
VIDYĀ

It would not have been necessary to devote so much space to the truth that Parāvidyā deals with the intrinsic or highest value (Nirāśreyasa) and Aparāvidyā with the instrumental value (Abhyudaya), had there not been a misunderstanding about the exact subject-matter of the two, as will appear from the discussions which are to follow immediately. One writer has even held the view that two different conceptions of Parāvidyā are to be met with in Śaṅkara's writings.² This is not all. The same writer authoritatively claims that the two conceptions of Parā and Aparā Vidyā are not very "clearly separated from each other" by Śaṅkara; they "rather meet us everywhere interwoven with each other".³ Thus there are "false connections" "in the organism of his system", and he "has fallen short of the greatness of his own point of view", and "lagged behind the full scope of his thoughts".⁴ Deussen takes "endless pains" to reconstruct Śaṅkara's views and place them in what he thinks a clearer light. We shall now proceed to examine whether there is any truth in Deussen's view regarding Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and Aparāvidyā. At any rate, the detailed discussion which we have undertaken above has shown one important thing, namely the inner unity of Śaṅkara's thought regarding the

1 Brahad. S.B., IV. 5.15.

2 D.S.V., P. 131.

3 Ibid., P. 98.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

proper subject-matter of Parāvidyā, as outlined in his different works.

Daussen gives the following account of Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā in his work, "The system of the Vedānta". The Metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, a theological, exoteric, and a philosophical, esoteric form. They are present in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration, and that of liberation. They stand in a continuous contradiction. These two conceptions are not clearly separated from each other, but rather meet us everywhere interwoven with each other.

In the province of Theology we find the contrast made between exoteric and esoteric doctrines under the names of Aparā or Saguṇā Vidyā and Parā or Nirguṇā Vidyā. The object of Parāvidyā is the higher Brahman, and of the Aparā the lower Brahman, the aim of the former is "samyagdarsana", and its one and only fruit is liberation; the aim of the latter is not knowledge but worship of Brahman, and its fruit is either "prospering of works (karmasamṛdhi)" or "heavenly happiness (abhyudaya)" or "gradual liberation (krama-mukti)".¹

When we pass to the sphere of Cosmology we find that "the question is here no longer the contrast between aparā and parā vidyā, but another, the contrast between two standpoints which are distinguished as the standpoint of worldly action (vyavahārāvasthā) and the standpoint of the highest reality (pārmārthāvasthā). The former is that of the Avidyā, and the latter that of the Vidyā."² The former is the "empirical" standpoint; the latter is the "metaphysical".³ These two standpoints are the counterparts in the sphere of Cosmology of the Parā and Aparā Vidyā of Theology.⁴ The standpoint of vyavahārāvasthā teaches "the creation of the world by Brahman and a wandering of the soul rendered individual by the Upadhis".⁵ From the standpoint of pārmārthāvasthā, "the

1 Ibid., pp. 102, 455.

2 Ibid., p. 106.

3 Ibid., p. 459.

4 Ibid., p. 459.

5 Ibid., p. 459.

possibility of a creation and a transmigration ceases along with plurality";¹ "there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different from the Brahman nor any plurality of things and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent....."² This standpoint "denies..... the validity of the ideas of creation and existence of the world as well as the individuality and wanderings of the soul".³

The Parāvidyā "is distinguished, on the one side, from empiric cosmology and psychology, Avidyā; and on the other from the doctrine of the aparam, saguṇam Brahman, of its worship and the entering into it by way of devayāna; this is the aparā vidyā, saguṇāvidyā".⁴ According to Deussen, "this aparā vidyā is nothing but metaphysics in an empiric dress, that is, Vidyā as it appears considered from the standpoint of avidyā" (the realism innate in us). Deussen is careful to point out that "this definition" of aparā vidyā is not, however, found in Śāṅkara, "as in general the distinction of the esoteric and the exoteric doctrine, and the inner connection of the latter as well as of the former, does not attain the clearness with which" he expresses it.⁵ He believes that unless this distinction is expressed in the way in which he expresses it, we shall "have to renounce a full comprehension of the system".

"The parmīrthāvasthā of Cosmology and Psychology forms a whole with the parāvidyā of Theology and Eschatology"; and Śāṅkara has connected them together in the unity of an esoteric system.⁷ But he "was not so clearly conscious" of the fact "that quite analogously, the vyavahārāvasthā of the doctrine of creation and transmigration are to be connected with the aparāvidyā of..... a personal God and a soul which departs to him after death in the unity of an exoteric

1 Ibid., P. 106.

2 Ibid., P. 100.

3 Ibid., P. 459.

4 Ibid., P. 100.

5 Ibid., P. 100.

6 Ibid., P. 106.

7 Ibid., P. 101.

metaphysics."¹ "The aparāvidyā cannot exist without the vyavahārāvasthā. The reality of saṃsāra and the reality of creation stand and fall togetherThe aparāvidyā demands, as its complement, the realism of the doctrine of creation.....In exactly the same way the vyavahārāvasthā of the teaching of creation cannot exist without the aparāvidyā of saguṇam Brahman, for in order to create, Brahman requires a plurality of.....powers.....but these stand in contradistinction to a nityāśesa brahma."² Unconscious of this ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics, Śaṅkara was "prevented.....from connecting together—as he did in the case of the paravidyā—the aparāvidyā also, with his doctrine of the creation of the world and Saṃsāra."³ But 'the inner necessary connection between the vyavahārāvasthā and the aparāvidyā', as "demonstrated" by Deussen, "comes more or less clearly to Śaṅkara's consciousness"⁴ in certain passages. From these facts Deussen has felt himself justified in "the weaving together of the teaching of the saguṇam brahma, of a world thereby created.....into a whole of exoteric metaphysics."⁵ But he reminds us again "that it must still be borne in mind that Śaṅkara did not reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the exoteric doctrines"⁶, and his "weaving together" of these was entirely essential and indispensable for "a full comprehension of the system."⁷

But, according to Deussen, what is most disappointing in Śaṅkara is that "to the detriment of clearness and logic this dual standpoint in Psychology and Cosmology is not always strictly adhered to. The system takes up the metaphysical standpoint as a rule and neglects the empirical without, however, denying or being able to deny its relative right of existence."⁸ Śaṅkara takes endless pains to maintain the

1 *ibid.* P. 106.

2 *ibid.* P. 107.

3 *ibid.* P. 121.

4 *ibid.* P. 107.

5 *ibid.* P. 108.

6 *ibid.* P. 108.

7 *ibid.* P. 100,

8 *ibid.* P. 460.

teaching of the creation of the world through the Brahman, and to unify it with his better insight into the identity of the two, by trying to show that the cause and effect are identical, and then constantly asserting that the doctrine of creation had only the aim of teaching this identity of the world with Brahman, a view which cannot be brought into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which he himself bestowed on it.¹ In Deussen's view creation is the subject-matter of aparāvidyā. "This aparāvidyā treats the creation in the Cosmology very fully and regards it as real."² Because "this dual standpoint in Psychology and Cosmology is not strictly adhered to" by Śaṅkara, Deussen speaks of "fluctuations between the empirical and metaphysical standpoints", and regards them "as historical monuments of a stage through which the philosopher first struggled to fuller clearness without entirely effacing from his work the traces of the intermediate stage he had passed through."³ Thus it is that "the solution of the cosmological problem is first sought from the empirical standpoint and only when this method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called in."⁴ This is the "shortcoming" in Śaṅkara⁵, and this is how he "has lagged behind the full scope of his thought"⁶, and in "the weaving together of the teachings" of aparāvidyā and vyavahārāvatā lie the "improvements" made by Deussen, which, of course, are "suggested" by Śaṅkara himself.⁷ Deussen's view is shared by Professor Radhākṛiṣṇan in his "Indian Philosophy"⁸, and by Thibaut in his Introduction to the Translation of Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.⁹

VI CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF DEUSSEN'S VIEW THE UNITY OF ŚAṅKARA'S THOUGHT

Deussen, it must be said at the very outset, has missed the true import of Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and

1 Ibid. P. 101.

2 Ibid. P. 460.

3 Ibid. P. 273.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. P. 101.

7 Ibid., P. 273.

8 Vol. II. PP. 468, 518-519

9 PP. CXIII. CXVI.

Aparā Vidyā, and as the result of this Śaṅkara's philosophical system has presented itself to him in an entirely false light. It is a persistent misreading of Śaṅkara's works which is responsible for the view that "the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms", that there are two "theologies", two "cosmologies", two "psychologies" and so on, and they stand in a continuous contradiction. To think so is to do violence to the inner systematic unity of Śaṅkara's thought. There is nothing in Śaṅkara's writings to show that the view held by Deussen regarding the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā is acceptable to him. As I have proved above, according to Śaṅkara the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation (abhyudaya), the latter to eternal beatitude or summum bonum (niḥśreyasa); and this distinction is maintained by him throughout his works. The distinction is an axiological one and is fully consistent with the value standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara. There is only one "metaphysics" in Śaṅkara and it is the metaphysics of value and its problem is the investigation of the nature of that supreme value and the relation in which it stands to what human consciousness regards as the highest reality. There is no other problem which Śaṅkara sets before himself. To think otherwise is to shut one's eyes to the opening pages of his Brahma Sutra Bhāṣya, in which he formulates the problem of Brahmanavidyā. Parāvidyā, according to Śaṅkara, is the same as Brahmanavidyā, the same as Vidyā, the same as Nirguṇa Vidyā; these terms have the same connotation and are interchangeable. Parāvidyā is Parmātmavidyā, the science of the Highest Self, and it is also science of the Highest Good. In Brahman these two come together and coincide.

Likewise we have failed to discover any evidence in support of Deussen's view that the contrast between "aparā" and "parā" Vidyā has reference to Theology, and that between vyavahārāvasthā and parmārthāvasthā has reference to Cosmology. The standpoint of vyavahārāvasthā is that of Āvidyā; this Āvidyā, according to Deussen, is "empiric Cosmology and Psychology", and is distinguished from

Aparāvidyā or Sagunā vidyā. This over-nice distinction between Parāvidyā and Parmarīhāvasthā, which together form an esoteric system of metaphysics, drawn with so meticulous care by Deussen, serves only to hide Śāṅkara's meaning and not clear it. Similarly Śāṅkara's meaning is misunderstood when a distinction is drawn by Deussen between Avidyā and Aprāvidyā or Sagunāvidyā. According to Śāṅkara, Aparāvidyā is nothing but Avidyā, and the content of Aparāvidyā, which is admitted by Deussen to be Upāsana, is possible only during the state when Avidyā or ignorance envelops the soul.¹ Aparāvidyā is Avidyā because it is wholly occupied with relative values which are the result of merit, and demerit, and does not take any account of the eternal values, which are absolute and not relative to human activity and so not karmasādhya. This Aprāvidyā is no "metaphysics", as Deussen thinks it is, not even "metaphysics in an empiric dress". Brahmaavidyā or Parmātmaavidyā is the only "metaphysics" of which any systematic exposition is to be met with in Śāṅkara. Deussen's attempt to provide us with a definition of Aparāvidyā as "metaphysics in an empiric dress" does no justice to Śāṅkara's view. According to Śāṅkara even the highest truths, the truths which constitute the subject-matter of Parāvidyā, have to be expressed in an "empiric dress"; and this empiric dress is language. Language, Śāṅkara believes, in a very real sense creates "reality". It is no speciality of Aparāvidyā that it has an "empiric dress". Even the scriptures which deal with Brahman, with Mokṣa, with absolute truth, have got an empiric dress, and this is why Śāṅkara does not recognize them as completely transcending the sphere of Avidyā.² Deussen admits that this definition of Aparāvidyā "is not found in Śāṅkara".³ The truth is that this definition is not acceptable to him. His definition of Aparāvidyā we have given above. Śāṅkara has not left us in the dark regarding it, and we need not have recourse to guesses for inventing one.

1 Mind, S.B., I. 1.4.

2 Chand S B., VI. 1, 1. वाचार्थमज्ञं विकारो नामधेयम् ।

3 S. B. I. 1. 1.

4 D. S. V., P. 100.

The evils of this "dual standpoint" which has been made by Deussen the starting point for further investigation into Śaṅkara's philosophy are seen more prominently in his account of Śaṅkara's cosmological speculations. The most critical consequence of this line of thought has been that Deussen has been led to the view that creation is the subject-matter of Aparāvidyā. Starting with the assumption that the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, and both run parallel and are present in all the provinces of the Vedānta teaching, he has found it incumbent upon him to trace these two forms in the sphere of cosmology also. But, from the pārmāthika point of view, Śaṅkara denies that there is any multiplicity; "therefore, in the department of Cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence" from this point of view. From this arises also the necessity of referring creation to Aparāvidyā. All this, however, is contrary to Śaṅkara's teaching. The subject-matter of Parāvidyā is that Akṣara-Brahman who is the source as well as the essence of the universe and upon whose being known every other thing becomes known.²

A confusion arises in Deussen's mind, because he does not realize that the word "sṛṣṭi" in Śaṅkara's works is used to mean not only (i) phenomenal diversity, but also (ii) dependence upon Brahman and non-otherness from it. So far as the diversity is concerned, it is not ultimate, and sṛṣṭi śruti speaking of it is secondary; so far as the second sense of the word is concerned, scriptural texts speaking of it are primary and convey ultimate truth. Denial of "creation" (sṛṣṭi) in the first sense is perfectly consistent with its affirmation in the second sense, and one need not regard these as two different "doctrines" of creation and refer them to two different "vidyās". Because Deussen started with the presumption that there are two "cosmologies" in Śaṅkara, this line of speculation was not open to him, and he was prevented by this presumption from realizing the inner unity of Śaṅkara's apparently contradictory statements that "sṛṣṭi-Śruti" is "gauṇī" and at the same time it is "not gauṇī".

1. *ibid.*

2. *Mund. S. B.*, II. 1. 1.

If creation in the sense of "dependent emergence" were not a fact, the very truth for which Vedānta stands, namely "that by knowledge of the one the many become known", would have to be given up.¹ It is the fundamental tenet of Śaṅkara's philosophy that the highest good results from the knowledge of that which is the one Source of the universe.² The "metaphysical" point of view, as Deussen interprets it, does not explain creation but explains it away; it is no doctrine of creation, but a denial of any doctrine of creation; and such a view was far removed from Śaṅkara's mind. Ultimately this confusion and misunderstanding is traceable to Deussen's ignorance of the fact that the standpoint which Śaṅkara adopts is the standpoint of value. There is nothing to be said against Deussen's view that "Śaṅkara's system takes up the metaphysical standpoint as a rule"³ provided that by it is understood "the standpoint of value"; but from this point of view there can arise no question of "neglecting" "the empirical" without, however, denying or being able to deny its relative right of existence.⁴ "Value" is of "facts", and facts are implied in it; though, of course, value is something more than the bare facts. "Value" does not negate the "fact"; it only demands that the "fact" be recognized as having its being in "value".

What Deussen calls the *parmirthāvasthā* of creation is not concerned with denying the "validity of the world" but with determining the "value" of the world of creation. And its value is that it is an expression of Divine life and Divine fulness. Creation thus signifies the Brahmanhood of the world and the Self-hood of Brahman; Brahman is the Ātman of the entire universe. It is only ignorance of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy and inability to draw out its consequences that can find any difficulty in reconciling the view that "the doctrine of creation had only the aim of teaching identity of the world with Brahman"⁵ with "the ample and

1 S. B., II. 3. 6.

2 Prasna. S. B., VI. 1.

3 D. S. V., P. 460.

4 *ibid.*

5 D. S. V., P. 101.

realistic treatment" which Śaṅkara "bestowed upon it".¹ One really fails to see how the "realism" of creation comes in conflict with its Brahmanhood, which is its "value". Deussen fails to rise to the height from which Śaṅkara is inviting him to view the universe. There can be no doubt about the greatness of Deussen's work. His "System of the Vedānta" is one of the best works that have been written up to this time on this subject and for a long time to come students of Śaṅkara will have to turn to it. But its great drawback is that it fails to recognize the value standpoint which is central to Śaṅkara's philosophy. From the existential point of view, which is what Deussen adopts, there can be no end to the "fluctuations" and "inconsistencies" which his interpreters find in him. It is again ignorance of the value point of view which is responsible for Deussen's view "that the solution of the cosmological problem is first sought from the empirical standpoint, and only when this method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called in".² The existence of the cosmos is perfectly reconcilable with its divineness; the latter constitutes its value. This is the strength of Śaṅkara's system rather than its "shortcoming" as Deussen supposes.

The upshot of this discussion is that there are not two rival systems of metaphysics struggling for mastery in Śaṅkara; there are not two theologies, two cosmologies, two psychologies, and creation is not the subject-matter of Aparāvidyā. It is incorrect to say that Parāvidyā denies the validity of the ideas of creation and of the existence of the world. Parāvidyā is solely concerned with the ascertainment of the meaning and the value of the world and of the creative process. What it denies is that these "infinite shiftings of cosmic dust" possess any trace of intrinsic value. It is likewise incorrect to say that it is Aparāvidyā, and not Parāvidyā, which has to take upon itself the task of treating the creation in Cosmology very fully and treating it as "real". Accordingly there is no point in Deussen's suggestion that the ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics demands that Śaṅkara should have connected the Aparāvidyā also with his

1 *ibid.*, P. 101.

2 *ibid.*, P. 273.

doctrine of the creation of the world and saṃsāra; and when Deussen takes "endless pains" to weave together an exoteric system of metaphysics running parallel to the esoteric one, and standing in a continuous contradiction with it, he is not aware of the fact that he is introducing a dualism in Śaṅkara's philosophy which considerably weakens rather than strengthens it. He claims that Śaṅkara did not reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the exoteric doctrines. The truth is that the ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics with its own theology and cosmology was entirely absent from Śaṅkara's mind, and he cannot be expected to do a thing which he never proposed to do. And when Deussen attempts to lay down the reasons which "prevented" Śaṅkara "from connecting.....the aparāvidyā also with his doctrine of the creation of the world", he is simply offering an imaginary solution of an imaginary difficulty to the detriment of clearness and consistency. It is high time that we learned to give up the notion that Śaṅkara's metaphysics has two forms, running parallel and being present in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration, and that of libération. We need not fear that we should have to renounce a full comprehension of Śaṅkara's system but for this doctrine of dual metaphysics. The plausibility of the view that the Parmārthāvastha of cosmology and the Parāvidyā of theology together form rival esoteric systems of metaphysics arises from the fact that firstly Deussen wrongly understands Śaṅkara's explanation of the creation from the parmārthika point of view to consist merely in denying the origin of the world itself, and secondly he wrongly believes that there is an irreconcilable opposition between the "realism" of creation of the world and its identity with Brahman. Both these errors arise owing to neglect of the standpoint which is essential to Śaṅkara's system as a whole, namely the standpoint of Value. It is not Śaṅkara but Deussen that has "lagged behind the full scope of his thoughts" and "fallen short of the greatness of this.....point of view". The "false connections" which Deussen claims to have noted "in the organism of (Śaṅkara's) system"¹ do not constitute a discovery but an invention.

1 D. S. V., P. 101.

CHAPTER V
THE NATURE AND THE MEANS OF
KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters we have tried to explain the problems which Śaṅkara's philosophy sets before itself and of which it constitutes a solution. We have also given expression to our considered view that Śaṅkara stands among the greatest systematic thinkers of all times. But this is an "age of criticism", as Kant said of his own age, "a criticism from which nothing need hope to escape". Philosophy must justify itself at the bar of reason, if it does not intend to "lose all claims to the sincere respect which reason yields only to that which has been able to bear the test of its free and open scrutiny". Does Śaṅkara's philosophy do all this? Is it "philosophy" in the sense in which the modern age understands philosophy? It has been seriously maintained by many reputed scholars that Śaṅkara's philosophy "seeks to shelter itself behind its sanctity", and avoids facing the major epistemological issues "on the plea of the imbecility of human reason". It is, they would say, borrowing the words of Kant, dogmatic and not critical. Dr. Dasgupta holds that "Śaṅkara was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upanisads"; reason, according to him, could be used either for the "right understanding of the revealed scriptures", or "for the refutation of the other systems of thought". Likewise Deussen says that in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra there is not "any discussion of the Pramāṇas at all".² They are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedānta".³ According to him, the Vedānta even in Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which can enable metaphysics to "attain its contents only through a right

1 History, Vol. I, PP. 434, 435

2 D. S. V., P. 89.

3 Ibid., P. 90.

use of the natural means of knowledge".¹ The result is that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara has to "help itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge".² Śaṅkara has been able to grasp the metaphysical truth by intuition, but he does not know the "way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof".³ This is not all. He goes to the length of asserting that the Kantian analysis of the cognitive faculty is the only thing that can supply "the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system"⁴, and expresses the hope "that the Indians.....will accept the teachings of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', when it is brought to their knowledge, with grateful respect".⁵ Another Indian scholar, wholly agreeing with Deussen, writes that Śaṅkara keeps continually shifting from the vyavahārika to the pārmārthika standpoint, throws logic overboard, and is forced to take his stand upon pure scriptural authority whenever he has to answer logical objections against the Advaita position.⁶ It is nothing strange if to the European scholar who thinks his mind "is not bound by the doctrine of Śruti", any attempt to erect a metaphysical system on the basis of Śruti should "stand self-condemned".⁷

The question which an expositor of Śaṅkara has to face at the very outset is a very serious one, serious because an answer to this question will finally depend the position which history will assign to Śaṅkara in the hierarchy of the systematic thinkers of all times who have made an attempt to understand and expound the mystery of existence. The question is—is Śaṅkara's philosophy dogmatism with no rational basis? Is it mere "disquisition on the Vedānta-texts carried on with the help of arguments which are in conformity with such texts"?⁸ Is the task which Śaṅkara's philosophy places before itself nothing other than constructing a

1 *ibid.*, P. 90.

2 *ibid.*

3 *Aspects of the Vedānta*, P. 127.

4 D.S.V. P. 55.

5 *ibid.*

6 Belvalkar, P. 18.

7 Thibaut, P. ciii.

8 S. B., I. 1. 1.

system of "pure metaphysic", "without a previous criticism of pure reason", basing that system on principles "without first asking in what way reason has come into possession of them, and by what right it employs them"?¹ At first sight it seems that Śaṅkara's philosophy is nothing but dogmatism which has a naive simplicity about it and which does not trouble itself by any thought of examining the presuppositions on which the system is made to rest. For we find him confessing at the very outset in his Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*² that its aim is merely a "disquisition on the Vedānta texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments", and "the comprehension of Brahman takes place by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion of the sense of the Vedānta texts, and not by inference or any other means of valid knowledge".³ But the conclusion to which we shall be led in the subsequent discussions will be just the reverse of this. Śaṅkara's Advaitism is a rare example of a system which is throughout informed by a spirit in the highest degree critical and not merely speculative. There is not merely imaginative flight in Śaṅkara; there is also, in the same degree and to the same extent, that critical penetration without which philosophy would lose all the respect to which it is entitled as an intellectual discipline. We shall next proceed to an exposition of the epistemological basis of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The questions which will have to be discussed in this connection are the following—

- (i) Is there anything in Śaṅkara's writings which goes to substantiate the claim put forward on his behalf that he has an independent epistemological standpoint of his own on which he bases his world-views and from which these can be said to follow legitimately? What is this epistemological standpoint?
- (ii) In what way is his epistemological standpoint related to his theory of *Pramāṇas*, especially the *Śabda Pramāṇa*? What is the connection between his theory of the "Means" of Knowledge and his theory of the "Validity" of Knowledge?

1 Kant: *Selections from Kant* by Watson. P. 7.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1.

3 *Ibid.*, I. 1. 2.

There should be a harmony between the "theory of knowledge" and the "theory of reality", between epistemology and ontology. If we look into the history of philosophy, we shall find that this has been the driving force of all epistemological discussions. Realism and Rationalism, no less than Intuitionism and Mysticism, are inspired by this very ideal, however qualified by the success they are able to achieve. When Jacobi, Germany's apostle of intuition, recommended the intuitive way of knowing in metaphysics, and Schelling insisted that the genius of the artist is a gateway to metaphysical knowledge, and "art the organon of philosophy", they were emphasizing the self-same truth. The same ideal inspires the metaphysical construction of Henri Bergson in modern times. He gives expression to this conviction in numerous places. 'Theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable.'¹ 'The problem of knowledge is one with the metaphysical problem.'² And again, 'theory of knowledge must be dependent upon metaphysics.'³ He is under the impulse of the same ideal when he says that metaphysics claims to dispense with symbols and seizes reality without any expression, translation or symbolic representation. Realism stands for the same ideal, whether it believes in the independence of the immanent or the transcendence of the independent; and however polemical may be its attitude toward Idealism, both keep the same end in view, believing that there should be a harmony between the epistemological standpoint and the world-views which follow from it. The ideal has not always been achieved. Modern Realism is a case in point. It betrays the divorce between theory of knowledge and theory of reality in the most glaring way. James Bissett Pratt, one of the prominent realists of the present day, confesses this in his personal statement in "Contemporary American Philosophy".⁴ He writes, "Critical Realism was intended and is maintained as a purely epistemological doctrine. It would be strange, however, if it has no bearing on

1 *Creative Evolution: Introduction*, P. XIII.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 188.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Vol. II, PP. 216, 217.

the problems of ontology. There is, to be sure, little agreement among critical realists as to what this agreement may be. Several of the members of the group that wrote the "Essays" have developed out of their epistemological realism a naturalistic metaphysics. As I view the question the logic of the thing runs quite the other way. The concept of a mind that does transcend itself—which is the very centre of Critical Realism—would seem to me to imply a uniqueness on the part of mind such as to separate it rather sharply from the physical world and from mechanistic nature".

Theory of knowledge is the foundation-stone of philosophy and metaphysics is the structure built upon it. But at the same time theory of knowledge would degenerate into a mere wrangle of words and useless hair-splitting if metaphysical theory were not a direct issue of its special features. It stands to the credit of Śaṅkara that he has realized the greatness of the principle which we have laid down above, and uses it as the star to guide his way. The student of Śaṅkara need not go to Kant's "Critique of pure Reason" in order to discover the philosophical base of his Advaitism; a careful study of his commentary on the Brahm Sūtra and the Upaniṣads will supply all that is essential to support the superstructure of his system. His works, whatever else they may be, constitute, at the same time, a magnificent "Critique" of "Spiritual Reason", though not of "Pure Reason" as Kant understands it. The greatness of Śaṅkara consists in this, that his theory of knowledge is in perfect accord with his theory of reality. He recognizes, as Bergson does, that these are "inseparable" and the problem of knowledge is one with the metaphysical problem.¹ As we proceed in our exposition of Śaṅkara's theory of knowledge, we shall be able to refute the view that "there is neither in the text nor in the Commentary any discussion of the Pramaṇas at all"; that they are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedānta"; that the Vedānta is subversive of "the natural means of knowledge"; and that it is constantly engaged in "helping itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge."² In an exposition of

¹ Creative Evolution, P. 168.

² D. S. V., PP. 89, 90.

(§ II.) THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTANTRAM

Śāṅkara's theory of knowledge we must carefully separate the two questions of the source or means of valid knowledge and that of the test or criterion of validity. The former is the question of the origin of knowledge, the latter of its validity; and an answer to the first does not necessarily constitute an answer to the second. All the six orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy agree that perception, inference and vedic testimony are means of valid knowledge, but all of them do not give the same answer to the question what constitutes the validity of knowledge; nor do they always agree as to the sense in which one or other of the valid means of valid knowledge is to be understood. First we shall take up the mainly epistemological question which is concerned with the nature and significance of knowledge as such, and then discuss the significance of Śāṅkara's epistemological position and its bearing on his theory of pramāṇas or means of knowledge. Finally we shall endeavour to show the extent to which his world-views can be said to be in line with his epistemological conclusions.

II

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTANTRAM

According to Śāṅkara, the function of knowledge (jñānam) is to reveal the real nature of a thing. Knowledge or truth is an agreement of thought with reality¹; and in the absence of adequacy of thought to thing there can be no knowledge. Śāṅkara believes that no one can consistently deny relation of logic to reality; it would mean denying a relation of logic to truth. This shows his sharp disagreement with formal logic, which has no concern with reality. On this point Śāṅkara's view is similar to that of Bosanquet, who insists upon logic being regarded as dealing with reality. According to Śāṅkara, "the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on human notions. It depends on the thing itself."² "To say of a post that it is either a post or a man or something else is not to give its truth."³ The reason is that there can be no

1 S. B., I. 1. 2. वस्तु यायाः मया ज्ञातम् ।

2 Ibid.. वस्तु तन्ममेव तत् ।

3 Ibid.

option regarding the real nature of a thing: it cannot be of this nature as well as of that nature and also of a third one. Knowledge which satisfies this condition, i. e, which reveals reality, which is controlled by it, and which is not relative to human notions, is real knowledge. It is *tattvajñāna*.¹ It is *samyajjñāna*, perfect knowledge.² It is perfect because it has the characteristic mark of uniformity, is identical, and always of the same nature, being always determined by and under the control of the real thing.

This characteristic is shared by all knowledge whether it is spiritual or sensuous, whether it is intuitional or perceptual. Knowledge is one, and its fundamental characteristic is the same whether the object of that knowledge is Brahman or a post or a milestone along the roadside, whether that knowledge is, as Śaṅkara says, *Brahmajñāna* or *Arthajñāna*. According to Śaṅkara, the judgment "Fire is hot" embodies as valid a knowledge as the judgment "Brahman is sat, cit and ānanda", or the judgment that "the world is transitory and without essence."

If the knowledge of a reality which is an already existing one is always *vastutantram*, there is nothing which can prevent us from comprehending the nature of that reality, provided we make use of the right *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge, which, in its turn, will be determined by the nature of the reality to be known. In one case sensuous perception may be the appropriate means of knowledge; in another case the nature of the thing may demand that recourse be had to spiritual perception or intuition (*anubhava*). Whatever be the *pramāṇa* employed, the resulting knowledge will have the characteristic explained above. The knowledge that "fire is hot" can be had only by having recourse to that "means of knowledge" known as *pratyakṣa* or perception. Even if "the theory of perception adopted by the Advaita Vedānta is rather crude on the scientific side", as Professor Radhakrishnan thinks it is³, the epistemological character of

1 *ibid.*

2 S.B., II. 1. 11, तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् ।

3 J. P., Vol. II, P. 492.

the perceptual knowledge, which it has in common with all knowledge or knowledge as such, emphasized by Śaṅkara, constitutes a valuable discovery. As the knowledge of the mountain, the molehill and the mustard seed is vastutantram, similarly that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is vastutantram and not relative to human notions or authoritative injunctions,¹ Brahman, in spite of the fact that it is a "bhutavastu" and being a bhutavastu its knowledge is vastutantram, cannot be the object of that means of knowledge which is competent to reveal the nature of sensible things, namely pratyakṣa. Every pramāṇa operates within a limited and well-defined sphere. While Pratyakṣa reveals sensible things, Anubhava is the pramāṇa to be resorted to in order to get insight into the nature of the supreme values of Being, Consciousness, and Bliss, for which Mokṣa or Brahman is but another word in Śaṅkara's philosophy.

III

KNOWLEDGE DISTINGUISHED FROM ACTIVITY

The characteristic of knowledge as vastutantram according to Śaṅkara, serves to distinguish it from "activity". Knowledge and activity are entirely different in nature. One of the negative marks of "activity" is that it is not concerned with revealing the nature of an already existing reality, nor is it required to answer to the nature of the thing like knowledge; accordingly it is not controlled by the nature of the thing. Positively it is wholly relative to and bound up with some human individual.² Compare the Vedic statement, "One who desires heaven must perform the new and full moon sacrifices". This sentence enjoining the sacrifice, when fully understood, gives rise to knowledge. But the knowledge arising from it is not the performance of the sacrifice, which alone constitutes "activity". With regard to the knowledge, no option is possible, but it is of the essence of "activity" to carry option with it. One may perform the new and full moon sacrifice, one may not perform it, one may

1 S.B., I. 1.1; I. 1.4.

2 S.B., I. 1.1.

perform it in a way contrary to the prescribed one. This is possible because "activity" is wholly "puruṣatantram", i.e. relative to man. One cannot know fire either as hot or cold, for no option is possible where "knowledge" of a thing is under consideration, because knowledge must answer to the nature of the thing. But an action whether of ordinary life or enjoined by the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man may, for instance, go either by means of a horse, or on foot, or by some other means, or not at all.

In this sense, meditation (dhyānam) and reflection (cintanam) are, according to Śāṅkara, activities, though they are mental. They are wholly dependent on the meditating or the reflecting person. Modern psychologists point out that the human mind must interpret the sensations and put meaning upon them from its inner resources, in order that perception may result. But according to Śāṅkara these processes cannot pass for knowledge; they are no doubt preliminary to knowledge, but they do not form the essence of it. These processes are "activities" (kriyā). "Knowledge is not a mental activity."¹ Therefore knowledge, although mental, widely differs from meditation and the like.² "The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire..... is merely an action and dependent on man; the viewing of the well-known fire as fire is not dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and not action."³ Upāśanā, implying all the diverse forms of worship, meditation, prayer-offering, is a kind of "activity" because it is ultimately puruṣatantram. Because no option is possible with regard to the knowledge of a thing "it has never been observed either directly to remove some characteristic of a thing or to create one;It can neither create nor put a stop to real entity."⁴ Knowledge reveals reality and does not create it; the Vedas, which are the repository of

1 S. B., I. I. 4.

2 Ibid,

3 Ibid.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 10.

(§ IV) KNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF TIME, PLACE, CIRCUMSTANCES

perfect knowledge, "are only informative and not creative. A scriptural statement cannot impart any power to a thing."¹

IV

KNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF TIME, PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Because knowledge is controlled by the already existent reality, according to Śāṅkara "it is independent of place, time circumstances, etc, as 'fire is hot', and 'the ether is formless,'"² As the nature of a thing is eternal, because a thing can never divest itself of its natural property and be other than what it is, knowledge also, which is concerned with the revelation of the nature of the thing and which must answer to that nature, is characterized by universality and necessity. It is identical and uncontradictable. Truth means being of one and the same nature. "Fire is hot"—this knowledge, because it answers to the nature of reality and is bound up with it, is eternally true. The truth of the judgement is not relative to particular time, place, and attendant circumstances. This characteristic belongs in a way to all knowledge, as much to a priori as to a posteriori knowledge, as much to perceptual as to intuitional knowledge. Self-knowledge or knowledge of God has as much universality and necessity as the knowledge that fire is hot and ether is formless. The latter is as much independent of time, place and circumstances, as the former, because both are *vastutantram*. Time, place and circumstances are the necessary antecedents of knowledge, but they do not enter into its constitution as such.

This is also the dividing line between "knowledge" and "activity". "Activity, being bound up with persons, depends on place, time and circumstances."³ Let us explain the nature of activity as distinguished from knowledge by making a brief reference to Kant. According to Kant the character of

1 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

2 Ibid., IV. 5. 15. ज्ञान तु वस्तुत्वत्वात् न देशकालनिमित्तचपेक्षितं यथाज्ञानरूपेण आकाशोऽमृतं इति ।

3 Brhad. S.B., IV. 5. 15. क्रियायास्तु पुरुषत्ववस्तुत्वाद्देशकालनिमित्तचपेक्षितम् ।

the human mind (with its human sensibility and understanding) determines (along with things-in-themselves) our common objective world. The human sensibility impresses its own stamp, its own forms of space and time, upon the sensations which it receives, and thus makes the percept. But mere unrelated, disconnected percepts would not be knowledge; the human understanding connects these percepts by imposing upon them the categories which are the different forms of conceiving or relating or connecting percepts. The mind has to become active in thinking by contributing to the manifold of sense the categories; and in this way it prescribes its laws to the sensible universe. In this way, says Kant, reason makes the cosmos. According to Śaṅkara, so far as these functions of mind are concerned, they do not constitute knowledge; they are but operations or activities of mind. Śaṅkara is at one with Kant in his assertion that knowledge is judgment. But Śaṅkara would say that judgment may mean either of two things. It may mean (i) the mental activity of judging or (ii) the resulting knowledge, which, according to Kant, possesses (in certain cases) universality and necessity. According to Śaṅkara, the latter alone can be said to be "jñāna"; the former is "kriyā" merely; it is activity on the part of the mind. It is *puruṣatantram*. The further development of Śaṅkara's philosophy is bound up with the deduction of the consequences of this epistemological position.

V

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE

Though Śaṅkara holds that all knowledge is independent of time, place and circumstances, and there is a necessity and universality which characterizes knowledge as such, he is not unaware of the distinction between particular knowledge and universal knowledge. He fully recognizes that there is a knowledge which is merely particular, being confined to the differentiated objects, and is to be sharply distinguished from knowledge which is universal, just because it is concerned with reality in its absolute and infinite aspect and is conducive to the greatest good of man. This distinction between particular knowledge and universal knowledge

is, for Śaṅkara, a distinction of value and not only one of logical categories. Śaṅkara calls it the distinction between "Viśeṣa Vijñāna" and "Nirviśeṣa Vijñāna"; between "Upādhiviśiṣṭa Vijñāna" and "Sarvopādhivivarjita jñāna"¹, i. e. knowledge of reality as limited by name and form and reality as unlimited by any adjunct, because all limiting adjuncts are nothing other than Brahman which is the Reality and a thing cannot be limited by its own self. The knowledge that "fire is hot" is no doubt perfect knowledge, samyagjñāna, according to Śaṅkara, and is independent of time and place, just as is the case with the knowledge that 'Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, and is the Self of everyone'. But the former is the knowledge of a differentiated object, of reality as limited by name and form, of the absolute being infected with division and discrepancy.² Only that knowledge, which is the knowledge of Reality as it is in itself, is conducive to the attainment of the Highest Good. No such fruit attaches, according to Śaṅkara, to the knowledge of reality as differentiated by name and form.³ The knowledge that "fire is hot" and "ether is formless", though it is samyagjñāna, is not absolute or universal knowledge in the sense in which the knowledge that Brahman is the self of everyone is. The logical form of these judgments is the same, but they differ fundamentally in their axiological significance.

This is why, according to Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣadic knowledge alone deserves to be called universal knowledge, and apart from the Upaniṣads perfect knowledge is impossible.⁴ In other words, samyagjñāna or universal knowledge is knowledge of things as having their being in and through Brahman, and is identical with what Spinoza calls *scientia intuitiva*. "Fire is hot" is perfect knowledge,⁵ only in a certain sense and not absolutely. Fire is mere name and form, according to Śaṅkara, and fieriness from the "fire" vanishes

1 S. B., I. 3. 19; Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 19.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12. अवेक्षितोपाधिरुन्मूल्यम् । निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धम् ।

3 Ibid., II. 1. 14. ब्रह्मप्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव

4 S. B., II. 1. 1.

5 Ibid., II. 1. 11.

we realize that it is a modification based on words merely.¹ "Earth being only an effect of water, the only truth would be water, and earth would be a mere name. So too, the water being an effect of fire, would be a mere name; and the only truth would be the fire. Fire too, being an effect of Being, would be a mere name, the only truth being the Pure Being.....Thus, then, all things being only a modification of Pure Being, the knowledge of this makes all things known."² This knowledge alone is perfect knowledge, and "when a man realizes the whole variety of beings as resting in the one, and as an evolution from that (One) alone, then he becomes Brahman".³ Particular knowledge presents to us the passing, changing, particular and accidental. Universal knowledge reveals the universal, the changeless and the absolute, and is true knowledge. The particular knowledge, or *viśeṣajñāna*, is knowledge of the real through the limiting adjuncts or *upādhis*. The essence of the *upādhi* lies in its incompleteness. The knowledge of the particular, of the *viśeṣa*, is knowledge of a thing not having its being in and through the Absolute but having a self-subsisting independence and enjoying an existence in its own right and for its own self. To view a thing thus is to view it falsely.⁴ The particular knowledge is incomplete knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of an incomplete reality. The universal knowledge is knowledge of the reality in its absolute completeness.⁵

VI

ŚĀṆKARA AND KANT ON KNOWLEDGE

Kant's analysis of knowledge, with its assignment of a legislative function to the knowing mind, led him to the conclusion that the world we know is a world of appearance or phenomena, a world of things as they appear and must

1 Chand., S. B., VI. 4. 1. अग्रादग्नेरग्नित्वम् ।

2 Ibid., VI. 4. 4.

3 Gita. S. B., XIII. 20.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 5. 4.

5 B. had. S. B., II. 4. 12: विज्ञेयमज्ञा. विज्ञेयात्मनित्यभावः; IV. 3. 20. परिच्छिन्नात्मभावः; IV. 3. 23, विज्ञेयदर्शनः; I. 4. 10, अविद्याकृत असत्त्वः; IV. 3. 20, सर्वव्यापकत्वम्, निर्विशेषज्ञान ।

appear to human minds, but not a world of these things as they are in themselves. Real things never appear to us as they are in themselves; what we know is their appearance only, whose character is affected throughout by the nature of the knowing mind. Śaṅkara's analysis of the nature of knowledge, with its emphasis upon its objective character (*vastutantratva*) and consequent independence of time, place, circumstances, etc., led him to an entirely different conclusion. For Śaṅkara, knowledge, even when its object is what Kant calls "appearance", can be valid knowledge. According to him in every act of perception human mind is in contact with a real object and not with the appearance of it. Both Śaṅkara and Kant believe that "the being of reality is not apprehended by us, what we grasp is an appearance thereof".¹ But they believe it in entirely different senses, and the ways in which they arrive at this conclusion have nothing in common.

Kant proceeded by an analysis of "the nature of our cognitive faculty"², and determined the a priori conditions of experience. The consciousness which he interrogates is the perceptual consciousness; the ideal of knowledge which he places before himself is the scientific knowledge which is confined to the discovery of connections and interconnections among the phenomena. Śaṅkara begins his enquiry not by analysing the perceptual consciousness, as Kant does; but the valuational consciousness. Kant's Immanent Metaphysics is a metaphysics of science merely, which is no metaphysics at all; Śaṅkara's metaphysics is a metaphysics of Value, the metaphysics which really matters for us. "Liberation, therefore, is the Brahman which is the object of our present enquiry."³ Kant's reason for his assertion that the human mind knows the real not as it is but as it appears to it, is that it looks at the things-in-themselves through certain coloured glasses, namely, the a priori forms of space and time and categories of understanding. The perception we have is a coloured perception, and as these a priori intuitions and categories are native to the human mind and

1 I. P., Vol. II, P. 521.

2 D. S. V. . P. 55.

3 S. B. I. I. 4.

cannot be dissociated from it without destroying the mind itself, human knowledge is eternally and unalterably confined to the appearances only. Śaṅkara's reason for his statement that what we grasp is an appearance of reality and not the being of it is that we fail to realize the inner significance of things, which consists in their being an expression of Divine Life and Divine Bliss.

It is an error to believe, as Deussen does, that an "analysis" of "the nature of our cognitive faculty", "as Kant undertook it, would in fact give the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system"¹. To think that there is any identity between the teachings of the above critique and those of Śaṅkara is to do an injustice to the latter. The resemblance between Kant's axiom that "the transcendental ideality of the world does not exclude its empiric reality" and Śaṅkara's maxim that from the vyavahārika point of view the world is real and from the Pāramārthika unreal is not deep-rooted. The latter is a judgment made from the standpoint of value. This standpoint is completely foreign to the first Critique of Kant, which is believed by Deussen to supply "the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system." If there is any similarity to be drawn between Śaṅkara and Kant, reference must be made to the latter two Critiques. It is not until we come to the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant lays bare his teaching that the universe is a Kingdom of Ends and exists for the fashioning of moral personalities, or is, in the words of Keats, "a vale of soul-making", that we can discover any great kinship between Śaṅkara and Kant. Kant analyses the moral consciousness which gives us intimations of certain moral values; Śaṅkara interrogates the highest religious consciousness, which includes within its sweep the moral consciousness, and, while sublimating it, at the same time transcends it. Both appeal to the value consciousness of man.

Thus we see that there is not much in common between Kant's first Critique and Śaṅkara's Vedānta. The upshot of the whole Critique of Pure Reason is that metaphysics which pretends to a knowledge of the

¹ D. S. V., P. 55.

Absolute is doomed. The "Absolute" is the forbidden fruit for Kant in that Critique. But it is just with this forbidden fruit that Śaṅkara's philosophy deals. The metaphysics which Kant stigmatizes as "metaphysics as a natural disposition" is the metaphysics which really matters for Śaṅkara. Faithful to his analysis of knowledge and the discovery of its inherent nature as vastutantram, Śaṅkara is not led to the Kantian view that human knowledge is confined to appearances only, because it must of necessity come to man through certain coloured glasses which are native to the knowing mind. If the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding are part and parcel of the knowing mind, as Kant believes to be the case, a complaint against them is useless. According to Śaṅkara, the very nature of the knowing faculty cannot be used as an argument against its competence to give valid knowledge of the thing. This is why for Śaṅkara the judgments that "fire is hot" and "Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda" both constitute valid knowledge. In knowing that fire is hot we know the fire as it is and not the fire as it merely appears to us. Likewise in cognizing Brahman as the highest Reality, the greatest consciousness, and the intensest Bliss we know Brahman as it is and not merely as it appears to us.

VII

THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

If knowledge is vastutantram, the really important question to be asked and answered is: what is the means to the knowledge of the thing (vastu)? This is the question which Śaṅkara raises next. Śaṅkara holds that if knowledge is vastutantram, there is nothing to prevent man from knowing the nature of reality, provided he makes use of the right means of knowledge. Right knowledge is what Śaṅkara calls Pramā.¹ that through which right knowledge can be had is Pramāṇa, the Means or Source of Knowledge. "Knowledge is the result of the different means of knowledge and these have for their objects existing things."² "A means of knowledge

1 S. B., IV. 1. 2.

2 *ibid.*, I. 1. 4.

is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for instance, would be considered a means of knowledge in perceiving sound, etc.¹ Śaṅkara does not doubt the competence of the *pramāṇas* to produce right knowledge. Even Perception and Inference, to say nothing of the Scripture, are means of valid knowledge; "in the presence of Inference and Scripture leading to the knowledge of that (i.e., Self), it is sheer temerity to hold that knowledge cannot arise".² Śaṅkara nowhere speaks of "the perversity of ordinary means of knowledge" of which he is sometimes accused.³ On the contrary, he believes that if the means of knowledge are regarded as fundamentally defective and as infected with an innate "perversity", all our practical dealings will come to nought. Nothing would be further from Śaṅkara's thought than to believe that the means of knowledge are incompetent to give valid knowledge in their respective spheres. Speaking of the validity of Inference as a means of knowledge he writes as follows: "If we challenge the validity of an Inference of the kind based on general observation, all our activities, including eating and drinking, will be impossible. This no one desires. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance, are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt those means expecting similar results; all this would be impossible".⁴ All the means of knowledge produce "certain and fruitful knowledge".⁵ Perception produces the certain and fruitful knowledge that fire is hot; Anubhava produces the certain and fruitful knowledge that one's own self is pure, untainted with evil, consciousness, and bliss.⁶ "The possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of knowledge; the operation and non-operation of the means of knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossi-

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

2 Gita. S.B., II. 21.

3 A. C. Mukerjee, A. U. S., Vol. II. P. 388.

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3.7.

5 Ibid., I. 4.7.

6 Ibid., II. 1. 20; S.B., I. 1.4; II. 1.11.

bilities. What is apprehended by perception or some other means of knowledge is possible; what is not so apprehended is impossible."¹

It is, then, the question of the *pramāṇa* which comes to the forefront in Śāṅkara's philosophy. The nature of the *pramāṇa* to be used will be dependent upon the nature of the reality intended to be known. If the object to be known is an external material thing, *pratyakṣa* or sensuous Perception will have to be used. If we want to get an insight into the nature of a reality like the self or the Brahman, or the values, we shall have to depend upon *Anubhava* or Intuition.² This is true of all other objects of knowledge and their *pramāṇas*.³

Here also a comparison with Kant will be instructive. Kant's analysis of knowledge, directed towards the discovery of the a priori conditions of experience, led him to the conclusion that knowledge of the Unconditioned Reality is out of the question; the human mind must be content with the knowledge of the phenomena. Śāṅkara, with his main interest in the epistemological character of knowledge itself, was led to inquire into the nature of the *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge, as the result of his discovery that knowledge is *vastutantram* and is, inherently, independent of time, place, and circumstances. Śāṅkara boldly asserted that if the proper *pramāṇa* is depended upon, it will take us to the region of the Noumenal Reality also. That which stands in the way of our getting access to the Ultimate Reality is not the inherent nature of knowledge itself, but an injudicious use of the *pramāṇa* or the means of knowledge. The fault lies not with knowledge but with the means of knowledge and when Kant proposes Faith as an alternative to knowledge, what he is really doing is to substitute one *pramāṇa* by another *pramāṇa*, and not to change the nature of knowledge itself. Kant wrongly took knowledge to mean knowledge of the phenomena only. If it is the function of knowledge to reveal things, there is no reason why an

1 S.B., II. 2.28.

2 S. B: I. I. I, ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म।

3 S. B, I. I. 4. एकं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुम्, वेदितव्यम्

epistemological inquiry should start by equating knowledge with knowledge of the phenomena or sense-perception. Had Kant realized this from the very beginning, he would not have been forced to the irreconcilable dualism between faith and knowledge; instead, he would have been led, like Śāṅkara, to the oneness of knowledge whatever the type of it. The dualism of knowledge and faith, indicating a division in the sphere of knowledge itself, would have been replaced by a dualism of *pramāṇas*, based on a difference, not in knowledge, but in the nature of the objects of knowledge, each equally valid and equally valuable in its own sphere. He would not have been compelled to undo in the second Critique what he did in the first, and it would not have been necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality in order to make room for faith. Śāṅkara's view then is: there is unity of knowledge but diversity of *pramāṇas* resting on the manyness of objects.¹

The criterion or test of knowledge is the same everywhere; it is *vastutantram*. But the means to it differ with the difference in the object (*vastu*) of knowledge. Accordingly, it is doing less than justice to Śāṅkara to speak of "Intuition" as at once a "faculty of knowledge" and "the ultimate criterion" of truth.² To ask the question whether "the appeal to the *vedas* is nothing short of an extra-philosophical criterion" is to ask an awkward question³; and to say that "for the Vedāntist the ultimate criterion of truth is an immediate experience"⁴ is to miss the truth about Śāṅkara's epistemological standpoint. Scripture, Intuition, Perception and Inference are not the test of truth but means to it. The criterion of truth is that it is *vastutantram* and answers to the nature of reality. This is similar to Hegel's conception "of truth as self-accordance, the accordance of anything with its real nature, its notion".⁵ Śāṅkara's answer to the question what knowledge is valid is: "Knowledge which is *vastutantram*."

1 S. B. II. 1-11.

2 A. C. Mukerjee in A. U. S. Vol. III, PP. 385, 389.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 403.

4 *Ibid.*

5 Mure: Introduction to Hegel, P. 167.

This is the ultimate ground of the validity of knowledge, whatever be the source of it.

VIII

PRAMĀNAS AND THE REGION OF AVIDYĀ

We see how hollow is the contention of those who say that in Śāṅkara there is no discussion of the pramāṇas at all and they are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedānta,"¹ Śāṅkara's remarks on the "inadequacy and perversity of the ordinary means of knowledge" have been declared to be "sweeping" and his epistemological position dubbed as "unqualified irrationalism".² The statement of Śāṅkara which has called forth these remarks is to the effect that "the means of knowledge, perception and the rest, and the scriptures belong to the province of Ignorance", one among many such others, dispersed throughout his works.³ The truth is that the meaning and force of Śāṅkara's statement has not been understood, and he has been made to say something which is as far removed from his mind as the north from the south pole. The misunderstanding is bound up with the ignorance of the standpoint which Śāṅkara adopts, namely, the standpoint of Value.

His assertion, in the very beginning of his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, that all the means of knowledge and all the scriptures, whether they deal with ordinary human ends or with intrinsic and eternal values, belong to the province of ignorance, simply means that these phenomena are bound up with finite existence. Knowing or cognizing, implying a distinction between the knower, the known, and the means of knowledge, is a pragmatic attitude of the man; and the concrete situation in which he finds himself and which is preeminently marked by the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual is its sole justification and the only sound explanation. All injunctions and prohibitions, all delineations of the nature of the Good and the means to the

1 D. S. V., P. 89.

2 A. C. Mukerjee, A. U. S., Vol. III, P. 388.

3 S. B. I. I. 1.

attainment of it, have a meaning only in the region where the actual has not passed into the ideal. This is the region of struggle, of strife, of endeavour, and of effort; of effort issuing in success and hope in despair. When to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, the distinction between the knower, the known, and the object of knowledge vanishes, because there is nothing other than the knower and the conditions necessary for the operation of the means of knowledge are absent.

As knowing is a pragmatic activity, "we do not find any means of knowledge necessitating further operation (on the part of the Knower) when once the thing to be cognized by that means has been cognized".¹ "When to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what?"² When the Self has been realized, and, with the realization of it, the gulf between the Self and the Not-Self, between what ought to be and what is, between the realm of value and the region of existence, has been bridged, "no dealing implying means and objects of knowledge is possible". "This final authority does away with the cognitive-hood of the self, and, with the disappearance of it, the self ceases to be governed by the *pramāṇas*, just as the waking state by the dream-perception."³ There is no interest of the self which remains unsatisfied and to the satisfaction of which the *pramāṇas* can possibly be conducive. "When the awakening takes place that everything is the Self, perception, etc. cease to be operative".

Not only the secular means of knowledge, but the Scripture also ceases to be operative and have any sway over the man of realization who has transcended the duality of value and existence and raised himself to the point where they fuse in one. "When the awakening takes place the Scripture ceases to be authoritative."⁴ "So when they have attained

1 Gita. S. B., II. 69.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 14.

3 Gita. S. B., II. 69.

4 S. B., IV. 1. 3.

that result (i. e., the knowledge of Brahman consisting in the realization of the unity of the Self).....their real state of aloofness, their interest in the authoritative ness of the scripture, ceases. And in the absence of that the Scripture, too, just ceases to be Scripture to them."¹ True to his standpoint that the pramāṇas have a pragmatic value and are relative to the interests and needs of the pramātṛ or subject, Śaṅkara points out that when all duality is over, when knowledge reaches its perfection consisting in the realization of the oneness of the Self with Brahman, when only unity, the one without a second, the Good, stands, all differences such as scripture, disciple, and discipline are at an end.

To a man of realization scripture is no more a "means of knowledge"; it is his own knowledge. This is why the Upaniṣad says that to the man of realization "the Vedas are no Vedas".² The śruti loses its operation, not because the man of realization comes to adopt a defiant attitude towards it but because what the śruti intends to teach has already become an accomplished fact. It possesses no more value as a means, because the end to which it is a means is already realized. This is the real meaning of Śaṅkara's statement that the man who has realized Brahman as his Ātman is not subject to injunctions and cannot be commanded by them, because even the Vedas are born of him.³ "None can be commanded by his own words proceeding from his own knowledge; a wise master cannot be directed by an ignorant servant."⁴

The adhyāsa between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge with which Śaṅkara opens his Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra and which is declared therein to be the foundation of all the practical dealings involving the distinctions between the knower, the object and the means of knowledge, the doer, the action and the means of action, is but a natural consequence of the discrepancy which is the lot of the world of finite life. Adhyāsa, according to Śaṅkara,

1 Brhad. S. B. V. 1. 1.

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 1. 3. श्रुतेर्व्यनाशः प्रबोधे ।

3 Altareya. S. B., I. 1.

4 ibid.

is "the notion of something in some other thing,"¹ as when mother-of pearl is taken for silver, or the rope for the snake, or when the moon appears as double. It is viewing a thing as other than what it is; this, in its turn, is bound up with the consciousness of variety or multiplicity, with the consciousness of this as distinguished from that, that as different from this, of both as contrasted with a third something, the third with a fourth something, and so on. It is relative to the consciousness of Self as distinguished from a not-self.

¹ S. B., I. I. I, Introduction.

CHAPTER VI

ANUBHAVA OR INTUITION

ANUBHAVA AS VALUATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In spite of the fact that the criterion of knowledge, according to Śaṅkara, is identically the same throughout, the means of knowledge are varied. All of them are valid means of knowledge. They tend to become invalid only when applied to a reality which, by its nature cannot be the subject-matter of that pramāṇa. "The several means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres", and "one means of knowledge does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other means".¹ Śaṅkara in his works refers to at least five sources of knowledge—Perception, Inference, Analogy (Upamāna), Implication (Arthāpatti) and Scriptural statement (Śabda).² At other places he refers to three sources only, namely Perception, Inference, and Scripture.³ Sometimes he cites Purāṇa and Smṛti as pramāṇa⁴, and refers to Itihāsa and Purāṇa also as sources of knowledge. Śaṅkara is not so much interested in enumerating the possible sources of knowledge as in determining the pramāṇa on which there is "any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities", "the natural means of knowledge" by making a "right use" of which metaphysics can attain its content.

For Śaṅkara there are no "metaphysical verities"; there is only one metaphysical verity, namely the Absolute Good which is also the highest Reality. This absolute Good is, in the first place, a bhūta vastu an existent reality; in the

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 22, स्वविषयभूतानि हि प्रमाणानि शेषादिदत् ।

2 Ibid., न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुद्धयते प्रमाणान्तर्विषयमेव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति ।

3 Ibid., III. 3. 1.

4 Ibid., III. 2. 1.

5 Chand S. B., V. 10. 2.

6 S. B., I. 3. 33; III. 3. 32.

second place, it is completely internal, inseparable from consciousness. A direct insight into an existent reality can be had only through Perception, whether it is external or internal. Knowledge of the Good can be had only through internal perception, but one important feature of this internal consciousness will be that it will, at the same time, be a consciousness of value. This is what, in contradistinction from sensuous perception, may be called Intuition. This intuitional consciousness is a value-consciousness.

Śaṅkara excludes Sensuous perception (Pratyakṣa) from a knowledge of the Absolute Good or Brahman, because the latter, though it is an existent reality (bhūtavastu), does not exist either in space or in time and sensuous perception is of no avail in the region inhabited by a reality which is timeless and spaceless. Śaṅkara says that Brahman—and for him Brahman is the same as the Absolute Good, i.e., Mokṣa or Muktyavasthā—"though it is of the nature of an already existent reality, cannot be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge".¹ It cannot be the object of Perception; "sense-organs cannot grasp it, because the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman".²

Anubhava is the pramāṇa through which direct access can be had to the nature of Brahman, or the absolutely real Good.³ The problem of the "means" of knowledge cannot be discussed in isolation from and without reference to the "reality" which is to be known. This is the meaning of Śaṅkara's statement that knowledge is vasiutantram. Śaṅkara does not believe in the possibility of an epistemology which will be completely neutral. He does not first independently fix the pramāṇa and afterwards make an attempt to write down the nature of reality by making use of that pramāṇa. The decision about one involves a decision about the other. The "pramāṇa" of Anubhava is not a key which will open any and every lock; it has been made to suit a particular lock.

Experience makes us aware of a reality which is the oneness of value and fact, of an absolute "good" which is

1 S.B., I. 1. 4.

2 S.B., I. 1. 2.

3 *ibid.*

above all conflict and above all care. Śaṅkara discloses this fact to us and, basing his epistemological inquiry on the actuality of this experience, says that Anubhava or Intuition is the proper means to a knowledge of this reality. "How can one contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still in the body, vouched as it is by his heart's conviction?"¹ We can experience this "good" in our personal life, because we are ultimately made of the same stuff. We share the divine life and the divine consciousness; we partake of the divine bliss, our self is, in its essence, Sat, Cit and Ānanda. This is the guarantee and this the explanation of the possibility of our having a direct experience of the good. To a self which is devoid of the experience of the good in however imperfect a way, it can never be explained what good is like. If he were told what it is like, he would not follow it. But as it is, every one of us does experience this good, in however imperfect a way, in our lives. We experience it in "passing perceptions of beauty in nature" or in completely satisfied love which neither asks nor doubts, which is both intimate and intelligent, or still more intensely in that feeling which accompanies the spirit of surrender to an ideal which we have made our own. This good is experienced in its natural purity and still more continuously by the yogin during what Śaṅkara calls "Samrāḍhanakāla".² This experience is characterized, according to Śaṅkara, in the first place by the feeling that "I am Brahman" and that "I am all". Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda; accordingly in the feeling that "I am Brahman", or, what is the same, "Brahman is my Ātman", there is the enjoyment of infinite Being, perfect Awareness, and unbounded Bliss. The feeling that "I am all" expresses but another side of this experience. In this state of Brahmānubhava everything becomes the Self. The distinction between Self and Not-Self vanishes and the Self is no more limited by another. This identification with all, in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, is the highest of all attainments and constitutes the greatest bliss, in comparison with which all joys that are

1 S.B., IV. 1.15.

2 *ibid.*, III. 2.25.

due to the contact of the organs with their objects appear paltry and mean.

According to Plato also the "good" is supposed to be grasped by direct vision only, and for that reason is strictly "ineffable". Taylor, commenting upon this, says that neither Plato nor any one else could tell another man what the good is, because it can only be apprehended by the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight. Socrates feels his inability to describe this good. Śaṅkara also emphasizes the "ineffable" character of Brahmanubhava. This experience, he tells us, is unique, is peculiarly subjective.¹ It gives one the conviction that one is completely blessed, and it requires no other witness than the testimony of one's own experience; so what can be better than this?"² One experiences not only that one has been "touched" by the good but also that one has "realized" it oneself. This is "anuvēdana". "Anuvēdana" is explained by Śaṅkara as "that attainment which, as knowledge ripens, culminates in the ultimate results, as eating culminates in satiety".³ The good can be apprehended by direct acquaintance only, not by discursive reasoning. It is open to what Spinoza calls *scientia intuitiva*. Śaṅkara does not make a secret of it; and in his insistence on the possibility of a knowledge of this good through intuition only, a faculty "which all possess but few use", he shows his fundamental agreement with the great mystics of all ages. He confesses plainly that the good can be grasped only by "trenching on the mystical", and in his avowed mysticism he does not lay himself open to the charge either of ignoring the claims of logical understanding or of claiming any "special inspiration" for himself, which, according to Caird, is an "anachronism" for the modern spirit. Śaṅkara agrees with McTaggart that none ever went about breaking logic but in the end logic broke him, and accepts Caird's dictum that "the saint should also be a man of the world and that the prophet should show the logical necessity of his vision".⁴

1 Brhad S. B., IV. 4. 8, आत्मसाक्षिकमनुत्तमम् ।

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 Caird : Hegel, P. 131.

Śaṅkara does not mean to put forward any special claim either on his own behalf or on behalf of those in whose footsteps he is treading. He is never tired of repeating that "the knowledge of Brahman is accessible to all"¹, that so far as its attainment is concerned there is no difference between giants like Vāmadeva and the human weaklings of today, that not even the gods can prevent a man who has known Brahman from becoming Brahman and all.² It is written, "Whoever among the gods knew it also became that"³. But it is not given to all to have a direct vision of this Good, just as it is not given to every eye, to that of the Bushman and the Hottentot also, to perceive the work of the categories in the making of the world of experience. For Śaṅkara the vision is the privilege and the prerogative of the disciplined soul, disciplined in the purest of virtues, in keenest discrimination, and in persistent meditation.⁴ All reasoning, all reflection is only preparatory to an immediate and intuitive vision of the good. It is an indispensable aid no doubt, according to Śaṅkara, but only as tending to prepare the way for the birth of that scientia visionis in which it is the lot of the pure souls to possess.

Śaṅkara's Anubhava is in essence the same as Spinoza's scientia intuitiva. Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of the existence of individual things in so far as they are in God. It is seeing God in all things and all things in God. To the man who has it all things appear in a transformed light; he sees things not as determined by space and time but as eternally involved in the idea of God, sees them, as Spinoza puts it, "under the form of eternity". This knowledge is just the opposite of what ordinary mortals have, which is partial, abstract, and disintegrated. Intuitive knowledge is knowing God as God knows Himself, and to this corresponds the culminating stage of the moral life, the essence of which is that "intellectual love of God" which is but another name for that constant, supreme, and perfect joy and blessedness which comes to him who beholds all things in God and God

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 8.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

3 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

4 Kena. S. B., II. 1.

in all things. This anubhava is the "divine eye", the "divya chakṣu" of which the *Gītā* speaks¹, "the consciousness that sees the whole variety of beings as resting in the One and as emanating from that one."² When this anubhava takes place, a man becomes Brahman. This Anubhava is identified by Śāṅkara with what he calls *sarvātmabhāva*³, identification with all and this is said to take place when a man intuitively realizes that all that he perceives is only the Self. "Intuition, then, consists in the knowledge that my Self is pure consciousness, free from all pain."⁴ There is freedom from all pain, because the intuitional consciousness is the consciousness of a reality in which the distinction between self and not-self is non-existent, in which the duality between the ideal and the real, has been overcome and pain follows only as the result of an unreconciled opposition between the above pairs of opposites. This alone constitutes that integral experience in which the whole universe is regarded as the fulfilment of a single, coherent, divine purpose. This alone can represent that "unique intuition" the search for which constitutes philosophy according to Bergson. This is the "true empiricism" of which he speaks, the empiricism which, as he says, proposes to get as near to the original itself as possible, to search deeply into its life, and so, by a kind of intellectual auscultation, to feel the throbbings of the soul.⁵ This alone is "true metaphysics".

Anubhava or intuition is characterized by immediacy, like feeling and quite unlike thought, which essentially consists in the separation of the subject and the predicate, the self and the not-self, or, as Bradley would put it, of the "what" and the "that". In every experience below the stage of *Brahmānubhava* or *Ātmānubhava* there are two aspects, the "that" and the "what"; these two can be explicitly distinguished from each other. In thinking or reflection the "what", after being distinguished from the 'that', is ascribed to it as something which can be truly said about it. This distinction is

1 XI. 8; XIII. 34.

2 *Ibid.*, XIII. 30.

3 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, II. 5. 15.

4 *S. B.*, III. 1. 1, सर्वदुःखविनिर्मुक्तं कर्तव्यं तन्मात्रमिदं आत्मानुभवः

5 Bergson : *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, P. 31.

not peculiar to thought only, it is a characteristic of finite existence itself. Anubhava implies fusion at a higher level into a single directly apprehended whole of the vast complexity yielded by the process of thought and reflection. This means that the immediacy characteristic of Anubhava is not pre-reflective, but post-reflective. Anubhava is immediate experience, but "not at a level below distinction and relation." It includes everything but includes it "in such a way as to transform its character", as to make it appear to be the necessary expression of a transcendent Good, of a divine fulness, of a spiritual meaning. Anubhava is the experience of a reality possessing "a super-abundance in which all partial discrepancies are resolved and remain as higher concord."

Śaṅkara never represents anubhava as the consciousness of a reality which is a lion's den or of a light in which all colours are grey. Anubhava is an experience the central feature of which is constituted by value-consciousness. It is an experience of the reality and substantiality of values, of their being foundational to the universe, and of the universe resting in and through them. It is this experience which possesses the highest authority so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned; it is the highest *pramāṇa*, the final court to which appeal should be made when one is in doubt or darkness.¹

Anubhava, possessing these characteristics, is what Śaṅkara means by a completely adequate apprehension of reality, and the man who has this himself becomes Brahman. Brahman is nothing but this Integral experience. What Śaṅkara means by Anubhava is most adequately expressed by the śloka of the *Gītā* quoted above.² "When a man sees the whole variety of beings as resting in the one, and as emanating from that (one) alone, then he becomes Brahman." This anubhava is the same as *samyagdarśana*³ Śaṅkara, commenting upon it, says, "When a man sees that all the

1 *Bṛhad. S.B.*, I. 4.7, आत्मप्रत्ययः सार प्रमाण यस्य तु गीयस्याधिगमे तु गीयने क्वात्म-
प्रत्ययसार । *S.B.*, II. 1. 14 अपि चान्त्यमिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकम् ।
नातः पर किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति ।

2 XIII. 30.

3 *ibid.*

various classes of beings abide in the One, in the Self, i.e., when he intuitively realizes that all that we perceive is only the Self, and when he further sees that the origin, the evolution (of all), is from that One, the Self as stated in the passage 'From the Self is life, from the Self is desire, from the Self is love, from the Self is *ākāśa*, from the Self is light, from the Self are waters, from the Self is manifestation and disappearance, from the Self is food'—then he becomes Brahman".

Realization of this anubhava, then, will be an integral experience. It would be all-embracing and all-comprehending. It will see the Self in everything and everything in the Self, God in everything and everything in God. It will be systematic as embracing the totality of existence, all at once and in a perfect unity, as its content, without discord or discrepancy. This Anubhava is knowledge of the real as the real knows itself. Man can have it only when man becomes one with the real. This knowledge of the real alone is real knowledge. Anubhava is at once this knowledge and also the means to it.

II

ŚĀṆKARA AND KANT

Anubhava as knowledge of God as God knows himself has affinity with what Kant called intellectual intuition. It is that kind of intuition which, according to Kant, brings direct knowledge of the ultimate reality. But, in Kant's view, it is not given to man to possess this intuition. It is "the prerogative of the Original Being, and can never belong to a being which is dependent in its existence as well as in its perception, and in fact is conscious of its own existence only in relation to given objects".¹ This kind of intuition is "original" (*intuitus originarius*). In the case of human beings sensuous intuition alone is possible, and this never enables them to know the thing-in-itself but only the empirical object of experience. Human perception (i.e., under forms of space and time) is "sensuous simply because it is derivative (*intuitus*

¹ The Philosophy of Kant, selected by Watson, P. 38.

derivativus) and not original (*intuitus originarius*) and therefore is not an intellectual perception".¹ It is derivative because it is dependent upon the existence of the object and therefore is possible only if our perceptive consciousness is affected by the presence of the object. Were it original the very existence of the object would be given in the perception. But such a perception, so far as Kant sees, can belong only to the Original Being. Śaṅkara and Kant are at one in their belief in the reality of intellectual intuition. Both of them believe that a knowledge of the ultimate reality cannot be had through sensuous intuition. According to Kant, so far as the transcendental thing-in-itself is concerned, there is no possibility of ever making it an object of "knowledge"; for Śaṅkara Brahman, though it is an already existent reality, cannot be the object of sensuous intuition and the other ways of knowing.²

But the similarity between their thoughts on this point ends here. Kant says that intellectual intuition can never belong to man; for Śaṅkara *anubhava*, the synonym of the Kantian *intuitus originarius*, is foundational to his metaphysics. The transcendental reality is seen by the yogin during the state of *saṁrādhana*. It is open to immediate intuition, which is also the end of the enquiry into Brahman.³ Kant lays so much stress upon the impossibility of intellectual intuition for human consciousness that he distinguishes his own philosophy on this ground alone from other forms of Idealism which rest upon a belief in the possibility of intellectual intuition. His attitude is one of uncompromising hostility. According to Śaṅkara, human intuition is not mere sensuous intuition; it is also original or intellectual in the words of Kant. Man can have direct knowledge of his own Self, which is *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*; he can have an intellectual or original intuition of it along with the supreme values of "existence", "bliss" and "consciousness" of which it is an embodiment. The Self is identically the same as Brahman and Brahman is the Self of everyone. Man can thus have an intellectual intuition of God also. Perception is the fundamental means

1 *Ibid.*

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 S. B., I. 1. 2.

of knowledge, according to Śaṅkara. It may be sensuous or non-sensuous, i. e., spiritual. Material things are known through sensuous Perception; spiritual realities through spiritual Perception. Spiritual Perception is what Śaṅkara calls Anubhava. Kant's admission that God's knowledge of Himself takes the form of an intellectual intuition really amounts to saying that intellectual intuition is the true type of all knowledge. This also carries with it the implication that the main function of knowledge is to reveal reality, a truth duly emphasized by Śaṅkara in his conception of jñāna as vastu-tantram. But if it is so, Śaṅkara says that it does not stand to reason that a limitation should be imposed on human knowledge and doubt cast upon man's experience of the transcendental realities and values.¹ If God has access to the thing-in-itself through intellectual intuition, human beings must have access to it in the same way in which God has access to it.

For Śaṅkara there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of man's knowing God as He is, because God is the very Ātman, the very life and breath of every living being. God is not an external creator or designer of the universe; He is the self-communicating life. The universe is God realizing Himself. Man in trying to know God only tries to know his own Self, his own Ātman. If the object to be known, i. e. God, were something entirely alien to the knowing mind, the latter would never be in a position to have any knowledge of it. His quest would be the quest of the Holy Grail; he would, as Śaṅkara says, only dare to find the footprints of birds in the sky, to pull it with his clenched hands or to cover it as with a skin. "It is the definite conclusion of all the Upaniṣads that we are nothing but Ātman, the Brahman that is always the same, homogeneous, the one without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, immortal, deathless and free from fear."² This is the ground of the possibility of Anubhava in case of human beings. Kant was prevented by the deistic thought of his age from recognizing any such internal relation between the human soul on the one

1 S.B. IV. 1.15.

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 7.

hand and God on the other. He could not present a better and nobler conception of God than that of a "Paymaster" whose supreme function lay in the distribution of "doles of happiness", in exact proportion to virtue, among those who had worked for it.¹ Man and God belong to two entirely disparate realms; and it is not strange that, to Kant, what is a privilege for the one is a privation for the other.

Because Kant could not give up thinking that God and the human individual were alien to each other, he was forced to propose two different ways of knowing the reality of things. God knows the thing-in-itself through an intellectual intuition; man has access to it through faith. But if intellectual intuition is the true type of all knowledge, if it is the way in which God knows Himself as He really is, if it is the way which yields a direct knowledge of things-in-themselves, human beings can and will have access to the unconditioned reality not through faith, as Kant said, but, through "intellectual intuition". This dichotomy of intellectual intuition and faith is non-existent in Śaṅkara. There is only one way of knowing the unconditioned reality which is also the ultimate and absolute value. It is direct experience of it. It is Anubhava or Ātmapratyaya.² Accordingly, Śaṅkara does not find it necessary, as Kant does, to deny "knowledge" of God, freedom and immortality in order to make room for "faith". However, Kant in saying that reality is given to man by faith must not be understood to adopt an attitude of antagonism to intuition. The logic of the thing would point to a different conclusion. If the same unconditioned reality is known by God through "intellectual intuition" and given to man through "faith", ultimately intellectual intuition and faith must be one and the same. If they are entirely different in their nature, it will be difficult to be sure that the reality known through these means of knowledge is one and the same. Samyagjñāna is vasiutantram. It is of one and the same form (ekarūpam). Anubhava is the means to it.

III

ŚAṅKARA AND BERGSON

Śaṅkara's Anubhava is often compared to Bergson's Intuition, and there is no doubt that there are very close

1 Pringle Pattison: *Idea of God*, P. 35.

2 S. B., I. 4. 7.

resemblances between the two. According to Bergson, in intuition we experience and know the reality as it is in itself. Intuitional knowledge alone can attain the absolute and this very knowledge is also absolute knowledge. It is knowledge of a thing from within. It is a non-intellectual cognition by which we place ourselves within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Bergson's view of intuition and its appropriateness as a philosophical means of knowledge is closely connected with his theory of reality. Both of these must, therefore, be considered together in order to understand Bergson's position. This, as we have already insisted, is also the position of Śāṅkara. According to Bergson the ultimate reality is a living, flowing, moving reality. It is an absolute, unchecked flow, a completely unimpeded movement. Reality is change itself. There is no thing which changes. Change is the only thing. It is the *elan vital*, the inwardly grasped "real duration", the absolute reality. This is the essence of what we call our "self", its innermost being. This self is a continuous flux and the real nature of it is open to intuition only. Its reality we can seize from within only, by intuition and not by analysis or discursive understanding. It is our own personality in its flowing through time revealed to us directly in intuition. The psychologist, by having recourse to the method of analysis and abstraction, is able to give us only a special aspect of the personality, a snapshot of the inner life, a diagram of concrete inclination. This method resolves the self into a series of "states", but these states are mere abstractions, the outer crusts of the self. There is, as Bergson says, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux one has ever seen. This is the real Self. Its nature is one of pure duration, excluding all ideas of juxtaposition, reciprocal externality and extension. This flowing reality, this *elan vital*, at times slows down and reverses its course, and then there is "genesis of matter". Matter, therefore, is a negation of the free flow of reality, an inversion of the free activity of the creative process. Reality, according to Bergson, presents itself in two ways, as a flow and as rigid matter. As the theory of knowledge must always be dependent upon metaphysics,

consciousness also assumes a double form like the reality at the base of the universe. "The double form of consciousness is due to the double form of the real."¹ This double form, namely Intuition and Intelligence, are turned in opposed directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life. "Consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life."²

Śaṅkara proposes Anubhava as the means to a true knowledge of the real (tattvajñāna). In Anubhava we do not move round the object but we enter into it; we do not adopt any special point of view, but seek an immediate rapport with the object by becoming one with it. In Anubhava we view the thing from inside; in any other knowledge we view it from the outside. In Anubhava the standpoint we adopt is the standpoint of the reality itself; it is the absolute standpoint and the knowledge it gives is absolute knowledge. The standpoint of Anubhava is the standpoint of intuition as Bergson conceives it. The intuitional knowledge which this standpoint gives is the knowledge of Brahman, which is, in the words of Śaṅkara, "sarvopādhivivarjitam". Brahman is the ultimate reality and everything is the manifestation of that Brahman. The manifested universe, being an effect of Brahman, is not something other than it; it is Brahman in its essence always and eternally. In ignorance we see it and its contents as something other than Brahman and independent of it. When there is something other, Brahman is perceived as limited by it and standing to it in different relations. This is the view of "Brahman as qualified by the limiting conditions consisting in the multififormity of evolved names and forms", the "nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭa rūpam" of Brahman, as Śaṅkara puts it.³ This is the view of reality which we get when, instead of placing ourselves within it, we look at it from the outside, setting ourselves up against the reality while, in truth, we form part and parcel of the

1 Bergson : *Creative Evolution*, P. 188.

2 *ibid.*

3 S.B., I. 1. 12.

universal living process. As a matter of fact, we have not to "place ourselves" within the reality; we are within it; nay, we are that real which is the ultimate fact behind which philosophy cannot go. We have to become conscious of this truth, and the awareness of the real from this standpoint is what Bergson calls intuition and Śaṅkara Anubhava. Both of them believe that the absolute can only be given in intuition. According to both of them, "it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us".¹ It enables us to see reality as it is; in the words of Spinoza, to know God as God knows Himself; in the words of Śaṅkara, to know Brahman as devoid of any limiting adjuncts.

Because intuition enables us to enter into the very heart of reality and thus attain the absolute by becoming one with it, intuition according to Bergson, "implies the knowledge of matter". This matter is for him the *élan vital* itself, the current of life which flows on in its unimpeded movement and, in its flowing, creates its own forms of development. Knowledge of this "matter" is real knowledge. This "matter" is, for Śaṅkara, Brahman itself; knowledge of Brahman is the real knowledge (*tattvajñāna*); Anubhava "implies the knowledge of (this) matter". According to Śaṅkara, knowledge of reality which is obtained by recourse to a method other than that of intuition and in which reality presents itself as something alien to the knowing mind, is but external. This knowledge is relative to the special point of view at which we place ourselves. It is, as Bergson says, the viewing of a thing in terms of another thing, approaching the real through an endless series of symbols. It is the translation of the vital in terms of the mechanical; according to Śaṅkara, seeing Brahman through the "limiting adjuncts", *upādhis* which are but its effects and which consist in "name and form". Śaṅkara calls this knowledge *upādhiviśiṣṭa* knowledge of Brahman. But this knowledge does not take one to the very heart of reality; it leaves a man outside it. According to Śaṅkara the knowledge which is given by discursive intellect, as Bergson conceives it, is the knowledge of Brahman as *nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam*. Accord-

1. Bergson; *Creative Evolution*, P. 186.

ing to Śaṅkara, this knowledge is infected with ignorance; according to Bergson, intellect presents a distorted view of reality. "It goes all round into life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it", and thus succeeds only in bringing us a translation in terms of inertia, a snapshot, an external and schematic representation.¹ Bergson regards the knowledge which intellect places at our disposal as but a "translation", because in it reality is viewed not as it is in itself but as it is seen when manifesting itself through the moulds of matter. This matter is the "form" through which the real "matter" at the base of the universe, the *elan vital*, the life-force, is perceived by the intellect in its attempt to cognize it. It is for this reason that Bergson says that "intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form."² According to Śaṅkara, the intellectual way of knowing the real is not knowing it as it is, but as it appears when seen through the limiting adjuncts consisting in the diverse names and forms which are its own evolutes. It is the knowledge of the real as *nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam*.³

Enough has been said to show that there is a remarkable similarity between Śaṅkara and Bergson. But in spite of this remarkable similarity between the "intuition" of Bergson and the "Anubhava" of Śaṅkara, there are points of difference which are no less noteworthy. The Anubhava of Śaṅkara is a value-charged consciousness, a consciousness which, in its very essence, is oriented towards the good. The intuitional consciousness of Bergson is a value-free consciousness, and this is but a corollary of his view of the metaphysical reality, which is conceived by him as a pure flow, a perpetual becoming, a constant and continuous flux, having no goal and devoid of all determination. The real is 'change' itself; it is ever in the making and cannot be supposed in any way to be fixed. But a flow which is merely a flow, a process which is merely a process, cannot be said to possess any intrinsic value. In every change, in every process, there is always

1 *ibid.*, P. 186.

2 *ibid.*, P. 156.

3 S. B., I. 1. 12.

implied a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal and a tendency on the part of the actual to move towards the ideal. This is the inner meaning of the cosmological situation. This tendency on the part of the actual to move towards the ideal constitutes the element of the *nisus* or direction which is vital for the very existence of the process itself, in the absence of which it will cease to be what it is. This is the element of value which is foundational to the process itself. According to Bergson, time or duration is the only reality; it is change or evolution itself, and this evolution is essentially creative. But, as Urban has pointed out, it is the weakness of the whole group of philosophies which make evolution itself creative that they falsely assume that time, process, tendency themselves carry meaning and value. As has been pointed out above, the meaning Bergson appears to find in becoming does not belong to the becoming itself. Bergson's *élan vital* has no trace of that intrinsic value which, according to Śāṅkara, constitutes the very essence of Brahman. It is mere fact just as other facts are. Only it is a pure dynamism. This very duration is also the essence of our self. The result is that the intuitional consciousness which, according to Bergson, has been evolved "because of the need it had.....to follow the stream of life" and which is the only means which "leads" to the very "inwardness of life" appears to be in no way different from introspection or inner observation.

According to Bergson self-knowledge is perhaps the best case for intuition. This intuition is the immediate sense of our being, of our own personality in its flowing through time, of our self which endures. Intuition reveals to us that the self is of pure duration. The inner life is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it; no one of them begins or ends but all extend into each other. It is variety of qualities, continuity of progress and unity of direction. Bergson's only complaint against the competency of psychological introspection as a means to give insight into the real nature of duration or *élan vital* is that it is analytic and resolves the self into a series of elements.

Saṅkara's Anubhava is not the intuition whose only function is to reveal the inner self in its flowing through time. It is the consciousness which is charged with meaning and value and which is oriented towards the good. For such a consciousness the question whether the self is pure dynamism or has a rock-like fixity and possesses the immobility of the mountain is of little or no importance. The question which is significant is the question whether it is intrinsically valuable. Anubhava is the consciousness of the supreme reality of the intrinsic values of life, the values of existence, of consciousness, and of bliss. The Self is the supreme value. It is Sat. It is Cit. It is Ānanda. Anubhava is the means to it. The Self is Brahman itself and Anubhava of Brahman is the same as anubhava of the Ātman. Brahmānubhava and Ātmānubhava signify one and the same fact of the intuitional awareness of the absolute reality which is not merely the highest existence but also the most supreme value. "Anubhava or intuition of the self consists in the realization that my Self is pure consciousness, free from all pain. For him who is in the enjoyment of this intuitional awareness of the Self, there is nothing else that remains to be done."¹ Attainment of this intuition is the attainment of the highest good, of the most supreme bliss, of the greatest beatitude. Saṅkara repeatedly insists that "a palpable result, cessation of grief and delusion, is brought about by the intuitional awareness of the Brahman"², Brahman which is eternal Liberation itself³, the great, the unborn Self, undecaying, immortal and fearless.⁴ There can be, he says, no doubt regarding the capacity of the intuitional awareness of Self which is no other than Brahman to produce certain and palpable fruits. He says, "There should be no fear that true knowledge may be destitute of its result, because that result is the object of immediate intuition"⁵. In the case of such results of action as the heavenly world and the like which are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a doubt; but there can be none about the fruit of true knowledge which is present to intuition.

1 S. B., IV. 1. 2.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

3 S. B., I. 1. 4; III. 4. 52.

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 25.

5 S. B., III. 3. 32. प्रत्यक्षानुभवाच्च ज्ञानस्य ।

CHAPTER VII

ŚRUTI PRAMĀṆA

KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTĀNTRAM AND ŚRUTI PRAMĀṆA

Anubhava when recorded through the medium of language and handed down traditionally comes to be known as Śruti, that which is heard or revealed. Śruti pramāṇa is really anubhava pramāṇa. Its authority is the authority of an experience which is an embodiment of an intimately personal and, as Plato would say, ineffable realization of the meaning of existence. Its certainty is the certainty of a direct perception. This is why Śaṅkara says that Śruti is Pratyakṣa, i.e. intuitional perception.¹ Like all perception it has a self-certifying character, does not depend on any other authority, and embodies knowledge which is directly experienced. Anubhava is personal acquisition and is confined to the individual who has it. Śaṅkara recognizes that "its result is unique—it is subjective",² and is certain that "it requires no other witness than the testimony of one's own experience".³ But this kind of experience, unless made part of the social heritage by being expressed and communicated through the instrumentality of language, would have little or no significance as a "means of knowledge" or pramāṇa. When expressed in language, it is dragged out of its subjective seclusion and made part of the common culture of the people. It then becomes, to use the words of Ruskin, "his writing, his inscription or scripture to which all who want to know and learn can turn. Left to itself Anubhava can be of no use to others. Others can profit by it only when it is recorded in language. So long as it is confined to the seer, this Anubhava or experience is "pramā" or knowledge merely; when reduced to "words" and made available for use by others, it becomes "pramāṇa" or means of knowledge. The "words" carry authority with them and become "Śabda pramāṇa"—

1 S. B., I, 3. 28; III. 2-24.

2 Brhad. S.B., IV. 4. 29.

3 Ibid.

the authority of the word. What is a purely personal experience acquires an objective worth.

The reality and substantiality of the supreme values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss is a matter of direct Anubhava. Reasoning can only point to their actuality but can give us no insight into their real nature. Intuition alone can do it. This is why Śaṅkara regards Anubhava as the highest pramāṇa and as having final authority in matters of religion. And as Śruti is but an embodiment of the experience in connection with these supreme spiritual values, for Śaṅkara Śruti and Anubhava are really identical. In his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkara calls Anubhava the final pramāṇa.¹ In his commentary on the Gītā Ātma-svarūpādhigama, i.e. self-realization, which is but another word for Anubhava, is said to be the final pramāṇa.² In the same work he declares the Śāstra to be the final authority.³ It is the underlying oneness and inseparability of Śruti and Anubhava which makes Śaṅkara say at once that Self-realization is the means of obtaining insight into that fourth state of the soul which marks the oneness of Brahman and the individual, and that the true nature of Brahman is inconceivable without the aid of the Scripture.⁴ The truth is that for Śaṅkara Śruti is the visible garment of the experiences of the awakened soul. To miss this truth is to miss all that is of significance in Śaṅkara's utterances regarding the value of Śruti for the man who is treading the path of self-realization and for the philosopher who is aiming at the construction of a system of religious metaphysics.

The authoritativeness of Śruti with regard to matters stated by it is independent of everything else, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour.⁵ Those who conclude from these words of

1 S.B., II. 1.14, अपि चान्यमिदं प्रमाणमार्थकत्वाय प्रतिपादकम् ।

2 Gita. S.B., II. 69.

3 Ibid., II. 18, वास्तवं तु अन्त्यं प्रमाणम् ।

4 Brhad. S.B. 1.4.7. आत्मप्रत्ययः सारं प्रमाणं यस्य तुरीयस्याधिगमं । S.B., II. 1.27, किमुताचित्यस्य स्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्दं न निरूप्यते । तस्मान्मध्यममूल एव ।

5 S. B., II. 1.1, वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यं शब्देन रूपविषये ।

Śaṅkara that he is appealing to an extra-philosophical standard, and who regard his attempts to bring the truths of Śruti into conformity with the demands of reason as mere rationalization of the dogma fail to understand the inner spirit of Śaṅkara's undertaking. In order to understand the true meaning of his statement that the authority of the Veda is independent and direct we must go back to his theory of knowledge according to which jñāna is vastutantram. Śruti is an embodiment of truths directly realized in intuition. That is why Śaṅkara calls it Pratyakṣa also. Pratyakṣa is direct awareness of a thing and is not relative to any other knowledge or avenue thereof as inference is. Spiritual perception is the only authority in matters concerning the nature and reality of the supreme values of life which are the same as Brahman, just as sensuous perception is, concerning sensible things. Brahman, which is the Self of everyone, can be known only through intuitional perception. The Veda contains knowledge of Brahman, which is an "existent reality". Therefore Vedic knowledge is also vastutantram, and, being vastutantram, is samyagjñāna or perfect knowledge and is independent of time, place and circumstances, just as is the case with all other knowledge, knowledge that fire is hot and ether is formless.¹ This is why the authority of the Veda is independent. Its authority is supreme because it is an embodiment of true knowledge about the Ātman, which is a bhūtavastu, and which, being a bhūtavastu, is open to intuitional perception only. The authority which the Śruti sways is the authority of the jñāna which it embodies, and which is dependent upon and controlled by the "existing reality", which is Brahman in this case.

It is one of the cardinal contentions of Śaṅkara against the Mīmāṃsakas, that the Vedas deal with existent realities also. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that a sentence of the Veda is authoritative when it is devoted to an action, when it says that a certain thing is to be done through such and such means in a particular way. Hence according to them "such terms as the Supreme Self and God have not the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences."² But Śaṅkara, in sharp disagreement with the Mīmāṃsakas, contends that the

1 Brhad. S.B., IV. 5. 15.

2 Ibid. I. 3. 1.

Vedas deal with actually "existent realities", Brahman being such an existent reality. "To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things is a mere bold assertion."¹ Śāṅkara is never tired of repeating that Śruti passages are authoritative because they are an embodiment of "certain and fruitful knowledge".² In view of the statements of Śāṅkara to this effect the charge that Śāṅkara merely rationalizes the dogma refutes itself. Śāṅkara writes that "the test of the authority or otherwise of a passage (of the Śruti) is.....its capacity to generate certain and fruitful knowledge. A passage that has this is authoritative, and one that lacks it, is not. Is or is not certain and fruitful knowledge generated by passages setting forth the nature of the Self, and if so, how can they lose their authority? Do you not see the result of knowledge in the removal of the evils which are the root of transmigration, such as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear?"³ Ultimately, then, the authority of the Śruti is made to rest on its capacity to produce certain and fruitful knowledge, which is a matter of direct intuition. If any one regards this Śruti as being without authority, Śāṅkara says, "what trust can one repose in passages dealing with the new and full moon sacrifices", for instance?⁴

The attitude of Śāṅkara towards the authority of the Śruti is very well expressed in the following passage from Professor Whitehead : "What is important is that the scheme of interpretation here adopted can claim for each of its main positions the express authority of one, or the other, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant. But ultimately nothing rests on authority, the final court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness."⁵ Śāṅkara can very well say that the scheme of metaphysics outlined in his works can claim for its main position the express authority of some text or other of the Holy Scripture; but ultimately everything rests on its intrinsic reasonableness; nothing rests on authority. In the vein of Professor Whitehead he

1 S. B., I. 1. 4.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

3 *ibid.*

4 *ibid.*

5 P. R., P. 53.

says, at one place that, "the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedānta texts, not either by inference or by other means of right knowledge", and at another that "the true knowledge of an existent reality depends on the thing itself; and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends on the thing itself i. e., Brahman, it being an existent reality." According to Śaṅkara finally it is "jñāna" which constitutes the means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman can be had;¹ and intuition is the final result of the knowledge of Brahman.² We can clearly see the intrinsic oneness of Śaṅkara's statement at one place that Brahman is "to be known only from the Upaniṣads and through no other means of knowledge" and his assertion at another that "it is to be apprehended by the serene light of knowledge only".³

Though Śaṅkara's statement, at one place, to the effect "that in the inquiry into Brahman scriptural texts, on the one hand, and intuition, on the other, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion"⁴, is liable to be so interpreted as to lend support to the view that Śruti and Anubhava are two independent pramāṇas, having a coordinate rank, yet on deeper reflection in the light of Śaṅkara's own explanation of what the term "Upaniṣad", which is his "Scripture" or "Book", connotes, the plausibility of this view will disappear. The Upaniṣads constitute for Śaṅkara the Śruti which owns the highest authority in matters concerning the eternal verities; and, with the modesty of a maiden, he says in places that the purpose of the Brahma Sūtra and his own commentary thereon is nothing more than "a disquisition on the Vedānta-texts".⁵

The Vedānta is constituted by the Upaniṣads. But what are the Upaniṣads? According to Śaṅkara the word "Upani-

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad S. B., III. 1. 26. यः औपनिषदः पुरुषोऽज्ञानादिवर्जितः उपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञेयो नान्यः प्रमाणगम्यः । S. B., II. 3. 29. परस्यैवात्मनः ज्ञानप्रसादगम्यत्वेन च प्रकृत्वात् ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 2.

5 Ibid.

sad" primarily indicates the "knowledge which shatters or destroys the seed of saṃsāra, such as ignorance and the rest, in those seekers after emancipation who, devoid of all desires for objects seen and heard of, acquire that knowledge."¹ It is only secondarily that it signifies the book containing this knowledge. "The word 'Upaniṣad' is formed by adding the 'Kvip' suffix and the prefixes 'upa' and 'ni' to the root 'sad' meaning (i) to shatter or kill; (ii) to attain; (iii) to loosen. By the word Upaniṣad is denoted the knowledge of the knowable entity inculcated by the work to be commented upon (i. e. Kathopaniṣad)." The primary meaning of "Upaniṣad" is "knowledge", "because the meaning of the root 'sad' i. e. the killing of the cause of saṃsāra, etc., cannot attach to mere book, but attaches to knowledge only";² Śaṅkara does not object to the word "Upaniṣad" being applied to the book containing this knowledge; "even the mere work may also be denoted by that word, because it is meant for the self-same purpose as when it is said 'ghee verily is life'. The word Upaniṣad, therefore, is used in its primary sense when it is used to denote knowledge; but it is used by courtesy i. e. in a secondary sense, to denote the book".³ It is this "knowledge" which is recommended as the "means" to the comprehension of Brahman.⁴ It is this knowledge which is said to be "perfect and complete".⁵ The culmination of this knowledge is an intuitional awareness of Brahman.⁶ Śruti and Anubhava are, in their essence, one. Śaṅkara brings out the same truth when he says in another place that by Parāvidyā, which is a means to the comprehension of Brahman, "is meant primarily that knowledge of the Immutable which could be known through the Upaniṣads and not the mere assemblage of words in them".⁷ It is the "meaning" which is important and not its dress. "Knowledge of the meaning of the Upaniṣad

1 Katha. S. B., Introduction.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., तस्माद्विद्यायां मुख्या वृत्तोपनिषच्छब्दो वर्तते शब्दे तु भक्त्येति ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 1.

5 Ibid. II. 1. 11, सिद्धमर्थोपनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम् ।

6 S. B., I. 1. 2.

7 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 5. उपनिषद्वेदाक्षरविषयं हि विज्ञानमिह पराविच्छेति प्राधान्येन विवक्षितं नोपनिषच्छब्दराशिः ।

is the primary thing about it."¹ But meaning is a mere abstraction apart from its being known or felt or experienced. The authority of the Upaniṣad is the authority of the experienced truth, anubhava. But meaning cannot be abstracted from the medium through which it is expressed. The authority of Anubhava thus comes to be the authority of the word which conveys that Anubhava. Thus it is that for Śaṅkara "both Intuition and Scripture constitute, so far as possible, the means of knowledge in connection with the inquiry into Brahman."²

Śaṅkara says that in matters concerning the knowledge of supersensible realities scripture alone is authoritative.³ What he means to emphasize is that the supreme values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss are a matter of direct experience. Only intuition can have access to them. Reason can only point to the indispensability of these values for life and thought, but can give us no insight into their exact nature. Only an actual experience of these values can do that. Logic will only tell us that knowledge is impossible without the acknowledgement of these values, which are presupposed in any attempt on our part to distinguish between the real and the unreal, the true and the false, the fleeting and the permanent, in short, in any attempt to think. But there can be no acknowledgement without knowledge in some sense of the object about which that acknowledgement takes place. Ultimately, then, we have to appeal to Intuition for an insight into the nature of these values, which, for Śaṅkara, are the same as Brahman. Śruti is the recorded intuition. This is why Brahman "is to be known solely from the Scripture"⁴ Sensuous perception is of no avail. Only a "differentiated" object possessing name and form is open to sensuous perception.⁵ There is nothing else which can be perceived by means of the senses.⁶ Likewise Inference cannot be of much help. "Inference is not valid when it contradicts

1 Taitt. S. B., I. 2. 1, अयंज्ञानप्रधानत्वादुपनिषदः ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 2.

3 Ibid., II. 3. 1.

4 S. B., II. 1. 6.

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 26.

6 Ibid., I. 4. 7.

perception; for it depends upon the latter."¹ We shall discuss later on the relation in which reason stands to intuition in Śaṅkara's system. At present it is enough to bear in mind that the work of Inference cannot begin unless "Perception", either sensuous or spiritual, has taken place. The underlying basis of Śruti pramāṇa, then, is that knowledge is vastutantram, Brahman a "bhutavastu", and Scripture a repository of this knowledge of Brahman.

II

ŚRUTI AS A GUIDE AND A VEHICLE OF CULTURE

Śaṅkara's attitude towards the Śruti or Scripture is not only a reflection of his epistemological attitude; it also summarises his experience of the need for a guide to the soul who is treading the path that leadeth unto God. Very few souls are responsive to the influence exerted by the "invisible helpers" who undertake to guide the aspirant. Very few can feel the touch of the unseen hand and hear the voice of the silence which assures us, "I am with thee". For the majority some more tangible help is needed. It is the word of the Master, which will console, illumine, and elevate. It is what Śaṅkara calls "upadeśa".² Scripture is the repository of this "upadeśa". No one, unaided by instruction, is able to find out by mere reasoning what specific thing has what particular potences helped by an assignable set of auxiliaries and what particular spheres of action, and lead to what particular actions. So also is it impossible to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought. This is the reason for Śaṅkara's unbounded reverence for the Scripture and the seer whose vision the Scripture embodies. Scripture is also the repository of the knowledge that has been handed down to us by the ṛṣis. We ought to be grateful to them

Śaṅkara's reverence for the Śruti is also an expression of the cultural debt which we owe to the seers. This is the ruling idea behind the insistence that we must know the ṛṣi,

1 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

2 S. B., II. 1. 27.

the chanda, etc., of the mantras of the Vedas.¹ "He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he does not know the *īśi*, the metre, the divinity, and the Brāhmaṇa runs against a post, falls into a pit, etc.; therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra."² It is the sense of the cultural debt we owe to the makers of the Vedic civilization which has led Śaṅkara to attach so much importance to the Vedas and the Vedic tradition. "Those alone who tread the path shown by the Śrutis and the spiritual teachers, transcend ignorance. They alone will succeed in crossing this unfathomable ocean of delusion."³ Śaṅkara attaches so much importance to the traditional way of looking at the meaning of the Vedas that he even goes to the extent of saying that "he who is not acquainted with the traditional interpretation is to be neglected as an ignorant man, though learned in all the Śāstras."⁴ Such a man, ignorant in himself, "confounds others devoid as he is of the traditional key to the teaching of the śāstras."⁵ The world-spirit itself is represented by Śaṅkara as being eagerly concerned with the preservation of tradition and traditional ways of thought and life. "A two-fold *nīṣṭhā* or path of devotion was taught by me, the omniscient Lord, when at first at the beginning of creation, I created people and revived the tradition of the Vedic doctrine to teach them the means of attaining worldly prosperity and bliss."⁶ Truth, Śaṅkara honestly and firmly believes, is "inaccessible to persons of shallow understanding, and those who are devoid of the grace of the scriptures and the teacher"; and "they are the scum of the Brahman and other castes who hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition"⁷. Śaṅkara's eagerness to claim and quote some statement of the Scripture in support of his main positions is not a reversion to scholasticism; it is, on the other hand, the expression of the spirit

1 S. R., I. 3. 30.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 16.

4 Gitā. S. B., III. 2.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*, III. 3.

7 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

which is deeply conscious of the debt which it owes to the seers, and is willing to acknowledge the indebtedness.

But, for Śaṅkara, "tradition in philosophy is no literal repetition of dead concepts". "Tradition", he is fully aware, "is life and movement and perpetual reinterpretation". That which constitutes the very life-blood of tradition is the spirit which unfolds itself in the historical movement of thought where alone it can be caught. This spirit remains constant in a flux of forms. It is this spirit which supplies, by its never-ending presence, that "abiding sense of direction" which alone is permanent in tradition. There is a long line of ṛṣis who have seized this tradition, have lived themselves into it and continued it creatively. Śaṅkara associates himself with this tradition. Vāmadeva and the rest are the preceptors who constitute this line and whose traditional teachings have enlightened those desirous of emancipation and wishing to attain *sarvātmabhāva*.¹ Śaṅkara wants to stick to this tradition and has stuck to it without laying himself open to the charge of arresting it "under the pretext of being faithful to it". This will be visible even to the most casual eye which surveys the development of Vedāntic thought from the time of the Upaniṣads to the age of Śaṅkara. That which is vital to the Vedic tradition is the sense of the reality of the eternal value. Brahman or Mokṣa is Śaṅkara's word for it. The Veda deals with the nature of this supreme value which is also the supreme reality, and the way in which it stands related to existence. The preservation of this element, which is the permanent feature of the Vedic tradition, is the task of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and, in one sense, by stating his belief that the train of thought in his works is Vedic, he is doing no more than endeavouring to exhibit the reality of an Eternal Good which is the origin of the whole creation and towards which all of it moves.

In view of the observation we have made above that tradition, as understood by Śaṅkara, is life and movement and far removed from immobility of thought, Thibaut's statement that Śaṅkara was not free in his speculations "but strictly

1 Allareya. S.B., II. 1. ब्रह्मदेवादिवाच्यं परम्परया श्रुत्या ।

bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not be changed or added to but merely systematized and commented upon" loses its force.¹ Thibaut misses Śaṅkara's attitude towards what he calls the "traditional body of texts" when he says that "they cannot be changed or added to but merely systematized and commented upon". He is labouring under the erroneous impression that it is the "words" which are of significance to Śaṅkara. That which commands Śaṅkara's homage is "that knowledge of the Immortal which could be known through the Upaniṣads and not the mere assemblage of words in them".² It is this knowledge of that eternally real good which is central to the Vedānta texts and is the common presupposition of all of them. Śaṅkara has this in mind when he thinks of the possibility of laying the foundations of a philosophy of Advaita on the basis of the scriptural texts. The essence of his Advaitism is the oneness of value and reality; and the success of his genius lies in the way in which he gives an explanation of "existence" without surrendering this standpoint. It would be doing less than justice to Śaṅkara to look upon his philosophic attempts merely as an endeavour "to force the interpretations of divergent philosophers into a vague agreement."

III

ARE ŚRUTI AND PRATYAKṢA INCOMPATIBLE

Śaṅkara's philosophy, we have shown above, does not seek to spin reality out of a priori truths and to construct a conceptual system independently of experience. It is based upon solid human experience, upon immediate intuition, upon aparokṣānubhūti. From this point of view he is an empiricist to the core. Śruti, for him, is an embodiment of the experiences of a long line of seers and divines. It is not only in this sense that Śruti, and Śaṅkara's system based thereon, are in harmony with experience. They are in harmony with it even in its more limited sense, meaning perceptual experience only. Śaṅkara's system does not falsify the

1 Thibaut, P. civ.

2 Mund. S.B., I. 1.5.

world of experience; it simply seeks its meaning. His anxiety about philosophy being faithful to experience, even ordinary everyday human experience, is amply reflected in his attitude towards the Śruti or Śāstra. Śruti is jñāpaka merely and not kāraka¹. "The Śruti is merely informative. The scriptures seek not to alter things but to supply information about things unknown as they are."² "The scriptural statement cannot impart any power to a thing. It is an accepted principle that the Scriptures are only informative and not creative."³ Śāṅkara says that whenever Scripture seeks to tell us about something which is unknown, it does so by examples and illustrations from actual life. This would not be possible, if the intuitional experiences with which the scripture deals were fundamentally opposed to ordinary perceptual ones. "By citing them as examples the Scriptures seek to tell us about some other thing which does not contradict them. They would not cite an example from life, if they wanted to convey an idea of something contradictory to it. Even if they did, it would be different from the thing to be explained. You cannot prove that fire is cold, or that the sun does not give heat even by citing a hundred examples, for the facts would be known to be otherwise through another source of knowledge."⁴ It is experience which tells us that there are many "distinct kinds of genus, sentient and insentient", and the Upaniṣads cite many diverse examples indicating varieties of genus.⁵ Śāṅkara entertains no doubt on the point that philosophy cannot claim immunity from appeal to experience. He says "if you deny an observed fact, saying it is impossible, you will be contradicting experience, a thing which nobody will allow. Nor is there any question of impossibility with regard to an observed fact."⁶ Not infrequently he has recourse to experience in elucidating metaphysical truths. Thus he writes, "there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes."⁷

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 4. 10.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 20.

3 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

4 Ibid., II. 1. 20.

5 Ibid., II. 4. 9.

6 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

7 Ibid., IV. 3. 30.

If there is no inherent conflict between Śruti and experience, if the Scriptures, by citing the characteristics which things in the world are known to possess, simply seek to tell us about some other thing which does not contradict them, then there can be no opposition between Śruti pramāṇa and other means of knowledge. The contrary theory which has long been associated with the name of Śaṅkara and which has been used as the principal key to the understanding of the relation in which the different pramāṇas stand to each other in his philosophy has a fairly long history behind it. The darkness which history has allowed to gather has but served to create a false impression in the minds of readers about the true meaning and force of Śaṅkara's teachings on this matter.

As far back as the eleventh century, Śaṅkara was misunderstood and misrepresented by Rāmānuja on this point. Rāmānuja represents Śaṅkara as holding the view that Scripture and Perception as "means of knowledge" are mutually contradictory; and when there is conflict between Scripture and Perception, the former is of stronger authority and is capable of stultifying the latter. Rāmānuja says that according to Śaṅkara there are scriptural passages which deal with the one absolute Brahman and others which deal with the one phenomenal world of variety and distinctions; and that the former passages are of stronger authority than the latter. Not only this, Rāmānuja thinks that it is even possible, according to Śaṅkara, for some portions of the Scripture to stultify other portions thereof. The conclusion to which this view of the relation between these pramāṇas is interpreted to lead is that the cessation of that bondage which is of the form of varied superimpositions resulting from direct perception which apprehends the world of distinctions does take place by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the Self with Brahman and this knowledge can be had from Scripture alone. This view of the relation between Scripture and Perception does naturally pave the way to the conclusion that the world is an unmeaning illusion and life a tragic joke.

This view, which so grossly misrepresents Śaṅkara's position, has been revived in modern times by Deussen; and

the reputation which the latter enjoys as a scholar and the eminence in which he is held as an indologist have only conspired to perpetuate this error. Deussen simply pours the old wine into new bottles. According to Deussen the fundamental dogma of the Vedānta is that "only unity exists, plurality does not exist". But he says, "this statement abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception, etc., but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition"²; it "contradicts experience, which shows us not that unity, but a plurality, an extension of names and forms (i. e., impressions of ear and eye, sense impressions), and as a part of them our own Self in the form of our created and perishable body"³. Deussen is one with Rāmānuja in attributing to Śaṅkara the view that Scripture is in contradiction not only with Perception but with the canon of Vedic ritual also.

Both Rāmānuja and Deussen have failed to gather Śaṅkara's views on the relation and interrelation in which the different pramāṇas stand to each other. This ignorance is partly a consequence of the failure to recognize that the philosophy of Śaṅkara is a philosophy of value and the standpoint which he adopts is the valuational standpoint, and partly it has itself contributed to this failure. Nothing is farther removed from Śaṅkara's mind than that "the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory, and the Upaniṣadic statement about the unity and oneness of Brahman abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition". Śaṅkara most carefully warns his reader that "one source of knowledge does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other means"⁴. "The several means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres."⁵ It is only the self-styled wise men, "the logicians, those first-rate heretics and liars", and the scum of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes who "think that the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory, and also level against us the objec-

1 D. S. V., P. 270.

2 Ibid., P. 270.

3 Ibid., P. 453.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

5 Ibid., स्वविवक्षुराणि हि प्रमाणानि श्रोत्रादिवत् ।

tion that if Brahman be the only reality, such Upaniṣadic texts contradict Perception "¹. Śaṅkara says, these are the persons who are "devoid of the grace of the Scriptures and the teacher", and "hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition". "To those who say that sound, etc., perceived through the ear and so forth contradict the unity of Brahman we put this question: Does the variety of sound and the rest contradict the oneness of the ether? If it does not, then there is no contradiction in our position with Perception."² There is no contradiction because the two statements have reference to two entirely different standpoints. From the existential point of view, the function of Perception is only to give us knowledge of differentiated objects. The perceptual consciousness is a factual consciousness; its deliverance is that there is a plurality, an extension of names and forms. For it "there is a *rerum natura*" and "all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world" have a real subsistence. There is no doubt that Perception is a perfectly valid means of knowledge according to Śaṅkara. But it must be noted that Śaṅkara is not content to take the universe "simply as a fact or set of interrelated facts". Śaṅkara holds that if the philosophical impulse is to be satisfied we must be able to attach the predicate of value to the universe of which the perceptual consciousness makes us aware. Śruti or Scripture, which is an embodiment of the valuational consciousness, can never come in conflict with the former, which is but an ascertainment of the fact of which Śruti constitutes the meaning. There can, accordingly, arise no question of Śruti stultifying Perception.

IV

ARE THE UPANIṢADS AND THE RITUALISTIC PORTION
OF THE VEDAS CONTRADICTORY ?

Far from holding the doctrine of the mutual incompatibility of Śruti and Perception as means of knowledge, Śaṅkara emphatically dissociates himself from those who are inclined

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

to it and repudiales it vehemently. The view that "the fundamental dogma of the Vedānta is equally in contradiction with the canon of the Vedic ritual"¹ receives the same treatment. "The Vedānta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic Scriptures. Nor are the latter thereby deprived of their scope. Neither do the ritualistic Scriptures, which uphold differences such as the factors of an action, take away the authority of the Upanisads as regards the unity of Brahman. For the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres."² In view of this unequivocal statement of Śaṅkara on the point, it is really strange that Rāmānuja and Deussen, the latter of whom merely repeats the former's voice, should insist upon making us believe that according to Śaṅkara the statement regarding the unity of Brahman "abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception, etc., but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition"³. This view which is attributed by Rāmānuja and Deussen to Śaṅkara is really the *prima facie* view of the opponent stated by him in order to refute it and expose its hollowness. It is the *pūrvapakṣa* and not the *siddhantapakṣa*. Rāmānuja and Deussen wrongly take it to be the *siddhānta*. This *prima facie* view is stated by Śaṅkara in the following words. "The Upanisads that establish the existence of Brahman alone not only contradict their obvious import and the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, but they also run counter to such means of knowledge as Perception, which definitely establish differences in the world."⁴ After the statement follows Śaṅkara's refutation of this view which we have quoted above. "One source of knowledge does not contradict another".

A careful perusal of the following disquisition about the relation in which the Vedānta texts stand to the ritualistic portion of the Vedas will throw much fresh light on this much misunderstood problem, and will serve to remove many false notions about the metaphysical

1 D. S. V., P. 453.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 22.

3 D. S. V., P. 270.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20

position of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara which this erroneous view has engendered and perpetuated. The disquisition runs as follows, and is self-explanatory: "You have said that passages of the Upaniṣads clash with the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas. This is not correct, because they have a different meaning. The Upaniṣads establish the unity of Brahman, they do not negate instruction regarding the means to the attainment of some desired object or prevent persons from undertaking it. Nor do ritualistic passages fail to lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. If a passage produces valid knowledge regarding its own special meaning, how can it clash with other passages?..... The Śruti says nothing either for or against the truth of the diversity of actions, their factors and their results, which people have already taken for granted. It only prescribes means for the attainment of desired ends and the avoidance of untoward results. To be explicit: As the Śruti that deals with rites having material ends takes the desires as they are — although they are the result of erroneous notions — and prescribes means for attaining them, and it does not cease to do this on the ground that desires are an evil, being the result of erroneous notion, similarly the Śruti dealing with the regular rites such as the Agni-hotra takes the diversity of actions and their factors as they are — although they proceed from error — and enjoins rites such as the Agnihotra, seeing some utility in them... People have innumerable desires and various defects such as attachment. Therefore they are lured by the attachment, etc., to external objects, and the scriptures are powerless to hold them back; nor can they persuade those who are naturally averse to external objects to go after them. But the Scriptures do this much that they point out what leads to good and what to evil, thereby indicating the particular relations that subsist between the end and the means. The Scriptures neither hinder nor direct a person by force as if he were a slave. We see how people disobey even the scriptures because of an excess of attachment, etc..... In this matter people themselves adopt particular means according to their tastes, and the scriptures simply remain neutral, like the sun, for instance, or a lamp."

1 *ibid.*

(§ IV) UPANISADS AND RITUALIS NOT CONTRADICTORY

According to Śaṅkara a means of knowledge is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge, and he has no doubt that ritualistic passages lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. "The means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres. Therefore the Vedānta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic Scriptures."

The view, therefore, that the different means of knowledge are contradictory, and that if Brahman is the only reality, the Upanisadic texts contradict Perception and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, is the result of a confusion of standpoints. When Śaṅkara reminds us that "the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres, like the ear, etc.", he means to direct our attention to the diversity of standpoints from which things have to be looked at. The distinction between the existential and the valuational standpoint is foundational to every utterance of Śaṅkara, and nothing but error can result from a confusion of them. The standpoint of Perception is the existential standpoint, the standpoint of the Upaniṣad is the standpoint of value, the Infinite standpoint. The latter standpoint is the fulfilment of the former. This is the truth which Śaṅkara means to bring out when he repeatedly says that the passages of the Upaniṣads and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas "have a different meaning". The real conflict, according to Śaṅkara, is not between the Upaniṣads that establish the unity of Brahman and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, as Rāmaṇuja and Deussen think, but between "the knowledge of the unity of Brahman" and "one's competency to perform rites".² The knowledge of the unity of Brahman "only destroys one's natural idea of difference. It does not nullify other injunctions".³

Rites such as the Agnihotra which are connected with the wife and fire, can be performed only if there are agencies for whom they are meant, and this entails an idea

1 Ibid.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20. ब्रह्मैकत्वं विद्यायाः कर्माधिकारविरोधस्योक्तत्वात् ।

3 Ibid., न हि विध्यन्तरविरोधकमात्मज्ञानम् । स्वाभाविकभेदबुद्धिमात्रं निरुणद्धि ।

of difference. They cannot be performed unless there are the gods—Fire, etc.—for whose sake they are undertaken, and this last depends on the sacrificer's regarding the gods as different from himself. Our natural consciousness of difference regarding action, its factors and its results is, previous to the awakening of Self-knowledge, an incentive to the performance of rites. But when this notion of difference regarding the deities to be honoured and the means to it is destroyed in the state of enlightenment, by knowledge, this "knowledge of the unity of Brahman militates against one's competency to perform rites".¹ It is these two which cannot go hand in hand. This is also Śāṅkara's "answer to the charge that if Brahman be the only reality there will be no scope left for instruction, and hence it can neither be received nor produce any result".² When ignorance and the consequent consciousness of difference are removed, the Vedic injunctions are not nullified, only the tendency to perform rites is destroyed. This is "analogous to the cessation of our tendency to perform rites having material ends when desire itself has been removed".³ The Vedānta texts that teach the oneness of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic scriptures.⁴ Shall we say, then, that Rāmānuja and Deussen are among those "self-styled wise men" of whom Śāṅkara speaks, and who "following their own caprices, think that the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory and level against us the objection that if Brahman be the only reality, such Upaniṣadic texts contradict Perception"⁵?

V

AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF RESOLVING THE
CONFLICT

Śāṅkara's resolution of the apparent discrepancy between Śruti and Perception as pramāṇas, the one teaching

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 *ibid.*, तस्मान्न ब्रह्मैकत्वं ज्ञापयिष्यन्ती वेदान्ता विधिगात्रस्य बाधकाः ।

5 *ibid.*, तत्र पंडितं मन्याः किंचित्स्वचित्तवशात् सर्वं प्रमाणमितरेतरविहृतं मन्यन्ते ।
तथा प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधमपि चोदयन्ति ब्रह्मैकत्वं ।

the unity of Brahman, the other insisting upon a fundamental plurality of things, has nothing in common with the many attempts made in the history of the Vedānta philosophy itself and associated by philosophers belonging to a rival camp with Śaṅkara's name also. Rāmānuja attributed to the Vedāntin, the view that Perception "apprehends pure and unqualified existence. Perception (also) cognizes Brahman, which is devoid of attributes and is pure existence", and consequently there is no conflict of the Śruti which teaches the oneness of Brahman with Perception.¹ Thus Perception also is made to confirm the deliverances of the intuitional consciousness. In the light of what we have said about the relation in which Śruti and Perception as means of knowledge stand to each other in Śaṅkara's philosophy, there will appear to be a certain meagreness and externality in the above attempt to bring the two into line with each other. This is the impression left on the reader's mind by Maṇḍana's *Brama-siddhi*. Maṇḍana, who, according to Dr. Dasgupta, "must have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara", undertakes to prove in the *Tarka—Kāṇḍa* chapter of his *Brama Siddhi* "that we cannot perceive 'difference' through perception, and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upaniṣad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference".²

The problem arises as follows. The perceptual mode of consciousness reveals difference. The Śruti, on the other hand, teaches that Brahman is one, and all that we see and hear and feel is nothing but Brahman. Does not Perception contradict the deliverances of the intuitional consciousness and therefore the Śruti also which embodies these deliverances? Both Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana recognize that here is a genuine problem to be solved, but their solutions differ fundamentally. Maṇḍana undertakes to prove that "difference", whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception.³ The verdict of the Upaniṣads that reality is one and that no

1 R.B., I. 1.1.

2 History, Vol. II, P. 88.

3 *ibid.*, P. 92.

diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. The line of argument which Śāṅkara adopts is related to the standpoint of value which he consistently maintains throughout his works. Perceptual consciousness reveals facts merely; the intuitional consciousness is concerned with the meaning of facts. As the variety of sound does not contradict the oneness of ether, similarly the differentiated names and forms do not contradict the oneness of Brahman. It is from this valuational point of view that Śāṅkara says that the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of Brahman as the only reality do not contradict Perception.

The attempt of some of the later Vedāntins, referred to by Appaya Dikṣita in his *Sidhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, to resolve the seeming inconsistency between Perception and Śruti resembles very much that of Maṇḍana. It is pointed out therein that the author of *Tattvaśuddhi* holds that in Perception the sense-organs grasp "bare existence" unqualified by name and form, and thus there is no conflict between Perception and Śruti. There would be a conflict, if Perception grasped differentiated name and form: but this it does not do. It cognizes bare existence (*sanmatram*). The *Nyāyasūdhā* outlines a similar view. In all probability the view which Śāṅkara criticizes in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is the same as is subscribed to by Maṇḍana, and Śāṅkara's criticisms have in mind Maṇḍana's resolution of the conflict between the perceptual and the intuitional modes of knowing things. According to Śāṅkara, Maṇḍana's way of resolving the conflict between the two is not in keeping with the spirit of the Vedas, and is "divorced from tradition". In Śāṅkara's attempt there is genius, in Maṇḍana's there is trick. For it is nothing but trick to invent argument to show that the sense-organs reveal what they are never meant to reveal. Sense-organs are concerned with the revelation of a reality which is differentiated. "Objects such as sound and the rest which are perceived by the ear and so forth, are observed to be different from one another." But Maṇḍana wishes us to believe that in Perception only a differenceless reality is cognized. Śāṅkara never subscribes to this view, and to think that on this point Śāṅkara and Maṇḍana are in substan-

tial agreement is to shut one's eyes to the fundamental contrast in their positions.

A discussion of the nature of the pramāṇa of Perception would not be of any great value for understanding Śāṅkara's philosophical position. The only justification for not neglecting it and for treating it at some length is that a wrong view has been held by some of the Vedāntins who profess to follow Śāṅkara about the nature of this pramāṇa, and this wrong view has been supposed to supply part of the foundation of the Advaita philosophy. The misconception which has been used as an argument in support of the Vedāntic Absolutism consists in holding that Perception reveals nothing except a differenceless reality (sanmatram). The great merit of Śāṅkara's analysis of the nature of Perception for the purposes of epistemological inquiry is that he clearly recognizes that knowledge (and perception is a way of knowing things) presents to us a situation in which the knower has to deal with a reality other than himself; and thus steers clear of the difficulty in which the idealists of the Buddhist type have landed themselves.

Sense-perception has the power to deal only with "differentiated realities" or "particularized things". "Only a differentiated object which is within the range of the organs can be perceived."¹ Perception can make us cognizant of things which are limited and finite; it can never give us knowledge of the whole, the totality, the complete. It is true that whatever is perceived is perceived as a whole, as a totality; the perceptual process has a unifying character. But the wholes are perceived as particular wholes, distinguishable and distinguished from other such wholes and standing in definite relations to them. Perceptual consciousness has for its object the *saṁta* and not the *ananta*, the ending and not the endless. Whatever can be an object of knowledge is comprised within "name and form", according to Śāṅkara,² and the term "the known" means the entire differentiated universe.³ It is the sense-organs which help the individual

1 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 26.

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 24. नामरूपयोरेवान्तर्भावान् विदमभेदम् ।

3 Kena. S. B., I. 3.

to particular experiences, and "when they are absent, there is no particular experience, for the latter is the product of the organs, etc."¹ Śaṅkara's meaning is that "degree of discriminative sensibility corresponds broadly to the complexity and differentiation of the organs of sense".

Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, in believing that Śaṅkara holds that Perception can grasp mere Existence or Absolute non-difference and not individualized existence, have not only been unfair to Śaṅkara but have positively served to perpetuate this erroneous notion about his philosophy. "Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished reality, cannot be the object of Perception and the other means of knowledge".² Brahman is not a "thing" among other things, though it is the source of all the reality and being of every thing; and a mode of consciousness which nature has evolved to give us knowledge of things among other things can never be adequate to the comprehension of Brahman, which is everything and which, at the same time, transcends every particular real thing.

Certain physiological conditions are indispensable in their initiating a series of changes which result in awareness or knowledge. Śaṅkara very well recognizes that "there can be no knowledge in the absence of the body and the organs. When there is no body there can be no organs, for they will have no support.....If knowledge could arise even in the absence of the body and the organs there would be no necessity for any one to possess them."³ In order that perception may result, the sense-organs must be stimulated by some object. "Sound, which is the object of hearing, stimulates the ear, its organ."⁴ The sense-organs can be stimulated by their specific stimuli only. "We cannot suppose that eyes can perceive also taste."⁵ The nature of the resulting sensation will depend on the particular sense-organ stimulated. There is an inner affinity between the sense-

1 Brhadj S. B., IV 3. 23.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 23, 7.

4 Ibid., IV. 3. 5,

5 Ibid., III. 3. 1,

organ and its adequate stimulus, and normally these organs do not respond to modes of stimulation other than those to which they are especially attuned. Thus Śāṅkara considers "the organs to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as light, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours".¹

Perception, in itself, is a perfectly valid means of knowledge. Objects of perception are as definite as any knowledge had through the scriptures. Facts of Perception cannot be doubted. "When a thing is directly recognized as identical, it is improper to infer that it is something else, for when an Inference contradicts Perception, the ground of such Inference becomes fallacious."² Perceptions may sometimes be wrong. "Whenever a wrong Perception arises, it does so on account of a certain similarity of something to another thing without ascertaining the particular nature of that thing, as when mother-of-pearl is mistaken for a piece of silver."³ So far as men are concerned, "there are five distinctions of buddhi, having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, and on their account there are five organs of knowledge"⁴. The sense-organs are merely instruments at the disposal of the self, to be used by it; and it is only when they are inspired by the energy of the self that they "receive their powers of vision and so forth". By themselves, divested of the light of the Ātman that is Pure Intelligence, they are like wood or clods of earth.⁵ The Self is different from one's body and organs, and illumines them like external lights, such as the sun, but is not itself illumined by any of them.

1 *ibid.*, II. 4. 11.

2 *ibid.*, IV. 3. 7.

3 *ibid.*, I. 4. 10.

4 S. B., II. 4. 6.

5 Brhad. S. B. IV. 4. 18.

CHAPTER VIII

VALUE CATEGORIES AND ŚAṆKARA'S SEARCH FOR A SYSTEM

SAMYAGJÑĀNA AND THE VALUE OF REASONING

That Anubhava or intuitional experience, which, when recorded in language, gets the name of Śruti is the only gateway to a knowledge of Brahman or the Absolute has been the occasion for a number of attacks from diverse quarters by critics who see in this a-logism of Śaṅkara nothing but an appeal to an essentially extra-philosophical standpoint. "Inference" or "reasoning" is one of the valid means of knowledge recognized by Śaṅkara. He calls it "tarka" or "anumāna". It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or līṅga which is associated with it. From a knowledge of the līṅga or sign we get a knowledge of the object possessing it. This līṅga or sign is the ground of inference.¹ The validity of the inference depends on the presence of the līṅga or hetu in the pakṣa. Thus when we perceive smoke rising from a hill, we infer that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire on yonder hill. What is important to recognize is that Śaṅkara, like Vātsyāyana, holds that "no Inference can take place in the absence of Perception, for the former depends upon the latter".² For this very reason "Inference cannot stand against Perception", and it cannot be valid when it contradicts it".³ Śaṅkara warns us against challenging the validity of an Inference of the kind based on general observation.⁴ If we did so, he tells us, "all our activities, including eating and drinking, would be impossible. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance,

1 Bhṛad. S.B., IV. 3. 2. निगम्य त्वमभिचारित्वं प्रदर्शनाय ।

2 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 1. 20.

4 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

5 Ibid., IV. 3. 7.

are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt these means expecting similar results. As a matter of fact, however, people who have experience of eating and drinking infer on the ground of similarity that their hunger and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, and proceed to act accordingly."¹

The question which has to be answered is: Can *tarka* or reasoning be relied upon for a knowledge of Brahman or Absolute? Śaṅkara's answer is both "yes" and "no". To the question whether the truth in the Advaita philosophy can be comprehended only by means of Scripture, or reasoning also can prove it, Śaṅkara's unequivocal answer is: "It can be comprehended by means of reasoning also".² But at another place we find him stressing the point that though Brahman is an actually existing and accomplished reality, it is gratuitous to suppose that it can be known through some other means of knowledge. "Brahman, because it is devoid of form, etc., cannot be an object of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*); nor can it be known by means of Inference or reasoning (*Anumāna*), because of the absence of the known inferential marks."³ According to Śaṅkara, "reasoning" can as well as not help us in getting an insight into the nature of Reality, which he calls Brahman. Śaṅkara here attaches an importance to this means of knowledge which cannot belong to what he calls *pratyakṣa* or sensuous perception. Whenever Śaṅkara has occasion to speak about the means to the realization of Brahman or the Highest Good, he takes special care to point out to us the part which reasoning will play in taking us nearer the goal of life. "When both scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity of self, they can show it as clearly as a bael fruit on the palm of one's hand."⁴ A thing, he says, that is ascertained by the Scriptures and reasoning, deserves credence on account of its proving universally true.⁵

1 Ibid., IV. 3.6.

2 Mand. S. B. III. 1. अद्वैतं किमप्यनमाद्येण प्रतिपत्त्यमहोस्वित्तर्कैर्नापि.....
शक्यते तर्कैर्नानिश्चातुम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.6.

4 Brahd. S.B., II. 5. 1.

5 Ibid. IV. 5.1.

One of the customary ways of acquiring knowledge, as observed in the system of logic which Śaṅkara himself approves is the association with adepts in that sphere and discussion with them.¹ The portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad relating to Yājñavalkya, which deals with the same subject as the preceding one, namely the nature of the Self, is mainly argumentative. The pathway to reality is marked by the triple stages of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. "Brahman should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon. It should be heard of from the spiritual teacher and the scriptures, and reflected on through reasoning. The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition, 'All this is but the Self'.² Brahman is to be known not only from the Scripture or through Intuition. Śaṅkara, agreeing with the scripture, says, "we have to know Brahman by inquiry also".³ Brahman is "mīmāṃsyam" also, worthy of inquiry.⁴ The same Upaniṣad speaks of the disciple who discussed within himself the meaning of the Āgama as pointed out by his preceptor, arrived at a conclusion by his reasoning, realized it in himself, approached the preceptor and exclaimed "I think I now know Brahman."⁵

But how are we to resolve the inevitable conflict into which Śaṅkara forces his reader by his contradictory statements that reasoning is an indispensable aid to the man who is treading the path that leadeth to Brahman, and that it is not possible to assign any stability to reasoning, because what one logician puts forward as true is upset by another and what this other one establishes is controverted by another still.⁶ The contradiction is only an apparent one, and Śaṅkara himself shows us the way out of it. His resolution of the seeming contradiction consists in laying down the principle that reasoning should be conducted in accordance with the

1 *ibid.*, III 2. 1.

2 *Brhad. S.B.*, II. 5.1.

3 *Kena. S.B.*, II. 1.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

6 *S.B.*, II. 1.11.

teachings of the Scripture.¹ "It thus stands established that in conformity with the Scripture and in conformity with the reasoning consistent with the Scripture, it is the intelligent Brahman that is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world."² This is one of the classical attempts in the history of philosophy to bring intuition and reasoning together by assigning them what is their proper due and asking them to contribute what they severally can towards the construction of a systematic philosophy. The reason why reasoning should be subordinated to and made consistent with Śruti lies in the nature of reasoning itself. Anumāna or Inference cannot wholly transcend, and has to be rooted in, Perception. Śruti is called Pratyakṣa by Śaṅkara, because it is an embodiment of the truths directly experienced by the seers.³ Any reasoning or Inference with regard to the nature of Brahman should be in conformity with the experienced truths about Brahman, because Inference depends upon Perception.⁴ Anubhava or intuition should be the regulative principle to which reasoning should submit itself.

Śaṅkara in his insistence on the principle that reasoning should be in conformity with the Scripture, far from rationalizing the dogmas, is laying down a fundamental epistemological as well as methodological principle. Logic or reasoning cannot by itself determine the nature of being. It can be known only by means of the proper pramāṇa consistent with the nature of the reality to be known. Brahman is the object of Śaṅkara's inquiry. It is an appeal to Intuition which will decide the nature of Brahman; logic or reasoning cannot do this. Śruti or Anubhava alone can give us the content or material or a philosophy of religion. The function of tarka should be confined to bringing out the implication of the Anubhava of which Śruti is the record. Reasoning is not a substitute for actual Anubhava; it is but a supplement.

1 S. B., I. 1. 2, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

2 S. B., C. 1. 11, आगमवशेन आगमानुसारितकवशेन च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्च ।

3 S. B. III. 2. 24. श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां प्रत्यक्षानुमानाम्याम् ।

4 Brhad. S.B., I. 2. 1, प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वादनुमानस्य । S. B., I. 3. 28. प्रत्यक्षं हि श्रुतिः प्रामाण्यं प्रति अनपेक्षत्वात् । अनुमानं स्मृतिः प्रामाण्यं प्रति सापेक्षत्वात् ।

Borrowing a term from Kant with some modification, we can say that according to Śāṅkara "spiritual sensibility" alone can supply the content or material of knowledge; reason without it will be empty. This is the real meaning of his repeated insistence that *tarka* should be in conformity with the Śruti; this also is the real explanation of his seemingly dogmatic assertion that Brahman is cognizable only from the Scripture.¹

II

LIMITATIONS OF REASONING OR
INFERENTIAL THOUGHT

The ordinary causal argument which proceeds from effect to cause cannot be of much help to us, according to Śāṅkara, in ascertaining the nature of the reality in which this universe is rooted, if we exclude from consideration the deliverances of the religious consciousness, i. e. of Intuition. Śāṅkara's complaint against the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy is that while they profess to base themselves upon the Śruti and claim to be in line with the Vedic tradition, they draw their inspiration from an entirely alien source and commit themselves to views which are divorced from the teachings of the scripture. These systems forget, according to Śāṅkara, the elementary principle of reasoning that Inference depends upon Perception and cannot stand against it; and in all our reasoning concerning God we must constantly appeal to relevant experiences of sages and seers who say they have seen Him. The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are victims to the twin illusions that reason, without the intervention of sensibility, can supply the content of knowledge also and that a philosophical doctrine of God can satisfactorily be based upon "a contemplation of the works of nature merely...that is to say, of the order and adjustment of the material system to the exclusion of human nature and human experience in any other than its sense-perceptive aspect." Śāṅkara says that an appeal to

1. S. B., II. 1. 6, आगममात्रं तन्मतिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थः ।

(§ II) LIMITATIONS OF REASONING OR INFERENTIAL THOUGHT

the religious experience itself, the highest of which guarantees that the soul is pure consciousness, free from all pain and pure bliss, can alone supply us with the hint of a concrete and tolerable solution. If we rely on the sense-perceptive aspect of experience alone and try to infer truths about the nature of metaphysical verities, paying no heed to the deliverances of Intuition, we shall be led to paralogisms and nullify all chances of attaining beatitude. "If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect. But we only perceive the effect, so that it cannot be decided whether the world is connected with Brahman as its cause or with something else."¹

The systems named above, proceeding upon the principle that insight into the nature of Brahman, which is an already existent reality, is possible through a means of knowledge other than Śruti or Anubhava, arrive at mutually conflicting conclusions without even a remote chance of reconciliation. The Sāṅkhya, says Sāṅkara, basing its speculation upon the strength of reasoning alone, holds that the cause of the world has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connection of the *pradhāna* with the souls.² The followers of Kanāda, being guided by the self-same principle, are led to infer that God is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are its material; and the Naiyāyikas join hands with them in viewing the real as the regulative principle merely, which is solely concerned with the organization of the material at its disposal. All these theories, because they refuse to profit by the experiences relevant to the subject in hand, end by accepting conclusions which outrage some of the deepest conviction of the religious consciousness. Their chief sin, in a language which philosophy spoke in India twelve centuries back, is that they are "*vedabāhya*".³ If we make use of a more modern idiom, we can say that their besetting sin is that they want to spin a system out of pure reason, without appeal to experience,

1 S. E., I. 1. 2.

2 S. B., I. 1. 5.

3 S. B., II. 2. 11.

while hoping that the system will be true to facts and be a mirror in which one will see the face of the universe as it is.

Śankara is aware of the difficulty which many who have attained to perfection of power and vision experience with regard to the true nature of the cause of the world. That is why he teaches us to limit our rationalism by a proper empiricism; and unless this is done, so that the rationalist also becomes an empiricist, "a knowledge of the true nature of reality, which is perfectly unfathomable and on which depends man's final emancipation, cannot even be guessed except with the help of the Scripture".¹ The argument from effect to cause, by itself, can only point to the necessity of some reality in which the universe which we experience must be grounded. It can at best show that the value of Existence is an independent and absolute value. The reasoning process can merely give us the knowledge that Brahman is Sat. But no amount of inference can ever succeed in showing that reality is consciousness or unconsciousness, is bliss or devoid of bliss. It is only a first-hand, direct, intuitive experience of the values of consciousness and bliss that can assure us of their reality. This is the reason why Śankara says that intuition is the final result of the inquiry into Brahman.² This is the reason why he exhibits the deceptive nature of mere ratiocination in his works³, and stands up for the subordination of it to experience or Śruti.

But at the same time Śankara has not omitted to discuss the question whether and in what way "it is possible to establish by reasoning also the causality of Brahman, but not of the Pradhāna and similar principles."⁴ But the peculiarity of his attempt is that he, along with the other Brahma-vādins, "defines the nature of the cause, etc., on the strength of the Scriptures".⁵ This, he believes, is also the strength of his system. The refusal to subordinate tarka to Śruti by the Naiyāyikas, etc., and their over-confidence in the power of

1 S. B., II. 2. 11.

2 S. B., I. 1. 2, अनुभावसानत्वात् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 6, केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 5.

5 S. B., II. 2. 38.

reason, have, according to Śaṅkara, vitiated their attempt to found a philosophical theory of God on tarka merely. The fault from which those theories which regard God as the "efficient" cause only suffer are all traceable, in Śaṅkara's view, to their neglect to profit by experiences concerning God, which experiences are in the very centre and foreground of the picture which Śaṅkara draws of the universe. The Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, etc., while professing to accept the pramāṇa of Śruti, are, in practice, systems of avowed rationalism and "expound the nature of the cause on the strength of mere analogy".¹ They forget that the nature of the cause, the constitutive stuff of the world, cannot be discovered in a place other than our inner nature. To interrogate our inner nature is to appeal to experience. Appeal to experience is appeal to Śruti.

III

REASONING AND SEARCH FOR A SYSTEM

But appeal to Śruti is not enough. Religion is realization, anubhava or sāksātkāra. Philosophy is mīmāṃsa or reflection. It is an inquiry or investigation into the nature of the truth in the light of the deliverances of religious consciousness. In other words, philosophy is an intellectual interpretation of intuitional awareness of reality, and as such it is concerned with the establishment of certain views which are consistent with that intuition (pratipādana) and the refutation of others which are opposed to it.² Logical analysis and dialectic are indispensable in philosophy. Tarka also establishes the Advaita standpoint³, and whenever Śaṅkara has to say anything against it, it is against tarka which ignores what Intuition vouchsafes and attempts to override it. Śaṅkara assigns a primary position to Intuition as a means of knowledge because it alone can supply the content of knowledge. But if tarka without Anubhava is empty, Anubhava without tarka is chaotic. Knowledge is neither empty nor chaotic. It is content organized in relations. Reasoning or reflection alone

1 idid., दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयन्ती ।

2 S. B., I. 4. 28, प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता ।

3 Mand. S. B., III. 1.

can be entrusted with the work of organization, because it is the faculty of logical analysis and dialectic and these latter are forms of relational consciousness, which in its turn, is bound up with the perception of multiplicity or manyness. Reflection or *tarka* has to view things as differentiated as well as integrated. Thus it has to introduce order and unity into the phenomena, to systematize them, and to make a whole of them by discovering the ground underlying them.

If *tarka* or reasoning is not resorted to in order to systematize that experience, we shall have Intuition without a philosophy of intuition. Śāṅkara therefore insists that Śruti and *tarka* are the true bases upon which a philosophical system can be reared. Anubhava or Śruti cannot do the work which Śāṅkara assigns to *tarka*, whether it be the theoretical aspect of knowledge or the practical side of it that is under consideration. The theoretical aspect of knowledge consists in the formulation of a reasoned and consistent view of the universe. Both Anubhava and *tarka* contribute to it; the former by supplying the material and the latter by organizing that material in accordance with certain principles of order. The practical side of knowledge aims at the actual realization of the truth by having recourse to the threefold discipline of "hearing" the scriptural text, "reflecting" on it through reasoning, and finally "meditating" on it. The practical aspect of knowledge closely corresponds to the theoretical; only the latter has one stage less, namely that of Anubhava. Philosophy or *mīmāṃsā* needs Śruti and *tarka*; religion or realization needs both these; and, in addition, actual Anubhava of the truth. Philosophy or reasoned knowledge of Brahman is an indispensable stage that finally culminates in Brahmanubhava. When Śāṅkara has in mind the construction of a systematic philosophy which will do justice to the religious experience of mankind, he insists upon our having recourse to Śruti and *tarka*, the former supplying the matter and the latter the form. He believes, though he does not explicitly undertake to show, as Kant did later on, that knowledge is neither empty nor chaotic, but content organized in relations. When he has in view the actual *sādhana* aiming at the realization of beatitude, the

summum bonum of life, he speaks of all the three, hearing, reflection and meditation. When he is discussing the theoretical aspect of knowledge he is content with remarking that "In conformity with the Scripture and in conformity with reasoning consistent with the Scripture, Brahman is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world".¹ But this intellectual conviction is only a stage on the road to realization; and when this is the point under consideration, Śāṅkara hastens to add that *nididhyāsana* should follow *śravaṇa* and *manana*, finally ripening into *anubhava*.

IV

SĀṆKARA'S INTUITIONISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF HEGEL

It is said that there is a contrast between the intuitional or mystical method of Śāṅkara and the dialectical method of Hegel. According to Śāṅkara, the Absolute is revealed in an immediate experience. Hegel, on the other hand, insists on the mediating activity of thought. No experience in its immediacy can reveal the real. The Hegelian method of knowing the Absolute is thus different from the Vedāntic method of knowledge. This way of putting the matter, however, serves to conceal many important points of affinity between Śāṅkara and Hegel regarding the method as well as the conclusions. From the simple fact that Hegel has criticized immediate or intuitive knowledge as the organ of philosophy, people have passed to the conclusion that Hegel's criticisms are applicable to Śāṅkara's position also because Śāṅkara also holds that Brahman can be known only in an intuition of it. But Jacobi's theory of intuitive knowledge, which is what Hegel repudiates, is entirely different from that of Śāṅkara: and the reasons for which Jacobi is understood to reject "thought" as an organ of philosophy are not acceptable to Śāṅkara.

The line of argument advanced for the thesis that the knowledge of God and of truth must be immediate or intuitive,

1 S.B., II, 1.11.

which is what Hegel understands by the "Intuition theory", is that thought is a mere "faculty of finitisation".¹ Thought, in its operation, has to make use of categories. But these categories, as arrested by the understanding, are limited vehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned. A thought limited to these modes has no sense of the Infinite and the True. "Consequently, if the object in question be the True, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, we change it by our notions into a finite and conditioned; whereby instead of apprehending the truth by thought, we have perverted it into untruth."² As Hegel says in another place, "the absolute on this view is not to be grasped in conceptual form but felt, intuited; it is not its conception, but the feeling of it and the intuition of it that are to have the say and find expression".³ According to Hegel, "truth finds the medium of its existence in notions or conceptions". According to the opposite view, "it is rather the opposite of the notional or conceptual form which would be required for systematic philosophical exposition".⁴

Jacobi's reason for rejecting thought is that it is a faculty of finitisation; it can deal with the conditioned only. Śaṅkara rejects tarka or reasoning because it is not competent to grasp the ultimate values, Sat, Cit and Ānanda which in their unity constitute what he means by Brahman. But it is an error to think that Śaṅkara approves of Anubhava as an organ of philosophy; for systematic philosophical exposition recourse to conceptual thought is indispensable. Intuition will give us religion merely. But the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is not merely religion; it is a philosophy also, though a philosophy as a formulation of this religion. Śaṅkara says that tarka also proves the truth of his system of Advaita. This tarka operates only by making use of conceptual thought. Reasoning in Śaṅkara's system, which is bound up with the conceptual mode of thought, proceeds by developing and systematizing the results of intuition experience. This is why Śaṅkara gives us at the end not merely aparokṣānubhūti, but a Śārīra-ka Mīmāṃsā.

1 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 122.

2 *Ibid*, PP. 121, 122.

3 Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind, P. 71.

4 *Ibid*.

Hegel's criticism of the Intuitionist theory of Jacobi and the Romantics is not at all applicable to Śaṅkara. On the other hand, Hegel and Śaṅkara are at one at many points. Hegel quarrels with the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge because "it sets itself up against philosophy". He makes it plain that "the difference between philosophy and the asseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the exclusive attitude which immediate knowledge adopts when it sets itself up against philosophy". Philosophy, for Hegel, is the thinking study of things. It aims at the "systematic development of truth in scientific form". This alone is the true shape in which truth exists. In other words, according to Hegel "truth finds the medium of its existence in notions or conceptions alone".¹ Hegel does not "seek to controvert the maxims of immediate knowledge"; "it is the last thing philosophers would think of".² For example, he points out that "immediate knowledge consists in knowing that the Infinite, the Eternal, the God which is in our idea, really is; or, it asserts that in our consciousness there is immediately and inseparably bound up with this idea the certainty of its actual being". It would be strange, he says, if any one could suppose that these principles were opposed to Philosophy. But "this immediate consciousness of God goes no further than to tell us that He is". Philosophy is reflective knowledge; it should tell us not only that he is but also what He is. To know merely that He is would be knowing what Hegel calls a "vague and indeterminate Divinity", "that very nativete of emptiness of knowledge". The ideal of philosophy will be satisfied when we also know what He is; but this would be an act of cognition, involving meditation. To know God fully would be to know him as a spirit, as "at once the beginning and the end, as well as the mean". This knowledge of God implies mediation. Without this mediation "God as an object of religion is expressly narrowed down to the indeterminate supersensible".³ The ideal of philosophy is the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge.⁴ The

1 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 127.

2 Hegel : Phenomenology of Mind, P. 71.

3 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 126.

4 The Logic of Hegel, P. 136.

5 Hegel: Phenomenology, P. 79.

truth is the whole. "But just as little is the attainment of a general notion of a whole the whole itself."¹ Philosophy, as a thinking consideration of things, wants, as Hegel says, to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches, and its mass of foliage. It cannot be satisfied by being shown an acorn instead. It is the endeavour of philosophy to grasp and express the nature of the Absolute in conceptual form.

Śaṅkara knows that language fails to describe the Absolute Experience adequately; it is ineffable. It is to be lived only.² But at the same time he is not unaware of the fact that philosophy is a matter of intelligible expression, and that language and reality are inseparable; that language is the only medium through which the nature of the real has to be expressed and communicated.³ For Śaṅkara also philosophy or *mīmāṃsā* of the nature of Brahman is a matter of mediated knowledge; though *Brahmānubhava*, which alone, according to him, constitutes religion, is an immediate experience. Philosophy is a systematic formulation of this religion or experience. We miss the close resemblance between the thoughts of Śaṅkara and Hegel on this point, because we fail to see that Hegel has in mind the linguistic expression of the absolute experience, while Śaṅkara is thinking all the time of that experience as actually lived. It is no doubt true that certain remarks of Hegel himself about what he calls the "Hindoo" view of immediate experience are responsible for this misconception about the relation between their views. But the truth is that Hegel has missed the true import of the Vedāntic view of immediate experience and its proper place in the philosophical scheme put forward by Śaṅkara. There is nothing to support Hegel's indictment that it is because the Hindoo believes "the immediacy of consciousness to be the criterion of truth" that he finds God in the cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama.⁴ If we consider carefully some of the philosophical tenets of Śaṅkara's Advaitism, it

1 *Ibid.*, P. 75.

2 *Mand. S.B.*, I. 9.

3 *Ibid.*, I. 1, परंच ब्रह्माभिधानाभिधेयोपायपूर्वकमेव गम्यते ।

4 *The Logic of Hegel*, P. 136.

will appear to us that they constitute not immediate but mediated knowledge, because, as Hegel rightly points out, "whatever is more than a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a form of mediation, contains a process towards another state from which we must return once more".¹ The statements of Śaṅkara that the Conscious Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, that it is the Self of everything and the goal of the entire world process, which, along with several others, constitute his Brahmanavāda, are forms of mediation; and only in this form can they be put forward as doctrines of a philosophical system. But these truths can be directly experienced also. This explains why Śaṅkara's Advaitism is not only a religion but a philosophy also, a philosophy as the formulation of this religion, involving in its turn meditation also. In understanding the attitudes of Hegel and Śaṅkara towards what is called "immediate experience", we must not forget that Hegel's "reason" is not the same as what Śaṅkara calls "tarka", and what the latter says against tarka does not indiscriminately hold true of "reason" as the former conceives it. Tarka is reflective activity. But Hegel's "reason" does not mean simply reflective activity; it is both reflective activity and intuitive activity, and both at once in an indivisible act. It is, therefore, "mediate and "immediate" in its operation.

V

THE VALUE CATEGORIES OF ŚAṅKARA

Reflection involves the use of categories of thought, and Śaṅkara uses certain categories in order to systematize and express the experience in which the Absolute reveals itself. A careful study of these will most clearly show to us that in Śaṅkara's system thought is not alien to intuition but an indispensable ally of it; and reason, far from misrepresenting the nature of the Absolute, provides one of the bases for the composition of that dialectic hymn of absolute knowledge which Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra so singularly typifies. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the general nature of reality will be found to contain the essence of the categories

¹ Hegel: *Phenomenology*, P. 82.

used by him in exhibiting the details of his Advaitism, and also the solution of the problem presented by them. The chief of these are (i) Substance and Quality, (ii) Cause and Effect, (iii) Universal and Particular. The categories in terms of which the nature of the universe and human experience of it are to be determined and communicated share, in common with them, not only the inseparability of value and existence but also their characteristic duality. This is the case with the category of Substance and Quality and with that of Cause and Effect. This is, likewise, the key to the understanding of his view of the Universal and its relation to the Particular. These categories of philosophical explanation, as used by Śaṅkara, share this nature because philosophy or reflective activity regarding the meaning of reality is bound up with the world of finite experience, which is marked by the characteristics noted above. Even if the Mukta, the freed soul, who has overcome the opposition between value and fact, chooses to describe his experience of the Absolute which is nothing other than Mokṣa itself, he will have to make use of an idiom which belongs to the realm of duality. This, however, does not mean that philosophy is nonsense. It only means that description of the absolute experience falls short of the experience itself.

The principle, then, which we have to bear in mind in understanding the nature of the categories is that, in the first place, Brahman as the highest value and reality is the Ātman of the entire universe, which is a revelation of its nature; and, in the second, this revelation, while one with Brahman, is at the same time not wholly Brahman, and, while something other than it, is not wholly other.

VI

THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE

The category of substance as used by Śaṅkara is a value category. It is concerned with the value of "Reality", "Being" or 'Satto' and is a development of that. Consistent with the value standpoint which Śaṅkara adopts, his inquiry into the nature of substance is an inquiry into the value of

it. What we call things are regarded by us as possessing qualities or characteristics. Therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion, a spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone.¹ Śāṅkara admits "that we cannot say that things have no natural properties at all", and it is also clear, he says, that "a thing can never divest itself of its natural property at all."²

The question arises, what are we to understand by the "it" to which these numerous attributes are ascribed, and how does it possess them? In other words, what is the substance to which the several qualities belong or in which they inhere? According to the Vaiśeṣika system substance is the substratum or support of qualities, the āśraya on which qualities depend. It is something over and above the qualities and is their basis. Quality abides in substance and has itself no quality. According to Locke the idea of substance is the idea of "the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine resubstante*, without some thing to support them"; this support we call substantia "which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding."³ Both these systems try to know the substance as "something besides" the qualities that characterize it; and, as Pringle-Pattison points out, "all the difficulties in regard to the obscurity of the idea, our inability to give it any determinate content, and our consequent ignorance..... of the real essence of any substance" are traceable to this inconsistent demand. "Nothing can be at all without being in some determinate way, and this 'being in some determinate way' is precisely what we mean by the qualities of a thing." We cannot divorce the being of a thing from the essence of it; the that of a thing is inseparable from its what. Existence cannot be dissociated from its reality or value. Accordingly, Śāṅkara points out that

1 Locke: *Essay* abridged and edited by Pringle-Pattison, p. 156.

2 Brahm. S. B., IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 6.

3 Locke: *Essay*, p. 156.

"the quality must be held to constitute the very essence of the substance". True to his standpoint of Advaita, the non-duality or oneness of value and reality and the inseparability of essence and existence, Śaṅkara does not regard the quality as something which supervenes on or is derived from the substance, or the substance as something which can exist without and apart from the latter. "Heat of fire lasts as long as fire."¹ "Fire can never part with its natural light or heat."² The latter is the essence of the former, its very self, the Ātman. "If a thing cannot exist apart from something else, the latter is the essence of that thing". "The heat or light of fire surely is not a consequence of the activity of fire; it is a contradiction in terms to say that they are, and yet that they are the natural properties of fire"³. The thing is not first there and then in a magical way clothed with qualities afterwards. A thing is nothing apart from its inherent nature, and the inherent nature of a thing, according to Śaṅkara, is eternal. The quality is simply a special way of the thing's being there. Śaṅkara is whole-heartedly of Lotze's view that all attempts to lay down a theory of the way in which the what of things flows from a mere that are attempts to answer the absurd question "how Being is made". Thus Śaṅkara is led to the view "that between the cause and the effect, as between the substance and its quality, we should assume an identity of essence, as there is no distinction between them such as there is between a horse and a buffalo".⁴ It is an imperfect way to view the quality as something which is different from the substance and which is owned by the latter.

Rāmānuja has failed to grasp the true position of Śaṅkara on this point, and his criticism of the category of substance and quality betrays a misunderstanding of its nature as discussed by Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja takes pains to make the

1 S. B., II. 2. 17. तस्माद् द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य ।

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 1. 23.

3 Ibid., IV. 3. 7.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 7. यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणाग्रहणं यस्य तस्य तदात्म्यमेव लोके दृष्टम् ।

5 S. B., II. 1. 18. कार्यकारणयो द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाद्यमपह्निषद्वन्द्वुदय-
भावात्तादात्म्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

point that all the accepted criteria of truth prove only such things as are qualified by attributes. There can be no reality which is nirguna. That which is said to be known on any ground must have some character by which it is known. Substance is what possesses qualities. The basis is the substance and what depends on it is the quality. The relation between the two is one of inherence wherein distinction subsists between the substance and the attributes as well between the attributes themselves. The distinction between the object and its qualifications cannot be done away with. That Brahman is Saṁgu and not Nirguna is but another way of expressing this epistemological view entertained by Rāmānuja. From what has been said above it is not difficult to see that Ramanuja misrepresents Śāṅkara's position when he attributes to him the view that there are things which do not possess any quality, and he exposes himself to the charge of ignoratio elenchi when he points out that what is to be known on any ground must have some character by which it is known. Śāṅkara has pointed out in unmistakable words that it cannot be said that things have no-natural properties at all.¹ He boldly asserts that what is natural to a thing can never be eliminated, as the heat and light of the sun., and has the courage to lay it down as a maxim that "nothing but the inherent nature of a thing can be regarded as eternal".² Rāmānuja and Śāṅkara are at one on this point, though Rāmānuja fails to see this. The difference between the two consists in the fact that Rāmānuja is content to treat the category of substance and quality as a merely descriptive category while Śāṅkara uses it as an ontological category. That there are things and these things are viewed by the mind as possessing certain qualities is the deliverance of commonsense. Rāmānuja accepts it as a fact and Śāṅkara does not see any reason to overthrow it. Rāmānuja stops here. Śāṅkara presses his inquiry deeper and attempts to determine the philosophic significance of this tool of thought; and, as the result of his inquiry, tells us that quality must be

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 6. न च स्वाभाविको घट इव नास्ति पदार्थानामिति दास्यं वक्तुम् ।

2 Ibid., IV. 4.6.

held to be the very essence of the substance. There is an identity of essence between them, because existence is inseparable from essence.

But if substance and attribute are identical in essence, whence the necessity of coining two different words, one to designate the "dravya" and the other the "guna"? Govindānanda anticipates this objection.¹ Śāṅkara says that the universe in which these distinctions are experienced and to which they have relevance exhibits not only the inseparability and oneness of essence and existence, but also their duality. It is *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*. Śāṅkara says that just as in our ordinary experience of the world objects like a hare, kuśa-grass, a palasa tree, being absolutely distinct from each other, are never found to be dependent upon each other, similarly if quality and substance are absolutely distinct from each other, quality cannot possibly be dependent upon substance.² But again, as Govindānanda points out, if complete difference is destructive of any such relation, so is complete identity also.³ Śāṅkara points out that the level of ordinary human experience involves the distinction between essence and existence, and that is why one and the same substance appears under these varied attributes or qualities, as when we speak of "a white blanket", "a ruddy cow", or "a blue lotus".⁴ But here also Śāṅkara is careful to note that "there never exists in the case of the substance and its qualities a knowledge of their distinctness, as it does in the case of the fire and the smoke".⁵ Hence the quality constitutes the very essence of substance.⁶ Hence also "the assumption of the relation of Inherence is purposeless, because substance and quality are actually perceived as identical-in-essence".⁷

1 Ratnaprabha on S.B., II. 2.17. अभेद द्रव्यगुण इति शब्दप्रत्ययभेदः कथम् ।

2 S.B., II. 2.17.

3 Ibid., अत्यन्तभेदवदत्यन्ताभेदेऽपि धर्मधर्मित्वायोगादिति मन्तव्यम् ।

4 S.B., II. 2.17.

5 S.B., II. 2.17. तेन तेन विशेषणं प्रतीयमानत्वान्नैव द्रव्यगुणयोरभिधूयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति ।

6 S.B., Ibid.

7 S.B., II. 1.18. तादात्म्यप्रतीतिरेव द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकृतानानर्थक्यम् ।

VII

THE UNIVERSAL AND ITS RELATION TO THE PARTICULAR

Another category which plays an important part in Śaṅkara's metaphysics is the category of the universal and the particular. The central problem of philosophy from time immemorial has been the relationship of the One to the many or of the universal to the particular. This was the problem which occupied the attention of Plato, whose doctrine of Ideas is the answer to it. This very problem "which had already been recognized as fundamental by Socrates, stands in the centre of the Aristotelian logic", whose Categories formulated it. It at once produced the Platonic doctrine of Ideas and gave rise to the Aristotelian logic. The problem was hotly debated in the Middle ages, and, as Windelband points out, it is significant that this occurred independently in the Orient and in the Occident. The zeal which enlivened Plato's discussion of the problem and turned his philosophy into the science of Ideas, the enthusiasm with which Aristotle carried on his war against that doctrine of ideas, while himself always remaining a Platonist, the tenacity with which the science of the Middle Ages held fast to the elaboration of this problem in endless discussions, unerringly prove that "in this question a very real and very difficult problem lies before us".

Śaṅkara's discussion of the problem has a uniqueness about it, though we are disappointed to miss in it that many-sided approach to the question which a man of his genius alone could effect with courage, confidence, and insight. Anyhow, his discussion of the problem does not degenerate into a mere game with the abstractions of formal logic. In order to understand the nature of the universal and its relation to the particular we must carefully note that the basic

1 S. B., II. 2. 17.

2 S. B., II. 2. 17. तेन तेन विशेषणं प्रतीयमानत्वात्तेन द्रव्यगुणयोरग्निष्मयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति ।

3 S. B., *ibid.*

4 S. B., II. 1. 18. तादात्म्यप्रतीतिश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानयंबन्धम् ।

conception of Śāṅkara's axiological ontology and epistemology is that of the Ātman. Time and space cannot render intelligible to us the real nature of the Ātman, the essence of a thing, and the relation in which the one can stand to the other. The universal, according to Śāṅkara, is the essence of the particular, its very Ātman, that in the absence of which the particular cannot be what it is. The relation between the two is one of identity-in-essence; the particular is nothing other than the universal. The question about the relation between the particular and the universal would not have presented a problem before us, had it not been for the fact that the level of experience at which we find ourselves is infected with a duality between reality and existence wherein the two, while inseparable, are not completely reconciled to each other. In the case of a thing and its essence, we cannot even say that the one depends upon the other or the one supports the other. If the real nature of the particular is that it has its essence in the universal, if it is the universal which reveals itself as the particular this or that, if the universal is the Ātman of the particular, it is futile, according to Śāṅkara, to think that there can be any relation of dependence or inherence between them. When one is the other, we cannot speak of the one as supporting the other or the other as supported by the one. According to Śāṅkara, this view of the *ananyatva* of the particular from the universal not only blurs but abolishes the sharp distinction between what is universal and what is particular. If the universal is the essence of the particular, they cannot be treated as "antithetical terms". Accordingly, it is a concession to the exigencies of language when Śāṅkara speaks of the particular as included in the universal and as participating in its essence, and of the latter as giving reality to the former. "*Svarūpapradāna*" is the word used by Śāṅkara. The universal communicates its own life to, or better in, the particular. It sets itself up as the particular and the particular is but the appearance or form of the universal. The universal is not first there and then, at some later moment, commences pouring its life into the particular, which perhaps may be thought to have an independent life of its own alongside the universal. It is the one life of the universal which

reveals itself as the particular. Śaṅkara's doctrine is neither that of "the universal in things", nor of "the universal before things", but of the universal as the Ātman of the thing. All the relational forms turn out to be inadequate when it is a question of expressing the nature of the relation between a thing and its essence. The thing is made of its essence. When Śaṅkara speaks of the universal as "sustaining" or "supporting" the particulars, it is only to bring out the truth that the universal is their Brahman, their Self, because they have no reality apart from it, for if a thing cannot exist apart from something, the latter is the essence, the self of that thing.¹

Śaṅkara reduces the relation of the universal and the particular to that of cause and effect, where the latter is but the differentiation of the former. The particulars are included in the general and are not separate from it, just as an effect is not separate from its cause. The general, the universal, is the "uktha", the source of the particulars. It is their "sāman" (common feature), for it is common to all the particulars. It is their "Brahman", their Self, for it sustains them. That which is derived from another is not other than it, as a jar, for instance, is not other than clay. The particulars being derived from the universal are not other than it. Śaṅkara illustrates this point.² "Speech, that is, sound in general, is the "uktha", the cause or material, of the particular names, as the salt rock is of the particles of salt. All names, differentiations, such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta, spring from it, this generality of names, as do particles of salt from the salt rock. Sound in general is their sāman, that is, common feature. It is common to all names which are its own particular forms". The particular names are derived from speech, because speech is their Brahman, Self; for they have no reality apart from sound. "Sound in general sustains or supports all names or particular sounds by giving them reality."³ "Thus on account of their relation as cause and effect, and as general and particular, and the one giving the other reality, particular names are proved to be just sound"⁴. The particular is thus

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 6.

2 ibid., I. 6. 1.

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 6. 1.

4 ibid., एव कार्यकारणत्वोपपत्तेः सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तेरात्मप्रदानोपपत्तेश्च नामविशेषाणां शब्दमात्रता सिद्धा ।

identical in essence with the universal and non-different from it. The universal being the essence of the particular, Śaṅkara speaks of it as the cause of the latter. But he warns us against thinking that the particular is made of an alien essence. The relation between the particular and the universal is one of *tadatmya*, identity of essence.

The various words which are employed by Śaṅkara to bring out this identity of essence, in spite of their seeming separateness, are to be understood in the light of the principle of the identity of value and reality which, as we have said above, is the bedrock upon which his system is founded. His statements to the effect that the particulars "arise"¹ "are born"² and "are differentiated"³ from the universal and are included in it,⁴ and the universal "sustains and supports"⁵ the particulars and "lends them its own life"⁶ are but to bring out the truth and strengthen the idea that the particular is nothing other than the universal. If the particular shares the life of the universal, it is one in essence with it. If it is one in essence with it, it cannot exist in isolation from it at any instant. This mode of conceiving the nature of the particular and the universal precludes any relation of "inherence" between them.

In the Middle ages the schoolmen gave to the doctrine of the real existence of universals the name of "realism". In this sense of the word, Śaṅkara's philosophy can most fittingly be described as realism, which stands in sharp contrast with conceptualism. According to conceptualism the only existent realities are individuals. No common natures exist, and so individuals cannot share a common nature. The universals are mental constructs formed by a process of abstraction from the contemplation of individual entities. They are created

1 उत्तिष्ठन्ति ।

2 उत्पद्यते ।

3 प्रविभज्यते ।

4 सामान्येन्तर्भावात् ।

5 विभ्रति, पारयति ।

6 स्वरूपप्रदानेन आत्मप्रदानेन

by the mind in order, through their instrumentality, to acquire knowledge about real things. These concepts somehow correspond with each of a number of individuals. This doctrine of "universalia post rem" does not find favour with Śaṅkara, who holds that common natures do exist. The universal is called *sāman* "because of sameness, that is, common feature".¹ In this way there are "varieties of universal".² Śaṅkara and Plato are at one in thinking that the name remains insignificant unless there really is a "common nature" which justifies the common name. Neither of them is prepared to believe that the universals are just 'thoughts in our minds' and exist in intellectu merely; to think that they are merely "labour-saving devices", "conceptual shorthands" is to ignore the truth about them. Plato's rejoinder in the "Parmenides" has a unique parallel in Śaṅkara's statement in his commentary on Bhādaranyaka quoted above. The Platonic realism has been summed up in the formula "universalia ante rem". It would be instructive to bring out a comparison between the Platonic realism and the Vedāntic realism of Śaṅkara.

VIII

PLATO AND ŚĀṆKARA ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL

According to Plato, the "universals", "ideas", or "forms" are the substantial realities. They exist in and for themselves. They are the incorporeal, eternal, self-identical entities, the original transcendent archetypes of things existing prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The particulars are the imperfect copies or reflections of these eternal patterns. They may come and go; but the idea or form goes on for ever. The idea is the rational essence of things, it is that which each group of things is in itself. It is the universal as in or beside the particular, the common element in or beside the point of difference. On this view

1 Bhāṣ. S. B., I. 6. 1. समत्वात् साम सामान्यमित्यर्थः

2 *Idid.*, II. 4. 9. सामान्यबहुत्व व्यापनार्थः ।

any intelligible connection between the universal and the particular was ex-hypothesi excluded. The world of incorporeal ideas was regarded as the higher, the more valuable, the more primitive world; the world of sensible objects was said to possess a merely borrowed existence, being but an image, an imitation, an imperfect copy of the former. Critics have, accordingly, not failed to point out that on account of this absence of relation between general and particular, between ideas and phenomena, between conception and perception, this "tearing apart" of essence and existence, being and becoming "all philosophy of nature is cut off by the hypothesis of Ideas"¹. It has been emphasized that Plato, in spite of all his efforts, had not been able to overcome this absence of relation even in the later phases of his teaching, which viewed the idea as the final cause of phenomena, as the end for the sake of which occurrence takes place "Even as the final cause of occurrence the ideas remained a world by themselves beside the phenomena."²

If the general idea is the substance of the particulars or the essence of the things, how can it exist apart from that of which it is the substance or the essence? The general cannot exist outside of and alongside the particular. This "tearing apart" of the world of "essence" and the world of "existence" by Plato became the chief target of attack by his successor Aristotle, who constantly urges that the universal cannot exist out of the particular, and whose entire effort is directed towards bridging this gulf which his predecessor had created by allotting to the ideas a transcendent region in which they reposed in their self-identical purity. In so far as the ideas are put outside of the particulars, they can explain neither the existence of the particulars nor our knowledge of them. The universal is the constitutive nature of a group, and the constitutive marks of a class are only found in the concrete particulars. According to Aristotle, then, forms or universals exist only as characteristics or features of individual things. They are real, but real only as the essence of concrete individual entities. The universals exist "in" the various

1 Aristotle : *Metaphysics* A. 992 b. 8.

2 Windelband : *History of Philosophy*. P. 133.

instances, so that there would be no "squareness" unless there were squares, nor "manness" unless there were men. On the Aristotelian view, though there are no universals *ante res*, there are universals *in rebus*, and this doctrine is historically known as the doctrine of "universalia in re". The controversy between Plato and Aristotle regarding the relation between the universal and the particular, whether the former exists prior to things and apart from them and independent of them or is inherent and immanent in the thing, loses much of its significance for Śāṅkara on account of the special point of view from which he looks at the problem, namely, the axiological. Śāṅkara says that if the universal is the essence of the particular, if it is its very Self (Ātman), it is idle to raise the issue whether the "idea" exists "in" the particulars or "outside" them, whether the one is "along with" the many or "in" and "among" the many.

The problem with which Śāṅkara's doctrine of the "sāman", the universal, is concerned is, as is the case with the Platonic theory of ideas, the explanation of the world of generation, the world of phenomena. But explanation, in the hands of Śāṅkara, assumes the form of determining the significance, the value of the phenomena. The category of causality as used by him bears an axiological stamp. Śāṅkara does not separate the one from the many and then attempt the impossible task of deducing the many from the one. His is the awareness of a non-temporal unchanging realm of absolute existence, of a "grand universal" which subsumes all other universals, and of a changing cycle of merely relative being; and the problem before him is only that of finding out how the world of generation is necessarily implicated in the world of absolute being. In his own way he endeavours to show that the world of generation is a revelation of the life of the Absolute, the Great Universal, the Mahasāmānya.

It cannot be said of Śāṅkara that by his doctrine of sāman, "all philosophy of nature is cut off"; nature is the manifesting life of the universal.¹ Plato's doctrine of universalia *ante rem* marks a deviation from that valuational standpoint which is his greatest contribution to philosophy. If the universal is

1 S. E., I. 4. 14.

the essence of the particular it cannot be outside the particular. Using the plain man's language, we can say that it must be in the particular; and Śaṅkara would have nothing to say against Aristotle's doctrine of *universalia in re*. But it would be truer to say, according to Śaṅkara, that the particular is in the universal, if we cannot afford to give up the plain man's language. The universal cannot be sought in the particular; it is the latter which is to be sought in the former. In this sense the Aristotelian view of *universalia in re* tells only a half truth. The universal transcends the particulars and is not exhausted by them. In this sense the Platonic Realism embodies a great measure of truth. But neither the Platonic nor the Aristotelian view contains the full measure of it; for half a wave can only tell half a truth. For Śaṅkara the particular is undivided from the universal; it is *avibhakta*, as he says, from the universal.

Though from the standpoint of the highest reality, the particular is non-different from the universal, yet when we have recourse to language which commonsense speaks we can say that the particular is in the universal and the universal in the particular. As containing the particular and being the source of it, the universal is transcendent; and as being present in the particular, it is immanent. The highest universal is both transcendent and immanent. Brahman is in everything and everything is in Brahman. But Śaṅkara is careful to draw our attention to the fact that this mode of expression is a concession to the weakness of language, though it is nearest the truth, because it does away with the onesidedness of the Platonic and the Aristotelian way of characterizing the nature of the universal. Śaṅkara, in this matter, does not hesitate to speak with the vulgar while thinking with the learned. He knows "it is impossible even in the most rigid philosophic reasonings so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies".

While holding tenaciously to the truth that the particular is nothing other than the universal, in which case a relational mode of thought and expression will be out of place, he yet has recourse to a mode of speech which use had made inevi-

table, and speaks of the relation between the two with the help of the concept of "participation". The individual thing but partakes in the universal essence of the Idea, the *sāman*; it is included in the universal.¹ This act of participation connotes to Śaṅkara identity of essence and not incongruity of nature between the Idea and the particular. Śaṅkara prefers to designate the relation as one of participation and not imitation, "because imitation suggests a separate independent reality of the universal, and participation means that the plan is not copied but modified to suit the special circumstances of time and space"².

The universal and particular are of one and the same stuff. The universals do not belong to a transcendent world from which, as it were, they descend upon their particulars and infrom them with their spirit. From the standpoint of commonsense the universals can be regarded as the more primitive, the producing and determining substances, and the particulars as dependent upon them. This determination or dependence is conceived by Śaṅkara as a causal process in which the universal takes on form and unfolds itself as the particular. More correctly speaking, the universal is neither in the particular nor outside of the particular; it is the *Ātman* of the particular, and in the *Ātman* there is neither "in" nor "out". In this view of the nature of the universal and the particular the difficulty regarding the status of the finite individual which divides the Absolutists from the Personalists loses much of its sting.

The pressing problem before Śaṅkara is not whether the individual possesses adjectival or substantive reality. His view is far removed from that "contrary opinion" of which Professor Whitehead says that "it led to the collapse of Descartes's many substances into Spinoza's one substance; to Leibniz's windowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the sceptical reduction of Hume's Philosophy".³ Though Śaṅkara, like the medieval thinkers in the West, changes the

1 Brhad. S. B., I, 6. 1, अन्तर्भाव ।

2 Alexander: Space, Time and Deity, P. 221.

3 P. R., P. 66.

logical subordination of the particular into a production and inclusion of it by the general, and reiterates "that the particular forms of existence are produced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that which is general is produced from particulars"¹, yet he also holds that a mere particular does not exist. "All specific forms have their origin in mistaken cognitions."² "But the particulars are false only in their character of specific forms; in their character of pure being these too are true".³ The superior reality of the universal does not swallow up the particular, according to Śaṅkara. That would be but a wooden way of expressing the identity of essence which the individual enjoys with the universal.

Like Plato, Śaṅkara also teaches that there are varieties of universal. There are numberless such forms or ideas, nothing being too lowly or insignificant to have its idea. "There are many distinct kinds of universals and particulars; sentient and insentient"⁴. Professor Alexander expresses a similar truth when he says that "the universals are spatio-temporal, physical, biological, mental, according to the level of existence to which their individuals belong. The universals of physical things are physical and the universal man, though it is not a man, is man or human. A physical universal is a physical subsistent and a mental one a mental subsistent"⁵. The universal, according to both Śaṅkara and Alexander, belongs to the same order as the particulars. These ideas or universals, though numberless, are not disordered like chaos. They constitute a well-ordered world. This order forms an inter-related organic unity, the universals being arranged in logical order, and subsumed under the highest universals, the Mahāsāmānya, which, according to Śaṅkara, is nothing but Brahman itself, the source of all the rest. According to Śaṅkara, there is a gradation of universals, the lower of which are joined together by means of other universals of a higher

1 S. B., II, 3. 9. सामान्यादि विशेषा उदात्तमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

2 Chand. S. B., VIII. 3. 4.

3 Ibid., तान्यपि आकारविशेषोन्मत्तं स्वतः सामान्यरूपतया सत्यम् ।

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 9. अनेके हि विसृजणाश्चेतनाचेतनरूपा सामान्यविशेषाः ।

5 Space, Time and Delfy, P. 223.

order; the latter, in turn, are embraced under others, still more exalted, and so on; the universals increase in generality and force until we reach the top, the last, the highest universal or the Brahman which comprehends, contains or summarizes the entire system. This Brahman is the highest reality and the greatest value, and thus conceived, it is also the cosmic purpose. "The distinct kinds of the general and particulars are, through a series of intermediate steps, included in a supreme genus, Pure Intelligence."¹

Śaṅkara does not tell us anything more about the systematic connection and order existing in the realm of universals. Though he believed in the possibility of a coordination and subordination among the universals, the thought of a "logically arranged pyramid" of universals which must culminate in the universal that is most general seems not to have been carried out. It is present only in a seed form in his writings, but it is the key to the understanding of his system. What Windelband said of Plato characterizes Śaṅkara's position on this point; and it is as true of Śaṅkara, as of Plato, that the subordination of the other universals to the highest universal is not the logical subordination of a particular under the general but the teleological subordination of the means to the end. The world is governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the Good, and is a rational spiritual whole.² All change and occurrence exists for the sake of the Idea, the Universal, the Brahman. The Mahāsāmānya is the final cause of phenomena. "Just as a drum, a conch and a viṇā have distinct general and particular notes of their own, which are included in sound in general, so during the continuance of the universe we may know all things to be unified in Brahman, because the varieties of genus and particulars are not different from it".³

Plato speaks of "the heaven which is above the heavens", of which "no earthly poet ever did or will sing worthily", as

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4.9., तेषां पारम्पर्यगत्या यथैकस्मिन्महासामान्येऽन्तर्भावः प्रज्ञानघने ।

2 S. B., I. 4.14.

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 4.9, एवं स्थितिराद्ये तावत्सामान्यविशेषादतिरेकाद्वैकत्वं शक्यमवगन्तुम् ।

the abode of the idea. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; "the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul."¹ But this heaven is not the physical heaven, part of the mundane universe. What Plato really means is that the home of the Idea is Idea as such; the Idea has no place outside of itself. In the same vein Śaṅkara speaks of the *Brahmapuram* as the abode of the Brahman, the *Mahāsāmānya*, the Great Universal. But this *Brahmapuram* is nothing other than Brahman itself. "The true city of Brahman is Brahman itself."² Brahman is the city and also the citizen. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara's conception of the universal and the particular is but the consequence of the valuational standpoint which he adopts throughout. This also enables us to see that standpoint in a truer light and a more proper perspective. This consideration of the nature of the universal and its relation to the particular which Śaṅkara has "transformed into a causal process by means of which the universal takes on form and unfolds itself in the particular" has prepared us for understanding the nature of the creative aspect of the Vedāntic Absolute, which, for a fairly long time, has been represented as a lion's den into which every foot was seen entering but none coming out, or as "the night in which all cows are black".

IX

ŚAṅKARA'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

It has been the misfortune of philosophy that it has always been called upon to express and expound the complex nature of reality in words while that reality has always been found to be too deep for words. There does not seem to be an end to that difficulty. The difficulty arises owing to something which is inherent in the nature of reality itself and the medium through which it is to be expressed. The difficulty, as Deussen has pointed out, is that "all metaphysics has to battle with the great difficulty, unique in the whole province of science, that it must think in conceptions and

1 Plato. *Phaedrus*, 247.

2 Chand. S B., VIII. 1.7.

express in words what is properly contrary to their nature, since all words and conceptions at last spring from that very base of empiric reality which metaphysics undertakes to transcend, in order to lay hold on the 'Self' of the world or the thing-in-itself which finds its expression and manifestation in all empiric reality".¹ This difficulty attracted the notice of Kant, who coined entirely new words and redesigned the language to make it suitable for philosophy and, as Urban says, "in pouring new wine into the old bottles of Scholastic terminology produced a 'barbarous language'." Bergson and Whitehead, in our own times, have pressed upon us this problem of the relation between language and the reality to be expressed by it. Bergson complains that natural language was made to handle the static and cannot grasp the dynamic; "it is not moulded on reality". He concludes that we should not try to express reality in linguistic symbols, but use language only poetically, only to bring us to the point where we may intuit directly the "duration" which escapes language. As reality is not static, nouns and adjectives, which symbolize states and can represent only the static, misrepresent reality. Bergson says that the statement "the child becomes a man" does not express the truth, because "the reality which is the transition" from childhood to manhood has slipped between our fingers. We have only the imaginary stops, "child" and "man", and we are very near to saying that one of the stops is the other.² The truth is, he continues, that if language were moulded on reality, we should not say "The child becomes the man", but "There is becoming from the child to the man." But the first manner of expression is alone conformable to our habits of language.³

Whitehead, influenced by Bergson and the New Logic which replaces natural language with non-linguistic symbols, has brought about a "linguistic revolution" by creating a language of pure dynamism. Natural language, according to him, is unable to express reality. But the tool

1 D.S.V., P. 97.

2 Creative Evolution: P. 330.

3 *ibid.*, P. 330.

required for philosophy is language. According to Whitehead, then, philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned.¹ The language of literature, he says, breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities.....the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express. This very dissatisfaction has led him to create an entirely new language and design an entirely new idiom. He has undertaken a drastic revision of the basal categories which rendered metaphysical speculation possible during the course of the centuries preceding his age. This revision is in the direction of the displacement of static categories by dynamic ones, because reality is dynamic, is fluent energy. Whitehead thus asks us to speak, and himself attempts to speak, a language wholly of verbs. All modern philosophy, he says, hinges about the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. But this manner of speech does violence to the truth which is dynamism. For the category of "substance" we have, in him, the category of the "actual occasion", which is not a thing but a 'process'. These "processes" are the ultimate entities of the temporal world. For the category of "inherence" we have the category of 'ingression'; for the category of "thinghood" that of "concrecence". Bergson taught the lesson that philosophy must redesign language. He did not himself practise what he preached. Whitehead profited by that lesson and, in redesigning the natural language, produced a work which, according to a contemporary writer, "has proved to be the most unintelligible essay in philosophy ever written".

Śāṅkara's philosophy of language consists of some very simple truths about the deficiency of human language, through which alone the inexpressible has to be expressed, and of certain propositions which have to be borne in mind in any attempt to characterize the absolutely Real. Śāṅkara does not make any attempt to redesign the language which his predecessors wrote and his contemporaries spoke on the

1 P. R., P. 14.

ground that it is not moulded on reality. The real, according to Śaṅkara, is above all change and rest, and neither a language of pure dynamism nor one which derives its metaphor from the unmoving rock can be adequate to its essence. Śaṅkara's complaint is not with reference to any particular type of language but to language itself; but, at the same time, he does not fail to see that language is the only tool which one can use in philosophizing.

The real nature of Brahman, which is above all division and differentiation, cannot be adequately expressed through the use of words. Language presupposes distinctions and differentiations, distinctions between different kinds of being, between being and non-being, between reality and unreality and different orders of reality. It is relational in essence and "naturally makes use of relations of like with like, of content to container, of cause to effect, which are implied in every phrase in which there is a subject, an attribute and a verb, expressed or understood".¹ "A presentation", says Śaṅkara, "by some one has for its object something to be presented, and this is possible only where there is difference", difference not only between the man who undertakes the presentation and the thing which is to be presented but also between "that" which is presented and "what" is presented of it. When reality is everything, and there is nothing other than it, "what is there that can be specified and through what"? Śaṅkara is at one with Bradley in thinking that "thought essentially consists in the separation of the "what" from the "that", and however much it may endeavour to restore this breach there still remains a difference unremoved, between the subject and the predicate, a difference which, while it persists, shows a failure in thought but which, if removed, would wholly destroy the special essence of thinking".³ Liberation, which is Śaṅkara's Brahman, is the consciousness that I am all this, in which there is no want and no striving. For such a consciousness there is present neither the distinction between the self and the not-self nor the distinction between one thing and another.

1 Bergson : *Creative Evolution*, P. 156.

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 3. 8.

3 *Appearance and Reality*, P. 319.

In the absence of the former distinction there is an utter annihilation of any tendency to carry on any reflective activity. This is the reason why "Brahman is unknowable. One is known by another, but it is one, hence unknowable".¹ In the absence of any distinction predication itself would not be possible, for predication presupposes the distinction between the subject and the predicate.

According to Śaṅkara, every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing as associated with a certain genus, or a certain act, or a certain quality, or a certain mode of relation.² For example, "cow" and "horse" imply genera, "cooking" and "reading" imply acts, "white" and "black" imply qualities, 'wealthy' and "cattle-owner" imply relations. But Brahman belongs to no genus, as it is the highest genus, the Mahāsāmānya. "It cannot have anything like a generic property like the cow, etc., because it is devoid of all upādhis or limiting adjuncts; it has neither generic nor specific characteristics because it is one, without a second."³ The varieties of genera and species are not other than it, being but differentiations of it, and consequently cannot be set up as against it and limiting it. Brahman cannot be treated as a class among other classes, and thus cannot be said to possess any generic property. It is only well defined classes remaining distinct from each other that can do so. Being devoid of qualities it cannot be denoted by a word implying a quality. The distinction between substance and quality is non-existent in Brahman because in it existence is inseparable from essence. Being actionless it cannot be denoted by a word implying act. It is not related to anything else, for it is one and non-dual and there is nothing other than it. "It is one, without a second. It is no object (of self). It is the very essence."⁴ As a matter of fact, the inability of language to express the nature of the Absolute is ultimately

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 20., प्रतिपादयितुः प्रतिपादनस्य प्रतिपाद्यविषयत्वात् । भेदे हितद्वयवति ।

2 Gita. S. ., XIII. 12.

3 Mond. S., I. 9.

4 Gita. S.B., XIII. 12, न च सम्बन्धि एकत्वात् अद्वयत्वात् अविषयत्वात् आत्मत्वात् ।

grounded in Śaṅkara's basal assumption that reality is advaitam, non-dual, in which essence and existence are inseparable, and the distinction between subject and predicate is non-existent.

As Brahman is the absolute existence, Śaṅkara says that "when we wish to describe its true nature, free from all difference due to limiting adjuncts, then this is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one way left to describe it as 'Not This', 'Not This' by eliminating all specific determinations of it that one may know of".¹ "Because it is above all duality, it is described as 'Not This, not this.'"² Brahman transcends and is wholly other than every particular real thing. None of the particular predicates we affirm of it therefore can be adequate to the all-inclusive and infinite nature of it. We cannot attempt to know the Absolute Brahman as we can know, for example, "a cow"³ Because it is not a thing among other things and is the very essence of them, their very self, "all the characteristics of a substance are denied of it; in other words, the Immutable is not a substance; it is not gross, nor minute, nor short nor long."⁴ Every particular predicate we affirm of it properly belongs to some one of its effects in contradistinction from others, and can therefore be applied to it only analogically and with the warning that the mode of characterization is bound up with the consciousness that there are things other than the Absolute. It is the finite or imperfect consciousness, according to Śaṅkara, which creates something other than Brahman, sets up a region of not-self, and then superimposes this not-self, this something other, upon it. It is by way of this superimposition that the work of predication proceeds and Brahman is viewed as "this" or "that". But when the predicate is seen to be the manifesting life of the subject and the subject to be the very self of the predicate, when this consciousness of non-duality dawns, "what is there that can be specified and through what?"⁵ Śaṅkara here is wholly of Bradley's mind when the

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 3.6.

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad. S.B., III. 4.2.

4 Brhad. S.B., II. 8.8. एतैश्चनुमिः परिमाणप्रतिषेधैः द्रव्यमप्रतिषिद्धो भवति ।

5 Brhad. S.B., III.8. 8, एकमेव द्वितीयं तत्केन किं विशिष्यते ।

latter says that "used of the whole each predicates would be the result of an indefensible division and each would be a fragment isolated and by itself without consistent meaning"¹, and that such predicates belong to and have a meaning only in the world of appearance".² The real nature of the Absolute cannot be expressed through words which were devised to handle one or other of its effects. It can be done only by denying all specific attributes. "It can be said to be neither 'sat' nor 'asat'."³ Therefore in all the Upaniṣads Brahman is described in a "negative way" or "by way of remotion" as "not this", "not this".⁴

This negative way of speaking about Brahman incorporates within it a profound mysticism, and in order to grasp Śaṅkara's real meaning it should be read as part and parcel of his metaphysical views. In the highest state of realization, when everything becomes the Self what should one see and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, and what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what? "Not this, Not this"—this means that "there is nothing other than or separate from Brahman. These words do not mean that Brahman itself does not exist"⁵ The particle "neti, neti" also points to the absoluteness of the eternal value by denying the self-subsistence of the relative values which are ultimately grounded in and derive their being from the former, i. e. it is a value-charged idiom. It is but a means of pointing out to us that there is nothing in the world of space and time which can give us an insight into the absolute nature of them. This "negative way" tells only half the truth, of which there is a positive side which we have already discussed while explaining the nature of Brahman as Saccidānanda. "Neti, neti" is not the established dogma of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara; it is, as he puts it, but a "pratipādanaprakriyā", "pratipādanaprakāra", "way or manner of establishing the

1 Appearance and Reality, P. 432.

2 Ibid. P, 318.

3 Gita. S.B., XIII. 12.

4 Brhad. S.B., II.3.6. प्रतिपदद्वारेण नेति नेति इति निर्देशः ।

5 S. B., III 2. 22.

truth". The manner of exhibiting the nature of Brahman by having recourse to the denial of particular attributes is the same everywhere.¹ "The passage 'from whence all speech along with the mind turns away unable to reach it' embodies but a mode of establishing Brahman."² It tells us, as Śaṅkara says, about the nature of Brahman by denying the reality of forms fictitiously attributed to it.

Is, then, intelligible discourse about Brahman an impossibility? If we divorce philosophy from language we cannot talk intelligibly about anything. If the philosopher wants to speak about Brahman, about Ātman, about Liberation or even about things temporal, he must use language. Even if he wishes to talk about that state of perfection from which words return back without being able to reach it, he must perforce use language unless he chooses to be content with "living" that. Language is the very condition of there being any significant reality about which we can talk intelligibly.

According to Śaṅkara, if we want to talk about the Absolute and think of its nature, we can talk and think only by predicating of it its other which we have abstracted from its undivided life by an act of indefensible division which, for this very reason, is avidyātmaka. "Brahman is described by means of name, form and action superimposed on it."³ Even if a perfected consciousness were to choose to write down a philosophical exposition of the absolute consciousness it would be compelled to have recourse to what Bradley calls an act of "indefensible division" and Śaṅkara "adhyāropa". An ignorant man does it under an erroneous conception, taking it for solid truth. The wise man does it under a necessity which belongs to the very nature of thought, which is relational in essence. "Ignorant people have false notions, whereas thinking people have notions that relate to an apparent basis for conventional intercourse. For instance, even thinking people sometimes say that the sky is dark or

1 S. B., III. 3. 33. समानो हि सर्वत्र विशेषनिराकरणरूपो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकारः ।

2 S. B., III. 2. 22, प्रतिपादनप्रक्रिया त्वेषा 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह' ।

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 3. 6. अध्यारोपितनामरूपकमंदारेण ब्रह्म निदिश्यते ।

red, where the darkness or redness of the sky has just the above apparent reality."¹

Though the Absolute cannot be subjected to any relative treatment such as thinking or talking about it, the philosopher drags it out of its absolute seclusion and makes it the object of "conventional intercourse" through the limiting adjuncts of name and form. Only thus is reflection on the Absolute possible². "Brahman with the two limitations of name and form becomes the subject of discourse as the knower, the knowable, knowledge and all other wards."³ Brahman is thus described as "Knowledge, Bliss, Existence", as "Pure Intelligence", as "Atman". It is only in this way that it is thought of as the source and the ground of everything, as sustaining and supporting everything. Reflecting upon Brahman is subjecting it to relative conditions, and these relative conditions in Brahman are only possible through the limiting adjuncts of name and form. Even when we speak of Brahman as the Ātman of all, we are creating a distinction in thought between Brahman and other things and viewing Brahman as the "Self" with reference to them.

1 *ibid.*, II. 1. 20, अविवेकिनां मिथ्याबुद्धित्वात् विवेकिनां च संव्यवहारमात्रालम्बनार्थत्वात् ।

2 *Mand. S. B.*, IV. 100. अव्यवहार्यमपि व्यवहारगोचरमापद्य ।

3 *Taitt. S. B.*, II. 6. 1. ताभ्यां चोपाधिभ्यां ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानशब्दार्थादि संव्यवहारभागवत् ।

CHAPTER IX

VALUE AND EXISTENCE

EXISTENCE GROUNDED IN VALUE

For Śaṅkara existence is grounded in value and is inexplicable apart from it. The world of existence is an expression of the world of value. It also represents the duality of value and existence, a discrepancy between the ideal and actual. But, at the same time, it symbolizes their oneness and inseparability also. Śaṅkara expresses this dialectical antinomy which is embedded in the heart of reality—the duality as well as the oneness and inseparability of value and fact—in one word by calling the world of existence *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*.

The interpreters of Śaṅkara have allowed themselves to forget that according to Śaṅkara philosophy has to deal with the value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from value. "Fact or existence" does not contain its own value; it derives its value from something other than itself; and existence, being, becoming, perishing of the world process becomes intelligible and gets rid of the arbitrariness which otherwise would cling to it, only when it comes to be viewed in terms of value. It is from this valuational standpoint that Śaṅkara declares that the universe conceived as a mere flow, as a mere kaleidoscopic transformation, is without essence. Śaṅkara knows as well as Bergson and Heraclitus that the universe resembles "a flowing river or a burning lamp"¹, but considered in itself "it is transient, impure, flimsy and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, a dream, and so on, though it appears to those who have identified themselves with it to be eternal, undecaying and full of substance."² It is merely "a scheme of mathematical phenomena shifting lawfully through endless space and time." But no value attaches to these "infinite shiftings of cosmic dust." Śaṅkara

1 *Brhad. S. B.*, I. 5. 2.

2 *ibid.*

believes with Plato and Aristotle that the source of all intelligibility is value. Viewed in terms of value, the universe points to a source other than and independent of itself, of which it is a manifestation at the spatio-temporal level. That source is Brahman which is at once Divine Life, Divine Light and Divine Bliss.

Both Rāmānuja and Bhāskara attribute to Śaṅkara the view that the world of name and form is unreal and illusory. Rāmānuja thinks that according to Śaṅkara the world is an unreal play, carried on by implements unreal and known by the jīva to be unreal¹, and takes pains to point out that this view militates against Śaṅkara's own conception of Causality, which regards the effect as non-different from the cause.² Bhāskara gives the same interpretation. The world, according to Śaṅkara, is an illusory phenomenon. External objects, like fire, earth, water and mountain, have no existence, are mere phases of consciousness, and are momentary and without essence. Śaṅkara is one who does not believe in the externality of objects of perception.³ Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara share these views held by Rāmānuja and Bhāskara. In Dasgupta's view Śaṅkara holds that world-creation is illusory and but a fanciful appearance. Though he admits that "there was some amount of realism in Śaṅkara," he is never able to persuade himself to believe that this realism is a feature of Śaṅkara's philosophy. He says that Śaṅkara "was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations" but that this can hardly be taken to be "the meaning and force of Śaṅkara's philosophy".⁴ Thibaut attributes the same view to Śaṅkara. "Neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes unreality. The whole world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the belated traveller."⁵

1 R.B., II. 1.15

2 Ibid.

अवाद्यायंवादिन्

4 History, Vol. II. P.42

5 Thibaut, P.CXIX,

II

THE WORLD AS AN EXISTENTIAL ORDER

These views grossly misrepresent Śaṅkara's true meaning. Śaṅkara not only did not hold that the world as a fact is illusory but vehemently criticised those who shared this view. Śaṅkara's criticism of the Buddhistic idealists and nihilists leaves no room for doubt regarding his true meaning. So far as the "fact" of the world is concerned Śaṅkara is a realist to the core. The "world differentiated by name and form contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of action, these fruits having their definite times, places and causes"¹ and "is the object of perception"². It comprises "the sun, moon, planets, constellations and stars", all obeying a fixed law.³ Things do not happen spontaneously; "all things spring from definite causes".⁴ There is constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, and no mere chance play. "A son has the same form as, or resembles, his parents. A quadruped is not born of bipeds, nor vice versa."⁵ "The bird and the serpent are seen to be born from bird and serpent; hence a bird is the origin of another bird and a serpent of another serpent."⁶ "The seed, if lifeless, will not develop, which means that the vital force (*prāṇa*) begins to function earlier than the eye and other organs. ... The vital force goes on fostering the embryo from the moment of conception, and it is only after it (the vital force) has begun to function that the eye and other organs begin their work."⁷ Things in the world have certain fixed characteristics such as grossness or fineness. "You cannot prove that fire is cold or that the sun does not give heat."⁸ It is only a blind prejudice, that will assert that things are devoid of inherent qualities.⁹ We have

1 S. B., I. 1. 2.

2 Chānd. S. B., III. 14. 1.

3 Kāthā. S. B., II. 3. 2.

4 Bṛhad S. B., I. 4. 10.

5 *ibid.*, II. 5. 19.

6 Chānd. S. B., VI. 3. 1.

7 Bṛhad S. B., VI. 1. 1.

8 *ibid.*, II. 1. 20.

9 *ibid.*, IV. 4. 8.

but to open our eyes to see the surprising wealth of detail which the universe presents to us.¹ It comprises different worlds, Bhū, etc., different beings, god, birds and man, &c, different castes and orders of life.² It has a three-fold division according to the body (adhyātma), the elements (adhibhūta) and the gods (adhidaiva); it includes the animate kingdom and the inanimate one—stationary objects such as hills.³

Some of these objects which make up the entire universe are "external".⁴ As examples of these Śaṅkara cites the following in his works: earth, ākāśa, atoms⁵; "houses, couches, palaces, pleasure-grounds and the like things, which according to circumstances are conducive to the attainment of the pleasure or the avoidance of pain"⁶; "jars, pots and urns; bracelets, armlets and earrings, needles, arrows and swords."⁷ Some of these objects are the handiwork of God; some are the product of human agency. But in any case they are external. The external objects enable the soul to enjoy the fruits of its various actions.⁸ This world is the "abode where all creatures are born and experience the results of their past work".⁹

There are other objects in the universe like the living organism.¹⁰ These bodies are of various classes and consist of a "definite organization of the different parts".¹¹ It is in and through the instrumentality of the body that one experiences the fruits of one's actions.¹² According to Śaṅkara the body has not the same status as the other objects of the universe. There is a peculiar feeling of subjectivity which

1 S.B., I. 3. 33, जगद्विचित्र्यम् ; II. 1. 30, विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्चः ।

2 S. B., I. 3. 3C.

3 Brhad. S.B., I. 5.2.

4 S. B., II. 2. 1; III. 2. 21; Mand. S. B., II. 38.

5 ibid; S. B., II. 3. 7.

6 S. B., II. 2. 1.

7 S. B., II. 3. 7.

8 S. B., II. 2. 1.

9 Brhad. S. B., VI. 2. 10.

10 Mand. S. B., II. 38; S. B., II. 2. 21; II. 2. 1.

11 S. B., II. 2. 1. प्रतिनियतावयव विन्यासम् ।

12 ibid. कर्मफलानुभवाधिष्ठानम् ।

characterizes the possession of a body. Though this is the result of an adhyāsa according to Śaṅkara, it is the indispensable basis of all practical dealing.¹ The jīva's body is not only a complex of presentations like every other physical thing. It forms a part of the jīva, the striving purposive individual. It is a thing which the jīva feels as a whole in common or organic sensations. The physical body possessed by a living being is different from that of which we have perception in dreams or which is result of magical illusion.²

Thus the conclusion to which these considerations lead us is that for the perceptual consciousness the world is a fact. Śaṅkara does not deny that there are imaginary objects. But such objects have no externality. "They last only so long as the act of imagination lasts."³ Śaṅkara, therefore, calls such objects "cittakāla", "cittapariśeṣa".⁴ The "external" objects are entirely different in their nature; they are not "cittakāla". They, according to Śaṅkara, exist not only during the time when they are experienced, as is the case with the imagined objects; they are also perceived as persisting and co-existing with other objects. We at any time perceive an ordered co-existence of the different parts of the external universe. Because they co-exist, they also limit each other and thus exclude each other. Externality, according to Śaṅkara, thus implies ordered co-existence and mutual exclusion.⁵ An imagined object does not co-exist with any other imagined object, nor does it exclude it. External objects, on the other hand, exist, persist, change and interact with each other independently of any experience of the individual who cognizes them. The time which marks the existence of an external object is not only the time of the occurrence of any mental state in relation to it, but also the time which records its distinction and exclusion from other connected physical things. Therefore Śaṅkara

1 S. B., II. 1. 1. Introduction.

2 Mand. S. B., III. 10.

3 Mand. S. B., II. 14. कलनाकाल एवोपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः ।

4 ibid

5 ibid., परस्परपरिच्छेद परिच्छेदकत्वं बाह्यानां भेदानां ।

says that external objects are "double-timed".¹ Imagined objects are only "single-timed", because their existence is marked by the time when the act of imagination takes place.

Though the spatio-temporal order is a fact, its existence does not constitute its reality, which is a value notion in Śāṅkara. "True, the truth of the modifications has been mentioned in other Śruti passages, but this declaration is without reference to the highest truth; it is only with reference to the consideration of the fact of certain objects being amenable to the senses and others not being so amenable."² Earth, &c., are real and permanent, though their reality and permanence is relative.³ "But here we speak of 'truth' (satyam) from a practical point of view, and therefore relatively; compared with the falsity of a mirage, water is said to be true. 'Satyam', therefore, means true relatively, for there is but one absolute truth and that is Brahman."⁴ But it is strange that his medieval critics should attribute to him the view that external objects like fire and water have no existence and are mere phases of consciousness. It is all the more strange when we see that many of the modern interpreters of Śāṅkara, who claim to take a more dispassionate view of the matter, hold the same view. The concept of "existence" is not identical with that of "value". To say that external objects like fire, earth and water exist is not to say anything about their value. Śāṅkara knows this full well. "What is admittedly an unreal entity can be said to be neither eternal nor non-eternal."⁵

It was never a problem for Śāṅkara to prove that there is not a "world" with "souls" in it; there could thus be no possible occasion for "indulging in realistic interpretations" and then, by having recourse to "linguistic trickery", "getting out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions... were merely an estimate of things from the commonsense

1 Ibid., ब्राह्मण द्वयकाला ।

2 Chand. S. B., VII 17. 1.

3 Katha. S. B., I. 3. 15 आपेक्षिकं नित्यम्

4 Telit. S. B., II 6. I, व्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं सत्यम् ।

5 S. B., II. 2.24, न हि अवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा संभवति ।

point of view".¹ Just as to admit a fact is to say nothing about its value, similarly to deny a fact can never amount to a judgment of value about it. Dr. Dasgupta does not realize the implications of his own words—"estimate of things from the commonsense point of view". "Estimate" implies evaluation, and the latter implies a measure of value. A "fact" cannot be its own measure of value, unless it be shown that fact has a right to independent existence, in which case we shall have a concept which symbolizes a reality where value and existence fuse into one. The world of "common-sense" does not contain its own value. In the words of Śaṅkara, it possesses only a degree of reality. To ignore that all "estimate" is in terms of value and "estimate of things" is a value idiom is to open the door to serious misunderstandings.

III

FACTUAL ORDER AND THE VALUE CONSCIOUSNESS A KEY PASSAGE FROM ŚAṅKARA

Before we proceed to demonstrate that his problem is not to discuss the existence or non-existence of the world but to ascertain its value, it is necessary to bring out the distinction between the terms "pratipādayati" and "anuvadati" which Śaṅkara maintains with meticulous care throughout his works. Śaṅkara whole-heartedly accepts the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation, and carefully draws a distinction between (i) that which constitutes the main topic dealt with in a particular work and (ii) that which is mentioned only by the way and is subsidiary. The former, according to Śaṅkara, is the "pratipādyaviṣaya"; the latter is merely "anuvāda". "Pratipādana" is demonstrating, proving, establishing. "Anuvāda" is merely repeating after some one by way of corroboration, echoing, resounding. Śaṅkara, following the Mīmāṃsakas, calls it "arthavāda" also.² Śaṅkara in expounding his views, and in interpreting the texts of the Vedānta closely observes this distinction.³ What is the

1 Dasgupta: History, Vol. II, P. 2.

2 Aitareya. S. B., II. 1. 1.

3 S. B., I. 4. 14; I. 3. 19; III. 2. 30; IV. 2. 30; IV 3. 14; II. 1. 27; II. 1. 33; Mānd
S. B., III. 14, 5.

"pratipādyā viśaya" is primary and essential (mukhyam); what is merely "anuvāda" is secondary.¹ The "pratipādyaviśaya" is concerned with "value" or "significance"; what is mere "anuvāda" is concerned with the reporting of facts.

Equally necessary is it to understand the sense in which the term "sṛṣṭi" and its equivalents are used. The word "sṛṣṭi" is used by Śaṅkara to mean creation, production, or making²; and this, in its turn, implies differentiation, multiplicity, diversity, manyness. Sṛṣṭi, then, means any and all of these things. In his commentary on the Māṇḍūya Kārikā he uses the word sṛṣṭi in the sense of "multiplicity" or "diversity".³ The word "vikāra" is also used in the same sense; the production of effects (vikaroti) means giving rise to multiplicity.⁴ In his commentary on the Brahman Sūtra whenever there is occasion to use the word "sṛṣṭi" or "vikāra", he uses it in the sense of "phenomenal diversity".⁵ Nor are his commentaries on the Upaniṣads an exception to this.⁶

Śaṅkara's problem is the determination of the value of the factual order. He gives unequivocal expression to it.⁷ "The manifoldness of creation" is not what Scripture wishes to establish. For we neither ourselves observe nor learn from Scripture that any good is connected with (the knowledge of) it. Nor can we assume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the manifoldness of creation have a consistency in meaning⁸ with the passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages speaking of the manifoldness of creation and so on serve the purpose of giving us knowledge of Brahman, Scripture itself declares. Compare Chāndogya,

1 S. B., III. 2. 29. अमदमेव हि प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन निर्दिशति, भेदं तु पूर्वं प्रतिदिष्टमेवानुवदति ।
Mand. S. B., III. 14. भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

2 Mand. S. B., III. 14. 15. उत्पत्त्यादि ।

3 Ibid. III, 15.

4 Ibid., III. 13. विकरोति नाना करोति ।

5 S. B., I. 4. 14; II. 1. 28; II. 1. 30; II. 1. 22.

6 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20. नोत्पन्न्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनपरम् । Ibid., I. 4. 7.

7 S. B., I. 4. 14.

8 सूत्र्यादिप्रपञ्चः ।

9 एकवाक्यता ।

VI. 8. 4: 'In the same manner, my dear, from food as an offshoot infer water as its root; from water as an offshoot, infer fire as its root; and from fire as an offshoot, infer the Being (sat) as its root. We, moreover, understand that by means of comparison such as that of the clay, &c., the manifoldness of creation is described solely for the purpose of bringing home to us the non-difference of the effect from the cause. Accordingly it is said by those who know the sacred tradition that the statement of the fact of creation by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things is only a means for bringing home to us the truth that (ultimately) there is no diversity. On the other hand Scripture expressly declares fruit to be connected with the comprehension of Brahman. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest'; 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief'; 'A man who knows him conquers death'. This fruit is, moreover, a matter of direct intuition. For as soon as a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, by means of the text 'That art Thou', its transmigrating nature vanishes for him."

This is one of the many classic statements of Śaṅkara which embody his conviction that philosophy deals with the meaning and value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from meaning and value; and which go to show that Śaṅkara, with his eye on the Good, adopts a valuational, not an existential view of the universe. "The manifoldness of creation is not what Scripture wishes to establish." One may know the whole history of the evolutionary advance and yet have no philosophy. All this is mere description of facts. Nor can a mere recognition of the factual multiplicity of the spatio-temporal order yielded by the perceptual consciousness be in any way conducive to the attainment of what is the highest good for man. This is the recorded experience of those who have realized this beatitude.

Though, according to Śaṅkara, the essence of the universe is not constituted by the "infinite shiftings of the cosmic dust" and so conceived the universe is a "senseless spectacle", a mere "vicious circle of existence", yet there is another side to the universe. The universe is also "an almost untouched reservoir of significance and value", and living a

rational life is, for him, "reaching out to the reality of things as a region in which the discovery of value need never end."¹ But this picture of the universe can be taken to be faithfully drawn only when we regard the universe as an expression of a divine purpose and meaning. This is what Śaṅkara wants to emphasise when he says that "the passages about the manifoldness of creation have a consistency in meaning with the passages treating of Brahman"² When it is pointed out by the Upaniṣads (and consequently by Śaṅkara) that it is Brahman (which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda) which has manifested itself in the variety of diverse names and forms, the truth that is brought out is that the entire multiplicity, because it has no other source than Brahman, because it subsists in Brahman during its continuance, and finally dissolves in Brahman, is nothing other than Brahman. Knowledge of the bare multiplicity of the world and its creation is of no value. "Fruit" attaches only to the realization of the universe as an expression of Brahman, of Divine Existence, Divine Wisdom, and Divine Bliss.³

Any attempt to interpret the words of Śaṅkara* to mean that he denies the fact of creation and of phenomenal diversity proceeding from Brahman is to misunderstand him and misinterpret him. Śaṅkara is solely concerned with the defending of the truth that this diversity is rooted in Brahman, and is an expression of Brahman's nature. According to Śaṅkara "those whose preoccupation is the reflection on values have no respect for creation".⁴ The refusal to be interested in "creation and its manifoldness" is connected with an axiological bias and a pragmatic consideration, and not with any mere ontological prejudice. Those who have dedicated their lives to the pursuit of the Good do not feel inclined to devote themselves to "the observable processes of nature, life, society, and history", to "stars and systems wheeling past", to the "groaning and travailing of creation"

1 Hocking: *Types of Philosophy*, P. 428.

2 S.B., I. 4.10.

3 S.B., I. 4. 14. ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिबद्धं तु फलं श्रूयते ।

4 नह्यं सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चः प्रतिपिपादयिषितः ।

5 Mand. S.B., I. 7. ननुपरमार्थचिन्तकानां सृष्ट्यावादरः ।

and "the dread strife of poor humanity's afflicted will", for their own sake. If they ever do so, they do it in order to discover "the One Spirit's plastic stress" which

Sweeps through.....

Torturing the unwilling dross that checks its flight.
To its own likeness as each mass may bear.¹

The passage quoted above from his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*², only one among many of the same import, is the key to the interpretation of Śaṅkara's philosophy. An analysis of this passage will reveal to us that Śaṅkara is endeavouring to show two things, one of them negative and the other positive. It would be truer to say that these are not two truths, separate and independent, but two aspects of one and the same truth. (a) In the first place Śaṅkara wants to show that philosophy is not concerned with the bare facts of the natural order. No fruit or value attaches to the bare recognition of the multiplicity or manifoldness of creation. The following passage from Pringle-Pattison most truly represents Śaṅkara's meaning: "The kaleidoscopic transformations of external nature possess in themselves no trace of that intrinsic value which must belong to what Kant calls an end-in-itself. They are all summed up in Spencer's phrase, 'the redistribution of matter and motion'. The human mind is not content to take the universe as a fact or set of inter-related facts. It is not intellectual coherence alone which the philosopher seeks.....The most perfect realization of unity in variety is as naught, if there is nowhere anything to which we can attach this predicate of value."³ The first sentence of this quotation reads as if it were a literal translation of the opening lines of the passage quoted above.⁴ (b) In the second place Śaṅkara wants to give expression to his conviction that the world of multiplicity, of name and form, is a manifestation of Brahman, which is Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss and so ultimately divine in its nature and in

1 Quoted in Urban: *Intelligible World*, P. 328.

2 I. 4. 14.

3 *The Idea of God*: P. 30.

4 P. 272.

its essence. "Fruit" attaches to this knowledge alone.¹ Pringle-Pattison expresses exactly the same idea when he says, "If the philosophical impulse is to be satisfied, we must be able to repeat the verdict of the divine Labourer upon his world, we must be able to say that the world is 'good' in the sense of possessing intrinsic worth or value".² The universe is an expression of divine life and divine bliss—this is the last word of Śaṅkara's philosophy. Realising this, one attains the highest, is able to overcome grief and conquer death and become immortal.

As I pointed out above, this is not the only passage in which Śaṅkara embodies his conviction of the centrality of the problem of "value" in the Vedānta philosophy. This is the constant theme to which he frequently recurs. Lest I should be considered guilty of reading my own thoughts into Śaṅkara's statements by torturing the texts, I will quote at length, even at the risk of repetition, the different statements which show that Śaṅkara's philosophy is concerned not with existence but with the value of these existences. There is a striking unanimity in the import of these statements dispersed throughout his works. Śaṅkara seems to have taken meticulous care in emphasizing both the negative and the positive moments of the truth which constitutes the central theme of his philosophy, the value-character of the universe. The following will amply repay careful study and patient reflection:

I. (a) "While the realization that Brahman is the one Self (of every being) is the means to the attainment of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent fruit is connected with the realization of the truth that Brahman has modified itself into the form of this world." (b) "Whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own, as for instance, the statements which speak of Brahman's modifying itself into the form of this world—is merely to be used as a means for the realization of Brahman. Whatever has no fruit of its own but is mentioned in connection with something else which has such a fruit is auxiliary to it."³

1 S. B., I. 4. 14.

2 The Idea of God: P 30.

3 S. B., II. 1. 14.

II. (a) "Nor have the Scriptural passages which speak of (Brahman's undergoing) modifications the purpose of establishing the fact of a change¹; for realization of this is not attended with any fruit." (b) "They rather aim at establishing that Brahman is the Self (Ātman) of all—Brahman which is raised above this phenomenal world, for we learn that fruit is attached to the realization of this"².

III. (a) "The scriptural texts speaking of creation (i. e. phenomenal diversity) do not refer to the highest good (Paramārtha); they refer only to the phenomenal world of name and form which are the figments of Avidyā". (b) "Nor is it to be forgotten that the aim of these texts is to establish that Brahman is the Self of every one".³

IV. (a) "There is no 'good' (phalam) to be attained by the knowledge of the narrative of the creation." (b) "It is well-established in all the Upaniṣads that immortality can result only from the realization of the oneness of the Self."⁴

V. (a) "The examples of gold, iron, sparks of fire are not meant to establish the multiplicity caused by the creation, etc., of the universe."⁵ (b) They are only meant to strengthen one's idea of the oneness of the individual self and Brahman."⁶

VI. (a) "Since duality has been repudiated, the passages delineating the manifestation, etc., of the universe can have the sole aim of helping the realization of the unity of the Self."⁷

VII. (a) "The realization of the manifoldness due to creation has been censured."⁸ (b) "The realization of the

1 न परिणामप्रतिपादनाय ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 27.

3 S. B., II. 1. 33.

4 Ritareya. S. B., II. 1. 20.

5 नोत्पत्त्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनं परम् ।

6 Brhad S. B., II. 1. 20.

7 Ibid., I. 4. 7.

8 Mand. S. B., III. 24. निन्दितत्वाच्च। सृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः ।

oneness of the Self, because it carries fruit with it, is the settled meaning of the Scripture."¹

VIII. (a) "Those whose ideal is the attainment of the highest good² do not entertain any respect for creation (i. e. manifoldness, diversity), because it can lead to no purpose." (b) "The noble ones who desire to win immortality concern themselves with the meditation of that 'fourth' and the highest good."³

IX. (a) "The difference between the individual and Brahman, which has been announced by means of the Upaniṣadic texts, is not the highest truth. It is only secondary (gaṇam). Ultimate diversity can never be the final meaning of the passages speaking of difference. They only intimate the attitude of the ignorant, which is marked by difference and diversity.....This, however, is not the primary truth."⁴ (b) "In the upaniṣads what is intended to be established by means of the statements regarding origin, dissolution, etc., is the oneness of the individual Self and Brahman."⁵

X. (a) "The Scriptural texts which speak of origin and creation have another significance." (b) "The creation and its different modes which have been described by having recourse to the examples of clay, iron, sparks of fire, etc., are but the means and ways for bringing home to our minds the truth of the oneness of the individual and the universal self."⁶

IV

THE SYMBOLISM OF CREATION: ITS POINTER VALUE.

We thus come to the conclusion that "creation" in Śaṅkara's philosophy has only a symbolic value, inasmuch as

1 *ibid.*, फलवत्त्वात्सैकत्वदर्शनमेव श्रुतिनिश्चितोऽर्थः ।

2 *Mand. S. B.*, I. 7, परमार्थचिन्तकानां मुमुक्षुणाम् ।

3 *ibid.*, I. 7.

4 *ibid.*, III. 14, भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

5 *ibid.*, III. 14.

6 *ibid.*, III. 15.

It points to those timeless values of which it is revelation in time. It establishes the "self-hood" of Brahman. There is no other meaning of "sṛṣṭisruti". The question naturally arises, "How does Śaṅkara show this?" Śaṅkara is quite clear on the point that the argument which he has advanced in order to substantiate his main thesis that "Brahman is everything and so the Ātman of everyone" is the causal argument. "The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition 'All this is but the Self', viz., that the universe has sprung from the Self, has the Self alone for its genus and dissolves only into the Self."¹ "Because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued.....with it during continuance, for it cannot be perceived apart from the Self, therefore everything is the Self."² The various illustrations given to show the oneness of the universe with Brahman and its non-difference from it, are those of clay, gold, iron, and sparks of fire. "By means of comparisons such as that of the clay, etc., the manifoldness of creation is described solely for the purpose of bringing home to us the non-difference of the effect from the cause"³ "The examples of gold, iron, and sparks of fire are only meant to strengthen one's idea of the oneness of the individual self and Brahman, and not to establish the multiplicity caused by the origin, etc., of the universe. When one is told that the self has been separated from the Supreme Brahman like a spark, one is firmly convinced that one is Brahman. We know that a spark is one with fire before it is separated."⁴

Śaṅkara gives, in one of his works, an admirable summary of what we have tried to state at length. An objection is raised against his doctrine that the aim of the scriptures (which also represents Śaṅkara's own view) is to teach multiplicity or diversity. Śaṅkara does not associate himself with this view but openly repudiates it. "Not so, for the

1 Chend S. B., VII. 25. 2.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 4. 6.

4 S. B., I. 4. 14.

5 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

passages are meant to convey the idea of oneness. We notice in life that sparks may be considered identical with fire. Similarly a part may be considered to be one in nature with the whole. Such being the case, words signifying a modification or part¹ of the Supreme Self, as applied to the individual Self, are meant to convey its identity with It. That this is so appears also from the introduction and conclusion. In all the Upaniṣads, first identity is broached, then by means of illustrations and reasons² the universe is shown to be a modification or part or the like of the Supreme Self³, and the conclusion again brings out the identity.⁴ Here, for instance, the text begins with, 'This all is the Self', then through arguments and examples⁵ about the origin, continuity, and dissolution of the universe it adduces reasons for considering its identity with Brahman, such as the relation of cause and effect, and it concludes with 'Without interior or exterior', and 'This Self is Brahman'. From that introduction and conclusion it is clear that the passage setting forth the origin, continuity, and dissolution of the universe are intended to strengthen the idea of the identity of the individual Self with the Supreme Self. Otherwise there would be a break in the topic. All believers in the Upaniṣads are unanimous on the point that all of these enjoin on us to think of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self. If it is possible to construe the passages setting forth the origin, etc., of the universe so as to keep up the continuity of that injunction, to interpret them so as to introduce a new topic would be unwarrantable. A different result would have to be provided for. Therefore we conclude that the Śruti passages setting forth the origin, etc., of the universe must be intended to establish the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self."⁷

1 विकारांशत्वाच्चा शब्दाः ।

2 दृष्टान्तः हेतुभिरपि ।

3 विकारांशत्वं जगतः प्रतिपाद्यम् ।

4 पुनरेकत्वंमुपसहरति ।

5 Brhad. II. 4. 6.

6 हेतुदृष्टान्तः ।

7 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

THE VIEW-POINT AND ITS INTERPRETATIONAL VALUE

From what we have shown above it is clear that statements that "the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of pralaya than during the period of its subsistence"¹ and that "neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority..... ..to the highest spiritual principle constitutes unreality in the sense in which the *Māyā* of Śaṅkara is unreal"² are far from representing faithfully Śaṅkara's view. This misrepresentation is the result of the failure to distinguish between "existential" and "axiological" concepts. Likewise Professor Dasgupta strikes a false note when he says that Śaṅkara makes use of "linguistic trickery" in order to prove that the world is a magical illusion.³ Critics fail to realize the value-character of Śaṅkara's philosophy when they insist upon seeing an incongruity between Śaṅkara's statement, in certain places, that the world-creation forms the very nature of Brahman and his assertion, in others, that the world is "unreal".⁴ Their interpretation is not a new one; it is a mere revival of views preached much earlier by the medieval critics of Śaṅkara, namely Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Vijñāna-bhikṣu. Professor Dasgupta believes that the creative aspect of Brahman is irreconcilable with the ascription of unreality to the world and that Śaṅkara flatly contradicts himself when he wants to hold to the first and at the same time stick to the other. We select Professor Dasgupta's exposition for comment and criticism, while at the same time desiring to make it clear that what we shall say about him holds equally true of all other expositors and critics who think that Śaṅkara adopts the existential point of view and are not alive to the fact that the driving force of his thought is primarily axiological and not merely ontological.

Professor Dasgupta is discussing Śaṅkara's answer to the question: "Why should Brahman create this world

1 Tilbaut, P. XCIV.

2 *ibid.*, P. CXIX.

3 *History*, Vol. II. P. 2.

4 *ibid.*, P. 42.

when He has nothing to gain by it?" Śaṅkara's answer to the question is contained in his commentary on B. S. II. 1. 33. Commenting upon this Professor Dasgupta writes as follows: "The reply (i. e. of Śaṅkara) is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by his *līlā* or play. Śaṅkara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the *māyā* theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sūtras which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the sūtra as attributing the world creation to God's playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience, and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the Self and Brahman."¹

There is nothing in Śaṅkara's commentary on the above sūtra which can be taken to lend plausibility to the view that Śaṅkara is singing his old song of the *māyā* theory. Professor Dasgupta is led to believe that Śaṅkara is endeavouring to establish the falsity of creation, because he fails to understand the true import of Śaṅkara's words. The passage under consideration is the following:²

न चेयं परमाद्यविषया मृष्टिश्रुतिः अविद्याकल्पित नामरूपव्यवहार गौचरत्वात्
ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपश्चाच्चैत्यंतदपि नैव विस्मृतव्यम् ।

Professor Dasgupta interprets the words 'न चेयं परमाद्यविषया मृष्टिश्रुतिः', to mean that "all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance." This is not the meaning Śaṅkara intends to convey by these words. What Śaṅkara wants to express is that realization of diversity or multiplicity, which no doubt is a fact for the perceptual consciousness, is not at all conducive to the attainment of the highest good, nor is it something whose very being is its validity. The right translation of the passage would be: "The scriptural texts speaking of creation (i. e., phenomenal diversity) do not refer to the highest good." This is one of the cardinal tenets

¹ *Ibid.*, P. 42.

² B. S. II. 1. 33.

of Śaṅkara's philosophy, which is a philosophy of value; the "kaleidoscopic transformations of external nature possess in themselves no trace of intrinsic value." There are many statements which corroborate this view.¹

It is really strange that the above words should convey to Professor Dasgupta the meaning that the principal truth which Śaṅkara wants to bring out here is that the world-creation is a fanciful appearance, when there is overwhelming evidence, scattered all over Śaṅkara's works, to show that he is concerned with the determination of the value of the world and not with its affirmation or denial as a fact for perceptual consciousness, and when in the same passage which is under consideration² Śaṅkara makes it abundantly clear that it is not possible to deny "creation" (implying phenomenal diversity), because there are specific texts to this effect. He says, "It cannot be said that He either does not act or acts like a senseless person: for Scripture affirms the fact of creation, on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other."³ Creation is a fact; that there are scriptural texts to this effect is also a fact. But that there is ultimate diversity and multiplicity, that the universe is its own value—this is not the meaning either of the eternal process of creation or of the scriptural texts which embody this truth. The meaning of the eternal process of creation is that the universe, which is a manifestation of Brahman's

- 1 (i) न ह्यमृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चः प्रतिविपादयितः न हि तत्प्रतिबद्धः कश्चित्पुरुषार्थो दृश्यते श्रूयते वा, (S. B., I. 4. 14.)
- (ii) न च जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कर्मचित्फलया मिश्रयते । (S. B., II. 1. 14.)
- (iii) न चेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था तत्प्रतिपत्तीकलानवगमात् । (S. B., II. 1. 27.)
- (iv) न हि मृष्ट्याद्यायिकादिपरिणामात्किञ्चित्फलमिष्यते । (Altareya. S. B., II.)
- (v) भुवर्णमणिसोहानि त्रिकुण्णिगदृष्टान्तानोत्पत्त्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनपरा । (Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.)
- (vi) निन्दितत्वाच्च मृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः । कलवच्चात्मकत्वदर्शनमेव श्रुति निन्दितोऽयं, (Mand. S. B., III. 24.)

2 S. B., II. 1. 33.

3 Ibid. नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तवृत्तिर्वा, मृष्टिश्रूतेः सर्वजश्रूतेश्च ।

nature, is nothing other than Brahman; it is divine in its nature. Professor Dasgupta fails to realize the inner significance of Śaṅkara's statement that "scriptural texts relating to creation" aim at "establishing"¹ "the selfhood of Brahman".²

In the passage under discussion what Śaṅkara is establishing is not that "the ultimate reality is the identity of the Self and Brahman", as Professor Dasgupta erroneously thinks, but that "the nature or causality or Brahman's creativity proves the Selfhood of Brahman." Śaṅkara is not concerned with pointing out the "fact" of the identity of Self and Brahman in the above passage; he is concerned with showing the "mode" in which the "fact" of their identity can be proved to be in conformity with the demands of reason. "The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition, "All this is but the Self", viz., the universe has sprung only from the Self, has the Self alone for its genus and dissolves only into the self."³ The compound word "sīṣṭi-śruti" sums up the entire reasoning which Śaṅkara has to offer in support of the proposition that everything is the Self.

Professor Dasgupta fails to realize this, because somehow or other he has missed the import of the word "pratipādanaparavāca". Śaṅkara has not used this word as a loose writer might. He needs it; "no other words would or could serve the turn, and no more could be added", and any one who would go to the author to get at his meaning and not to find his own, should pause and ponder over the word and what it implies. It carries with it a reminder that "sīṣṭi-śruti" is a mere means to prove the conclusion that Brahman is the Self of everything. The statement of Śaṅkara⁴, namely "सृष्टिभूतेः ब्रह्मात्मभाव प्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च:", is really an enthymeme of the first order; and when fully expressed in logical form will stand as follows:

1 Ibid. प्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च ।

2 Ibid. ब्रह्मात्मभाव ।

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 1.

4 S. B., II. 1. 33.

(§ V) THE VIEW POINT AND ITS INTERPRETATIONAL VALUE

1. Whatever springs from a thing, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance has that thing as its Self and is nothing other than it.¹
2. Everything springs from Brahman, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance.²
3. Therefore everything has Brahman as its Self and is nothing other than that Self.³

The principle of causality, as understood by Śaṅkara, constitutes the major premise of the syllogism, the fact of creation supplies the minor, and the Brahmanhood of the world and the Selfhood of Brahman is the conclusion to which the premises lead.

One is apt to think the two statements of Śaṅkara in his commentary on B. S. II. 1. 33, namely, (i) "that the scriptural texts about creation refer only to the phenomenal world of name and form, which are the figments of avidyā" and (ii) "that the aim of scriptural texts is to establish that Brahman is the Self of everything", are mutually irreconcilable. This is the impression left on Professor Dasgupta's mind also. But on reflecting deeper we shall see that there is no such irreconcilable opposition. (a) We have already pointed out that "sṛṣṭi" for Śaṅkara both means and implies "phenomenal diversity".⁴ But this phenomenal diversity, according to Śaṅkara, is not pārmāthika, that is, it does not represent the essential nature of Brahman, though it constitutes an irreducible moment in the life of that Brahman. It is, as he says, māyika.⁵ We shall show later on the necessity of this māyika sṛṣṭi and its metaphysical significance as explained by Śaṅkara. Here we are interested in reminding the readers of Śaṅkara that to regard the diversity and multiplicity as ultimate and final is ignorance, and so long as this consciousness does not disappear, the achievement of the Highest Good will remain unrealized.

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 4. 6. कार्यकारणानन्यत्व ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 33. सृष्टिश्रुतेः ।

3 Ibid., ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादन ।

4 Mand S. B., III. 24.

5 Ibid., III. 1; III. 9. माययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः ।

But there is another side of this *śiṣṭi*, and another implication of the *śiṣṭi-śruti*. *Śiṣṭi* not only means phenomenal diversity; it also implies (i) dependence upon Brahman and (ii) non-otherness from it.¹ So far as the aspect of diversity is concerned, it is not ultimate and no fruit has been assigned to a knowledge of it by those who have actually attained the summum bonum of life. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that this "bheda-dṛṣṭi", this consciousness of diversity, and the scriptural texts which embody this "bheda-dṛṣṭi", are not primary but secondary.² In this sense *śiṣṭi* is "gaṇi", secondary and subordinate. But it is not "gaṇi", secondary, when used in the sense of "dependence upon Brahman" and "non-otherness from it". The one ideal of philosophy, according to Śaṅkara, is the attainment of the knowledge of that synthetic principle knowing which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known. This, says Śaṅkara, is possible when the entire universe is non-different from Brahman, which is the knowable. Non-difference again of the universe from Brahman is possible only when the former originates from the latter. The following quotations from Śaṅkara will amply justify my contention and bring to light a cardinal principle of his philosophy which has not up till now received the attention which it deserves.

"The scriptural texts about the origin of the *prāṇa* cannot be taken in a secondary sense, because therefrom would result the abandonment of the original promise. For after the text has held out the promise that by knowing the one every other thing is known, it goes on to say, in order to prove that statement, that 'From it is born *prāṇa*', etc. This statement is made good only if the whole world, including the *prāṇa*, is an effect of Brahman, because there is no effect independent of the material cause. If, on the other hand, the statement as to the origin of the *prāṇas* were taken in a secondary sense, the promissory statement would thereby

1 S. B., II. 1. 20, कृत्स्नस्य जगती ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदन्यत्वं न ।

2 Mond. S. B., III 14, न हि भेदाक्त्यानां कदाचिदपि मुख्यभेदादित्यम् । भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

be stultified.”¹ And again: “In all the Vedānta texts we meet with promissory utterances of the following nature: ‘That by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, the unknown becomes known’;² ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this becomes known’;³ ‘Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?’ These promissory utterances are not abandoned, that is, not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, which is the knowable; for if it were something other than Brahman, the promise that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known would not be fulfilled. This non-difference again is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman.⁴ And we understand from the words of the Vedas that the fulfilment of the promise is possible only through the theory of the non-difference of the effect from its cause. For the affirmation contained in the clause, ‘That by which the unheard becomes heard,’ etc., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, etc., which all aim at showing the non-difference of the effect from the cause. In order to establish this⁵ the subsequent clauses also, ‘In the beginning my dear, this was pure Being, one, without a second; it thought; it created fire’⁶, at first state that the entire aggregate of effects originates from Brahman, and then declare its non-difference from it, viz. in the passage, ‘In it all that exists has its Self.’.....In all the Vedānta texts there occur passages which, by means of various instances, make the self-same assertion, ‘All this is that Self.’⁸” Śaṅkara sums up this long argument in the following words: “The promissory utterance of the scripture, viz. ‘That by

1 S. B., II. 4. 2, गौणं तु प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतौ प्रतिज्ञेयं हीयेत ।

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3.

3 Brhad. S. B., IV. 5. 6.

4 S. B., II. 1. 20, स चाव्यतिरेक एवमुपपद्यते यदि कृत्स्नं वस्तुजातमेकस्माद्ब्रह्मणः उत्पद्येत ।

5 Ibid., तत्साधनाय च ।

6 Chand., VI. 2, 1.

7 Ibid., VI. 8. 7.

8 Brhad., II 4. 6.

which the unheard becomes heard', &c, is established, because the entire universe is an effect of Brahman and is non-different from it."¹

1 S. B., II. 1.20. कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदनन्वत्वाच्च मिदं ता श्रोती प्रतिज्ञा
'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' ।

CHAPTER X
EXISTENCE AS ROOTED IN REALITY
THE PROBLEM OF CREATION

THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Śaṅkara says that the world of value is Brahman itself; the world of existence is the world of Avidyā. This may give rise to the suspicion that the two are ultimately irreconcilable and their dualism is the last word of Śaṅkara's constructive metaphysics. This would be a grave mistake. Value and existence, though they are not identical for the ordinary human consciousness, whose nature it is to be always endeavouring to bring the ideal and the actual together, are not complete strangers to each other. The world of existence lives on a spark of Brahman. "The manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the reality of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour."¹ The world of value and the world of existence do not stand facing each other idiotically. Śaṅkara shows that, in its essence, the world of existence is an expression of the world of value, the actual of the ideal, the not-self of the Self. This, however, cannot be made clear unless we are told "why these appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds"²; unless we "know why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one"³; in short, unless we get an insight into the meaning and mystery of the process of creation.

The problem of creation in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara has been the subject of constant misunderstanding and this

1 S. B., I. 4. 22.

2 Bradley : *Appearance and Reality*, P. 467.

3 *ibid.*

misunderstanding is bound up with ignorance of the standpoint which is central to Śāṅkara's metaphysics, namely the valuational standpoint, and his philosophy of language. The question whether Brahman is essentially a creative reality cannot be answered satisfactorily if we ignore the very condition under which this question presses itself and under which the operation of language is possible. The word "creation" recurs so constantly in philosophical and theological discussions of the nature of God and his relation to the world that it is desirable to submit the idea to a somewhat more searching examination before we can take it as expressing or pointing to a philosophical truth. Such terms as creation, means and end may retain little of the ordinary meaning attaching to them when they are used to describe the ultimate conditions of the universe. But, with this reserve, they still remain useful and intelligible modes of expressing the truth about the real. They are, when so used, to be regarded as axiological concepts.

The question whether Brahman is essentially creative is an intelligible question, because it aims at finding out the essence of the universe which is a fact before us. For Śāṅkara the question whether Brahman is the cause of the universe is really the question whether essence is irrelevant to existence and existence intelligible without essence. It is the question how duality is implicated in non-duality and the *dvaita* is the differentiation of the *advaita*. This question arises in the world of *Māyā* where existence is other than essence but not wholly other. It is relevant to the universe which, in the words of Śāṅkara, is *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya*. For both the raising and the answering of the question the duality of value and existence is an indispensable condition. Neither the question nor the answer has any significance for the stage where fact and value are identical. The language in which the answer to the above question is expressed bears an unmistakable and at the same time unavoidable stamp of the duality of fact and value.

The recognition of Brahman as a creative reality means the acceptance of the truth that essence explains existence;

and the assertion that the revelation of name and form (which is what Śaṅkara means by creation), which are neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman, takes place from Īśvara, has reference to exigencies of language.¹ The modern interpreters, instead of using Śaṅkara's philosophy of language as giving the clue to the understanding of his metaphysical position, especially as regards the creative aspect of it, have fallen back upon the device of drawing a distinction between the Śuddha and the Māyāśabala Brahman, or Brahman and Īśvara, and relegating the work of creation to the latter. Śaṅkara's description of Brahman as "nett nett", as Nirguṇa and Nirviśeṣa, is perfectly consistent with his ascription of causality to it. The distinction between Brahman and Īśvara when they are viewed as metaphysical principles is non-existent in Śaṅkara. The distinction which has significance and upon which is based his whole philosophy of sādhanā, with its recognition of Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman or Niguṇa and Saiguṇa Brahman, is the distinction between Brahman realized as our very Ātman and Brahman realized as different from us and controlling and governing our destiny.²

Every term of our mortal speech retains the association of time. The only language which philosophy can intelligibly speak is a language of time, and it is through this language that the nature of the timeless has to be expressed. The only way then in which the nature of Brahman as the most supreme reality and value, as the timelessly real, can be expressed is by calling it the Source, the Origin, the Cause, the Absolute Ground, the Adhiṣṭhāna of the world. The perceptual consciousness makes us aware of the world-fact; the valuational consciousness finds that it is not self-subsistent, that its being is not its validity, that it is not a self-justifying end. In its search for the reality which sustains the world-fact and the world-process, and its discovery of the value which invests it with meaning and significance, the

1 S. B., II, I. 14.

2 Chand. S. B., I. 11.1, आत्मा इति च आत्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य आदित्यादि ब्रह्मणः उपास्यत्वं निवर्तयति । अमर्देन आत्मा एव ब्रह्म ब्रह्मवात्मा ।; Tatit. S. B., II. 8. 5. वेदां पुनर्गोश्वरोज्यो आत्मनः कार्यं चाग्न्यत्तेषां भयानिवृत्तिः भयस्यान्यनिर्मितत्वात् ।

valuational consciousness is led to recognize Brahman as the Self of the universe, and its innermost essence, and as the goal towards which the world-process can be said to be moving. Brahman is the final explanation of the world-fact. Apart from Brahman the world is an unintelligible fact. At the level of our experience, which is characterized by the duality of Self and not-self, or value and fact, the essential metaphysical truth for which Śaṅkara's Advaitism stands, namely the absoluteness of Brahman and the inseparability in it of value and existence, cannot be expressed in a better, more intelligible, and more exquisite way than by calling it the Ātman or the absolute ground. Śaṅkara's notion of the Ātman is that of the cause, the cause not as a temporally antecedent event but as the essence, which explains the fact and in which the fact is rooted and has its being and apart from which it is unintelligible. All this is Brahman—this is the key-note of Śaṅkara's philosophy. How even what appears to be other than Brahman is really Brahman, or what is really Brahman appears to be other than Brahman—this is the key-problem of Śaṅkara's doctrine of creation.

To him, believing as he does that there is an essence to everything and that this essence is neither a matter of doubt nor disbelief and denial the question whether Brahman, which is the Ātman, the Self or essence of the universe and can be separated from it neither by time nor by space, is the source or ground and cause of that universe, does not present any serious philosophical difficulties. We never find Śaṅkara struggling with the problem how Brahman can be the cause of the universe. The difficulty which some of the followers of Śaṅkara and many of his modern interpreters experience in accounting for the origin of the universe out of Brahman is of their own making; and the hypothesis of a "saṁgha Brahman or changing Brahman" is a gratuitous one. Śaṅkara never doubted that Brahman is the cause of the universe. At the very outset, in his commentary on the First Sūtra, Śaṅkara shows that Brahman cannot be denied, because it is the very Self of the universe and of every one of us. In the commentary on the Second Sūtra he elaborates his view as to how Brahman can be regarded as the Self of

the universe. Prahman is the Ātman or Self, because it is the cause or source of the universe.

The entire misunderstanding about the problem of creation in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara has its genesis in the thought that the Saguna Brahman is an ontological principle and the Second Sūtra undertakes to define the nature of this Saguna Brahman. Deficiency of language has been erroneously made identical with deficiency of realization. The Second Sūtra undertakes to express the perfect truth that Brahman is the essence of the universe in language which, after all, is an imperfect medium of expression, being relational, by calling it the origin, etc., of the entire aggregate of phenomena. The ontological truth that Brahman is the essence of the universe can be expressed only by having recourse to the value category of cause, and the Second Sūtra, in its own way, expresses how the spatio-temporal order of the universe has its being in Brahman, the highest reality and value.

II

THE VALUE CATEGORY OF CAUSE

The concept of cause, according to Śaṅkara, is an axiological concept. It is the concept of the Self or Ātman or essence. The cause is the essence of the effect, and, as the existence of a thing is inseparable from its essence in time as well as in space, the causal relation, according to Śaṅkara, is not a relation of temporal sequence. "If a thing cannot subsist apart from something else, the latter is the essence of that thing."¹ To find out the cause of a thing is to ascertain the "essence" of that thing. Brahman as the cause of the universe cannot be reached at the farther end of any chain of phenomenal antecedents and consequents. It is cause only in the sense of ground, essence, that is to say, the Being whose nature is expressed in the universe as a whole. In other words, Brahman is cause only when cause=ratio; for the reason or ultimate explanation of anything is only to be found in the whole nature of the system or in the supreme values

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4.7.

which are foundational to that system. All questions of temporal beginning and of historical emergence are, from this point of view, secondary. But the existing interpretations of Śaṅkara's written words, in their confusion of existential and axiological categories, view the causal or creative nature of Brahman in a false light and raise difficulties which are in no way connected with the central concepts of Śaṅkara's metaphysics. The problem of creation is treated by Śaṅkara as part and parcel of the problem of value. For him the important question is: What is the meaning of creation? And in consonance with the standpoint of value which he adopts, the process of creation assumes in his philosophy the character of a means or intermediary towards an end—that end being the revelation in and to finite spirits of the infinite riches of the divine life and the affirmation of the absoluteness of it. The idea of creation tends to pass into that of self-revelation or self-realization, and creation becomes the very *svabhāva* of Brahman, "an act grounded in the divine nature, and therefore, if we are to use the language of time, coeval with the divine existence". It belongs to the very being of Brahman, to his very essence to be creator; and creation is the revelation of Brahman's nature.¹

As existence and essence are inseparable, and cause is the essence of effect, it is not a problem for Śaṅkara how the universe becomes separated from Brahman in time. There is no point of time when we can conceive of a gulf between Brahman and the universe. Being the Self of the universe, Brahman gives it the reality which it possesses. Nothing can be independent of its essence or *Ātman*. Accordingly, Śaṅkara does not attempt to solve the problem of the relation between Brahman and the universe, which is but a variation of the more general problem of the relation between cause and effect, by having recourse to the concept of time. The solution assumes the form of determining the value of the universe with its distinctions and diversities and the treatment of the concept of time becomes in Śaṅkara part and parcel of the general and more vital problem of the relation between value and existence. To understand the purpose

¹ S. B., I. 4. 14.

of the gulf which appears to divide Brahman from the universe and the universe from Brahman, is to understand the meaning and also the mystery of the process of creation. The problem of creation is: Why is existence made to appear separate from essence when they are one and inseparable? Creation is the visible gulf between the ideal and the actual. Time and space are the media through which the actual is made to appear as other than and separated from Brahman. Time and space, therefore, are appearances according to Śaṅkara. They are vikāras. Śaṅkara's doctrine of creation is intended to show that the universe, even when time does its best to bring about a gulf between it and the Brahman, cannot be separated from Brahman and continues to have its essence in it in all the instants of time and points of space. In other words, the truth of the universe is constituted by the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. The concepts of time and creation are utilized by Śaṅkara in the service of his Axiological Monism; and his Creative Monism is to be read as part and parcel of his Axiological Monism.

At the very outset of his Commentary, Śaṅkara makes it clear that Brahman is that from which the origin of the universe. The Second Sūtra of the First Adhyāya undertakes to give a definition of Brahman whose cognition the First Sūtra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedānta, that Brahman, whose cognition is the only road to final release, that Brahman, in fact, which Śaṅkara calls the highest. It is unfortunate that history should have allowed clouds to gather round this point and led generations of interpreters to be busy with the discussion whether Brahman or Īśvara is the explanation of the universe and whether the second sūtra is a definition of the former or the latter. There is nothing in Śaṅkara's commentary on the first two Sūtras even to suggest that there is any such problem. In his comments on the First Sūtra Śaṅkara lays down the problem of his philosophy. It is an inquiry into the nature of Brahman whose comprehension constitutes the highest beatitude. This Brahman is declared to be the very essence of the universe and of every conscious being in it and is said to give reality to the whole of it and to

every part of it.¹ In the Second Sūtra he shows the manner in which Brahman can be viewed as the Ātman or the essence of the universe. Brahman is the Ātman, because nothing can be perceived apart from Brahman. "Nothing can be perceived apart from the Self, because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in it and remains imbued with it during continuance. Therefore everything is the Self."² Thus on account of the relation of cause and effect, of general and particular, of the one giving the other reality, Brahman is the self or essence or Ātman of the universe. Therefore is Brahman defined as that from which the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the universe proceed. The universe has being by participation in this Brahman. It is only because Brahman is the source or ground of the universe, the latter being its self-revelation and Brahman being the self-communicating life, that an intuition into the essence of the universe is possible.³

There is nothing in Śāṅkara's commentary on these sūtras to support Thibaut's contention that the Second Sūtra can be accepted by Śāṅkara only as a definition of Īśvara, who is an inferior principle, and not of Brahman.⁴ It is an error to think that according to Śāṅkara "Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates", and then to bring against him the charge that "it is improbable that the sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit".⁵ There are not two metaphysical principles in Śāṅkara, one to account for the existence of the universe and the other to insure the attainment of the summum bonum of life. One and the same reality is the productive source of the universe as well as the highest good in the realization of which consists the perfection of human achievement. Brahman is this reality as well as this good. It is the source of the universe and is also the highest beatitude. "One should know the highest Brahman to be one's Ātman and the Ātman of

1 S.B., I. 1.1.

2 Brhad. S.B., II, 4.6.

3 S.B., I. 1.2.

4 Thibaut, P. XC.

5 Ibid.

all living things, now treated of and to be particularly described in the sequel as the cause of the creation, support, and destruction of the universe, for the cessation of all the miseries of saṁsāra."¹ "The settled meaning of all the Upaniṣads is that the highest consummation results from a knowledge of Brahman which is the cause of the universe."² Brahman from which the origin of the universe proceeds is the subject-matter of Paravidya, the discipline the one purpose of which is to give us an insight into the nature of the supreme Good. "That entity known as Puruṣa from which the universe derives its essence, from which, as its source, it proceeds and into which it is again absorbed is true;.....It is the subject of Brahnavidyā."³ "It is the omniscient, not subject to saṁsāra; both high and low, high as being the cause and low as being the effect; when it is seen directly as 'I am that', one attains emancipation, the cause of saṁsāra being uprooted"⁴

Professor Radhakrishnan draws our attention to the fact that "at the centre of Śaṅkara's system is the eternal mystery of creation, a mystery in which every movement of life and every atom of the world is implicated". Śaṅkara no doubt admits that there is "mystery" in creation, but this mystery is very different from what it is ordinarily understood to be. Ordinarily the following two ideas are looked upon as constituting the meaning and mystery of creation according to Śaṅkara: (i) creation is illusory; (ii) it is not due to Nirguṇa Brahman, but to the Saguṇa or Māyāśabala or changing Brahman. Īśvara is this changing Brahman. According to both these views Īśvara is an inferior principle and "has less of reality than absolute being".⁵ The first view does not amount to any serious attempt to explain the problem. It merely explains it away. According to the second view there are certain genuine difficulties inherent in the nature of the problem itself, but the whole discussion centres round

1 Altareya. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Praṇa. S. B., VI. 1. जगत्तच्च यन्मूलं तत्परिज्ञानात् परंश्रेय इति निश्चितोऽयं ।

3 Mund. S B., II. 1. 1.

4 Ibid, II. 2. 6., परं च कारणात्मनावरं च कार्यात्मना तस्मिन्परावरे साक्षादह-
मस्मीति चष्टे संसारकारणोच्छेदान्मुच्यत इत्यर्थः ।

5 Radhakrishnan: I. P. Vol. II, P. 572.

certain issues which were never present to the mind of Śāṅkara and which consequently cloud the discussion instead of shedding light on it.

According to Professor Dasgupta Śāṅkara believes that "in reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory."¹ But in the sense in which the world exists and we all exist as separate individuals we can affirm the existence of Īśvara as engaged in creating and maintaining the world.² This Īśvara, according to Professor Dasgupta, has "little importance" in the Vedānta system, "for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer and much more powerful than we, but he is as much phenomenal as any of us."³ Professor Dasgupta's conviction that creation according to Śāṅkara is illusory does not lead him to make further inquiries into the "how", the "why" and the meaning and purpose of creation. From what he says in the second volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy*, namely that "Padmapada's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakāśātman, has been taken in the first and second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedānta"⁴, it would appear that he also attributes to Śāṅkara the view that Brahman and Īśvara are different, and it is the latter and not the former who is the productive source of the world and its multiplicity. It would also seem that, according to Professor Dasgupta, Śāṅkara distinguishes, like the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, between the *Śuddha* and the *Kāraṇa* Brahman, and attributes the act of creation to the latter. But we are led to doubt his faithfulness to the *Vivaraṇa* School, when we read that "Brahman, the Self, is at once the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) as well as the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the world"⁵, for the very point which Prakāśātman wants to make is that it is the *Māyāśābala* Brahman and not the *Śuddha* which is the cause of the universe. The reader also finds it difficult to reconcile this statement with another statement of his on a different page that "the highest truth is the

1 *History*, Vol. I, P. 438.

2 *ibid.*, P. 438.

3 *ibid.*, P. 477.

4 P. 104.

5 Dasgupta: *History*, Vol. I, P. 438.

Self, the reality, the Brahman, and both *jīva* and *Īśvara* are but illusory impositions on it"¹. According to Professor Dasgupta Śaṅkara's attempt to resolve the mystery of creation may be summed up by saying that all creation is illusory but that accepting it as illusion it may be conceived that God created the world as a mere sport.² Professor Dasgupta's interpretation of Śaṅkara does not help us much in obtaining insight into Śaṅkara's resolution of what Professor Radhakrishnan has called "the eternal mystery of creation". Nor does it explain to us, as other interpretations seek to do, how *Īśvara*, who is different from Brahman, is metaphysically a more competent principle.

The view that *Īśvara* and not Brahman is the creative principle responsible for the evolution of the universe is the result of the recognition, on the part of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, that Brahman is metaphysically a deficient explanatory principle. While, on the one hand, it is thought that "*Īśvara* has less of reality than absolute being", it is virtually conceded on the other that it possesses greater reality because Brahman is unable to explain the world of becoming and the only way to account for it is "through the recognition of a *saguṇa* Brahman or changing Brahman, an *Īśvara*" in whom "we have besides the absolute Brahman the element of objectivity or *prakṛti*, self-expression or *Māyā*".³ This vein of thought is wholly foreign to Śaṅkara and has its root in the failure, on the part of these interpreters, to make sufficient use of the axiom of the inseparability of value and reality upon which Śaṅkara's system of Advaitism rests. These interpreters are not fully alive to the significance of Śaṅkara's thought when they speak of an *Īśvara*, a God who is on a lower level of reality than Brahman and who produces, sustains and dissolves the universe eternally and as part of his nature.

The root of the whole difficulty is that all of them are haunted by the feeling that Brahman is, after all, a "value" or an *essentia* and needs some intermediate link to connect it

1 *Ibid.*, P. 477.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 438.

3 Radhakrishnan: I. P., Vol. II, P. 555.

with what is existent or real. They fail to see that Brahman is not only the highest value but also the highest reality, and the two are one and inseparable. If existence is inseparable from essence and essence includes existence, the doubt how existence can arise out of essence or how essence can produce existence loses its relevance. The only meaningful question which should suggest itself to the inquiring mind is, if essence and existence are in their very nature inseparable, how is it that they appear to be separated and what is the significance of this apparent gulf between the two? As I have said above, according to Śaṅkara this is the implication of creation. Creation is the bringing about of an apparent distance between the ideal and the actual. The purpose of this apparent distance between the two is to reaffirm that the two are in essence one and inseparable, that Brahman is the Ātman, the essence of everything.¹ An intermediary in the form of an Īśvara or Māyāśābala Brahman has been felt necessary to bring Brahman, which is Being, Knowledge and Bliss, and the Universe together, because these interpreters do not remain true to the standpoint of value according to which Brahman is the essence, the self, the Ātman of the universe. According to Śaṅkara, the affirmation of Brahman's causality is but an alternative way of reassuring our faith in the absoluteness of the value of Existence.² To say that Brahman is Absolute Existence is to say that it is the Original Cause. Without acknowledging an absolute value of Existence, which is to acknowledge a First Cause, our thought will be moving in a vicious circle.³

The recognition that Śaṅkara uses the category of cause as a category of interpretation and not scientific description or explanation, will resolve many of the tangles in which Śaṅkara's Absolutism finds itself with regard to its creative aspect. As effect is inseparable from cause in time as well in space, to have recourse to spatial and temporal ways of

1 S. B., I. 4. 14.

2 Tai. S. B., II. 1. 1. अतः कारणत्वं प्राप्तं ब्रह्मणः । कारणस्य च कारकत्वं वस्तुत्वात् ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव न नो ब्रह्मेत्यविरोधः मूलप्रकृत्यभ्युपगमेऽनवस्था । प्रसंगात् ।

explaining the relation between the two is to misunderstand Śāṅkara's treatment of the category of cause. Neither time nor space can affect this inseparability of essence and existence. To understand the relation between essence and existence is to understand the relation between cause and effect or between Brahman and the universe. Śāṅkara does not, like Bergson, deify "time" and transform it into a mysterious entity endowing it with something of divine Providence. Time does not render intelligible the nature of reality. It is reality itself which explains time and renders it significant and meaningful. But it is only when the real is conceived as value that Śāṅkara regards it as explanatory of time and becoming. In other words, it is the conception of Brahman as the Ātman or the Self which gives time the intelligibility it seems to have. The reality of a thing cannot be abstracted from its value; in fact it is constituted by its value. What we call "being" or "fact" is a form of value. Essence is what Śāṅkara calls Ātman. The very nature of essence forbids a complete abstraction of existence from essence as irrational. Time, whose essence consists in the apparent gulf between essence and existence or the ideal and the actual, is not, therefore, as real as the essence or the ideal itself, which is the standard with reference to which any idea of a gulf or discrepancy is formed. Time, therefore, does not explain the Ātman, but is itself explained by the Ātman.

III

THE CAUSE AS THE ĀTMAN OR SELF

SATKĀRANAVĀDA

If the filaments which unite the effect to its originating cause are never severed by time and space, the effect has always its being in and through the cause, and it can never set itself up in opposition to the cause nor can it transgress the limits set up by the cause.¹ The effect is the cause itself having assumed another form. The effect is always with the cause. The pot cannot exist if it chooses to renounce the

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 4. 1. कारणं हि आत्मा । न शक्यं हि कारणातिक्रमणं कर्तुं कार्येण । Gita. S. B., VIII. 28. कार्यं हि कारणस्यान्तर्बन्धि भवति ।

earth as its Self and live in abstraction from it. If it succeeds in renouncing it it will reduce itself to a non-entity. The tie which unites the effect to the cause is too close to be severed by time or space.¹ Śaṅkara points out that we are not wholly correct in speaking of a tie or bond between cause and effect which time itself is not able to destroy. But for the duality between value and existence there would be little justification for employing language in which cause and effect were treated as related. A thing can only be related to another; and it is only in the case of realities which are different from each other that we can speak of the one as producing or attaining another or transgressing it. A thing can in no way be said to produce or attain itself or transgress itself. The pot neither "attains the earth nor transgresses it".²

So viewed the category of cause turns out to be an axiological and not an existential category. Its purpose is not to describe the facts, but to penetrate beneath the facts and discover their value. The category of cause, regarded as an existential category, points to and presupposes difference and discrepancy, but used as an axiological category, as is the case with Śaṅkara, it establishes the Advaita position according to which essence and existence, Brahman and the world, are one and inseparable. When it is used as an existential category Śaṅkara says that "men of wisdom should not think of the true nature of Brahman in terms of whole and part, unit and fraction, or cause and effect; for the essential meaning of the Upaniṣads is to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman".³ But Śaṅkara realizes quite well that we can talk about Brahman only by having recourse to categoric modes of thought and expression. Therefore, when compelled to do so, we must view these categories as axiological categories, that is, as intended to bring out the

1 S.B., IV. 3.14. विकारेणैव विकारिणो नित्यप्राप्तत्वात् । न हि घटो मृदात्मना पण्डित्यज्जातमिच्छते परित्यागे वाग्भाव प्राप्तेः ।

2 Chand. S.B., VIII. 4.1. अत्रेव हि अन्यस्य प्राप्तिरनिकम्प्यं वा विद्यते । न तु तेनैव तस्य । न हि घटेन मृदाप्यतेऽनिकम्प्यते वा ।

3 Brhad. S.B., II. 1. 20. अतो न पदितं : सत्यस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तिविषयं ब्रह्मणोऽशब्दवैकल्येनैव विकारविकारित्य कल्पना कार्या ।

value of the facts. "Such being the case, words signifying a modification or part of the supreme Self, as applied to the individual self, are meant to convey its identity with it. The Śruti, through arguments and examples about the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe, adduces reasons for considering its identity with Brahman, such as the relation of cause and effect."¹

The effect cannot be viewed as something other than the cause. The language of time fails to give any insight into the true nature of the relation which unites the effect to its cause or existence to its essence. The scientist's definition of cause as an immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedent of a phenomenon is, according to Śaṅkara, content with an external and superficial view of the concept and fails to penetrate beneath the surface. If the relation of cause and effect be understood to carry the implication that existence can ever be abstracted from value or essence, Śaṅkara is prepared to go to the length of asserting that neither logic nor reasoning can establish such a view and philosophy can very well do without it.² The doctrine of the identity and inseparability of value and reality forbids any conception of causality in which the cause and the effect are treated as "different from each other or as even standing in the relation of the dependent and the support. The effect is only a special state which the cause assumes and in which it exists".³

The distinction between cause and effect is a distinction which has been created by language, but for which we could not speak of one thing as the effect and the other as the cause. Language in a very real sense creates reality. All modifications or effects are "names" only and exist through or originate from speech only; in reality the effect has no existence apart from the cause, because it is in all

1 Ibid. उत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयहेतुदृष्टान्तैः विकारविकारित्वाद्येकत्वं प्रत्ययहेतुप्रति-
पाद्यान्तरमवाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्युपसंहरिष्यति ।

2 Mand. S.B., IV. 40. अतो विवेकिनामसिद्ध एव कार्यकारणभावः ; ।

3 S.B., II. 2. 17, न हि कार्यकारणयोर्भेद आश्रिताश्रयभावो वा वेदान्तवादिभिरभ्यु-
पगम्यते । कारणस्यैवमस्यानमात्रं कार्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् ।

times rooted in the cause. The only reality is the cause. The effect is only a variation of this reality. The clay is the reality and all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails all of which agree in having clay for their self or essence, are forms of clay. In themselves they are not realities, for existence in abstraction from essence or value is inconceivable and what is inconceivable can never be. The effect or change is a passing state of the real and every change is temporary. It is the permanent essence behind the change which renders it possible and intelligible. When Śāṅkara says that the words "production" and "creation" are words used by the ignorant what he intends to bring out is the inseparability of existence from essence and, consequently, of effect from cause, in time as well as in space. His Ajātavāda stands for the repudiation of a view of causality in which the concept of time, unrelated to meaning and value, is utilized to explain the relation between the effect and the cause. In other words, it is a denial of the position that time can ever bring about a cleavage, whether passing or permanent, between essence and existence or between the self and the thing. Ajātavāda, as Śāṅkara understands it, is inconsistent not with creation and the reality of a creative force, but with that conception of creation in which time is allowed to play the part which should properly belong to value and that conception of reality which in revealing itself exhausts itself and loses its essence. The picture of creation which Ajātavāda is made to offer represents at once the duality of value and existence, the discrepancy between "is" and "ought", the distance between the ideal and the actual and their oneness and inseparability. This is the *anirvacanīyata* or *Māya* as Śāṅkara puts it. Creation is not pure essence; nor is it mere existence. It is not the complete oneness of value and existence, nor is it a total and wholesale denudation of value. It is the distance between the two. The inner meaning of this creative process is the exhibition of the truth, which is the reality also, that existence itself is a form of value and lives in and through it. Ajātavāda, in short, means that time, while it appears to bring about a gulf between the cause and the effect, is not able to create, at any point of time or space, a divorce between the two, so that the effect is always with the

cause, because it is nothing other than the cause. Ajātavāda in Śāṅkara is explicable only as a value concept. It is an organ of his Brahmapada or Brahmakāranavāda.

It is not true to say that causality is only the bond which binds all the phenomena of the world together, and does not bind the phenomenal world with that which manifests itself through it. Deussen, in holding this view, forgets that the concept of cause is a value concept and is but a development of the absolute value of Existence. "The cause, therefore, must exist before the effect is produced."¹ "If existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be perceived as enveloped in non-being. But as a matter of fact, they are all observed to be positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor does any one think that pots and the like which have their essence in clay are the effects of threads and the like. Everyone knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only."

Hence as we see, on the one hand, that nothing originates from non-being, such as the horn of a hare, and, on the other hand, that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the doctrine of something coming out of nothing cannot be accepted.² If the cause did not exist before the effect is produced, we should be able to perform impossible feats and achieve undreamt-of results. Rice would grow for the husbandman, even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves, even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver, too lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving.

The acknowledgement of the reality of the cause is an acknowledgement without which reason cannot work. Human mind with all its cunning cannot banish the values out of existence and think of the universe as being without them. For a logic which knows its business and does not love to indulge in sophistry the assumption of the reality of the cause is a necessary assumption. "We observe that a positive

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1, अतः निदः प्राक्कार्योत्पत्तेः कारणसद्भावः ।

2 S. B., II. 2. 26.

effect which is produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause."¹ We must, therefore, admit the reality of the cause before creation.² This argument, it should be noted, is not merely an inferential argument. The logic which leads to it is a logic which is ruled by the presupposition of the foundational nature of values. Śāṅkara's view of causality may be said to be Satkāraṇavāda.³ It affirms that value or essence or Ātman cannot be denied.

IV

THE VALUE NOTION OF POTENTIALITY

SATKĀRYAVĀDA

But Satkāraṇavāda embodies and emphasizes only one aspect of Śāṅkara's conception of causality. There is another side to it which is expressed by the term Satkāryavāda.⁴ It is not true to say, as Professor Belvalkar does, that Śāṅkara's real view is not "Satkāryavāda" but "Satkāraṇavāda"; and it is missing the proper balance to think with Dr. Dasgupta that Śāṅkara's doctrine is "more properly" called Satkāraṇavāda.⁵ Likewise, Rāmaṇuja and Bhāskara are far from the truth when they represent Śāṅkara as establishing the non-difference of cause and effect on the theory of the effect's non-reality, both of them neglecting the maxim, which Śāṅkara holds as foundational to his system, that being abstracted from value is inconceivable. Śāṅkara's doctrine is both Satkāraṇavāda and Satkāryavāda. They are but complementary ways of expressing the truth that the ultimate object of our thought is not abstract being unrelated to value, but value itself, of which being is a form; in other words, of expressing the truth that value and reality are ultimately one and inseparable. The doctrine of Satkāryavāda emphasizes the existential aspect of reality, the

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Ibid., अनुमीयते च प्राक्कार्योत्पत्तेः कार्यकारणयोरस्तित्वम् ।

3 Ibid., कारणमङ्गुलः ।

4 Ibid., तस्मात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि यदेव कार्यम् ।

5 History. Vol. II, P. 468.

doctrine of Satkāraṇavāda, the value aspect of it. An adequate explanation can ignore neither the value aspect of things nor their existential aspect and a comprehensive view of causality must recognize that just as the cause or the essence exists before the effect is produced, the effect too exists before it is produced.¹ The concept of potentiality, of which the doctrine of Satkāryavāda is an embodiment, is a value concept and maintains that in any derivation the meaning and value of the thing which is derived is retained and conserved, and the objects which are derived have meaning and value as part of their very nature or reality. Inasmuch as the concept of potentiality means that there is nothing of lasting value in the end that was not present in kind in the beginning, it is only a reaffirmation, in different words, of the doctrine that existence without essence, or reality without value, is unintelligible and that both in the end are one.

It is as true to say that the cause exists before the effect is produced as to say that the effect too exists before it is produced. But as the effect is nothing other than the cause, and can at no point of time maintain its existence in isolation from the cause, it is equally true to say that the relation of cause and effect, implying the antecedence in time of the cause, cannot be established by logic. When both are together the one cannot be said to precede or follow the other. They cannot be really separated from each other. But as they appear to be so separated, the only legitimate and philosophically significant question concerning the problem of causation is: "Why do the cause and the effect appear to be so separated? What is the inner meaning of this separation?" The causal relation involves a dialectical antinomy. The effect is nothing other than the cause, but it is not wholly one with the cause. It is neither "tat" nor something other than "tat". It is anirvacanīya, inexpressible in terms of pure value or mere existence. The axiom of the oneness of value and reality at once affirms and denies the reality of the causal relation, brings out its inexpressibility, and transforms it into a relation of identity. Śaṅkara, by emphasizing the different

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

aspects, brings out the many-sidedness of the category of causality.¹

The doctrine of Satkāryavāda that there is nothing evolved which was not originally involved is a natural corollary of the axiom of the oneness and inseparability of value and existence. Śaṅkara says that "the very manifestation of the effect points out its pre-existence".² Manifestation, according to him, means coming within the range of perception. Only a thing which acquires the character of an existent can be said to come within the range of perception. But an existent apart from its value or essence is a nonentity; it is the value or essence which embodies itself in an individual form that is characterized by existence in space and subsistence in time. It follows that what is not grounded in the essence or is foreign to it can never be brought into being. Being cannot be abstracted from value; existence cannot be alienated from essence.³ "That which is posterior in time, that is, the effect, has, previous to its actual beginning, its being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely."⁴ The jar can be had from the clay only and cloth from the thread alone. Oil cannot be squeezed out of sand nor curd from water, because they do not have their self or essence either in sand or in water. On account of the specificity which characterizes the capacity of the cause, the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause cannot be accepted and the logic of the thing points to its having potential being in its cause. "The effect must be viewed as existing through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does exist independently, apart from the self of the cause. The inseparability of the

1 Mand. S. B., IV. 40. असिद्ध एव कार्यकारणभावः ।; Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1, अतः अनुमीयते च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यकारणयोरस्ति तद्वत् S. B., II. 1. 15, कारणदन्यत्वं कार्यस्य ।

2 S. B., I. 2. 1, कार्यस्य चाभिव्यक्तिर्लिङ्गत्वात् कार्यस्य च सद्भावः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सिद्धम् ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 18, कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एवानात्मभूतस्यानारभ्यत्वादित्यभाणि । S. B., II. 1. 16, यच्च यदात्मा न वर्तते न तत्तत् उत्पद्यते ।

4 Ibid., कारणान्मनैव सत्त्वम् ।

effect from the cause is the same before its origination (as after it). The effect with all its qualities of sound, etc., does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning of it. It cannot, therefore, be said that the effect is non-existent before its manifestation."¹

Potential existence, implying as it does "the absence of spatio-temporal determination"², is liable to be mistaken for unqualified non-existence; and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought, in its confusion of existential and axiological categories, has actually fallen a prey to this error. For Śāṅkara who always insists that the ultimate truths cannot intelligibly and adequately be expressed in the relations of space and time, the concept of potentiality is essentially a value concept, and the potential reality of things cannot be identified with existence in space and time. If existence is equated with position in space and time, Śāṅkara would prefer to speak of potential reality rather than potential existence. The objection to Śāṅkara's doctrine of the potential reality of the effect that "it must be perceived, because it is not non-existent" derives its plausibility from the fact that it views the concept of potentiality as an existential concept and the objector wants to perceive an intelligible reality by making use of sense-organs as one would perceive a cow or a castle. The effect, the jar for instance, although existent is not perceived before its manifestation, because its essence or self or Ātman, in and through which it lives and from which it can never be abstracted, has not embodied itself in that particular form which we call a jar. This is the obstruction in the way of the jar being visible during its potential existence. "Before its manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists in the particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump. Therefore the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its manifestation as it is hidden."³ Every effect, says Śāṅkara, has two kinds of obstruction. When it has become manifest and acquired the character of a spatio-temporal existence like other differentiated objects, the obstr-

1 S. B., II. 1. 7.

2 Mand. S. B., I. 2. अस्माकृतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात् ।

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

uctions which can veil the effect are of a physical nature like "darkness and the wall, etc." The obstructions are such as are consistent with the nature of an existent. The obstruction which prevents the perception of the potential reality of the effect is of a different nature. It consists in the essence not having realized itself in an individual form or, as Śaṅkara puts it, "in the particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump". The terms and the concepts, "destroyed" "produced", "existence" and "non-existence" depend on this two-fold character of "manifestation and disappearance" according to Śaṅkara.¹

Śaṅkara's doctrine of Satkāryavāda should not be identified with the Sāṅkhya view bearing the same name. In spite of the similarity in the statements of the doctrine there is an essential difference which reveals itself in the philosophical consequence which the doctrine is made to yield. Śaṅkara's conception of Satkāryavāda is essentially an axiological conception. The Sāṅkhya conception of it is an existential one. Both the systems recognize that without accepting a First Cause, a Mūlaprakṛti, our thought will be moving in a vicious circle. Śaṅkara says that the Original Cause is what he means by Brahman.² But here the similarity between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta of Śaṅkara ends. Śaṅkara's thought moves along a value-scale and leads him to a reality which is the most supreme value also, to a supreme Genus, Pure Intelligence, in which "through a series of intermediate steps" all things are "included" and "unified". It finds the last basis of being in the Ātman which is the measure of all reality and of all value.³ The Sāṅkhya view, in its search after a Final Cause which is more and more comprehensive and inclusive, uninspired by the idea of a scale of values is ultimately led to a reality in which there is no trace of that intrinsic value of which Śaṅkara's Brahman is an embodiment. The Brahman of Śaṅkara is value itself, a value which is at the same time creativity also; the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is an essentially value-free reality. It is

1 Ibid.

2 S. B., II. 3. 9. या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 15. आत्मनोऽस्त्वितिः प्रलयश्चाद्भुतः ।

mere existence, unbounded and unlimited. Śāṅkara appreciates the truth which the Sāṅkhya system has caught hold of, the truth, namely, that the less can be derived from the more, never the more from the less, a truth which is vitally connected with the notion of value and a scale of values, and that this movement along a value-scale ultimately takes us to an Absolute Existence.¹ But he does not see his way to accepting the Sāṅkhya view in toto as a philosophical creed, because the system, as it moves along, fails to realize that the conception of "potentiality" is not an existential but a value concept, and ends by equating the Prakṛti, the Original Stuff, with mere existence, which is wholly devoid of value. Had the Sāṅkhya started with the recognition that intelligible causation means axiological interpretation, that is, in other words, the placing of things in an order of meaning and value, its logic would neither have stopped with the Prakṛti nor ended in a dualism of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, but would have led to a conception of Puruṣa which was the fulfilment of the Prakṛti and its own meaning and justification. The dualism which the Sāṅkhya system has perpetuated by recognizing a Puruṣa coordinate in rank with the Prakṛti is the historical monument of an unsuccessful attempt to bring value and reality together in a system. The Sāṅkhya was not able to fulfil this task. The value which it gives us in the end is barren and the reality which is the *fons et origo* of all is blind. A barren value and a blind reality—this is the last word of Sāṅkhya constructive metaphysics. It was left to the Vedānta of Śāṅkara to bring reality and value together in a whole and declare that both in the end are ultimately one and inseparable, thus laying the foundations of an axiological epistemology and a metaphysics of value.

It is only from the standpoint of value that Śāṅkara makes the statement that the effect too, like the cause, exists before it is produced though it exists potentially and not actually. The complaint of the *Āsatkāryavādin* that the effect, though said to be existent, is not visible, and therefore it cannot be viewed as real, ignores the very condition under

¹ S. P., III. 2. 17.

which the statement can be regarded as intelligible. The proposition of the Sāṅkaryavādin is a statement of value and not of fact. There is a certain sense in which, according to Śāṅkara, the effect may be said to be non-existent. The statement of the Asāṅkaryavādin regarding the non-existence of the effect before its actual production is true from the existential standpoint, but this standpoint possesses little or no value for philosophy, whose task is interpretation and not description. "If, however," writes Śāṅkara, "you say that before its manifestation the jar is non-existent, meaning thereby that it does not exist exactly as the potter, for instance, exists while he is at work on production (that is, as a ready-made jar), then there is no dispute between us It should be borne in mind that the present existence of the lump or the two halves is not the same as that of the jar. Nor is the future existence of the jar the same as theirs. Therefore you do not contradict us when you say that the jar is non-existent before its manifestation while the activity of the potter, for instance, is going on. You would be doing this if you denied to the jar its own future form as an effect. But you do not deny that. Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not mean that it does not at all exist as an entity before it comes into being. If the jar before its manifestation be an absolute non-entity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot be connected either with its cause or with existence."¹ The effect, therefore, before its production is existent.²

Śāṅkara draws and develops the consequences of the doctrine that the effect, too, like the cause, exists before it is produced. If the effect is potentially existent, it must exist in and through the cause which is the very self or essence of the effect. The jar cannot deny the earth and enjoy an existence. To deny the earth would be to destroy its own existence.³ The effect, therefore, is not separated from its cause, which is its essence, either in time or in space. The

1 S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 S. B., II. 1. 19. युक्तं च प्रागुक्तं: कार्यस्य यत्नम् ।

3 S. B., IV. 3. 14. न हि घटो मृदात्मना परित्यज्याज्वनिष्ठो परित्यागे वाऽभावप्राप्तेः ।

cause or the essence is eternally present to the effect.¹ We must, then, revise our language and say that the effect not only exists before it is made actual but is non-different from the cause both before and after its production, because it is but another form of the cause.² To say that both cause and effect exist before creation or manifestation is the same as to say that the effect is "ananya" from the cause³. Relational modes of expression cannot bring out this inseparability of essence and existence. We cannot even say that the one depends upon the other or supports the other. We can only say that the one is the other. The effect is the potentiality of the cause rendered actual. This potentiality is, to use the plain man's language, a certain power possessed by the cause.⁴ It is the very essence of the cause and "is thus identical with the self of the cause".⁵ The effect, again, is identical with the Self of that power. It can, therefore, be regarded neither as non-existent nor as something other than the cause, as the power can be said to be neither non-existent nor different from it. "As the ideas of cause and effect, on the one hand, and of substance and quality on the other, are not separate ones as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its quality must be admitted."⁶ The effect is thus non-different from the cause, because it is only when the cause exists that the effect is observed to exist and not when it does not exist. It is only when the clay exists that the jar is observed to exist and the cloth only when the threads exist. That the effect appears to have a different form should not be used as an argument for proving the independence and the otherness of it from the cause. "A substance does not become a different substance by appearing under a different aspect. Milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curd and so on. It is impossible, even in hund-

1 Ibid., विकारिणां विकारिणो नित्यमाप्तत्वात्

2 संस्थानमात्रम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.5. 4 S.B., II. 1. 18. शक्तिश्च कारणस्य ।

5 Ibid., तस्मात्कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः

6 Ibid., शक्तेश्चात्मभूत कार्यम् । अग्निराकार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषव-
द्देवदूयनावातादात्म्यमश्नुष्यन्त्यम् ।

reds of years, to prove that the effect is something other than the cause."¹ "We thus see that something which is derived from another thing is not different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from clay."² The cause, when it assumes a special aspect, receives the name of "effect".³

In spite of the non-difference of cause and effect, the effect has its self in the cause, and not the cause in the effect.⁴ There is a certain superiority in the cause, because in the last recourse it is value which explains existence and not existence value. Being does not explain essence. It is Essence which renders being intelligible. The idea of intelligible causation, according to Śaṅkara, is bound up with the giving of a "privileged position" to something; and this implies the recognition that the less can be derived from the more, never the more from the less. "The relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause, as for instance in the case of the clay and the jar; and without such superiority the relation is simply impossible."⁵

Śaṅkara believes that the idea of privileged position is inherent in the notion of value as such, and his complaint against the Pāñcarātra system is that it does not give a privileged position to something and place things in an order of meaning and value. But the whole idea of intelligible causation, of speculative deduction or evolution, involves as organic to it the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality and of value. The followers of Pāñcarātra, according to Śaṅkara, do not recognize any super-eminence of any one of the four vyūhas-Vāsudeva, Śaṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, and do not acknowledge any difference founded on the

1 Ibid.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 6.1.

3 S.B., II. 3.7. तदेव तु द्रव्यं विशेषवदवस्थान्मापन्नमानं कार्यं नामभगव्यते ।

4 S.B., II. 1.9. अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं ।

5 S.B., II. 2.44. भवितव्यं हि कार्यकारणयोरतिशयं न मूढद्वयोः न हि अत्यतिशयं कार्यं कारणमित्यवकाशते । S.B., II. 1.25. अत्यन्तं सात्त्विकं च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रतीयते ।...न ह्यमत्यतिशये प्रकृति विकार इति भवति ।

superiority of knowledge, power, etc., between Vāsudeva and the other lords. They simply say that they are all forms of Vāsudeva without any special distinctions, though they are successively derived from each other. It is because speculative deduction or derivation is a movement along a value-scale, the opposite process of dissolution also is determined by the same notion of order and value. It is the effect which returns into the cause and not the cause into the effect. Things which are made of clay, on being destroyed, pass back into clay, and things which have originated from water again dissolve into water. "In this way each particular effect passes back into its immediately antecedent cause, each cause being of a subtler nature than its effect, until in the end the last cause is dissolved into Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It is not reasonable to assume that an effect, passing over its immediate cause, should at once dissolve itself into the cause of the cause."¹ As the cause explains the effect and the effect presupposes the cause it is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause as long as an effect subsists, since on its dissolution the effect also cannot exist. The cause continues to exist even although the effect be destroyed.² It should be noted that the passing back of the effect into the cause is not a complete destruction of it, for just as the cause exists before the effect is produced, the effect too exists before it is produced. The passing of the effect into the cause is the returning of existence into its essence, and both becoming one. This is the cessation of the process of creation. The effect thus always exists in and through the cause and never transgresses it.³

The causal relation implies the permanence and continuity of the causal substance which manifests itself as the effect. It is the permanent and the stable which explains the changing and fleeting. The cause does not lose itself in expressing itself as the effect; it continues to live in the effect. The clay abides in the jar and the gold in the earring and the bracelet. "And even in those cases where the continued

1 S.B., II. 3. 14.

2 Ibid.

3 Ghs. S.B., VIII. 22. कार्यं हि कारणस्यान्तर्यंति भवति ।

existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' only means that the causal substance, the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility."¹ Therefore even in such cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, "we must acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition)".² The doctrine "that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence, is false"³.

V

BRAHMAN AS THE CREATIVE SOURCE

The creative nature of Brahman as it is conceived by Śaṅkara is but a consistent and rigorous application of the doctrine of causality which we have outlined above. "The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether, and so on", "the world which is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by mind". "The cause is the highest Brahman." Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, that is, has no existence apart from the cause.⁴ Brahman is the Self of the universe, its very essence, the supreme value in which it is grounded and without which even its existence is inconceivable. "We observe that a posi-

1 S. B., II. 1. 18.

2 S. B., II. 2. 27.

3 Ibid.

4 S. B., II. 1. 14. कार्यमात्रादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत् कारणं परं ब्रह्म तस्मात्कारणात्परमाप्तोऽनन्त्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेण भावः कार्यस्यावगम्यते ।

tive effect which is produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause. Similarly the cause of the universe must have existed before creation, as is the case with the cause of a jar, for instance".¹ The effect, too, exists before it is produced. "Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its manifestation".² As the cause, Brahman, does not deviate from existence in all time, similarly the effect, the universe, does not deviate from existence in all time.³ "The cause which covered and the effect which was covered were both existent before the origin of the universe."⁴ As something which is derived from another is not different from it, similarly the universe, both before and after its production, is non-different from Brahman. As existence is inseparable from essence and is nothing other than essence, and Brahman is the essence of the universe, the universe at the time of its origin, as also prior to it, is nothing but Brahman. As before the separation of sparks, smoke, embers and flames, all these are nothing but fire, and therefore there is but one substance, fire, so this universe differentiated into names and forms, is, before its origin, nothing but Pure Intelligence.⁵ It is not only at the time of its origin and continuance that the universe, on account of its non-existence apart from Pure Intelligence, is Brahman, but it is so at the time of dissolution also. Just as bubbles, foam, etc., are non-existent apart from water, so name, form and action, which are the effects of Pure Intelligence and dissolve in it, are non-existent apart from it.

If the real is, in its essence, advaitam and there is no difference either within it or without it, it being alike throughout its structure, as space and time which are the principles of differentiation lose their relevance where we have to deal with value and its relation to reality, the duality which meets us everywhere, the discrepancy between value and existence

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Ibid.,

3 S. B., II. 1. 16, यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यमपि जगत्त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति ।

4 Brhad, S. B., I 2. 1.

5 Ibid., II. 4. 10.

which stares us in the face everywhere, the gulf between essence and existence which constitutes the very life-blood of finite existence, must all be rooted in non-duality; the duality must be the differentiation of non-duality; the dvaitam of the advaitam. The multiplicity, the diversity, the rich variety must be the effect, the kârya, of what in its essence is above this division and discrepancy.¹

According to Śaṅkara the dvaita is the self-revelation of the Advaita. The universe is the self-differentiation of the Absolute Universal. This at once introduces the note of interpretation and sets up the problem of creation. How does Brahman become many? How is the unity of value and existence replaced by the duality of the two? How does the inseparability of essence and existence make room for their discrepancy? Creation, according to Śaṅkara, means the one beoming many, the unity giving rise to multiplicity, homogeneity developing into, or better still, developing heterogeneity. In more strict philosophical language we may say that creation, for Śaṅkara, is the bringing about of a gulf between value and existence, of a discrepancy between essence and existence, of an unreconciled but not irreconcilable opposition between the ideal and the actual. That reconciliation, which is the fundamental metaphysical truth about the constitution of the universe, can again be brought about in the personal life of the individual affirms the reality of religion and emphasizes the need of the religious life. The problem of creation, as formulated above, has in mind only one aspect of it, namely that aspect which aims at giving what, in the words of Padmapāda, may be said to be the upalakṣaṇa, and in the words of Prakāśātman, the taṭastha lakṣaṇa of creation only. It gives us an existential picture of creation. To know the svarūpa lakṣaṇa of creation we shall have to ascertain the purpose or the meaning which is being gradually realized through the creative process, which, according to Śaṅkara, is eternally complete and eternally being fulfilled, which is at once in time and out of time. First we shall take up the question of the way or mode in

1 Mand. S.B., III. 18, अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि यस्माद द्वैतं नानात्वं तस्याद्वैतस्य भेदस्त-
द्भेदः तस्य कार्यमित्यर्थः : 1...अनस्तद्भेदोच्यते द्वैतम् ।

which the One gives rise to the many; and then we shall endeavour to ascertain the ideal which inspires the creative movement and the purpose which guides it throughout.

VI

THE MODE OF BRAHMAN'S CREATIVITY AND THE ROLE OF AVIDYĀ

What is meant by saying that Brahman becomes many? And what is the way in which it becomes so? The real always maintains its nature.¹ Brahman is the reality. But multiplicity means break or division or, as Śaṅkara puts it, "bheda". "Śiṣṭi", "Dvaita", "Utpatti": "Bheda" "Vikāra" are synonymous terms in Śaṅkara. Creation or production means bringing forth multiplicity, the Advaita becoming dvaita.² The word "dvaita" is a synonym for the created universe in the writings of Śaṅkara.³ It denotes not only "duality" but multiplicity, for duality means "otherness" and the otherness of Brahman which is One Infinite Mass of Consciousness can be nothing other than multiplicity, diversity, variety⁴. The word dvaita is much more significant in another respect. It implies and sums up the nature of the universe, which is marked by the duality of value and existence. If the Advaita gives rise to dvaita, if the oneness makes room for manyness, then the dvaita or multiplicity cannot be as real as the one or the Advaita. It cannot be as meaningful as the other and cannot possess as much intrinsic reasonableness as belongs to the Advaita. The eternal inexhaustible truth can become many not by destroying its essence, which would mean destroying its own Self, but by having recourse to a mode of expression in which unity, without giving up its nature, gives rise to multiplicity. According to Śaṅkara, there is nothing else in the universe except Consciousness, which has the gift of maintaining its own unity and at the same time

1 Mand. S.B., III. 19. अनिष्टं स्वभाववैपरीत्यगमनं सर्वत्रमाणविरोधात् ।

2 Mand. S.B., II. 13. विकरोति नानाकरोति । *ibid.* III. 24. सृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः ।
ibid. III. 15. उत्पत्त्यादिकृतो भेदः । उत्पत्ति भेदादि ।

3 Mand., S.B., II. 31. विश्वमिदं द्वैतम् ।

4 *ibid.*, III. 18 द्वैतं नानात्वं तस्यद्वैतस्य भेदः ।

giving rise to multiplicity, of producing differences and at the same time not allowing those differences to tamper with its unity. Śāṅkara expresses this truth by saying that the Absolute Consciousness gives rise to multiplicity only through *Mâyā*.¹ And this multiplicity, this variety and manifoldness, can have meaning and significance only in and through the unity of which it is an expression.

In order to create the Absolute Brahman must divide itself into centres, and, while so divided, it must still remain one and at rest with itself. This division into centres, which must of necessity be centres of consciousness, as Brahman is nothing else but a mass of Blissful Consciousness, cannot be a division in which the created centres are, in any way, removed or cut off from the Supreme Centre by time or space. Time and space themselves are rendered intelligible and significant only with reference to the Ideal. They are distances between the Ideal and the actual; and the actual itself has meaning only as a form of the Ideal. Being in abstraction from value is non-entity. Time, therefore, cannot bring about this division or separation. The Absolute Brahman is Infinite Consciousness, in which there is an utter absence of the consciousness of an other. The infinite Consciousness is, in other words, a consciousness of "identity with all" (*sarvātmabhāva*). This "state of identity with all is another name for Liberation", according to Śāṅkara which is Brahman itself.² The division of Infinite Consciousness into multiple centres is possible only by having recourse to a mode of reproduction in which the divided centres are cut off and made to exist as conscious individuals limited by an external environment which is consciously treated by them as their "other". The idea of manyness can be said to have significance only for a conscious personality which is finite and limited and at the same time lives as such an individual.³ Its finitude exists in and through its behaviour, which

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, अजमव्ययमात्मनस्त्वं नाययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः तस्मान्न परमार्थमिदं ईदृशम् ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 4. अतस्तत् (i.e. मोक्ष) ब्रह्म यस्येयं विज्ञानाया प्रभुता ।; Ibid., III. 4. 52. ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्तयस्य ।

3 परिच्छिन्नमात्मभाव ।

reveals itself in its limited thinking, feeling, and willing. The first essential of the creative process, then, is to produce limiting adjuncts with which the divided centres should identify themselves. The production of the limiting adjuncts and the identification with them are not two different acts which are cut off from each other by intervals of time, as two pieces of land are separated by water or musical notes by intervals of silence. Consciousness itself cannot be chopped up into bits, as a piece of cloth can be divided into pieces. The one Universal Consciousness, therefore, reproduces itself into multiple centres only by identifying itself with the different limiting adjuncts. The idea of the "limiting adjuncts" itself is a product of limited consciousness. In the last resort, then, the idea of creation as a fact and as abstracted from its significance or value or the purpose guiding its movement, is identified by Śaṅkara with the idea of a limited consciousness or, as he puts it, with that of Avidyā.¹ Creation in the sense of differentiation or multiplication will be a word without meaning unless this rich variety, which the creative power of Brahman brings forward, is actually felt or appreciated or enjoyed by conscious spirits. For the rose and the lily, the hyssop and the hawthorn, there is neither creation nor the creative joy born of creation; there is neither division nor differentiation, neither unity nor multiplicity. For them there is neither the presence nor the absence of creation.

For a creative reality, the essence of which is constituted by Consciousness, the process of creation lives in and through an act of conscious enjoyment of the riches of that creative life.² The creative process, then, which means revelation of a plurality or multiplicity, which exists as such for a conscious individual, implies the setting up (i) of conscious subjects, (ii) of external objects for such subjects and (iii) of a medium or instrument through which the conscious subjects may take note of and deal with the external environment. It is in this way that particularized consciousness can be brought into being; and the bringing into existence of such

1 S. B., I. 4. 3.

2 Gītā. S. B., IX, 10, दृष्टिकर्मत्वापत्तिनिमित्ता हि जगतः सर्वा प्रवृत्तिः । इत्याद्यापत्तिनिष्ठा अवगत्यवसानं च ।

particularized consciousnesses is the meaning of creation.¹ The process of particularization or individuation is rendered possible, according to Śaṅkara, through the limiting adjuncts or upādhis which help the creation of multiplicity of subjects and objects. "Name and Form are the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, of which, when they are differentiated, it is impossible to tell whether they are identical with or different from It, as is the case with the foam of water. It is name and form in all their stages that constitute relative existence."² Māyā or the Divine Creative Power is but the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. In this antecedent condition names and forms lie unevolved.³ Name and Form constitute the "otherness" of Brahman; but they are not quite "other", for apart and in abstraction from Brahman they are non-existent and non-entities. Without "otherness" there cannot be said to be any variety or multiplicity. There is variety or multiplicity when there is something other than the Self. It is ignorance which brings forward something other than the Self. Consciousness of something other than the Self is the particular consciousness or the consciousness of the particular. "Variety is thus the cause of particular consciousness."⁴ "Only when the Self is under limitations do the organs stand as something different to help it to particular experiences. Those things that cause the particular experiences (of the waking and the dream states) viz. the mind (with the Self behind it), the eyes, and forms, are all presented by ignorance as something different from the Self."⁵ When the organs and objects do not stand as different entities, as in the state of profound sleep (suṣupti), there is no particular experience.⁶ The universal consciousness is Brahman consciousness. It is the consciousness of identity with all.⁷ The particular consciousness is the consciousness of identity with some and not with

1 विशेषसंज्ञा, विशेषात्मभाव ।

2 Brhad S. B., II. 4. 10.

3 S. B., I. 4. 9, सर्वं दैवीशक्तिरूप्याकृतनामरूपा नामरूपयोप्रागवस्था ।

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 21, नानात्वं विशेषविज्ञानहेतुरित्युक्तं भवति ।

5 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 29.

6 ibid.

7 सर्वात्मभाव ।

others.¹ Creation begins with the rise of individual conscious centres, which are embodied consciousnesses. But Consciousness can embody itself only when there is a body which is viewed as different from that self or consciousness. It is ignorance alone which creates the consciousness of "something other" than the Self.² The idea of "limiting adjuncts" has meaning only in and through an act of consciousness. The creative act thus implies the production of appropriate material for the fashioning of the universe, which are in the end reducible to names and forms, and the birth of a limited consciousness. Both rise and fall together. The Māyā of Brahman is not only the creative Power; it is also Avidyā. Much of the misunderstanding about the Vedānta of Śāṅkara would disappear if, instead of speaking of Avidyā as the cause of the world, we spoke of the Divine Power of Brahman as its creative source and of the projection of Avidyā as the means through which the creative act is accomplished.³

It stands to the credit of Śāṅkara that he has fully realized the importance of the concept of Avidyā for any philosophical doctrine of creation which asserts that creation means differentiation or revelation of variety and multiplicity. It is Avidyā which "represents that which is infinite as finite, presents things other than the Self, which are non-existent, and makes the Self appear as limited".⁴ As creation has no meaning apart from such consciousness on the part of an experiencer, name and form, in the revelation of which consists the creative act, are said to have their essence or self in Avidyā.⁵ The individual self is cut off as a separate entity from the Absolute Brahman, which is the Supreme Self, by ignorance, through its connection with the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, and thus becomes mortal, subject to birth and death hunger and thirst, and other such relative attributes,

1 परिच्छिन्नात्मभाव, विशेषात्मभाव ।

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 32. अविद्यया हि द्वितीयः प्रविभज्यते ।

3 S. B. I. 4. 9. पारमेष्ठिन्याः कृतेः समस्तजगद्विजायिन्या ।

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 20.

5 S. B. I. 4. 3. अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजवृत्तिः.....अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः संततो वर्तते ।

and is identified with name, form and action. When this separate existence enters its cause, the great reality, the supreme Self; and is merged in it, in other words, when the differences created by ignorance are gone, the universe becomes one without a second. The separate existence of the individual self, in which it is born or dead, happy or miserable, possessed of the ideas of "I" and "mine", and so on, is not the result of Brahman modifying itself. The individual is not the effect or vikāra of Brahman. It is the unmodified Brahman itself limited by the upādhis. Its division from the Absolute is figurative and not actual, due to the limiting adjuncts of name and form.¹ There are the elements transformed into the body, organs and sense-objects, consisting of name and form. They are like the foam and bubbles on the limpid water of the supreme Self. From these elements, that is, with their aid the self comes out. As from water reflections of the sun, moon and so on arise, or from the proximity of such limiting adjuncts as red cottonpads a transparent crystal turns red, and so forth, so from the limiting adjuncts of the elements, transformed into the body and organs, the self comes out clearly as an individualized entity. These elements are the cause of its individualization.² It is here that it is true to say that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul".³ According to Śāṅkara the difference between Brahman and the individual self is due to the limiting adjuncts. Intrinsically there is neither difference nor identity between them, for they are by nature Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a lump of salt. "The unconditioned Self, being beyond speech and mind, undifferentiated and one, is designated as 'Not this, not this'; when It has the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, which are characterized by ignorance, desire and work, It is called the transmigrating individual Self; and when the Self has the limiting adjunct of the power of Māyā manifesting

1 S. B., II. 1. 13. भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणा विकारः.....अद्विष्टरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वप्रवणत्वात्, तत्रापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभागः ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12. एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुदायः ।

3 Genesis, 2. 7.

through eternal and unlimited knowledge. It is called the internal Ruler and *Īśvara*. The same Self as by nature transcendent, absolute and pure, is called the immutable and supreme Self. Similarly, having the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and organs of *Hiranyagarbha*, the Undifferentiated, the gods, the species, the individual, men, animals, spirits, etc., the Self assumes those particular names and forms."¹

Creation, then, means becoming many. Brahman's becoming many means manifesting "names" and "forms" and "entering into" them.² When names and forms are manifested or unfolded they do not abandon their own Self, which is Brahman or become divided from Brahman either in space or in time. The production of name and form is not like the begetting of a son according to Śāṅkara, much less like the manufacture of an article. The creation of the universe is not comparable to the "manufacture of an article which remains throughout separate from its maker and which is dismissed, when finished, to do the specific work for which it is meant". Nor can the creative act of God be fitly represented by the addition of a child to a family. Śāṅkara raises the question: How is the phenomenon separated from Brahman? and answers "Not as the son from the father."³ The filaments which unite the created universe to the Creative Spirit are never severed. The Creative Spirit is not really the sustainer of the dependent universe; it is its essence. The universe, too, is Brahman in essence. The more appropriate way of expressing the nature of creation is to say that "Brahman created itself".⁴ "Therefore is Brahman said to be self-made. That Brahman is self-created is well-known to the world, because it is the source of all; or Brahman, the cause, is called *Sukṛta* on account of its virtue, because it created everything, being everything."⁵ Brahman becomes many by differentiating names and forms and developing these distinctions.

1 Brhad. S. B., II. B. 12.

2 Tatit. S. B., II. G. 1. तन्नामदा व्याकरणं ब्रह्मणो बहुभवनम् । Brhad. S. B., I.

4. 7. तस्या एव प्रवेद्य व्याकरणकृतं त्वय्युतः ।

3 Tatit. S. B., II. V. 1. किं ततः प्रविभक्तं कार्यमिति पितुरिव पुत्रः नेष्टवाह ।

4 Ibid., स्वयमेवास्मानमेवाकुरुत कृतवत् ।

5 Ibid.

What is the distinction between the differentiated and the undifferentiated Brahman? Prior to the creation the real could be cognized as Pure Being merely. Though at the present time also this is Pure Being it is differentiated into names and forms, the object of the notion of "this". "Before creation no object could be cognized as 'this', as differentiated into name and form, just as it is not so cognized during deep sleep. Just as on waking from deep sleep one recognizes mere Being—that during deep sleep the only object was Pure Being—so also prior to creation. Just as, in the world, in the morning, one sees the potter gathering clay for the making of the jar, and then having gone away to some other place, and returning in the evening, he finds in the same place various such articles as the jar, the cup and the like, and then the idea in his mind is that all this was clay in the morning, in the same manner we have the present assertion, 'In the beginning, this was Pure Being.'¹ The universe, diversified with the distinctions of name, form and action, was the one Ātman alone. "Though even now it is surely the one entity still there is a distinction. The distinction is that before the creation, the universe, with no manifested difference of name and form and one with Ātman, was denoted by the word Ātman alone; but now, owing to the manifestation of the difference of name and form it is denoted by many words and also by the one word Ātman. Just as foam, which, before the separate manifestation of its name and form from that of water, was capable of being denoted only by the word 'water'; but when it becomes manifested by its difference of form and name from that of water, the same substance, water, is denoted by more than one word, 'water' and 'foam', and foam is denoted by the one word 'foam'.²

VII

THE FUTILITY OF ANY AUXILIARY
PRINCIPLE

The Idealistic Monism of Śaṅkara according to which the Absolute transcends the distinction, often treated as

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 1.

2 Āitareya. S. B. I. 1. 1.

absolute, between value and existence, does not recognize any other auxiliary principle as explanatory of the creative process of the world. Śaṅkara tells us in unmistakable words that "there is, other than the Ātman, nothing which is divided from it, either in space or in time, which is subtle, distant, different, which was past, which is, or which is to be".¹ In his system of Advaitavāda there is no room for any other auxiliary principle like the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya, independent and material, or like the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas; and the Vivaraṇa school does not seem to be faithful to Śaṅkara when it emphasizes the need of accepting another principle in addition to Brahman.² Besides Brahman and its own effects there is nothing else. Brahman is Advaitya, non-dual, according to Śaṅkara. It is One. He compares it to clay.³ But here the comparison ends. "Whenever two things are compared they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison."⁴ Though in the case of the clay and the jar we feel the necessity of certain other cooperating agencies in the shape of the potter who is the efficient cause, and so forth, so far as Brahman is concerned, Śaṅkara excludes all such extraneous agencies. Apart from the Self, which is the Absolute Being, no other object exists. The recognition of another principle would come in clash with the monism of the Good, which is the very starting point of Śaṅkara.⁵ Neither the Māyā of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, which is the "Divine creative power", and "which

1 Talih. S.B., II. 6.1.

2 Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, p.681. ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वाज्जगद्रूपेण विकरिष्यमाणं वस्त्वन्तरं किंचिदङ्गीकार्यम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1. 14. एव ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ताग्नायः Mand. S.B. III. 15. मूलो ह विस्फुलिगादि दृष्टान्तापन्यासः सृष्टिर्वा बोधिता ।

4 S.B., III. 2.21; II. 3.40. तस्य दृष्टान्तदर्शनावतांशेन द्रष्टव्यः ।

5 Chand. S.B., VI. 2.1. सदव्यतिरेकेण सतः सहकारिणं द्वितीयं वस्त्वन्तरं प्राप्तं प्रतिपिद्यमानेऽद्वितीयमिति । नास्य द्वितीयं वस्त्वन्तरं विद्यत इत्यद्वितीयम् । Talih., S.B., II. 6.1. न हि आत्मनोऽन्यदनात्मभूतं तत्प्रविभक्तदेशकालसूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टं भूतभवद्भविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ।

exists in Brahman as warp and woof, as the potentiality of a fig tree in a fig seed"¹, nor the Name and Form, the concrete manifestations of *Māyā*, which is their unmodified state, can be viewed as something other than or external to Brahman. They are not the Not-Self, an *anātmavastu* like the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* or the Atoms of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. It is the exigencies of language which compel us to speak of *Māyā* as the divine power of Brahman. In truth there is no difference between the reality and its essence, between the *śaktimat* and the *śakti*. *Māyā* as the *śakti* of Brahman is nothing other than Brahman. The *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* system has not been integrated into a whole with its *Puruṣa*, and the atoms of the *Vaiśeṣikas* stand in an external and accidental relation to their God. They are in the words of *Śaṅkara*, *anātmabhūta*, *anātmavastu*, *vasīvantara*.²

It is, therefore, indifferent whether we say that Brahman or Name and Form constitute the material cause of the universe. "Name and form, one with the unmanifested *Ātman*, and denoted by the same word *Ātman*, can very well be regarded as the material cause of the universe, as water and foam in their unmanifested state being water alone become the causes of the manifested foam. Therefore the Omniscient created the universe with name and form, one with himself, as the material cause"³. As Brahman is the creator and also the material for creation we can very well say that it creates without any material (*nirupādānaḥ*). The analogy of the juggler bringing forth magical creations brings out this independence of the creative principle and the identity of the material and the efficient cause, so far as the final explanatory principle of the universe is concerned. It is a misconception of the analogy to interpret it in such a way as to concentrate on the indifference of Brahman about the creative process or the utter meaninglessness of it. To interpret it so would mean paying no heed to *Śaṅkara's* warning that "when-

1 *Kaṭha. S.B., I. 3. 11.*

2 *Altareya. S.B., I. 1. 1.* यथासंख्यानान्नात्मपञ्चपाति स्वतन्त्रं प्रधानं यदा च
काण्डानामण्यो न तद्विद्वान्नात्मनः किञ्चिदपि वस्तु विद्यते । : *Taṇi. S.B., II.*
6.1: *Chand. S.B., VI, 2. 1.*

3 *Altareya. S.B., I. 1. 1.*

ever two things are compared they are compared only with reference to some particular point they have in common, and the entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated".¹ Therefore Śaṅkara says that "the omniscient and the omnipotent Ātman, the great conjurer, creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe, just as the intelligent juggler, without any other material, creates himself in another form as travelling in the air"². The views which regard the illusoriness of the world and the falsity of the creation as the essence of Śaṅkara's Monism do little or no justice to the value side of the universe as conceived by Śaṅkara, and to his repeated insistence that the effect is real in the same sense and to the same extent as the cause and that the two are identical. The Creative Monism of Śaṅkara is inconsistent with "all the theories which maintain the unreality of the cause or the effect or both"; they are all "untenable and easily refuted".³ The interpretations of Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Dasgupta and Belvalkar, all of whom think that Śaṅkara proves the monism of the Brahman by denying the reality of the effected universe, and that his view is more properly called Satkāraṇavāda, miss the essential truth of the creative aspect of his Vedāntism. Brahman, which is the essence of the universe, its Self or Ātman, "creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe".

To start with, there is the Ātman only; there is nothing other than the Self, nothing which could be viewed as Not-Self. Creation means that the Ātman presents itself as "other" than itself in the form of the universe. In the absence of this discrepancy, the causal relation itself would disappear.⁴ Where essence and existence are one, and come together, there is neither any event nor any process. But, according to Śaṅkara, it is essence which explains existence and being

1 S. B., III. 2. 20.

2 Aitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1. यथा विज्ञान्वात्मायात्री निरूपादान आत्मानमेव आत्मान्तरत्वेन आकाशेन गच्छन्तमिव निमिमीते तथा सर्वज्ञो देवः सर्वशक्तिः महामाय आत्मानमेवात्मान्तरत्वेन जगद्वेण निमिमीत इति युक्ततरम् ।

3 Taitt. S. B., II. 6. 1. एवं च सति कार्यकारणोभयासद्वाद्यादिपक्षाश्च न प्रसज्यन्ते मुनिराकृताश्च भवन्ति ।

4 S. B., II. 1. 6, अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत ।

itself is a form of value. There is a certain superiority in the cause; the effect has its self in the cause and not the cause in the effect. Name and Form, therefore, which in their manifested state constitute the created universe, have their essence in Brahman. They exist in and through this Brahman. But they are not the essence of Brahman. Name and form are said to be Brahman, because when we deny Brahman they are not.¹ Name and Form are the limiting adjuncts of the Absolute, and with these two limitations Brahman becomes the subject of talk as the knower, the knowable. The created universe is neither one with Brahman nor wholly other than it. Its oneness would destroy the process itself; its complete otherness would prevent any process from coming into being. The cosmological situation involves and represents a dialectical antinomy, the resolution of which does not present any serious difficulty to Śāṅkara, as he believes that the two worlds of value and existence are identical in essence, that the world of fact is a necessary expression of the world of value, the Not-Self of the world of Self. There is no brute fact existing in its own right. There is nothing which is mere Not-Self, unenlivened by the life of the Self and the light of Brahman. Just as the foam is neither wholly one with water nor totally different from it, similarly the names and forms are neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman. Water is pure and limpid; the foam is impure and dirty. But the latter has no being apart from the former.

Śāṅkara, following the Upaniṣads, brings out the inseparability of the universe from Brahman by emphasizing the entrance of Brahman in the universe after the manifestation of name and form. "He entered the very universe which he created."² But Śāṅkara is careful to point out that the Self, which is without parts and which is all-pervading can never be supposed to enter in the sense of leaving a certain quarter, place or time and being joined to new ones.³ "The cause

1 Talit. S. B., II. 6. 1. अतो नामरूपे सवविस्थं ब्रह्मणोवात्मवती न बह्य तदात्म-
कम् । ते तत्प्रत्याख्यानं न स्तः एवेति । तदात्मके उच्यन्ते ।; S. B., II. 1. 6. कार्यस्य
कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं ।

2 Talit. S. B., II. 6. 1.

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

itself is transformed into the effect; therefore it is not reasonable that the cause should enter the effect after the effect is produced, as if it had not entered before."¹ The clay has no entrance into the pot apart from the clay becoming the pot. The Ātman is one, has no parts, and since there is no place where it is not to speak of its entrance is unsound. The entrance of the Self into the universe is but a metaphorical way of stating that the universe exists in and through the Self, "which is perceived in the midst of the former".² The Self is differentiated by the activities of living, etc., into name and form, such as the vital force or the eye. "That the cause of ākāśa, etc., after creating the world, is obtained within the internal cavity, with such distinctions as seer, hearer, thinker, knower, is what constitutes the entrance of the Self."³

Much of the difficulty which the readers of Śaṅkara experience in understanding the creative aspect of his Absolute will disappear if, instead of speaking of "creation", we prefer to talk of "revelation". "It is true", says Śaṅkara, "that from one entity no other entity is born. The truth is that Being alone subsists in another form."⁴ Creation, viewed as a process of revelation, brings out the continuity of the causal substance and emphasizes the need of recognizing what Professor Whitehead calls "an underlying activity, a substantial activity expressing itself in individual embodiments and evolving in achievements of organisms".⁵ Brahman presents itself in another form, just as the serpent coils itself into a ring or the clay-dust subsists in the form of the jar. "It is Being itself which subsists in the form of that which is denoted by the word 'this', just as it is the clay which is denoted by the words 'jar', etc."⁶ Though the various effects, lump, jar, etc., differ among themselves, yet they are the same with regard to the clay. Though the jar differs from the lump and the lump from

1 Taïtt. S. B., II. 6. 1.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

3 Taïtt. S. B., II. 6. 1.

4 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2. सत्यमेव न सतः सदन्तरमुत्पद्यते कितर्हि । सदेवा संस्थाना न्तरेणावतिष्ठते ।

5 Science and the Modern World, P. 135.

6 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2.

the jar, yet neither the lump nor the jar differs from the clay; hence both the lump and the jar are pure clay, only different forms of it. In the same manner all "this" is only a form of Being.¹

VIII

CREATION AS MĀYIKA DIFFERENTIATION

The question, "how can an indivisible and incorporeal Being be modified into different forms?" does not present any insuperable difficulty to Śaṅkara, who believes that the creation of multiplicity and diversity has meaning only for a consciousness which enjoys it as such. Apart from its being cognized, known, appreciated and accepted as such, it is difficult to see in what possible sense we can speak of variety as a fact to be taken note of. Before the clay can be viewed as having become many in the shape of the jar, etc., or the rope regarded as having grown forth into the form of the serpent, our mind must be affected accordingly. "The Lord is perceived as manifold, although He is ever the same Pure Intelligence, on account of Māyā."² Māyā is explained by Śaṅkara as "(diverse) knowledge or false identifications created by name, from and the elements"³ The creative act implies not only the projection of differentiations but also recognition of them as such. The latter aspect has greater significance according to Śaṅkara, for creation is an intelligible concept and possesses meaning only on the intellectual plane to which we rise from the level of bare existence. "The Lord with the help of his Māyā projects the differentiations within himself, like the snake in the rope, and knows them as such."⁴ The possibility of an indivisible and incorporeal reality differentiating itself into parts which are separated from each other in space and time is excluded by the

1 *ibid.*, मूदादिसंस्थानमात्रं घटादयः एवं सत्संस्थानमात्रमिदं सर्वमिति युक्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेः सदेवेति ।

2 *Bṛhad.* II. 5. 19.

3 *ibid.*, इन्द्रो मायाभिः प्रजाभिः नामरूपकृतमित्याभिमानीर्वा न तु परमार्थतः ।

4 *Mand. S.B.*, II. 12, देव आत्मन्येव वक्ष्यमाणं भेदाकारं कल्पयति रज्ज्वादाविव सर्पादीन् स्वयमेव च तान् बुद्धयते भेदास्तद्वदेव ।

very nature of it. As it is "false knowledge" or *Avidyā* which lends intelligibility to the concept of "differentiation" and consequently to that of "creation", the dissolution also with which Śaṅkara's philosophy especially deals is not the dissolution which is "natural" according to the Paurāṇikas and in which effects dissolve into their causes, but one "which is consciously effected by the knowers of Brahman through their knowledge of Brahman and which happens through the cessation of ignorance":¹ Śaṅkara calls this extreme dissolution or *ātyantikapralaya*. He has this "prajñā" or "diverse knowledge" aspect of the creative power of *Māyā* in mind when he says that "just as the parts of the serpents are assumed from the parts of the rope, similarly it would be possible for the forms of modifications to proceed from the assumed parts of the Being, all modifications being names merely".² Śaṅkara's intention is not to preach any variety of subjective idealism or to lay the foundations of mentalism. Far from even lapsing into any such vein of thought, he takes pains to dissociate himself from such views. Critics unable to perceive the true force of Śaṅkara's analogy come forward with the objection that if Brahman becomes many, like the rope growing forth into a serpent, then "in that case all that is seen to be is a non-entity, because the rope as a serpent is a non-entity".³ They level against him the charge that he makes a confusion between the *Parināma* and *Vivarta* illustrations, and the examples he adduces to illustrate the creative act do not fit in with the context.

The example of the rope and the snake, it is made clear by Śaṅkara, is not intended by him to prove the illusoriness or utter non-existence, of "all that is seen".⁴ According to Śaṅkara "there is no non-existence of anything anywhere".⁵ It is Being itself which is mistaken for dualities and diversities. There is nothing which is other than Brahman. "It is Being alone which names, and is named as other things; just as the

1 *Bṛhad. S.B.*, II. 4. 12.

2 *Chand. S.B.*, VI. 2.2.

3 *Ibid.*, II. 6.3.

4 *Ibid.* सर्वं यद्गृह्यते ।

5 *Ibid.* न असत्त्वं कस्मिन् क्वचिदिति ब्रूमः ।

rope that is named serpent by the notion of a serpent; or again just as the lump, the jar, being mistaken for something other than the clay, are named 'lump', 'jar'. For those that know the rope to be the truth, there is an end to the consciousness of the snake; and for those who know the clay to be the reality; there disappear the ideas of the lump, the jar, etc. In the same manner for those that have a discriminative knowledge of Being, there no more operates the consciousness of the modifications being something other than that Being.¹ All names and all things which are named as other than Brahman are forms of Brahman and have their essence in it. It is not the thing which is false; it is the consciousness of an alien reality, of a foreign substance, of otherness, which is believed to constitute the essence of things, that is false and is to be given up. We are wrong not in taking note of the facts, we make a mistake in understanding their meaning. Philosophy ascertains the value of the existential order of phenomena. And when philosophy becomes conscious of this mission, as it has done in Śaṅkara, it finds that "all that one sees or hears or touches is nothing but the Lord Vasudeva".²

The process of creation, then, according to Śaṅkara, consists in Brahman's differentiating names and forms and entering them and thus "obtaining specific or individualized consciousness" in connection with these names and forms.³ Brahman "in the process of manifesting name and form transformed himself in accordance with each form, or (to put it differently) assumed the likeness of each form".⁴ The manifested universe in its real form is Brahman. In this form it is complete and self-sufficient. The process of creation is also eternally complete but is also being eternally fulfilled. It is at once eternal and temporal; in time as well as out of time. In its essential aspect it is eternal and eternally complete; in its temporal aspect it is a process and a passage craving for completion. Sub specie aeternitatis it is perfect and infi-

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 3. मद्धिवेकदशिवामन्यविकारमद्वयद्वि निवर्तते ।

2 Gita. S. B., XIII. 18.

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 2. तस्य विशेषविज्ञानम् ।

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 19.

nite; *sub specie temporis* it is infected with imperfection and finitude. The universe is a manifestation of the Absolute Reality which is Brahman. As the Absolute in revealing itself does not lose itself and its infinite Existence, infinite Consciousness and infinite Bliss are eternally conserved to it, and as existence is one with and inseparable from essence through all instants of time and points of space according to Śāṅkara, Brahman and the Universe both are equally infinite. "That (Brahman) is infinite, and this (universe) is infinite. The finite proceeds from the infinite. (Then) taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone."¹ The universe appears to be separated from and other than Brahman—this constitutes the fact of creation. The universe is rooted in and one with Brahman—this is the meaning of creation. Time is what is meant by the gulf between Brahman and the universe or essence and existence. But time is not able to create an absolute divorce between essence and existence. Time itself becomes intelligible with reference to the essence and as the distance between the essence and the existence which is a projected form of the essence. This means that neither time nor the universe viewed as a process and a passage is absolutely real and intelligible. It therefore cannot be said to possess an intrinsic value and an absolute significance. Brahman is the meaning of the universe. It constitutes the absolute value and absolute existence. Time and the universe are meaningful only in so far as they point to the absolute values which are foundational to time and to the temporal world.

"The Supreme Brahman is complete, all-pervading like the ether, without a break, and unconditioned. So also is this conditioned Brahman, manifesting through name and form and coming within the scope of relativity, infinite or all-pervading, indeed in its real form as the Supreme Self, not in its differentiated form circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. This differentiated Brahman proceeds or emanates from the infinite or Brahman as cause. Although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up its nature, infinitude, the state of the Supreme Self—it emanates as but the infinite. Taking

1 Brhad., V. 1. 1.

the infinitude of the infinite, or Brahman, as effect, that is, attaining perfect unity with its own nature by removing through knowledge its apparent otherness that is created by ignorance through the contact of limiting adjuncts, the elements, it remains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman, alone, without interior or exterior, the homogeneous Pure Intelligence.”¹ The Infinite is Brahman. That again is this infinite universe — Brahman manifested as effect, connected with the limiting adjuncts of name and form, projected by ignorance, appearing as different from its real nature.

IX

FROM CREATIVE MONISM TO AXIOLOGICAL MONISM

From what has been said above it would seem that the causal argument is one of the pivots on which the Advaitism of Śaṅkara rests. Far from being riddled with contradictions, as Professor Radhakrishnan supposes to be the case, “the concept of causality” is an essential part of the foundation on which the superstructure of Śaṅkara’s monism is reared. But it is only when we view it a value category that it can perform the task which Śaṅkara assigns to it. The causal argument sums up the “reasoning” through which can be established the Brahman-hood of the universe. The universe is divine in character because it originates from Divinity. The Creator and Creation are one. “Virāja, after projecting this whole world, knew, ‘I indeed am the creation, that is, the projected world. The world I have projected not being different from me, I myself am that; it is not something over and above myself. For I projected all this, the whole world.’”² It is only when we treat the concept of causality as an existential concept that Śaṅkara “shows the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature” of it and not otherwise. It is hardly true to say that according to Śaṅkara “to postulate a first cause is arbitrary, since it would be to assume a beginning for the causal series, a beginning for time”.³ Professor Radhakrishnan

1 *ibid.*

2 *Bṛhad. S.B., I. 4.5, अहं वाव सृष्टिरस्मि अहं हीदं सर्वममृशीति ततः सृष्टिरभवत् ।*

3 Radhakrishnan. I. P., Vol. I. P.530.

misses the truth that the category of cause as employed by Śaṅkara is a value category, a category of interpretation and not of description in terms of before and after. It is not "time" but "value" which supplies the clue to the understanding of the inner meaning of the concept of cause and of the importance of such a concept for metaphysics, which concerns itself not with being abstracted from value, but with value itself, of which being is a form. It is hardly true to say of Śaṅkara's treatment of the category of cause that "when it is formulated truly it is useless; when it is useful, it is not true".¹ To postulate a First Cause is the fundamental demand of the logic and the intellect oriented towards value, according to Śaṅkara. It is the starting-point of philosophy. To assume a First Cause is to acknowledge an absolute value of Existence. Not to acknowledge it is to open the door to contradictions and confusions. "Without acknowledging an Original Cause our thought will be moving in a vicious circle."² The demand for a "First Cause" is the fundamental demand of a rational life and a rational logic.

We find it difficult to agree with Professor Radhakrishnan in his assertion that Śaṅkara, like Kant, shows the futility of the "cosmological" and "physico-theological" proofs for the existence of God.³ We find Śaṅkara religiously insisting, whenever there is an occasion to do so, that Brahman is the eternal and supreme cause and the cause is the Supreme Brahman.⁴ Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction is not with the causal argument, but with a particular formulation of the causal argument, namely the formulation which seeks to prove the existence of God, not as the constitutive stuff and the living content of the universe, but as its directive power only. The view which Śaṅkara controverts is the view that Īśvara is merely the operative or the efficient cause of the world. Śaṅkara himself is committed to the view that Brahman is both

1 *ibid.*, P. 532.

2 S.B., II. 3.9. मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ।

3 *ibid.*, P. 542.

4 S. B., II 2. 15, नित्यं परं कारणं ब्रह्म ।; *ibid.*, II. 1. 14, कारणं परं ब्रह्म । S. B., I. 1. 10, आत्मनः कारणत्वं दर्शयन्ति सर्वे वेदान्ता ।; S. B., I. 1. 16, सर्वविकारसृष्टिश्च न परस्मादात्मनोज्यत्रोपपद्यते ।

the material Cause and the ruler of the world.¹ The view which does not find favour with him is the view "which maintains that *Īśvara* is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i. e. the operative cause of the world", and it is this doctrine which is inconsistent with the Vedāntic tenet of the monism of the Good.² Śāṅkara's own view is *Brahmavāda*. It is Value Philosophy; he himself is a *Brahmavādin*, a Value-Philosopher. Brahman is identical with the Absolute Good in his system. His view is, therefore, the Monism of the Good. But his Brahman is the creative principle also, and his *Brahmavāda* is identified by him with *Brahmakāraṇavāda*. His Monism of the Good thus turns out to be essentially a Creative Monism. The difficulties which Śāṅkara has pointed out in the way of the causal argument do not vitiate his own statement of it, because it is identical in essence with what has been called in previous pages the "axiological" argument. The ordinary causal argument which proceeds from effect to cause, or from the empirically verified existence of the world to God as the cause which explains that existence, is based explicitly on what Hume called "a contemplation of the works of nature", "the frame of nature", and thus tries to rest a philosophical doctrine of God on a fragment of the evidence actually before us. If we take into account the whole evidence before us, "the works of nature" as well as man's awareness of the values which are organic both to man's life and to nature, we shall, according to Śāṅkara, be led to the view that Brahman is the Creator and also the Creation, the Musician and also the Music, the Song as well as the Singer. Śāṅkara demolishes not "*Īśvarakāraṇavāda*" but "*Kevalādhisthātāśvarakāraṇavāda*", that is "*Īśvarakāraṇavāda*" as accepted by the Nyāya system.³ It is the contingency of the finite, the relative, the conditioned, the *sopādhika* which is the whole nerve of the reasoning contained in the causal argument as employed by Śāṅkara. The conditioned Brahman is rooted

1 S. B., II. 2. 37. प्रकृतिभावेनाधिष्ठातृभावेन तन्मयस्य भावस्य ईश्वरस्य स्वयमेवाचार्येण प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात् ।

2 Ibid., तस्मादप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाना केवल निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इत्येवमर्थो वेदान्त-विहितं ब्रह्मैक्यं प्रतिपन्नत्वात्कलं प्रतिपिद्वप्यते ।

3 Ibid., II. 2. 41. सत्तमनस्य नातिकपरिगृहीत ईश्वरकारणवादः ।

in the Unconditioned. "The argument is not so much 'Because the contingent is therefore the necessary being is'; it is rather 'Because the contingent is not therefore the necessary being is'".¹ The effect is unable to stand alone, because it is infected with relativity. It has nothing stable in it, or permanently satisfactory. Human thought is thus compelled to pass beyond it to a reality which is abiding and permanent. The finite exists only in and through the Infinite. "Whatever is an effect, limited and gross, is pervaded by that which is the cause, unlimited and subtle, as earth is pervaded by water. Similarly (in the series from the earth to the ether) each preceding element must be pervaded by the succeeding one — till we come to the Self that is within all."² The implicit logic of religion leads us through a series of intermediate genera, to a Supreme Genus, Pure Intelligence, in which all the varieties of that genus are included and unified during all states.³

We have seen how the Absolute divides itself into centres and the way in which, so divided, it still remains one. The universe, according to Śaṅkara, is a place of soul-making and in the making of souls we have the typical business or the central interest of the universe. The fact of individuation, which is what Śaṅkara understands by differentiation or creation, constitutes the very essence and open secret of the Absolute life. "Brahman in the process of manifesting name and form transformed itself in accordance with each form", or, to put it differently, assumed the likeness of each form.⁴ Brahman, which is Truth, Knowledge and Infinity, having created akāśa, etc., ending with things made of food, "enters into them and appears as individualized".⁵ But "why these appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds"? "Why the fact of appearance and of the diversity of its particular spheres"? "Why does the Absolute divide itself into centres"? Śaṅkara's

1 S. B. II. 14. ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यभावाभ्यामात्र इति गम्यते ।

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 6. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 4. 2.

4 Ibid., II. 5. 19.

5 Tatit. S. B., III. 1. 1. तदेवानुप्रविष्टं विशेषवद्विवेकप्रमाणम् ।

6 Bradley : Appearance and Reality, P. 453.

7 Ibid., P. 457.

answer is not, as Bradley's is, "We do not know".¹ He does not say "these are questions not to be answered".² The answer to the question: "Why did He come in so many forms?" can be given only in a language of time which is relevant to the sphere of the duality of value and existence, as both the raising of the question and the answering of it belong to this. If this limitation is borne in mind, the essential truth contained in Śāṅkara's statement of the answer to the question and intended to be communicated to his reader cannot be darkened. Śāṅkara's answer to the question is formulated by him in two slightly different ways, which do not ultimately diverge, according as the answer is given from the side of the Absolute or from the side of the individuated self. There is difference in the formulation of the answer, because the Unconditioned Brahman and the individual self cannot speak the same language even when they undertake to express the same truth. The Supreme Unconditioned Brahman speaks a language the verb of which is in the present tense, but this "present" is a "timeless present". The individuated self is used to a language which cannot transgress the distinction between the past, the present and the future in its attempt to give intelligible description of things. The idiom of communication which the Unconditioned Brahman would employ would be an idiom which would negate the mutual externality of successive moments in time. The answers given from the two sides would not ultimately diverge because the Unconditioned and the individuated self are ultimately one.

From the side of the Absolute the answer which Śāṅkara gives is that the universe is the self-realization of Brahman, that Brahman is infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. This realization involves the positing, by projection, of individuated selves and seeing in them nothing but its own life, its own consciousness and its own bliss. "Brahman, having created all this universe beginning with ākāśa in due order, without the aid of any other entity than itself, entered, for its own realization, all the bodies having life. And, having so entered, it realized its own real

1 *ibid.*, P. 467

2 *ibid.*, P. 443.

Self directly thus: 'I, Brahman, am all this'. Therefore, it alone is the one Ātman in all bodies and there is none else."¹ From the side of the individuated self the answer suggested as giving the clue to the purpose guiding the process of creation is that man ought to know that "he is one with that Bliss which is Brahman and which is invisible and unlike everything else".² At another place the same truth is worded differently.³ Brahman manifested itself in different forms "for the sake of making itself known. Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature of this Self as Pure Intelligence would not be known. When, however, name and form are manifested as the body and organs, it is possible to know its nature."⁴ The truth underlying both these slightly different formulations is one and the same, namely that the process of creation is an expression and, therefore an affirmation, of the truth that Brahman is Infinite Consciousness and Infinite Bliss. Brahman is not first there and then undertakes the creative act and becomes the creator with a view to realizing any end or purpose. Brahman exists as creatively realizing itself in the world. This act of creative realization is an act of conscious enjoyment. But for the fact that Brahman is Consciousness which is the same throughout its structure, the creative act would not be possible. But as Brahman is Infinite and Eternal Consciousness, it is eternally aware of its infinite nature which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, and the creative act is being eternally fulfilled. Brahman is infinite, which means unlimited. A thing can be limited only by something other than itself. Brahman is Consciousness also and therefore it is Infinite Consciousness. An Infinite

1. Altoreya. S. B., II. 1. 1. सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वमिदं जगत् स्वतो ज्येष्ठस्त्वन्तरमनुपादायैव आकाशादिकमेव सृष्ट्वा स्वात्मप्रबोधनायैव सर्वाणि च प्राणादिमण्डलीराणि स्वयं प्रविवेक । प्रविश्य च स्वयमात्मानं यथाभूतमिदं ब्रह्मास्मीति साक्षात् प्रत्यबुध्यत ।
2. Taitt. S. B., III. 1. 1. सर्वकार्यविलक्षणमदृश्यादिधर्मकमेवानन्दं तद्वद्वाहमिति विजानीयादनुप्रवेशस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
3. Brhad S. B., II. 5. 19.
4. Ibid. तदस्यात्मनो रूपं प्रतिवक्ष्यामि प्रतिव्यापनाय । यदि हि नामरूपे न आक्रियेते तदास्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिव्यापेत् ।

Consciousness must eternally be aware of its infinitude. The eternal awareness of its infinitude means that it is always conscious that it is not limited by anything and there is nothing other than itself. This creative thought is at once the positing of an "other" and realizing that this other is not wholly "other" and is one with itself. Brahman "creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe" and "realizes its own real Self directly thus: I, Brahman, am all this".¹ This awareness that there is nothing other than myself is an eternal awareness. Therefore the act of creation is eternally being fulfilled and eternally complete. Creation, for Śaṅkara, is not a special act or an event in time. It is the eternal fashion of the cosmic life and is grounded in the divine nature. It is coeval with divine existence. It belongs to the very being of Brahman, to its very essence, to realize itself thus.

As the creation of the universe is an expression of the truth that Brahman is everything and there is nothing other than Brahman, similarly the realization that I am one with Brahman and with everything is also the end involved in the process of creation. Brahman is the origin and also the goal of the universe. Thus it is Brahman which as name and form—as the body and organs—is inside and outside everything. As it is Brahman which, after revealing name and form, has entered them, there is no other witness but this, no other hearer but this. It is Brahman which as the inner self sees, hears, thinks, understands and knows. Thus the projection of the universe and the entrance of the Self into it serve as an aid to the realization of the unity of the Self. Brahman is the inner Self of all and also the objective world of name and form. The individuated self, when it realizes this inner meaning of the creative process, "identifies itself with all as its limiting adjuncts, becomes the Self of all and become all. Again, it is without any limiting adjuncts, without name, devoid of interior or exterior", because everything, being its own expression, is non-different from it. Thus while, on the one hand, creation is the way in which Brahman exists, regarded as an act of differentiation and viewed in its conditioned

1. Atareya. S.B., I. 1.1; II. 1.1.

aspect, it has an instrumental or mediating function. Thus conceived Spirit is the terminus ad quem of creation. The names and forms were manifested, so that the transcendent nature of the Self as Pure Intelligence might be known. The meaning and the mode of creation harmonize with each other.

Is there, then, any recondite purpose in the making of the universe? Is there any ultimate motive by which the Absolute is moved to create? If by this we mean that the purpose is something "foreign and external" to Brahman, something which is far removed from its nature, something after which it has to strive and to which it has to adjust itself, then Śāṅkara repudiates all such ideas of finality. Brahman is Self-fulfilled and its self-fulfilment through time cannot be anything other than the expression of its perfection. That is why, for Śāṅkara, Brahman is infinite and this universe also is infinite; from the infinite comes out the infinite. Brahman can have no "purpose" in the above sense, in the making of the universe, because Brahman's life, which is a life of infinite consciousness and infinite bliss, is essentially a process of self-communication. Brahman exists as creatively realizing itself in the universe. To those who insist that philosophy should point to some definite purpose which determined the process of creation Śāṅkara's answer is that "it is irrelevant to ask or to answer the question".¹ To attempt an answer to such a question is to regard creation as an event which took place at some assignable date in the past, as in Biblical Chronology which fixed the date at 4004 B.C.

For Śāṅkara the question of historical emergence of the universe has no philosophical importance and there is something wrong with this whole method of attacking the problem of creation. Philosophy cannot undertake to account for what are but local incidents of the distribution of cosmic forces. It looks at the universe as part of a value-scheme; and this point of view cannot sanction any explanation in which the universe is made to stand somehow independently outside Brahman, whose relation to the subsequent unfolding of the

1 Gita, S.B., IX, 10, किं निमित्ता इयं सृष्टिः इति अत्र प्रश्नप्रतिवचने अनुपपन्ने ।

cosmic drama is at most that of an interested spectator. "Of what purpose is this creation by the One, the Divine, the pure, all-witnessing Spirit or Consciousness, who has really no concern with any enjoyment whatever?"¹ To answer this question will be to answer the question, "How Being is made," which, as Lotze said, is an absurd question. If we do not abstract Being from its Essence but admit that Essence is a matter of acknowledgment, which is the only legitimate procedure, there will be no difficulty in seeing that creation is the eternal fashion of the cosmic life. It is the eternal realization on the part of the Absolute that it is everything. This view is essentially one with the Hegelian view that the Absolute is not a substance but a Subject or Spirit, that this "Absolute Spirit takes upon itself and makes its own the stupendous labour of the world's history; that in so doing it infuses the component parts with spiritual significance, embodies itself in human form, and, in the process, at once eternal and in time, reconciles the world to itself and itself to the world". The universe being eternal, the process is eternally being fulfilled and eternally complete.

For Śaṅkara the idea of evolution which is philosophically satisfactory cannot be temporal. Like Bradley, he believes that a conflict with the sciences upon any question of development or order could not properly arise. As for the solution of the philosophical problem of evolution, the fact of time, i. e., succession, is in the main irrelevant and the conflict between Divine Evolutionism and Naturalistic Evolutionism has never assumed the formidable shape of a problem for Śaṅkara. Whether a particular order of reality appeared sooner or later in a particular time-series does not affect the philosophical view that God is the First and the Final cause of the universe. Philosophy is interested, according to Śaṅkara, in knowing that one reality from which everything springs and knowing which all else is known. But Śaṅkara is careful to warn us that "the general assertion of everything springing from Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately proceed from that which is, not that they should be its immediate effects".² Accordingly, Śaṅkara sees no conflict

1 *Ibid.*

2 S. B., II. 3. 10, प्रतिज्ञार्थि सद्व्यत्वमात्रमपेक्षते नाव्यवहितजन्यत्वमित्यविरोधः ।

between the scriptural texts which speak of "creation without specifying the order of succession" and the texts "which specify the order of creation". The statement that "fire springs from air" is as true as the statement that "fire springs from Brahman". "The supposition that after the creation of ether and air the air-form of Brahman gave rise to fire would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman; for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curd comes from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow."¹ This reconciliation which Śaṅkara effects between the "akram-avatsṛṣṭivādīnya" śrūtis and the "kramavatsṛṣṭivādīnya" śrūtis is really the reconciliation between Divine Evolutionism and Naturalistic Evolutionism, between the philosophical conception of evolution and the scientific conception of evolution. "The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants, such as kuśa-grass, kāśa-grass, palasa trees, or in various living beings, such as cattle, deer, men", has taken place, according to Śaṅkara, through the evolution and manifestation of "different species and individuals".² The question of the "origin of species" and the factors that contribute to it constitute the subject-matter of science, which is concerned with determining "how one effect proceeds from another".³ Philosophy is concerned with understanding the nature of that Supreme Genus which unifies the varieties of genera and species with the special natures of which sciences undertake to deal.

X

ŚAṅKARA'S VALUE-SCHEME AND THE DOCTRINE ON MĀYĀ

The forgoing discussion of the creative aspect of Śaṅkara's Absolutism has prepared us to understand the real significance of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā, which, by some enthusiastic commentators, has been raised to the rank of a

1 S. B. II. 3. 10.

2 S. B., II. 4. 20, प्रत्याकृति प्रतिव्यक्ति बानेकप्रकाशः ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9, विकीरयन् विचारान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् ।

vāda and by certain caustic critics reviled as the Vedāntic version of Buddhistic Nihilism and Idealism. The doctrine has proved a stumbling block to his readers, and has been regarded as a cloak which merely covers the inner flaws of his system. It has been said that when arguments are wanting, Śaṅkara falls back upon this doctrine, and manoeuvres an easy escape. It would seem, according to such critics, that instead of following the customary practice of abusing the adversary when arguments fail, he practices an abuse of logic by "throwing it overboard" and appealing to Śruti, or by choosing "to sing his old song of Māyā theory". The incorporation of the doctrine of Māyā in the body of the Vedānta system has been said to be an illustrious example of a halting logic, of faithlessness to facts, of blinking evidence and of a device to explain away instead of facing squarely the difficulties of the situation. All the writers on Śaṅkara hold that his real objective was to establish Vivartavāda or Māyāvāda as against Parīṇāmavāda; but many of them, like Dr. Dasgupta, are disposed to think that Śaṅkara was never concerned "to explain the definite relation of māyā to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. He did not think it worthwhile to explain anything definite regarding the nature of avidyā and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe."¹

Much of the misunderstanding which prevails about the true force of what Śaṅkara has said about Māyā is due to failure to realize that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of value, and that his Brahman is essentially a truly creative reality. His Monism is a Monism of the Good, and his Monism of the Good is a truly Creative Monism. The doctrine of Māyā is not a substitute for the Brahmapvāda of Śaṅkara but a phase of and incidental to Śaṅkara's philosophy of value, Brahman, or Mokṣa. Māyāvāda is not the whole of Brahmapvāda or Mokṣavāda, the foundations of which have been laid and made secure by Śaṅkara in his commentaries. The doctrine is concerned with merely pointing out the mode or manner in which Brahman creates and re-creates itself in nature, in

1 History, Vol. II, P. II.

history and in human affairs. It summarizes Śaṅkara's judgment not about the fact or otherwise of Brahman's causality but about the way in which Brahman's causality operates and attains completion. Māyāvāda is not a denial of Brahmanakāraṇavāda but an aspect of it. It presupposes that Brahman is also the creative reality and not merely a value, and simply draws the consequence of this presupposition, which, while being a statement about the mode of creation, is at the same time an assertion about the character of the created world in its relation to the creative source.

That Brahman is creative is a fundamental truth about the nature of the ultimate reality which is in no way derived from any other truth. Only Consciousness can be said to be the creative reality. There is yet another side to the truth about the nature of the real. It is the truth about the conservative aspect of reality. The real is so constituted that it cannot give up its nature and be something other than what it is. Śaṅkara's conception of causality is an embodiment of the creative as well as the conservative aspect of reality. Brahman, which is the most supremely real, reveals itself into multiplicity, but in so doing it does not give up its nature of being alike throughout its structure and of having no difference either within it or without it. This is the essence of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyavāda or Vivartavāda. The principle of "creativity" combined with the principle of "conservation" leads inevitably to the doctrine of Māyā, the essence of which is that Brahman, which is the Self-communicating life, does not lose itself in revealing itself in diversified names and forms and realizing that all this is its own Self. The doctrine of Māyā is not a theory or a hypothesis. It is a statement of fact about the nature of reality. According to Śaṅkara, "there is no reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the Brahman, which in its nature is one and non-dual, without destroying its character of unity".¹ This, it should be realized, is the essence of Māyāvāda, and we have the authority of Vacaspathiśra to support this view.²

1 S.B., II. 1. 28, एकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वयंपात्प्रमर्देनैवानेकारामृष्टिर्भविष्यति ।

2 Bhamati on S.B., II. 1. 28. अनेन स्फुटितो मायावादः ।

Our dream-life supplies us with an example wherein the dreaming person carries on and accomplishes the work of creation without any extraneous aid and without permitting its own unity of nature to be destroyed. Consciousness is the only reality of which we are aware as giving rise to multiplicity without destroying its own unity. "There are no chariots in the dream-state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads". Human experience in its higher as well as its lower ranges is full of examples of creative activity wherein the creator does not lose itself in creating itself. "The gods, manes, ṛṣis and other beings of great power are seen to create many and various objects without availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere resolve—a fact which is vouchsafed by mantra, arthavāda, itihāsa, and purāṇas."¹ In ordinary life the magician creates himself in another form, as travelling in the air, and produces multifarious objects like elephants, horses and the like, without giving up his nature. The doctrine of Māyā is not concerned with the denial of creation but with the revival of that view of creation according to which it is the eternal that explains the changing, the immovable which renders movement intelligible.

The Absolute can be said to create itself as diversified into multiplicity only in so far as this act does not tamper with the integral unity of Brahman. Māyā is the word chosen by Śaṅkara to express this truth. Brahman creates itself into many only through Māyā. The division of the Absolute into the relative many is not an absolute division. Neither the nature of the real permits such a division nor is such a division required for the fulfilment of the purpose which determines the origin and guides the course of the evolutionary process. The process is but incidental to the realization of the truth by the Absolute that it is everything and there is nothing other than and different from it. To say that a reality which is one and alike throughout its structure becomes many "really", that is, in the sense that multiplicity and diversity possess equal value and significance, is to admit that fire is at once hot and cold.

1 S.B., II. 1. 25.

(§ XI.) THE VALUE CONCEPT OF ANIRVACANĪYATĀ

The statement of Śaṅkara that multiplicity is not the paramārtha sat but māyā has presented serious obstacles to readers, because they have attempted to understand it while adopting the standpoint of existence. The statement is one made from the standpoint of value, and carries an axiological significance. That multiplicity is not paramārtha means really that this fact does not possess intrinsic value, that it does not carry its own meaning, that it is not self-explanatory unless understood as an expression of value. The significance of the creative process consists in the realization that the whole of creation is nothing other than Brahman. The creation of multiplicity is subservient to the realization that it is the Ātman ultimately. Brahman created the universe and then realized, "I, Brahman, am all this". Unity is in the beginning; it is in the end. It is the beginning and also the end. Multiplicity is in the middle only. It is māyika therefore. The highest truth is the oneness of value and existence. The Advaita appears as dvaita only through Māyā.¹ It is the identity of value and existence which renders significant their duality and discrepancy. The dvaita is the fact; the advaita is the value of this fact. The former possesses relative being and deficient value. The latter possesses absolute reality and infinite value.

XI

THE VALUE CONCEPT OF ANIRVACANĪYATĀ

The doctrine of Māyā not only emphasizes the origin of the world from Brahman and the latter's subsistence in its eternal purity and absolute integrity; it also summarizes the peculiarly baffling nature of the world of name and form. Śaṅkara characterizes the universe as anirvacanīya. Nāma and rūpa are everywhere said to be tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya, neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman. Brahman is the absolute value. The universe is neither absolute value nor absolute non-value. It is not absolute

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, अजमव्ययमात्मतत्त्वं माययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः ।.....

द्वैतमद्वैतभेद इत्यवते द्वैतमप्यद्वैतवत्परमार्थसदिति स्यात् कस्यचिदाशङ्क्यत आह—
यत्परमार्थसदद्वैतं मायया भिद्यते ।

value, because it is characterized by the discrepancy between value and existence, while in Brahman these two become one and inseparable. The absolute value is *advaita*; in it there is no trace of that conflict, that unreconciled opposition, between essence and existence, between the ideal and the actual, which describes the universe of which we have experience as finite individuals. It is a perfect and ideal embodiment of Infinite Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. Existence is the same as Consciousness. Consciousness in its turn is the same as perfect Bliss. The universe is not absolute value; neither is it absolute non-value. The universe lives on a spark of Brahman. If Brahman were to withdraw from the universe its reality, its consciousness and its bliss, the universe would lose all claim to be regarded even as something; it would be a non-entity like the flower of the sky or the son of a barren woman. The universe has a relative being. The consciousness which is an item of the universe is constantly circumscribed by something foreign to it; the Self is always confronted by a not-self which it can neither wholly reconcile to itself nor treat as absolutely alien to it. The bliss we meet with in the universe is conditioned bliss which today is and tomorrow is not. It is infected by the duality of subject and object, and is but a fraction, a particle, of the supreme Bliss in which all differences cease. The universe is not "Abraham". It is Brahman, but it is Brahman limited by name and form which constitute relative existence. The limitation of Brahman by name and form means, in other words, the duality of value and existence. The universe, embodying as it does, in the very heart of it a dialectical antinomy, can be described neither as absolute value nor as absolute non-value. It is characterized neither by oneness of value and existence nor by absolute antagonism between the two. It represents at once oneness and duality of value and existence, their inseparability as well as their discrepancy. This renders the universe, a passage, a flow, of which Absolute Value is the origin as well as the goal.

This way of characterizing the universe is the result of Śaṅkara's intellectual maturity, and reflects the genius of the

man. From the absolute point of view, when we rise from the sphere of logic to that of religion, the universe is seen to be nothing other than Brahman. But when we attempt to describe its nature from the standpoint of the logical understanding, for which the duality of value and existence is an indispensable condition, there is no better and logically more adequate and philosophically more comprehensive way of doing this than to say that the universe is neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman, that it is neither absolute value nor absolute non-value. The sphere of religion is the sphere of realization and when we have attained this, anirvacanīyatva ripens into ananyatva and the duality of essence and existence is replaced by their oneness and identity. The dvaita culminates in advaita. Tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya — this is a value judgment made by Śaṅkara, and only thus can its secret and the greatness of that secret be revealed to us. Shallow critics, unmindful of the value standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara, have missed the true import of it and identified it with the judgment "sadasadbhyāmanirvacanīya" and ridiculed Śaṅkara. Some modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, not being able to shake off the prejudice inherited from Prakāśātman, that of adopting the existential point of view, fail to rise to the height from which Śaṅkara views the universe. It should be borne in mind that Śaṅkara nowhere uses the term "sadasadbhyāmanirvacanīya" in connection with Māyā or the universe of Māyā. He has taken meticulous care to use the word "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya" in all his writings.¹ This use cannot be explained by calling it a secondarily automatic action. There is a set purpose in it, and the purpose is to draw attention to the fact that it is only in terms of Value that philosophy can undertake to understand the nature of ultimate truths. All ultimate judgments are, in the last resort, judgments of value. In the above judgment Śaṅkara uses the word "tattva" and not "tat". It is true that, according to Śaṅkara, the word "tat" also signifies Brahman. But the word "tat" expresses the nature of Brahman in terms of the value of "Reality" only and not as Absolute Value. For Śaṅkara the interest of philosophy is centred not in Being merely but in Absolute Value,

¹ S. B., I. 3. 19; I. 4. 5; II. 1. 27; II. 1. 14; II. 1. 5; Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 10.

and it is as the most supreme Value that Brahman is the most supremely Real. It is value which constitutes reality. It is Brahman as the Supreme Essence which is the most Real. Śaṅkara's philosophy of Value prefers to call Brahman not "tat" but "tattva". Brahman is no doubt "tat", that.¹ But the truth of Brahman is constituted by its essence, which consists in the oneness of the values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda. The true Reality is the Essence; the true "tat" is the "tadbhāvaḥ" which is the "tattvam". The true Brahman is the "Brahma-bhāvaḥ". Brahman is the "tattva", the Absolute Value. The universe is not "tattva" or absolute value or Brahman. But neither is it wholly "anyatva" or absolute non-value. It represents the oneness as well as the duality of Value and Existence. Its nature cannot be described in terms of pure Value or bare Existence. It is "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya".

This way of characterizing the universe is much more significant than calling it "śadasadbhyāmanirvacaniya". The former judgment measures the universe not only in terms of the value of Existence but also in terms of the values of Consciousness and Bliss. The latter views the universe with reference to the value of Existence merely, with the result that interpreters who have failed to note the subtle distinction between the two divergent characterizations have invariably lapsed into the existential view. The term "tattva" signifies all the three values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda; the term "Sat" is confined to one dimension of value, namely the dimension of Existence. The result of the lapse into the existential view has been that the interpreters have asked a wrong question and got a wrong answer. They have raised a false issue and have been satisfied with a false resolution of that issue. They have asked the questions: "Is the universe real or unreal? Is it existent or non-existent?" and have been content to learn that it is neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent. For them reality or existence has meant mere "being is space and time" in abstraction from all value and meaning. If they adopted the standpoint of value which is

1 Gita. S.B., II. 16. तदिति सर्वनाम सर्वं च ब्रह्म तस्य नाम तत् तद्भावः तस्य ब्रह्मणो यायात्म्यं ।

the standpoint of Śaṅkara, instead of being concerned with determining the existence or non-existence of the world they would try to ascertain the significance or value which the universe possesses. They would be led to recognize the instrumental or mediating function of the world and measure it in terms of value and not subsistence in time and existence in space. Even those interpreters who have followed Śaṅkara strictly in characterizing the universe as "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya" have failed to grasp the real significance of this characterization. Deussen, while faithful to Śaṅkara in this respect, inasmuch as he translates the above epithet as "neither Brahman nor something different from him"¹, fails to realize that Brahman for Śaṅkara is not mere Reality but also Value and that primarily. He equates Brahman with Being merely, and in consistence with this standpoint of existence wrongly understands Śaṅkara to mean that the whole empirical reality with its names and forms can be defined as "neither Being nor nothing"², as "neither Being nor non-being"³, and is comparable to an hallucination or to a dream.⁴ Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Kokilleshwar Sastri and Thibaut—none of them is able to give up the standpoint of existence. They invariably fail to distinguish between "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya" and "śadasadbhyāmanirvacaniya", and without exception translate the former as "neither is nor is not", "neither being nor non-being", "neither existing nor non-existing", "neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal".⁵ The modern interpreters, even when they equate Brahman with Being or Existence and identify "tattva" with it, do not treat Being or Existence as a Value concept. Being or Existence is always understood by them in terms of space and time. Thus Māyā, according to Dr. Dasgupta, "is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of Excluded Middle. Māyā

1 D. S. V., P. 467.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 277.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 136.

4 *Ibid.*, P. 303.

5 Dasgupta : *History*, Vol. I, PP. 442, 447; *History*, Vol. II, P. 13; Radhakrishnan : *I. P.* Vol. II, PP. 564, 579; Kokilleshwar Sastri : *Advaita Philosophy* P. 137; Thibaut, P. XXV.

can neither be said to be 'is' nor 'is not'.¹ This unconscious bias for the existential standpoint leads Dr. Dasgupta to endow time with something of divine providence and make it a mysterious reality designed to replace the old idea of Deity. The falsehood of the world-appearance, according to his interpretation of Śaṅkara, is involved in the category of the Indefinite which is neither sat ("is") nor asat ("is not"). He thinks that the opposition of "is" and "is not" is solved by the category of time. Since the world-appearance exists for a time, it is sat (is); but since it does not exist for all time, it is asat (is not).² Śaṅkara, however, does not measure the reality of the universe by time. To do so would be to hold that time is not only real but the only reality, that not only has it value, but it is intrinsic and absolute value. According to Śaṅkara the reality which belongs to time and the value which it possesses is derived from Brahman, which is the Absolute Reality and Value and the source of all other realities and values. This Brahman is the measure of all reality and the measure of all value. It sets up the standard with reference to which the spatio-temporal order of existence is to be judged as to its reality and value. Time does not explain the spatio-temporal world, it itself needs an explanation. Time does not solve the opposition of "is" and "is not"; it creates the opposition. Time does not provide the resolution of the discrepancy between "is" and "is not"; it constitutes the riddle itself. The answer to this riddle of the world in space and time lies outside space and time, that is, in Brahman. "Time limits everything that is born.....occupies a lower position without being able to limit It."³ When judged with reference to Brahman, we find that the world-appearance is neither Brahman wholly nor something entirely other than Brahman. It possesses a deficient value and a deficient reality, which is as much as to say that it has an instrumental value. In other words, it has a mediating function and its purpose is the revelation of Brahman's nature.

The medieval critics of Śaṅkara betray colossal misunderstanding of the position adopted by him on this point.

1 History, Vol. I. P. 442.

2 History, Vol. I. P. 443.

3 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 15.

Rāmānuja thinks that the *Māyā* of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is comparable to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like. It combines contradictory ideas in one and the same concept. Competent critics have established beyond doubt that the seven charges brought by Rāmānuja against Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* are irrelevant and do not touch his position. One is shocked to read Bhāskara's criticism of the *anirvacanīyutā* of *Māyā* and the *Mayika* world. It is an insult to human intelligence to have thought of propagating and perpetuating these ideas by writing a "book", which, as Ruskin said, is man's "inscription" or "scripture", his rock on which he engraves his ideas. Bhāskara says, if *Maya* is indescribable, how will the teacher impart instruction to the disciple, and if it remains incomprehensible how can we carry on our dealings with the help of that concept? If the names and forms are indescribable, how is it that we can clearly utter the words "cow", "horse", etc., and these are names of objects?¹ One wishes that Śaṅkara knew of this criticism and enjoyed the fun. There is evidence of extreme carelessness on the part of Bhāskara even in transcribing words and phrases from Śaṅkara, to say nothing of rightly understanding them. Thus he speaks of *Māyā* as² *sattvasattvābhyāmanirvacanīyā*, as *satyāsati*³, and at the same time as *tattvatattvabhyāmanirvacanīyā*⁴.

XII

THE VALUE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṆKARA AND THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PARIṆĀMAVĀDA AND VIVARTAVĀDA

What can be said regarding Śaṅkara's attitude towards the present controversy between *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*? Śaṅkara does not seem to be familiar with these names, and there is no evidence that he had begun thinking out and formulating the answers to the problem of philosophy in terms of either of these "vādas". The issue which

1 B. B., II. 1. 14.

2 *ibid.*, II. 1. 14.

3 *ibid.*, IV. 1. 14.

4 *ibid.*, IV. 1. 1.

has philosophical significance for him is the issue between *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and *Pradhanakāraṇavāda*.¹ The issue is whether the universe is intelligible as an expression of value or its nature can be rationally comprehended in terms of mere existence. Śaṅkara's *Brahmakāraṇavāda* stands for the former alternative and repudiates the latter. The rejection of *Pradhanakāraṇavāda* means for him the rejection of all those systems of thought, like the *Vaiśeṣika*, which attempt to deduce the world from a source other than the Absolute Good, which is called Brahman by Śaṅkara. In the *Pradhana* of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Atoms* of the *Vaiśeṣika* there is no trace of that intrinsic value which alone renders intelligible what we call the real. In abstraction from this value the might of the *Prakṛti* and the force native to the atom are as naught. The Good is the most real and the source of all intelligibility and reality possessed by everything. This Good cannot be identified either with the *Pradhana* or with the atom.²

The words "vivarta" and "pariṇāma" are not unknown to Śaṅkara, though he does not label his system as *Vivarta-vāda*. These words are used by him in one and the same sense, namely that of manifestation or expression. The passage where the word *vivarta* occurs is to be found in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* i. 3.39.³ Translated into English it stands thus: "For, in the air, when it manifests itself as 'parjanya', people say that lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves." The word *vivarta*, in the above passage, means "manifestation" merely, and does not imply any idea of "perversion" or "illusion". The word "pariṇāma" is also used by Śaṅkara in the same sense. (i) "The Ātman, though an already accomplished and existent reality, "modifies" itself into special forms of effects as their Self."⁴ (ii) "The sacred texts speak of Brahman and

1. S. B., I. 4. 28.

2. S. B., I. 4. 28. प्रधानकारणावादः सूर्यदेव पुनः पुनरावृत्त्यै निरुद्धः । एतेन प्रधानकारणप्रतिषेधन्यादहमनेन सर्वोत्पत्तिविकारणप्राप्ता अपि प्रतिविद्यमाना व्याख्याता ।

3. वायो हि पर्जन्यभावेन विवर्तमाने विद्युत्स्वनपित्तवृष्ट्यशनयोविवर्तन्ते इत्यादिशते ।

4. पूर्वविद्योऽपि हि न ब्रह्मात्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमद्यमास आत्मानमिति ।

its "modification" into the Self of its effects as coordinates."¹ (iii) "Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able "to modify" itself into manifold effects."² Padmapāda also uses the word "vivarta" in the sense of "manifestation" or "modification" without even suggesting any idea of "illusion".³

Śaṅkara had already emphasized the truth that the real reveals itself as many without destroying or giving up its nature as unity.⁴ This, according to him, is the mode in which alone the Ultimate Reality can be consistently conceived to produce or create itself in the multiplicity of names and forms. Śaṅkara's intention was to bring out the truth that value, which is essentially creative, is conserved in the process of creatively realizing itself. The statement that value is conserved is bound up with and incidental to the assertion that value is creative. Brahmakāraṇavāda, "Brahman as Creativity", is thus the fundamental thesis of Śaṅkara. That Brahman does not lose its Brahman-hood in the act of creation is incidental to its creative nature. Śaṅkara coined a technical term (Brahmakāraṇavāda) to designate his system in its totality, but did not think it necessary to find another to express the mode in which Brahman's creativity operated. Vācaspatimiśra coined the term Māyāvāda, which summed up this mode. Māyāvāda, in its essence, does not stand by itself; it is incidental to Brahmakāraṇavāda and is to be regarded as part and parcel of it. So far as the mode of creation is concerned, Śaṅkara did not think it worth while to distinguish between "vivarta" and "pariṇama" and solidify these ideas after the fashion of the later Vedāntins into two different "vadas", so long as it was kept in mind that "a multiform creation may exist in Brahman, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of

1 Ibid. यत् कारणब्रह्मण एव विकारात्मना परिणामः सामानाधिकरण्यादेनाग्नयते ।

2 S.B. II. 1. 24. तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विविधवित्तयांगालोरादिविद्विन्न परिणाम उपपद्यते ।

3 Panos, adika. P.82. नन्वेवं सति कथं सर्वज्ञता ? तस्यैव ज्ञानशक्तिविवर्ततात्मकत्वात् नामविकल्पप्रपञ्चस्यापि तदाश्रित्य विवर्तनात्तद्व्यवृत्ता । Ibid. P.78. अतो दददददभो विदयो विवर्तते प्रपञ्चः तदेवमूलकारणं ब्रह्मंति सूत्रायः ।

4 S.B. II. 1. 28

unity" of the values of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss.¹ Even in those cases which, according to the later Vedāntins, are to be classed as cases of "pariṇāma" as distinguished from vivarta, and where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, we have to acknowledge, according to Śaṅkara, as the cause of sprouting, etc., only those permanent particles of seed which are not destroyed.² But the permanence which the differentiated objects enjoy is partial, and is nothing as compared to the eternal perdurance of the Absolute. The later Vedāntins reserved the word "pariṇāma" for those cases of operation of causality where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the causal substance is seen to take place, and the word "vivarta" for other cases where the cause reproduces itself without giving up its nature.³ The former view was christened *Pariṇāmavāda* and the latter *Vivartavāda*.⁴ The controversy between *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and *Pradhānakāraṇavāda* was hushed into silence and that between *Vivartavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda* took its place. With the coming into prominence of the question of the *modus operandi* of Brahman's causality, the axiom of the essentially creative nature of value ceased to have the importance which it had for Śaṅkara according to whom the question whether it is Value (Brahman) or mere Existence (*Pradhāna*) which is really creative was a question of life and death for philosophy. The Vedānta philosophy forgot the lesson which was taught by Śaṅkara, that Value is Creativity. But, then, how could the question of the mode in which Brahman creates itself be settled? The question of the fact and that of the nature of Brahman's causality came to be amalgamated and considered as one. *Vivartavāda* or *Māyavāda*, which should have been a statement of the method of creation, came to be regarded as an answer to

1 Ibid., स्वरूपानुपमदेनेव ।

2 Ibid., II. 2.7.

3 Vidyaranya: *Vivaranaprameyasangraha*, P.674. किं ब्रह्म पूर्वमप्यपरित्यज्य परिणमते उताऽपरित्यज्य विवर्तते । ; *Prakāśatmaṇa. Pañcapādika Vivaraṇa*, P.206. सत्यतोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामो ।

4 *Pañcapādika Vivaraṇa*, PP. 206.212; *Vivaranaprameyasangraha*, PP. 651, 661, 662.

the question about the fact of creation; and "vivarta" was defined as the appearance of the one cause as the unreal many of the phenomena. *Pariṇāma*, on the other hand, was regarded as the development of the cause in its potential state.¹ The centre of gravity of philosophic interest shifted from value to existence. Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Brahmavāda*, which later on came to be identified, though unjustifiably, with *Māyāvāda* or *Vivartavāda*, laid emphasis on the conservation of value. The *Vivartavāda* of the later Vedāntins came to be viewed as synonymous with the denial of the reality of the effects and their treatment as non-existent and false.

The modern interpreters of Śaṅkara work with this conception of *Vivarta* and *Vivartavāda*, and try to affiliate his Vedantic monism to Buddhistic Idealism. Thus it is pointed out that Śaṅkara's *Advaita* is established by refuting not so much *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* as *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*, and his real objective is to establish *Vivartavāda* or *Māyāvāda* as against the *Pariṇāmavāda* of certain commentators.² The doctrine of *Vivartavāda* is identified with the view that the world does not actually "emerge" from Brahman, but is a "phenomenal appearance" of Brahman.³ This conception of *Vivartavāda*, which is far removed from Śaṅkara's view, leads inevitably to the doctrine of what Professor Dasgupta calls "the unreal many of the phenomena";⁴ If, on the other hand, we stick to the axiological significance which Śaṅkara intends to convey by his doctrine of *vivartavāda*, we shall be required to speak not so much of the "unreality" of the many as of their "value" or "significance". The failure to recognize and keep constantly in mind that the concepts used by Śaṅkara are axiological concepts is responsible for much misunderstanding and many a criticism which is wide of the mark. The root of the whole difficulty, according to these interpreters, is (i) that in the first place Śaṅkara is not able to keep distinct

1 Dasgupta; *History*, Vol. I, P. 468.

2 Hiriyanna. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, PP. 339, 340.

3 *ibid.*

4 *History*, Vol. I, P. 468.

the two widely divergent views of causation, the *pariṇāma* view and the *vivarta* view, and constantly confuses the two and (ii) that in the second place he gives examples to illustrate his theory which are "quite out of place".

Thus it is pointed out by Thibaut and Dr. Dasgupta that Śaṅkara's reply to the objection that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman, is not consistent with his conception of causality, according to which effects are "non-existent and false" and have "no substantiality".¹ Śaṅkara gives certain illustrations to show that effects can be largely dissimilar from their causes. Dr. Dasgupta says that Śaṅkara's arguments here are not only weak but uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere *mayā* and magic and has no essence, Śaṅkara, says Dr. Dasgupta, should have rushed straight to his own view of "effects having no substantiality" and not adopted the *pariṇāma* view of "real transformation". Dr. Dasgupta's suggestion is that Śaṅkara should have adopted the simple device of denying that there was any problem to be solved, as the world was an unsubstantial dream, non-existent and false. The objection, says Dr. Dasgupta, could have validity only with those who believed in the real transformation of effects from causes, and not with a philosopher like Śaṅkara who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Śaṅkara, according to the same writer, was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily in the commentary on the *Sūtras* an example of the *vivarta* view of the unreality of effects which could only yield a realistic interpretation. But Śaṅkara, it should be noted, knew quite well that the seeming multiplicity of the world could not be accounted for by simply attempting to write off the appearance of difference as mere illusion due to partial vision. The way out of the difficulty is to make a return to the value standpoint, which is the only standpoint Śaṅkara adopts. The conception of *Vivarta* is a value conception. The critics of Śaṅkara view it as an existential concept and not as an axiological one, and believe that the world is no more in Brahman at the time of *pralaya* than

1 Dasgupta: *History*, Vol. II, PP. 38,39,40.

during the period of its subsistence.¹ The conception of vivarta is not concerned with the affirmation or denial of existence as such, but with the recognition that in any attempt at explanation or deduction of existence values are conserved, and it is value which renders existence intelligible. Likewise this conception does not say anything about the fact of causality but only about the mode in which causality operates. The real issue before Śāṅkara is not whether the world originates from Brahman, but whether Brahman in manifesting the world loses itself, that is, whether the cause occupies a "privileged position" in relation to the effect. Śāṅkara's answer is that Brahman, without destroying itself, reveals itself in the form of the world and realizes in it its own life and its own bliss.

Whether there is conservation of value, and whether it is value which explains existence and ultimately renders it intelligible, and whether the idea of intelligible causation is not bound up with the giving of a "privileged position" to value — this should be the real point at issue between *Parīṇāma-vāda* and *Vivartavāda*. But this point has been lost sight of by the interpreters of Śāṅkara, and the controversy between the two schools has been understood and expressed from the existential point of view and in existential terms. Thus *Parīṇāma* is conceived as "real creation of real things"², or "real transformation of causes into effects", e. g., "the production of a pot from clay, or of curd from milk"³. *Vivarta* is regarded as the "merely apparent" or "illusory" "change" or "modification of any substance, as of the rope into the snake"⁴, and *Vivartavāda* is held to be the view about "the unreality of effects" or "effects having no substantiality" or the treatment of effects "as non-existent and false".⁵ This treatment of the concept of vivarta as an existential concept has led these interpreters to take serious objection to Śāṅkara's use of the examples intended to illustrate his theory regarding

1 Thibaut : P. XCIV.

2 Thibaut, *ibid.*

3 Dasgupta : *History*, Vol. II, PP. 38, 39.

4 Chatterjee and Datta: *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, PP. 287, 416

5 Dasgupta, *ibid.*

the creation of the effects as well as their absorption into the originating cause. Thus against Śaṅkara's view that "Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers able to transform itself into manifold effects just as milk is"¹, it is pointed out by Thibaut that this illustration "refers to the real creation of real things" and cannot be used to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. Likewise, Dr. Dasgupta finds fault with Śaṅkara for giving side by side "examples of magical creations" and of "realistic transformations." "If his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his examples of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the *pariṇāma* view of causation is to be adopted, the *vivarta* view is to be given up."²

As I pointed out before, the real issue which is of vital importance for Śaṅkara's metaphysics has been lost sight of by his interpreters. It is whether value will explain existence or existence value. According to Śaṅkara, it is value which explains existence. Value occupies a privileged position and as the notion of cause is, for Śaṅkara, the notion of value, i. e., of "reality" or the *Ātman*, the cause always possesses a superiority over the effect, whether the causality is of what the later Vedāntins and the modern interpreters call the "*pariṇāma*" type or of the "*vivarta*" type. Even when we have before us a case of what has been said to be a "real transformation of the cause into the effect, i. e. the production of a pot from clay", which is believed to be a case of *pariṇāma*, the cause and the effect do not occupy the same *status* according to Śaṅkara. The clay possesses a certain superiority over the effect, so that it is the clay in which the pot has its Self and not the pot in which the clay has its Self. The true reality is the clay; its effects are name and form assumed by the causal substance.³ If we constantly keep before our mind that the concept of causa-

1 S. B., II. 1.24.

2 Dasgupta: History, Vol. II. P. 38.

3 S. B., II. 1. 16, न ह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति । S. B., II. 2. 44, भवितव्य हि कार्यकारणयोरतिशयेन यथा मृदुषट्पथोः न ह्यसत्यतिशये कार्यकारणमित्यवकल्पते ।

lity is a value concept in the hands of Śaṅkara, that Śaṅkara's notion of cause is the notion of Ātman or Self, which is the notion of the value of 'Reality', and that it is value which explains existence and not vice versa, we shall not be required to distinguish between Parīṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda. The plausibility of this distinction and its value rest upon a confusion between the existential and the axiological notion of reality and cause. Parīṇāma is defined by the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara as "real creation of real things" or "real transformation of causes into effects". This view is borrowed from the later Vedāntins. Appayadikṣhit defines parīṇāma as a transformation or effect which has the same "status" or "order of reality" as the cause, and vivarta as an effect which has a status other than or inferior to that of the cause.¹ Parīṇāma, viewed as "real creation of real things", implies that cause and effect belong to the same order of reality. But here the significant question which suggests itself to our mind is this: what is the notion of "reality" in terms of which this definition of "parīṇāma" has been laid down? It is not difficult to see that in defining "parīṇāma" thus the concepts of "reality" and "order" are used as existential and not value concepts. It is only when cause and effect are regarded as mere existential categories that clay, which is the cause, and pot, which is the effect, can be said to belong to the same "order of reality"; both are empirical entities and possess the same empiric reality, the same vyāvahārika satta, being objects of sense perception. But the notion of cause, according to Śaṅkara, is a value notion implying degrees of reality and value; and placing things in the relation of cause and effect is placing them in an order of value. Thus it is the cause which is the Self of the effect and not the other way round. The cause, representing as it does the value of Reality, possesses a certain superiority over the effect. Thus it is not true to say, as Professor Radhakrishnan does, that "In the case of transformation, the cause and effect belong to the same order of reality"². Viewed as mere "existent

1 Siddhantalessasangraha, I. 2. वस्तुनस्तत्त्वमसत्ताकोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामः तदसमसत्ताको विवर्त इति वा ।

2 I. P., Vol. II, P. 570.

something" the clay and the pot have the same status and belong to the same order of reality. To be aware of them thus is to have factual awareness of them. But to view the clay as the cause of the pot, as the Self of the pot, and as its essence and its ground, is to raise it to a different level of reality and to confer a higher status upon it, the nature of which can be understood only when it is realized that the notions of reality and cause for an ultimate reflection are the notions of value, implying distinctions which are intelligible only as value distinctions. It is not fair to fasten upon Śaṅkara views which he did not hold and then to bring against him the charge that he is not able to keep distinct the two widely divergent views of causation, the pariṇāma view and the vivarta view, and constantly confuses them.

The true function of the "illustrative example", it must be pointed out, has also been forgotten by Thibaut and Dasgupta. "An example", according to Śaṅkara, "is cited with a view to explaining the whole by exhibiting only a part".¹ And whenever two things are compared, they are compared, says Śaṅkara, only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed, if it could be demonstrated, there would be an end of that relation which gives rise to the comparison.² At one place where he gives an example of the carpenter in order to illustrate the "upadhi", he points out definitely that the case of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to a particular extent only.³ The different illustrations given by Śaṅkara are intended to bring out special points in connection with the creative activity of Brahman, and the significance of the illustration is to be understood as being confined to that point alone. The example of the milk transforming itself into curd and of the gods creating without any extraneous means⁴ are intended only to bring out the truth that Brahman, without requiring any extraneous implements, can create the world (by its mere

1 Chaud. S.B., VI. 4.1, उदाहरणं नामैकदेशं प्रसिद्धयाशेषप्रसिद्धयर्थमुदाहृत इति ।

2 S.B., II. 3.20.

3 *ibid.*, II. 3.40.

4 *ibid.*, II.1.24.

resolve). The examples only bring out the truth that auxiliary means and extraneous implements are not indispensable. And so far as this point is concerned, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Dasgupta in thinking that these examples neither "fit in with the context" nor "hold good", and with Thibaut in believing that these "illustrative instances" are "essentially heterogeneous".¹ It is strange that these examples are understood by Thibaut to illustrate the theory which "considers unreality to be the true character of the world", as distinguished from the theory which believes in "the real creation of real things". The example of the magician given by Śaṅkara is everywhere and always intended to bring out the truth that Brahman, in the course of the creative act, does not lose its nature and the multiplicity of the creation does not tamper with the absolute unity and indivisibility of Brahman.² Similarly the "examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold" would appear to be "out of place" only if we forgot that the point which Śaṅkara intends to illustrate is that the nature of the originating cause is not affected by the reabsorption of the effect in to it. The solution of all these difficulties is that we must make a return to the standpoint of value which is organic to Śaṅkara's system.

XIII

THE CONCEPT OF AVIDYĀ

Much of the dissatisfaction with the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is due to the emphasis he lays upon the concept of Avidyā. The caustic critic goes to the length of asserting that Avidyā is the sole explanatory principle in Śaṅkara's metaphysics. We have already shown that the principle of Avidyā is indispensable for any system of metaphysics written by an intelligent author who wants to explain the fact of multiplicity. Multiplicity exists in and through a conscious experience of it, and this experience is bound up with a limited conscious.

1 *ibid.*, II. 1.24. 25. क्षीरवद्धि, देवादिवत् ।

2 S.B., II. 1-9. अस्मिन् चायमपरो दृष्टान्तो यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिद्वयि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते एव परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यते इति यथा च स्वप्नदृग्कः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति । ; *ibid.*, II. 1. 28.

ness. Hence evrey where Śāṅkara's description of Māyā as Avidyā, of the creative power as of the nature of nescience. The existence of the individual soul as such is altogether due to the relation in which it stands to nescience.¹ The world with which philosophy has to deal in respect of its value or significance is an experienced world containing within it conscious subjects and consciously experienced objects. If there is a world out of all relation to consciousness, philosophy can have nothing to do with it. The experienced world is made up of a constant and regular interaction between the subject and the object. This interaction in the form of a conscious enjoyment of the objective world is not possible without some principle of limitation, i.e., of Avidyā, which makes for limited feeling, limited knowing, and limited striving. "How could there be saṁsāra at all without Prakṛti transforming itself as causes and effects, as the body and the senses, as pleasure and pain, and without the conscious Puruṣa experiencing them? When, on the other hand, there is a conjunction—in the form of Avidyā or nescience—of Puruṣa, the experiencer, with Prakṛti, the opposite, the object of experience, in all its transformations as the body and the senses, as pleasure and pain, as causes and effects, then only is saṁsāra possible."² It is Avidyā which brings the subject and the object together. Avidyā exists either as want of knowledge, or doubt, or a wrong notion.³

The problem of the relation between Māyā and Brahman is meaningful only within the world of experience which is marked by the duality of value and existence or essence and fact. Māyā is nothing other than the creative power of Brahman. In truth the distinction between that which owns the power and the power itself has no meaning in the world of reality where essence and existence fuse in one. Making concession to the exigencies of language, we can say that Māyā is the śakti of Brahman, but we have

1 S.B., I. 4.3, अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः संततो वर्तते ।

2 Gita, S.B., XIII, 20.

3 Ibid., XIII. 2, अविद्या विपरीतग्राहकः संशयोपस्थापको वा अग्रहणात्मको वा । ; Brhad. S.B., III. 3.1, यदि ज्ञानाभावो यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीत ज्ञानं बोध्यतेऽज्ञानमिति ।

constantly to bear in mind that śakti is ananya, non-different from the śaktimat, and no question of a relation is possible as a thing cannot be related to its own self. This truth of ananyatva is not to be conceived but to be "lived". It is not logic but life which will resolve the discrepancy which is natural to the former. For the logical understanding Maya is neither one with Brahman nor wholly other than it. It is anirvacaniya, so is the world of effects. It is neither the oneness of value and existence as Brahman is; nor is it the complete divorce between the two. It shares the oneness and inseparability as well as the duality of value and existence. From the logical point of view, i. e., that of reflective consciousness, it cannot be said to be something independent like the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya. It is not anātmavastu, the Not-self. If it were so, Brahman could not be advitiya or advaita. The conception of Āvidyā, of a discrepancy between value and existence involving finiteness and limitedness, is dependent upon and presupposes the oneness and inseparability of the two. The fact of Āvidyā itself gives evidence that in one respect at least the Ātman transcends Āvidyā. "Ignorance is an object witnessed by the Self. He who visualizes the error of ignorance as something distinct from his own Self like a jar, is not himself under that error."¹

The doctrine of Māyā is neither a mere fabrication of the fertile genius of Śaṅkara nor traceable entirely to the influence of the Sūnyavāda of the Buddhists. Śaṅkara only elaborated the ideas that he found in the Upaniṣads and wove them into the contexture of his Advaitic philosophy. We find in the Upaniṣads all the material that may easily have led Śaṅkara to elaborate a theory of Māyā out of it.² The fundamentals of Śaṅkara's Advaitism were not moulded by Buddhistic influences, and the doctrine of Māyā, as it is found in Śaṅkara's works, is an indigenous development of the Upaniṣadic views. It is a natural corollary from his epistemological and ontological position. The doctrine of Māyā in Śaṅkara stands for either of the following two truths: (i)

¹ Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 6.

² Ranade : A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, P.288.

Brahman gives rise to multiplicity without destroying its unity (i. e. not really); (ii) the world of creation symbolizes the duality of value and existence (*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*). We have already shown that the principle of Creativity combined with the principles of Non-contradiction and Identity leads inevitably to the doctrine of *Māyā*.¹ The second truth that the world represents neither complete oneness of value and existence nor complete discrepancy between the two follows from the same principle and is traceable to the Upaniṣads, which speak of man's awareness of a region where all duality and opposition and strife is overcome, where "a father is no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas"², where everything becomes the Self; and of another sphere where there is duality between value and existence or Self and not-self, and where "one sees something, one smells something, one knows something"³. The world of experience is not "advaita", because it presents an unreconciled opposition between value and fact; but it is not mere "dvaita" either, because it lives on a spark of Brahman and its existence is inseparable from an Absolute Value. It is "*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*". In other words, the world of experience is the world of *Māyā*.

XIV

THE TERM *MĀYĀVĀDA* AS A LABEL

We shall conclude by saying a word as to how Śaṅkara's system is to be labelled. What is his "vāda"? Is the appellation "*Māyāvāda*", which is so often associated with the philosophy of Śaṅkara, justified? Does it represent the essential feature of Śaṅkara's system? Or is it a misnomer? A careful reading of Śaṅkara's aristocratically executed Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* will reveal to anyone his intense delight in inventing exquisitely exact names to designate his own and the rival systems. In this art he has

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, परमार्थसद्वैतं मायया भिद्यते ।

2 Brhad. IV. 3. 22.

3 Ibid., IV. 5. 15.

almost reached perfection. He uses the word "vāda" in the sense of "theory" or "doctrine" or "ism"¹ Those who hold a particular vāda are designated by him as "vādins", the word denoting exactly what its English equivalent "its" does.² Thus the Sāṅkhya system is referred to by him as Sāṅkhyavāda³, Pradhānakāraṇavāda⁴ and the upholders of the system are designated as Pradhānavādins⁵. The Vaiśeṣika system is called Aṇuvāda⁶, Aṇvādikāraṇavāda⁷ and their adherents Aṇuvādin⁸. The Nyāya system is designated as Tārikaparigrahita Īśvarakāraṇavāda⁹ or Kevalādhiṣṭhātri śvarakāraṇavāda.¹⁰ Buddhistic systems are referred to by the names of Sarvāstitva vādin, Vijñānāstitvamātravādin, Sarvā-sūnyatvavādin.

What about Śaṅkara's vāda? I have not come across any statement of Śaṅkara wherein he calls himself a Māyāvādin. The truth is that the words "Māyāvādin" and "Māyāvāda" were first applied to Śaṅkara and his philosophy by his opponents. In all probability it was Bhāskara who for the first time made use of these names to characterize Śaṅkara's philosophy. The terms, as used by Bhāskara, were those of reproach. Bhāskara, it is now settled, was either a contemporary of Śaṅkara or flourished just after his death. He frequently calls Śaṅkara a Māyāvādin, a hidden Buddhist, and dubs his philosophy Māyāvāda and regards it as another version of Vijñānavāda Buddhism.¹¹ Later writers who belonged to the rival schools only multiplied his voice, and the view that Śaṅkara's philosophy was mere Māyāvāda was given currency. Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara have merely repeated Bhāskara's utterance. Śaṅkara frequently calls himself a Brahmvādin¹²

1 S. B., I. 4. 8; II. 2. 32.

2 S. B., I. 3. 19; II. 2. 18.

3 S. B., I. 4. 9.

4 S. B., I. 1. 10; I. 4. 28; II. 1. 12; II. 2. 17.

5 S. B., II. 1. 29

6 S. B., II. 2. 13.

7 S. B., I. 4. 28.

8 S. B., II. 1. 29; II. 2. 11.

9 S. B., II. 2. 41.

10 S. B., II. 2. 37.

11 B. B., I. 2. 6; I. 2. 12; I. 4. 21; II. 2. 29; I. 4. 25; II. 1. 14.

12 S. B., II. 1. 6; II. 2. 38; II. 1. 29; III. 2. 11; II. 3. 53.

and designates his system as *Brahmavāda*¹ or *Brahmakāraṇavāda*² or *Vedāntavāda*³, implying, of course, that Brahman is the ultimate reality and the eternal source of everything. It is also called "*Īśvara Kāraṇavāda*"⁴ or more fully "*Aviśeṣeṇa-Īśvara Kāraṇavāda*", meaning that *Īśvara* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe. He also calls himself a "*Mokṣavādin*"⁵, i. e., a Value-Philosopher; for according to him *Mokṣa* is the highest good (*param puruṣārtha*) and is identical with Brahman. Brahman is consciousness, and so he calls his philosophy "*Cetanākāraṇavāda*" in opposition to the *Pradhānakāraṇavāda* of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Aṇvādikāraṇavāda* of the *Vaiśeṣika*. He is at one and the same time an Idealist (*Cetanākāraṇavādin*) and a Value Philosopher (*Mokṣavādin*). The term *Māyāvāda* in no way represents the essentials of Śaṅkara's Advaitism, the essence of which consists in the fact that the universe is an expression of Eternal Value; nor do the doctrines associated by Bhāskara with *Māyāvāda* represent Śaṅkara's position faithfully. What Śaṅkara has said about *Māyā* in his exposition of *Brahmavāda* or *Mokṣavāda* should not be raised to the rank of a "doctrine" or "vāda". To permit *Māyā* to set itself up as an independent principle is to take an external and extremely one-sided view of his system.

Though the name *Māyāvāda* was first applied to Śaṅkara's system by his enemies, who were interested in calumniating him, it was later on appropriated by many who professed to follow Śaṅkara and the terms *Māyāvāda* and *Brahmavāda* came to be synonymous. We find Govindānanda (1600 A.D.) using the terms as synonymous in his *Ratnaprabhā*. While Śaṅkara in his text calls himself a *Brahmavādin*, Govindānanda commenting upon the same text designates his system as *Māyāvāda*.⁶ Long before Govindānanda,

1 S. B., I. 3. 41; I. 1. 31; II. 2. 9.

2 S. B., I. 4. 28; II. 1. 13.

3 S. B., I. 4. 1; I. 4. 22.

4 S. B., II. 1.1; II. 2.10.

5 S. B., II. 1.11.

6 S. B., II. 1.29, परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः । Ratnaprabhā on S. B., II. 1. 29, परिहृतस्त्विति । उक्तं हि मायावादे सर्वं मामञ्जस्यम् ।

Vācaspatimiśra (840 A.D.) used the term "Māyāvāda" to designate Śaṅkara's system of the Vedānta. Commenting upon the same Sūtra,¹ Vācaspati calls Śaṅkara a Māyāvādin; for him also, as for Govindānanda, the terms Māyāvāda and Brahmapāda are interchangeable.² It seems Govindānanda borrowed this term from Vācaspatimiśra and had no reason to doubt the suitability of it as it was used by so great an authority. But the term, as used by Vācaspati, had none of the implications understood by Bhāskara. To Bhāskara the Māyāvādin did not believe in the reality of external objects; he was a mere "abāhyārthavādin"; "Āvidyā" was the sole explanatory principle with him—he was an "āvidyāmātravādin"; for him the external objects were merely phases of consciousness; thus the Māyāvādin was merely a hidden Buddhist. But for Vācaspati Māyāvāda is the doctrine that Brahman the ultimate reality creates the entire universe of names and forms, which is characterized by multiplicity, without destroying its real nature. This is what Śaṅkara also holds, though he calls this view Brahmapāda, and not Māyāvāda as Vācaspati does.³ According to Vācaspati the above sūtra and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon contain the essence of Māyāvāda, and the line just quoted sums up this vāda.⁴ So far as Śaṅkara and Vācaspati are concerned there is a difference only in the names used and there is perfect agreement regarding the essentials of the doctrine which the names are meant to signify. The only thing which is striking is that Vācaspati uses the term Māyāvāda while in his text Śaṅkara uses the term Brahmapāda. It seems Vācaspati was led to use the term in his defence of Śaṅkara against the attacks of Bhāskara, who had criticized him as a mere Māyāvādin. Vācaspati appropriated the term, while at the same time removing the misconceptions which had been associated with it by Bhāskara. In the latter act he rendered a signal service to Śaṅkara's Vedānta; but he little realized that in retaining the name which Bhāskara had coined he was taking

1 S.B., II. 1.29.

2 Bhamati on S.B., II. 1.29, न पुनरस्माकं मायावादिनाम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.28 एकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यति ।

4 Bhamati on II, 1.28, अनेन स्फुटितो मायावाद स्वप्नदृगात्मा हि मनसैव स्वरूपानुपमर्देन रथादीन सृजति ।

a step which, in this world of "name and form", would give rise to misconceptions and allow them to gather round the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. What Vācaspati wanted to emphasize was that Śaṅkara's view of Māyā, which formed an indispensable part of his Brahmanavāda, was not open to the charges levelled by Bhāskara. There is no doubt that the term Brahmanavāda is much more significant than the term Māyāvāda, because Brahman for Śaṅkara is the highest good (Mokṣa) as well as the highest reality (Ātman), and Brahmanavāda is an exposition of this. Śaṅkara's philosophy is not a philosophy of Māyā but a philosophy of Value, and his doctrine of Māyā is but incidental to it.

CHAPTER XI
THE ALLEGED CREATIVITY OF A
PHENOMENAL ĪŚVARA

THE CURRENT VIEW

Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, all attribute to Śaṅkara the view that Brahman cannot be defined as that from which the world proceeds and that the Second Sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ" is a definition not of the Śuddha or Nirguṇa Brahman but of the Māyāśābala or Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman, that is, of Īśvara. They are unanimous in holding that Śaṅkara denies the possibility of the origin of the universe from Brahman, which is the absolute reality, and insists upon the recognition of another reality in the form of a Saṅguṇa Brahman or Īśvara to account for the world of becoming. Thibaut regards Śaṅkara's Brahman as Pure Being, as a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, and raises the question: Whence, then, the appearance of the world? Śaṅkara's answer, according to him, is that Brahman is associated with a certain power called Māyā or Avidyā, to which the appearance of the entire world is due. The non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as it is intelligent, but in so far as it is associated with Māyā, which itself is of a non-intelligent nature. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called Īśvara. This "Īśvara is himself something unreal."¹ Likewise Deussen also holds that, according to Śaṅkara, it is only a Saṅguṇa, Savīṣeṣam, not a Nirguṇa or Nirviṣeṣam Brahman, who can be a creator. for in order to create Brahman requires a plurality of powers and these stand in contradiction to a Nirviṣeṣam Brahman.² The Saṅguṇa Brahman is the lower Brahman, and "only a lower not a higher Brahman can be conceived as creator of the world", and it is the Aparāvidyā which "treats the creation

¹ Thibaut : P. XXX.

² D. S. V., P. 107.

Īśvara, "who is different from Brahman", who "has less of reality than absolute being", who is himself "not above time but subject to time", and who belongs to the "empirical world" and is "phenomenal" in character, is capable of performing a feat which the "absolute being" itself is powerless to perform. Eternity alone explains time and the permanent the changing, according to Śaṅkara. The real, without giving up its nature, gives rise to change and explains that change as part and parcel of the meaning of the rational life of the real.¹ This, it should be recalled, is the essence of Śaṅkara's doctrine of vivartavāda or māyāvāda. Śaṅkara clearly says that change cannot explain change. "Even in those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition)."² Only things of permanent nature, which are always recognized as what they are, such as gold, are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments. Śaṅkara, who has severely criticized the Buddhist view "that nothing can become a cause so long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction"³, can hardly be expected to subscribe to the position that "a changing Brahman", for whom "changelessness and inactivity are impossible" and whose "nature undergoes change, contraction and expansion"⁴, is a metaphysical necessity: Śaṅkara's Brahman, like Aristotle's God, is the first mover and itself immovable.

Śaṅkara would have been not only shocked to hear that Īśvara, who was regarded by him as all-pervading, all-knowing, all powerful and the self of everyone, is represented by his

1 S.B., II. 1.28. नैवात्र विवर्तितव्यं कथमेकस्मिन्ब्रह्माणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकाराः सृष्टिः स्यादिति ।

2 S.B., II. 1.27.

3 Ibid., यत्कृतं स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्ति भवितुमर्हति इति ।

4 Radhakrishnan: I. P., Vol II, PP.557, 558.

interpreters as phenomenal, illusory, subject to time, possessing a deficient reality and belonging to the empirical world; he would have regarded it as blasphemy. The world of space and time, according to him, is grounded in a reality which is above space and time, which is the source of space and time themselves, and which itself is not a link in the causal chain of spatial and temporal events. Far from arguing the phenomenal character of Īśvara and establishing his empirical nature, in every line which he has written we see his unfailing insistence on the non-temporal and non-spatial character of Īśvara.¹ His Advaitism, he plainly confesses, is opposed to all attempts at "establishing the phenomenal character or empirical self-hood of Īśvara; it rather is concerned with denying the empirical character of the transmigrating soul and teaching that Īśvara is its real Self".² Īśvara is the source of the universe but is not subject to the changes which affect the universe; it is not a part of the universal flux which is the universe. It is present from the very foundation of the world but is not a part of the process which is the world. The world follows from Him but He does not flow with the world. He is eternally real.³ He is exempt from the attributes of empirical existence.⁴ The realization of him alone can bring about the cessation of the evils and imperfections which are natural to empirical life and existence. The truth is that the words Brahman and Īśvara are used by Śaṅkara to designate one and the same metaphysical reality. There is nothing in Śaṅkara to warrant the conclusion that Brahman is the Absolute Reality in his system of the Vedānta, and that the word Īśvara has been coined by him and reserved for the "Apara" or the lower Brahman. The distinction between the Para and the Apra Brahman, between the Nirguṇa and the Saṅguṇa Brahman, is not a metaphysical distinction in Śaṅkara. It is relevant and has significance within the sphere of practical realization. In the sphere of Upāsanā we are at

1 S.B. IV. 3.10. न देशकालादिविशेषयोगः परमात्मनि कल्पयितुं शक्यते ।

2 S.B., IV. 1.3. न हीश्वरस्य संसायित्वं प्रतिपाद्यते इत्यभ्युपगच्छामः किं तर्हि?
संसारिणः संसारित्वापोहेन ईश्वरात्मतत्त्वं प्रतिपिपादयिषितमिति ।

3 S.B., I. 1.5. नित्यसिद्धेश्वरस्य; Aitareya. S.B., I 1.1. पूर्वसिद्ध ।

4 S.B., IV. 1.12. एष व्यावृत्तसर्वसंसारधर्मकोऽयम्; Aitareya. S.B., I. 1.1. जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयकृदसंसारो सर्वज्ञः ।

liberty to think of Brahman in one way or another in order to comprehend its nature and bring it nearer to us. But when it is our aim to ascertain truth, which means "knowing" a thing as it is, we cannot think of it in alternative ways. The determination of the nature of the metaphysical truth cannot permit the recognition of alternative realities, a Brahman as the Absolutely Real and an *Īśvara* who "has less of reality than Absolute being".¹ The distinction between the Para and the *Āpara* Brahman has reference to the distinction between *Jñāna* and *Upāsana*, or Knowledge and Activity.² If *Āpara* Brahman is the *Upāsya*, the object of worship, "the best image of the truth", "the way in which the everlasting real appears to our human mind", our unwillingness to recognize and postulate it as the first metaphysical principle should not result in the introduction of irrationality into the universe and in leaving the mystery of creation "unexplained".

According to Śaṅkara Para Brahman is the same as the *Kāraṇa* or the *Suddha* Brahman, the same as the *Nirguṇa* or *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman; and the words Brahman and *Īśvara* are used to refer to the same reality. This Para Brahman is the causal explanation of the world in his system, which is at once called by him *Brahmavāda* and *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and is distinguished from other rival systems of thought in its insistence on Brahman being the Efficient as well as the Material Cause of the universe. Śaṅkara calls his *Brahmakāraṇavāda* by another name also, namely, *Aviśeṣeśvara-kāraṇavāda*³, where emphasis is laid on Brahman's being the sole and unconditional causal principle. The view that *Īśvara* and not Brahman, the *Saguṇa* and not *Nirguṇa*, the *Āpara* and not the Para, the *Saviśeṣa* and not the *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, is put forward by Śaṅkara as the causal principle of the universe has taken so deep a root in the minds of his readers that nothing short of an exhaustive, systematic, and synthetic appeal to his *ipsissima verba* will be of any avail in removing from our minds this idea. This appeal to his written words

1 Radhakrishnan: I.P., Vol. II, P.572.

2 *Kaṭha*. S.B., I.3.2. परमार्थज्ञानी सर्वज्ञविदात्मने ।

3 S.B., II. 2.37.

and the spirit in which they were written is rendered all the more necessary on account of the weight of authority which scholars like Deussen, Dasgupta, Thibaut and Radhakrishnan have lent to this view by accepting it as representative of the main tendency of Śaṅkara's cosmological speculation.

III

PARA BRAHMAN OR ĀTMAN DESCRIBED AS THE ROOT CAUSE

Though from Śaṅkara's statements to the effect that Brahman is the cause of universe, the view that the exigencies of thought demand the recognition of a Saguna Brahman, of an Īśvara who is "different" from Brahman and who is an "inferior" principle as Creator, is altogether excluded, yet there are explicit assertions of Śaṅkara where Para Brahman and it alone is described as the originating cause of the universe. "All these beings take their rise from the ether only—this sentence clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedānta-texts agree in declaring that all beings spring from the highest Brahman."¹ This Para Brahman is said to be the Mūlakāraṇa, the Originating Cause. It is the Param Kāraṇa, the Great Cause.² That very Brahman whose comprehension is said to lead to the summum bonum is the cause of the universe. "On the introductory words, 'he who knows Brahman attains the highest', there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman is true Existence, Intelligence and Infinity; after that it is said that from this very Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things, and that entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all."³ Brahman is described as Ākāśa in the Upaniṣad, and this Ākāśa or Ether is said to be the revealer of all names and forms.⁴ This Ākāśa is the Para Brahman according to Śaṅ-

1 S.B., I. 1.22. परस्व हि ब्रह्मणः इदं लिङ्गम् 'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि आकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते' इति परस्मादि ब्रह्मणो भूतानामुत्पत्तिरिति वेदान्तेषु मर्यादा ।

2 Ibid.

3 S.B., I. 1.15.

4 Chand., VIII 14.1.

kara. "The word 'Ether' can denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing. The complete revelation of name and form cannot be accomplished by anything else except Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self and evolve names and forms'¹ It is on account of the revelation of names and forms that creatorship is the characteristic mark of Brahman."² The Para Brahman alone is the causal principle; and it is only the Kāraṇa Brahman that can be said to be above the manifoldness, the diversity, and the division which affect the Aparā Brahman.³ The Kāraṇa Brahman is One and Non-dual. "In the manifested Brahman we may meet women but not in the Kāraṇa Brahman, (which is) the causal principle; for it is one and indivisible and knows no second, as is evident from the texts, 'Where one sees nothing else' and 'Who shall find whom there?'"⁴ The word Brahman is always used by Śaṅkara to mean Para Brahman, unless otherwise indicated; and when Brahman is described as the source of the universe, it is this Brahman and not any "inferior" or "phenomenal" reality that is meant.⁵ All the Vedānta texts are at one in using the word "Brahman" to mean Brahman which is the cause of the world.⁶ The distinction between Brahman and Īśvara conceived as different metaphysical principles is sanctioned neither by his written words nor by the spirit which informs his writing. There is only one ultimate principle. It is the Self of the universe and of every one of us. It is an interesting problem for the student of Śaṅkara to discover how, in spite of definite statements of Śaṅkara to the effect that Para Brahman is the cause of universe, the view that Aparā and not Para, Savīśeṣa and not Nirvīśeṣa Brahman, is the originat-

1 Ibid., VI. 3.2.

2 S.B., I. 3.41.

3 Mānd. S.E., II. 2.8. परं च कारणात्मनावरं च कार्यात्मना । S.B., III. 2.14.

‘आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म’ इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वप्रधानानि नार्थान्तरप्रधानानि ।

4 Taitt. S. B., I. 11.1.

5 S.B., I. 13. 14. परस्यैवेदं ब्रह्मणः पुरं सच्छरीरं ब्रह्मपुरमित्युच्यते ब्रह्मशब्दस्य तस्मिन्मुख्यत्वात् ।

6 S. B., II. 1. 1. यत्सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धं ब्रह्मशब्दस्यालम्बनं जगत्कारणम् ।

ing cause came to be accepted as representing the orthodox Vedānta position. We shall take up this question when we discuss the relation between Śaṅkara and the Vivaraṇa School of Prakāśātman. Meanwhile it is necessary to show the hollowness of the view that Īśvara and not Brahman is the creative principle by adducing more statements of Śaṅkara where he speaks of Para Brahman as evolving the universe and guiding its course as its inner controller. "The highest Brahman only is the evolving agent."¹ "And as the worlds and everything else are produced from the highest Brahman, so the prāṇas also.....As ether and so on are understood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prāṇas also are effects of the highest Brahman."² This statement as to the origin of the prāṇa, etc., from Brahman cannot be taken in a secondary sense; for the whole point of Śaṅkara's metaphysics is to show that Brahman, being the only reality, is the cause of everything and that this is why by knowing one thing every other thing is known, nothing being, in essence, other than that one thing. On any other interpretation the promissory utterance about the possibility of knowing everything by knowing the One will have to be abandoned, according to Śaṅkara, which would mean an abandonment of the very truth for which Śaṅkara's system stands, namely that Reality is advaitam or non-dual. Śaṅkara cannot be expected to introduce surreptitiously an "inferior" principle in the form of Īśvara, when he has himself been battling throughout his works against any and every form of dualism and pluralism.

Deussen's view that, according to Śaṅkara, Brahman, in order to create, requires a plurality of powers, and as these stand in contradiction to a nirviśeṣam Brahman, only "a sagunam, saviśeṣam", not "a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam" Brahman, can be a creator does little justice to Śaṅkara. The whole point of Śaṅkara's view of evolution or creation is that it is a process of differentiation in which unity gives rise to multiplicity, homogeneity to heterogeneity, indefiniteness to definiteness. In Śaṅkara's words, it is a process of the sāmā-

1 S. B., II. 4. 20. परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्याकृतं त्वमिहोपदिश्यते ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 1. यथा लोकादयः परस्माद्ब्रह्मणः उत्पद्यन्ते तथा प्राणा अपीत्यर्थः ।

nya, the general or universal, setting itself up as the *viśeṣa*, the special or particular.¹ Brahman is the *Mahāsāmānya* according to Śaṅkara, the Great Universal from which all the variety of genera and species and the particulars included in them arise and separate and which includes them all.² These are all unified in Brahman and are not different from it. As the *Mahāsāmānya*, Brahman is the "Root Cause" of the universe, whose reality cannot be denied.³ This Root or Original Cause, the *Mūlaprakṛti* which is Śaṅkara's Brahman, is *nirviśeṣam*, devoid of all specifications and particularizations, though it is the source of all particulars and differentiations. This is why Śaṅkara calls Brahman one "without breath and without mind, pure, higher than the high, imperishable".⁴ "Without breath, without mind, pure"⁵—these according to Śaṅkara, are the characterizations of the *Śuddha* Brahman, which is to be sharply distinguished from the *Saguṇa* or the qualified Brahman.⁶ It follows that it is the *Śuddha*, the *Nirguṇa*, and not the *Saguṇa* Brahman, which is the creative principle behind the universe. The *Śuddha* or the unqualified Brahman is the Root Cause. The conception of the *Saguṇa* Brahman, as we have shown, is the conception of the *Upāśya* Brahman in Śaṅkara's system. Far from representing a metaphysical truth which explains the existence of names and forms themselves, it is an embodiment of "the imperfect figurative ideas which we form of the Godhead in order to bring it nearer to our understanding and our worship", and presupposes the evolution of names and form, which supply the very basis of these presentation forms. This is not only a matter of inference for us, to be arrived at with the help of statements made at different places. There are explicit statements of Śaṅkara to this effect. "Though devoid of all specifications, it certainly exists, being known

1 S. B. II. 3. 9. समान्याद्वि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 9.

3 S. B., II. 4. 7. मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेऽवस्थाप्रसंगात् । या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म ।

4 S. B., II. 4. 2. मूलप्रकृतेः प्राणादिसमस्तविशेषरहितत्वावधारणात् । Ibid., II 4. 8.

5 Mund. II. 1. 2.

6 S. B., I. 2. 2. 'अप्राणो ह्यमना दृष्टः' इति श्रुतिः शुद्धब्रह्मविषया इयं तु मनोमयः प्राणशरीरः इति सगुणब्रह्म विषयेति विशेषः ।

as the root cause of the universe; for that into which effects are absorbed must undoubtedly exist. The whole system of effects traced back in the ascending series of subtlety leads to the conviction of something as existent (in the last resort)Therefore the cause of the world, the Ātman, must be known as existing."¹ Brahman is the essence of the entire universe of name and form, and being the essence it is the Mūlakāraṇa, the Original Cause, Mūlaprakṛti, the Aboriginal Stuff, the Paramakāraṇa, the Great Cause.²

When it is said that Brahman is "without prāṇa, without mind, and pure", it is not meant that Brahman on account of being immutable is not the cause of the manifested universe. This way of characterizing the Nirguṇa or Nirviśeṣa Brahman is not meant to negative its creativity. It is only a way of emphasizing the truth that prāṇa, etc., do not maintain their nature eternally and always as Brahman maintains its nature. Brahman therefore which is eternal perdurability, cannot be said to be "endowed with prāṇa, etc.," because they are partial moments in the Absolute life of Brahman. "If prāṇa, etc., existed as such in their own forms before their creation, like the Puruṣa, then the Puruṣa might be said to be "with prāṇa" because of their then existence. But they, the prāṇa and the rest, do not, like the puruṣa, exist in their own forms before their creation. So the highest Puruṣa is without prāṇa, etc., just as Devadatta is said to be without a son before one is born to him."³ According to Śaṅkara, the mind and all the sensory organs and their objects are born of this Unqualified Brahman, which is without prāṇa, without mind, and pure.⁴ In the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada "this very being who is to be known from the Upaniṣads and who has been described as 'Not this, Not this', who projects eight beings and withdraws them into the heart.....who transcends the being identified with the universe with his three states.....body, heart and sūtra, has been described both directly and as the

1 Katha S. B., II. 3. 12, तदाऽपि सर्वविज्ञेयरहितोऽपि जगतो मूलम्..... तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपपन्नव्यवः ।

2 S. B., II. 2. 9; II. 3. 14.

3 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 2.

4 Ibid., II. 1. 3.

material cause of the universe in the words 'Knowledge, Bliss', etc."¹

Brahman is called the Aksara, the Immutable, by Śaṅkara, and from this Immutable the whole creation is said to take its rise, "just as the spider without requiring any other cause itself creates, that is, sends out threads not distinct from its own body and again absorbs them itself"². At another place this Immutable Aksara is said to be the very essence of the universe, its immortal source, from which it proceeds and into which it is absorbed³. In view of such statements it is difficult to believe that Śaṅkara would have approved of Professor Radhakrishnan's line of argument explaining and justifying the "recognition of a Saṁguṇa Brahman or changing Brahman, an Īśvara" as necessary to account for "the world of becoming", because Brahman, which is Immutable, cannot give rise to change.

The words Ātman, Paramātmān, and Brahman are used in the same sense by Śaṅkara. Ātman is the same as Paramātmān. It is Brahman itself⁴. Paramātmān and Brahman are the same as Ānanda⁵. The same metaphysical reality which is declared to be the supreme source and the First and Final Cause of the universe is indifferently named Brahman, Ātman, and Paramātmān. It is said to be the Ātman of the entire universe precisely because it is its originating cause.⁶ The creation of the entire system of effects cannot possibly belong to any Self other than the highest Self⁷. "Everything springs from the Ātman, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance, for it cannot be perceived apart from the Ātman."⁸ Ātman is the Self-comm-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 1. 1, यः ओपनिषदः पुरुषो नन्ति नेतीति व्यपदिष्टः स माक्षा-
चोपादानकारणस्वरूपेण च निदिष्टः 'विज्ञानमानन्द ब्रह्म' इति ।

2 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 7.

3 Ibid., II. 1. 1.

4 S. B., I. 3. 1, आत्मशब्दश्च परमात्मपरिग्रहे सम्यगवकल्पते ।

5 S. B., I. 1. 12, ब्रह्मण्येवानन्द शब्दो दृष्टः । परस्मिन्नेव ह्यात्मन्यानन्दगदो
बहुकृतोऽभ्यस्यते । आनन्दमयः पर एव आत्मा ।

6 S. B., I. 1. 12, आत्मनः कारणत्वं दर्शयन्ति सर्वे वेदान्ताः ।

7 S. B., I. 1. 16.

8 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 6., S. B., I. 4. 6., III. 3. 16; Mund. S. B., II. 1. 10.

unicating life according to Śaṅkara¹. There are not two views traceable in Śaṅkara regarding the creative aspect of Supreme Reality which is sometimes called Brahman, sometimes Ātman and at other times Paramātman. "As the creator is described in any one Vedānta passage as all-knowing, the Lord of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedānta passages also. Brahman is, for instance, described as "Truth, Knowledge, and Infinity."² Here the word "Knowledge" and so likewise the statement made later on that "Brahman desired" intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares that the cause of the world is the Lord by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term "Ātman", and represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with the gross body, whereby it affirms it to be the internal self within all beings. Again, in the passage "May I be many, may I grow forth" — it tells how the Self becomes many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-different from the created effects. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also.³

IV

PARA BRAHMAN DESCRIBED AS PARAM

ĪSVARA

Just as Brahman, Ātman, and Paramātman are declared to be the originating cause of the world and its inner essence by virtue of this causality, similarly Īsvara also is invariably described as the source and the end of the whole creation. The word "Īsvara" is used in Śaṅkara to indicate the same Absolute Reality as is signified by the words Brahman, Ātman and Paramātman, and not any other entity which is "different" from them or on a lower level, or which is a mediating principle between Brahman and the world, or which is,

1 S. B., I. 4. 26. आत्मनः कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च दर्शयति ।

2 Talit., II. I.

3 Chand., VI. 2. 1; S. B., I. 4. 14.

In any sense, illusory or phenomenal or possesses a deficient or borrowed reality. All these views are at variance with the teaching of Śāṅkara, who openly declares that "in any attempt to ascertain the true meaning of the Vedānta texts we meet with no intelligent reality except the omniscient Īśvara, whose essence is eternal freedom".¹ He is described in the following Upaniṣadic texts: "There is no other seer but He, there is no other perceiver but He, there is no other knower but He"²; "There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it"³; "Thou art that"⁴, "I am Brahman"⁵. It is the highest reality. It is eternally existent and eternally perfect.⁶ From Śāṅkara's statement that "there is no permanence anywhere apart from the highest Brahman", and Īśvara is eternally real, it would naturally follow that Īśvara and Brahman are one and the same. But even the bare possibility of doubt is excluded when we find him attributing the work of creation and of the revelation of name and form, in one and the same passage, indifferently to Para Brahman and to Paramaśvara. "For the text says at first 'that divinity, etc., and then goes on in the first person, 'let me evolve', which implies the statement that Para Brahman only is the evolving agent..... That the highest Lord (Paramaśvara) alone evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged by all the Upaniṣads. The evolution of names and forms, therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who is also the author of the tripartite arrangements."⁷ It is no account of oneness of Īśvara and Brahman that the realization of Īśvara as our very Ātman is insisted upon by Śāṅkara for the attainment of the

1 S.B., II. 2. 33. न हि निरवमृताः परमात्मैवादीदृश्यादन्त्यस्तेनो वातुः द्वितीया विद्वान्नाहं निरुपनायामुपसन्त्यते ।

2 Brhad., III. 7. 23.

3 Chan., VI. 8. 7.

4 Ibid., VI. 1. 6.

5 Brhad., I. 4. 7.

6 S.B., IV. 4. 17. 18. निरवमिदं, पृथ्विमिदं ईश्वरः; S.B., IV. 4. 21. अनादिमिदं न-
हरेण ।

7 S.B., IV. 3. 9. न हि परमादुद्भवाणीत्यत्र तत्रचित्प्रत्यया मयमावयन्ति ।

8 S.B., II. 4. 20. तथा हि 'देवर्षेभ्यः' इत्यत्र कस्य? आकाशानि? इत्युक्तमनुस्यप्रयोगेन-
परमैव ब्रह्मणः आकाशं त्वमिहोपदिश्यते..... परमेश्वर एव नामरूपयो-
र्आकर्षेति मयीति निमित्तमिदं ब्रह्मणः ।

summum bonum. For Śaṅkara the choice is not between "the realization of Brahman" or "the realization of Īśvara". It is a choice between two different ways in which Brahman and Īśvara, which are one and the same, are to be realized—whether the realization of Brahman and Īśvara as our very "Ātman", our very "Self", will ensure the attainment of human perfection, or the realization of them as something other than our Self, as our controller or governor. For Śaṅkara the possibility of liberation is bound up with the first alternative. Accordingly he says that "the great Lord is to be realized as our very Self".¹ To the question whether the Paramatman is to be realized as one with us or as other than our Self his uniform answer is: "as our very Self".² The particle "tat" in the sacred formula of the Vedāntin, namely "tattvamaṣi" signifies, according to Śaṅkara, "the thinking Brahman which is the cause of the origin, etc., of the world, and which is known from passages like the following: "Brahman, which is Knowledge and Bliss"; "Brahman is unseen but seeing, unknown but knowing"; "not produced, not subject to old age, not subject to death, not coarse, not fine, not short, not long".³ Param Ātman, Param Brahman, Param Īśvara are words which are used by Śaṅkara invariably to designate one and the same entity which is the highest value and the highest reality and, in the latter capacity, the highest Self and the source of the universe also.⁴ As Brahman and Mokṣa are said to be eternally perfect, so Īśvara also is described as Nityasiddha.⁵ This eternally real and eternally perfect Īśvara is the subject-matter of Paravidyā, and the realization of it results in the attainment of summum bonum. In Śaṅkara's system the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of Paravidyā. If we were to assume that the Indestructible

1 S.B., IV. 1.3. द्वाहयन्ति च आत्मनोर्नवेदस्वर वेदान्तवाक्यानि नित्यमपि ॥१॥

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad., III. 8. 11.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 12. एक एव तु परमात्मेश्वरः ।

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 8. 8.

6 S. B. III. 4. 2. नृत्वंदेन च प्रकृतं मदं ब्रह्मेशित्वं जगती जन्मादिकारणमविधीयते 'मत्त्वं' ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तं. २. ६ ६.) 'विज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३. ८. ११.) ।

7 S.B., IV. 3. 14. नित्यमिदं निःशेषम्; S.B., III. 4. 52. नित्यमिदं त्वभावेनैव;
S.B., IV. 4. 18 पूर्वमिदं ईश्वरः नित्यमिदं ईश्वरः ।

distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Īśvara, the knowledge referring to it would not be Parāvidyā. The distinction of Parā and Aparā Vidyā is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to absolute good, the latter to merely worldly exaltation."¹

Deussen's view that Īśvara and the treatment of creation belong to Aparāvidyā is hardly consistent with the position of Śaṅkara, who takes special care to do away with all such views as seek to establish two or more metaphysical realities. There are no "fluctuations" between the empirical and the metaphysical standpoint in the sphere of cosmology as Deussen supposes to be the case. The root of the whole difficulty is that Deussen starts with the presumption that "the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms", an esoteric and an exoteric, and that these two forms are present and run parallel in all the provinces of the Vedānta teaching. But the truth is that Śaṅkara adopts only one standpoint, namely that of value, and it is from this standpoint that he explains the fact of creation and the meaning of the creative process. Deussen misses the truth that the distinction between the Aparāvidyā and the Parāvidyā is an axiological distinction in Śaṅkara, the former dealing with the relative good (abhyudaya) and the latter with the absolute good (niḥśreyasa); the Aparāvidyā treats of creation as a fact, the parāvidyā seeks to determine the meaning of this fact. It is only when we give up the standpoint of value which is central to Śaṅkara's metaphysics that we are led to imagine that his teaching of the metaphysical identity of Brahman and the world "cannot be brought into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which he himself bestowed on it".² The fluctuations between the empirical and the metaphysical standpoint in the sphere of Cosmology of which Deussen speaks, the false connections in the organism of his system which he discovers, and Śaṅkara's alleged failure to bring together the exoteric doctrines into a whole of exoteric metaphysics, which he considers essential, are all connected with the failure to realise that Śaṅkara's metaphysics is a metaphysics of value.

1 S.B. I. 2. 22.

2 D. S. V., P. 101.

The words Brahman and Īśvara indicate one and the same metaphysical reality, and accordingly Brahman and Īśvara are indifferently described as the cause and the source of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the universe. "That omniscient and omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this world is Brahman."¹ "The origin, etc., of the world possessing the characteristics stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else except the Īśvara possessing the qualities noted above."² The real nature of Brahman or Īśvara is above all particularizations because Brahman is *advaitam*, non-dual, and there is nothing other than it. "The real form of Īśvara is devoid of all particularizations and specifications."³ To the objection that the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self or Brahman does not leave any room for the ascription of creative activity to it Śāṅkara's unequivocal answer is that the fundamental tenet which he has outlined in I. 1. 2, namely that the creation, subsistence and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, is not contradicted here. "That tenet is maintained and we do not teach anything contrary to it."⁴

Brahman is described by Śāṅkara as the reality "from which are born all the living things from *Brahmā* to a worm, by which, being born, these living things are sustained, into which these beings enter at the time of their destruction and with which they become one, from which these things do not swerve either at birth or death or during their existence". This is the description of Brahman, and we are asked to realize this Brahman with a view to attaining immortality.⁵ "Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth' show in the first place that the Ātman is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by its reflection; and in the second place that it is the material cause also, since the words 'may I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying

1 S. B., I. 1. 2; I. 1. 5; I. 1. 11; I. 1. 20.

2 S. B., I. 1. 2.

3 S. B., I. 1. 20. निरस्तसर्वविशेषं पारमेश्वरं रूपम् ।

4 S. B., II. 1. 14. सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव न तद्विग्रहोऽयं पुनरिहोच्यते ।

5 Taitt. S. B., III. 1. 1.

itself has the inner Ātman for its object.”¹ The scripture, by saying that “the Self made itself”, intends to bring out the agency as well as the objectivity of the Self.²

It must be remembered that it is a concession to the ordinary modes of speech that Brahman is spoken of as the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. In Brahman itself there is no such distinction. The distinction is relevant to human ways of speaking the truth, and language always falls short of Brahman. Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with the thinkers who view God as the efficient cause only is due to the fact that these introduce into the nature of God a dualism, and therefore an imperfection, which, on their own assumption, is quite foreign to his nature. All of them profess to be Advaitavādins but they are not able to remain consistent with the Advaita creed. It is only a radical revision of the tables of stone on which their tenets are engraved that can bring about the much needed harmony between their silent assumption and their explicit faith, want of which is the bane of their systems.

V

THE UNITY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL AND THE COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

“The Ātman is the ‘operative’ cause because there is no other ruling principle, and the ‘material’ cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.”³ In Śaṅkara's works we do not even find a trace of the distinction between the Nirguṇa and the Māyāśabala Brahman of which Prakāśātman and the modern interpreters make so much. The very problem for which the later Vedānta had to create a metaphysical principle in the form of a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is non-existent in Śaṅkara. Brahman is always declared to be the origin and the source of the universe,

1 S. B., I. 4. 24.

2 S. B., I. 4. 26.

3 S. B., I. 4. 23, अविष्टान्तराभावादात्मनः कर्तृत्वमुपादानाभावाच्च प्रकृतित्वम् ।

and the word *Īśvara* is uniformly used as synonymous with Brahman. This Brahman or *Īśvara* is the principle in the realization of which consists the summum bonum of life. Śāṅkara has summarized his discussions, extending over several pages in certain places, in his Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, and these summaries unmistakably point to Brahman as the First Cause and as the highest end of human life. Śāṅkara sums up his long discussion carried on in the commentary on the first four *Sūtras* in the following words: "So far it has been declared that the *Vedānta* passages whose purport is to intimate to us the truth of Brahman being the *Ātman* of every one of us, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to action. And it has been further shown that Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world."¹ A little further on we find him re-emphasising the same point. "All the *Vedānta* texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman.....They declare the *Ātman* to be the cause.....The all-knowing Brahman is therefore to be viewed as the cause of the world, on account of the uniformity of view of the *Vedānta* texts."² In the beginning of the Second *Pāda* of the First *Adhyāya* Śāṅkara summarizes the contents of his comments on the *sūtras* of the first *pāda* in the following words: "In the First *Pāda* Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain characteristics have (implicitly) been declared—all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on." A little further on, summarizing his discussions, he says again the same thing: "After having set forth inquiry into Brahman as the main topic, we have first defined Brahman as that from which the origin, etc. We have, thereupon, refuted the objection that this definition holds good of the *Pradhāna* also by showing that there is no scriptural authority for this."³ We have shown in detail that the common purport of all the *Vedānta* texts is

1 S. B., I. 1. 5.

2 S. B., I. 1. 11.

3 S. B., I. 1. 5.

to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not Pradhāna, is the cause of the world."¹ The whole of the First Adhyāya is summarized at the end, and the discussion is shown to have developed the view that Brahman is the First or Originating Cause, and, as such, the very Self of every one of us, and it is the one aim of all the Vedānta texts to establish the selfhood of Brahman.² "It has been shown in the First Adhyāya that the omniscient Īśvara is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his controlling the created world, he is the cause of the subsistence of the world, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical display; and that lastly he is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has been further proved that Īśvara is the Self of every one of us."³ There is no alternative left to us except recognizing that there is only one ultimate Reality in Śaṅkara. We may call it Brahman, Ātman or Īśvara. It is the source of the entire multiplicity of the universe, and its destiny also. In the realization of this Brahman as our very Self lies the perfection of human achievement, and with it the cessation of transmigratory existence and its attendant evils and imperfections.

VI

THE THEORY OF MĀYĀŚĀBALA BRAHMAN

The theory that it is the Māyāśābala Brahman and not the Śuddha which is the creative principle behind the universe with its richness and variety is as old as Prakāśātman (1200 A. D.) and has been revived in modern times with much force of argument and added strength of conviction. It was Prakāśātman who, for the first time in the history of the Advaita Vedānta, impressed upon us the necessity of recognizing a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman in order to explain the becoming of the universe on the ground that the Śuddha Brahman, by its nature, was not an efficient metaphysical principle.

1 S. B., I. 4. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1.

3 S. B., II. 1. 1.

With the recognition of the distinction between the Śuddha and the Mâyāviśiṣṭa Brahman, he also distinguished between the "taṭastha" and the "svarūpa" lakṣaṇa of Brahman, and creatorship was declared to be the taṭastha lakṣaṇa of Brahman. According to Prakāśātman the world of becoming cannot be due to Brahman, which is the object of the inquiry undertaken by the Brahma Śūtra. Creation presupposes a multiplicity of powers adapted to a variety of actions and the power to generate it is foreign to and inconsistent with the nature of the Viśuddha Brahman. The creative power is thus merely upalakṣaṇa of Brahman. It is not its essential nature but merely an accidental feature of it.¹ Deussen repeated the same thing about seven hundred years after Prakāśātman, when he wrote that, in order to create, Brahman requires a plurality of powers, but as these stand in contradiction to a Nirviśeṣa Brahman, only a Saṁguṇa, Saviśeṣam, not a Nirguṇam, Nirviśeṣam Brahman can be creator. Prakāśātman's logic leads him to recognize another principle which, in conjunction with Brahman, would be able to produce the world of name and form with its multiplicity of agents and enjoyers and objects of enjoyment. This second principle is that of Mâyā. Brahman qualified by Mâyā is the causal explanation of the universe.² Vidyāraṇya, one of the most notable representatives of the Vivaraṇa school of Śaṅkara Vedānta, in commenting upon Prakāśātman's Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, distinguishes between the Śuddha and the Kāraṇa Brahman, and attributes the work of creation to the latter. Though, according to him, the Śuddha Brahman cannot be said to have anything to do with creation and the creative process, the Mâyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is vitally connected with it and alone deserves to be viewed as the explanatory principle. The Second Śūtra is a definition, not of the Śuddha, but of the Kāraṇa Brahman.³ Vidyāraṇya's reasons for the inability

1 Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa, P. 205. न हि नानाविधकार्यक्रियाविशात्मकत्वं तत्प्रसव-
शक्त्यात्मकत्वं वा त्रिजास्य विशुद्धब्रह्मान्तर्गतं भवितुमर्हति तस्माज्जगज्जन्मादि
कारणत्वमेवोपलक्षणमिति ।

2 Ibid. तस्मादनिर्वचनीयमायाविशिष्टं कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्राप्तम् तत्राह 'यदवष्टम्भो
विद्वो विवर्तते' इति ।

3 Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, P. 643, शुद्धब्रह्मसम्बन्धाभावेऽपि मायाविशिष्ट-
कारणब्रह्मसम्बन्धित्वात् । यत इत्यनेन हि सूत्रपदेन कारणमेव निदिश्यते न तु
शुद्धम् ।

of Brahman to explain the origin of the universe are the same as those given by Prakāśātman. He also feels the necessity of recognizing another principle in addition to Brahman which in cooperation with it would be able to produce the universe and sustain it. The conception of Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is the conception of such a principle, which combines within itself both being and becoming. Brahman is changeless. In order to explain change, either it must be joined to a principle of change or the principle of change must be added to it. Māyā is this principle of creativity. Both Brahman and Māyā should be brought together, and as the result of this arithmetical process we get a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman other than the Śuddha Brahman, who is invested with creative power and the force of conservation.¹

VII

PADMAPĀDA AND THE VALUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN UPA AND VIŚEṢA LAKṢAṆA

Padmapāda distinguishes between the "upa lakṣaṇa" and the "viśeṣa lakṣaṇa" of Brahman. "That from which the origin, etc." is the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, according to Padmapāda, and not the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, because it does not tell us that about Brahman knowing and realizing which we can attain the highest beatitude. It only tells us that we must acknowledge an All-sustaining Reality which is the origin of the universe and in which the universe rests. It does not tell us what the essence of this reality is. The realization of the summum bonum of life is not to be attained by simply recognizing that Brahman is the "general cause" of the universe. This knowledge has no special fruit attached to it. One must realize that Brahman is the Self of every one, and that this Brahman is "all-knowing, all powerful and supreme bliss". Realization of this "svarūpa" of Brahman brings about the

1 *ibid.*, P. 684, निर्विकारत्वाज्जगद्रूपेण विकरिष्यमाणं वस्त्वन्तरं किञ्चिदङ्गीकार्यम्...
माया ब्रह्ममिलित्वैकमेवोपादानमिति वाच्यम् ।

emancipation of the soul.¹ The Second Sūtra gives us a characteristic which no doubt belongs to Brahman, but it does not take us to the very heart of Brahman. It does not tell us what its essence is, because merely by realizing this we cannot become what Brahman itself is. For Padmapāda the causal argument which the Second Sūtra sums up can only point to the indispensability of Brahman to a rational explanation of the universe. It points to the necessity of acknowledging an absolute reality which is the source of the universe and in which the universe is grounded. But more than this it does not claim to tell us. In the words of Padmapāda, the Second Sūtra gives us an idea of Brahman as the "general cause" only.² The Upaniṣadic text "that from which these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death", embodies the necessity of acknowledging this absolute cause. But it does not contain the final conclusion of the Upaniṣad regarding the nature of this cause. The text, by affirming the reality of this cause, only urges inquiry into its true essence. It asks us to "to try to know that".³ Śaṅkara makes it clear that this text is not the last word about the true nature of Brahman. "The proposition which finally determines the sense of the above passage runs as follows: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death'."⁴ It is this which gives us an insight into the true essence of Brahman, and consequently this is the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman. As the view which regards Brahman as the general cause merely is not conducive to the true realization of Brahman, being only a half-truth about its nature. Padmapāda speaks of it as the view about "the indifferent causal principle of the universe,"⁵ a view in which there is no trace of the intrinsic values of consciousness and bliss which in their indivisible unity constitute Brahman.⁶ Creatorship, therefore, is

1 Pancapadika; P. 89. इदं तु कूटस्थनित्यं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रकान्तम यत्स्वरूपा-
वगमो मोक्षोऽभिप्रेयते ।

2 ibid.. P. 93. कारणमामन्यसिद्धे ।

3 तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म ।

4 S.B., I 1.2.

5 Pancapadika, P. 84, तदस्यमेव जगत्कारणं प्रतिपाद्य ।

6 ibid P. 81, ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शाभावात् ।

the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, and does not point to anything "special" about it.¹

In order to get a complete insight into the true nature of Brahman, Padmapāda asks us to read Śaṅkara's comments on the Second and the Fourth Sūtras together. The Second Sūtra purports to establish the nature of Brahman as the highest reality. But as this reality is one with and inseparable from the highest value, to view the real in abstraction from all value would be to take an existential view of it and reduce it to the status of a mere existent. As the Second Sūtra is content to view Brahman as the absolute reality only, according to Padmapāda, taken by itself it gives us only an existential account of Brahman and thus embodies merely its upa lakṣaṇa. But to be content with the existential view of reality is to be content with a onesided, incomplete and therefore erroneous view of it. The existential view should therefore be brought in harmony with the valuational view. The creative nature of Brahman should be read as part and parcel of its value character. The creative Monism of Śaṅkara would then be identical with his Monism of the Good. In his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra Śaṅkara has mainly shown that Brahman is the highest value and is the Self of every one of us; and true to the standpoint of value, which he adopts in full agreement with his master Śaṅkara, Padmapāda insists upon the ontological problem being conceived as part and parcel of the general axiological problem. His repeated assertion that in order to have real knowledge of Brahman after we are convinced that it is the general cause of everything, we must read together the texts, 'that from which all these beings are born', and 'thou art that' is an invitation to shift the centre of gravity of philosophical thought from mere being to value. He finds it intolerable to permit the Second and the Fourth Sūtras and Śaṅkara's comments thereon to stand in isolation from each other, because, according to him, reality and value are ultimately one and inseparable,

1 *ibid.*, P. 81 तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरे वाक्ये जन्मादिधर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वात् । P. 76.

किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मत्यत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः जन्माद्यस्य इति ।; P. 77,
तत्रेदं लक्षणं प्रपञ्चधर्मत्वात् पृथग्भूतमेव कारणमुपलक्षयति न विशेषणत्वेन अतः
पृथक् स्वलक्षणं कथनम् ।

and he finds reality, which the second sūtra undertakes to discuss, intolerable without raising it to the sphere of value, and deems it equally difficult to think of value, which is the content of the Fourth Sūtra, without implying some form of being.¹

Padmapāda imagines an objection to the effect that all that was to be said about the nature of Brahman and all the texts which served to elucidate it have already been mentioned by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Second Sūtra and there is little justification for further quotations in order to throw more light on Brahman's nature under the Fourth Sūtra.² In answer to this supposed objection, Padmapāda points out that in his commentary on the Second Sūtra, Śaṅkara has brought out only one aspect of Brahman's nature, namely its nature as the Absolute Reality. Brahman's nature as the most supreme Value also possesses much greater significance for a philosophy like that of Śaṅkara, the driving force of which is not merely ontological but rather axiological, and which is committed to the thesis that all problems of metaphysics ultimately resolve into questions of value. The Second Sūtra does not deal with Brahman as the Supreme Good and consequently is limited to the exposition of an aspect of reality which, taken by itself, cannot lead us to the very heart of it and the realization of which cannot ensure that eternal beatitude which is Brahman itself. Such a Brahman is a "taṭastha Brahman" for Padmapāda, and the texts quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ" are illustrative of this "taṭastha Brahman".³ The commentary on the Fourth Sūtra is especially devoted to the exposition of the truth that Brahman is the most supreme value and also the Self of everyone and that in the realization of this consists the perfection of life. To bring out this aspect of Brahman is to bring out the value side of reality, that aspect which really matters for metaphysics. The commentary on the Fourth Sūtra is not content to view Brah-

1 Ibid., P. 93. दृष्टान्तानि च वेदान्तशङ्क्यानि कारणसामान्यमिदं तद्विशेषावगमाय

समन्वितानि 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादीनि 'तत्त्वमसीत्यादीनि च' ।

2 B. S., I. 1. 4. तत्त्वमन्वयात् ।

3 Pancapodika, P. 84, अस्त्यत्रान्निप्रायो भाष्यकारस्य । तत्र ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं वक्तव्यमिति तदवश्यमेव ब्रह्मणो निरूपकाणि धान्यानि उदाहृतानि ।

man as the "indifferent causal principle", but endeavours to establish it as constituting the very essence of human life, being Infinite Reality, Infinite Consciousness and Infinite Bliss. The texts quoted under this sūtra are illustrative of the Selfhood of Brahman and the oneness of the individual with the universal Self, the latter being represented as the embodiment in one indivisible Absolute Experience of the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. The comments on this sūtra give what Padmapāda calls the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman and what, in the history of later Vedānta, came to be known as the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.¹

The distinction between *upa lakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* thus turns out to be a value distinction in the philosophy of Padmapāda. It may be said to be a distinction between the "existential" definition of Brahman and the "axiological" definition of it. The *upa lakṣaṇa* may be said to be the "existential" definition of Brahman, because it merely points to the bare existence of Brahman as a substance; it is *upa lakṣaṇa*, because it merely takes us near Brahman but does not let us in. Knowledge of the bare existence of Brahman as substance is not knowledge of the essence of Brahman. Knowledge of the essence or value which is indistinguishable from Brahman the real would be knowledge of the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. The *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* may thus be said to be the "axiological" definition of Brahman. Brahman is the essence of the universe, and unless we view Brahman as such our characterization of it as "that from which the origin, etc., of this universe" will be devoid of the very truth which Brahman in itself is.²

VIII

INSPIRATION FROM ŚAṆKARA, THE MASTER

Padmapāda, in indicating the distinction between the *upa lakṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, has drawn

1 *ibid.*, P. 84, इह तु तत्त्वमसीति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मतावगति पर्यन्तानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि न तटस्थमेव जगत्कारण प्रतिपाद्य पर्यवस्यन्तीत्यतस्तथाभूताग्नयेव वाक्यानि उदाहृतानि 'सदेव सोभ्यंदमग्रासीदित्येवमादीनि' ।

2 *ibid.*, P. 84, तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरेवाक्ये जन्मादिवर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वात् ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शाभावात् ।

his inspiration from his master Śaṅkara, in whose writings the distinction is perfectly clear, though the technical terms "upa lakṣaṇa" and "viśeṣa lakṣaṇa" are not to be met with there. Śaṅkara supplied the material and Padmapāda gave an official "form" to it. The instrumental or mediating function of the spatio-temporal universe is the larger idealistic truth which Śaṅkara always emphasized and endeavoured to make clear. The truth of the creative process is constituted by the values of which the process itself is a revelation. Śaṅkara would whole-heartedly approve of Padmapāda's statement that no trace of the essence of Brahmanhood is discoverable in the bare assertion "that everything has sprung from Brahman". This is an assertion about the mere "that", and says nothing about the "what". To give the "what" would be to give the essence. The essence would be the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa. The second Sūtra tells us about the "that", and Śaṅkara in his commentary merely throws out a hint about the "what" leaving the full exposition of the nature of the "what" for his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra. The process of creation, as understood and treated by Śaṅkara, points to Brahman, but is not the essence of Brahman. It is existence and presupposes essence. What the nature of essence is has to be ascertained, and emancipation is connected only with the realization of the essence. Among several statements of Śaṅkara from which Padmapāda may be said to have derived his distinction between the upa lakṣaṇa and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, the following may be given as an instance: "While the cognition of the oneness of Brahman is a means to final release, there is nothing to show that any independent fruit is connected with the view that Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passes over into the form of this world. The Scripture expressly declares that fruit attaches only to the knowledge that the Immutable Brahman is the Self of everyone ... Hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own, as for instance the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world, is to be understood as but a means for the comprehension of Brahman. Whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connection with something which has such a result, is sub-

ordinate to the latter.¹ This statement when read in conjunction with Śaṅkara's assertion in the concluding portion of his commentary on the Second Sūtra that the "what" of the "that" from which the origin, etc., of the world takes place, is constituted by Ānanda leaves no room for doubting that the distinction between the "substantial" and "essential" definitions of Brahman as drawn by Padmapāda was clearly present to Śaṅkara's mind. The statement that "from Bliss these beings are born; by Bliss, when born, they live; into Bliss they enter at their death" is one which "finally determines the sense" of the passage which has been summed up in the sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ". This utterance is the "nirṇayavākyaṃ" according to Śaṅkara, which Padmapāda, using more technical language, calls the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman.

Padmapāda is careful to point out that Śaṅkara's commentary on the Second Sūtra does not omit the mention the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, or as the later Vedāntins called it, the svarūpa lakṣaṇa, of Brahman. It also gives the svarūpa lakṣaṇa, the essential nature, of Brahman, which is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfect bliss, by supplying the desired attributes which qualify the "tat", that Brahman "from which the origin, etc., of this universe" and which the sūtra itself omits to mention.² Padmapāda says that but for this addition, which was sorely needed in the interest of clarification and comprehension of the essential nature of Brahman, the sense of the sūtra would be incomplete. This addition serves to give the essential nature of Brahman also, that is, its svarūpa lakṣaṇa.³ Śaṅkara, true to his Monism of the Good, carefully points out in his commentary referred to above that Brahman is not only the most real but also the highest value, and by mention-

- 1 S. B., II. 1. 14, न च यथा आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनमेव जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित्कलायाभिप्रेयते कृतस्य ब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम् । यत्तन्नाफलं श्रूयते ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि तद्ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव विनियुज्यते फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गमितिवत् ।
- 2 S. B., I. 1. 2, जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्नव्यवहारे कारणाद्भवति तद्ब्रह्मंति वाक्यशेषः । अन्यथाप्येव जातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यसुदृढवदमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयायादाहर्तव्यानि ।
- 3 Pancapaika, P. 77, 'जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः तद्ब्रह्मंति वाक्यशेषः इति-साकाङ्क्षस्य सूत्रवाक्यस्याकाङ्क्षितपदपूरणमुपलक्षितं ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणं च दर्शयति ।

ing both together intends to convey his conviction that a complete comprehension of Brahman's nature is not possible by taking into account only the one or the other of the two lakṣaṇas. Śaṅkara, no doubt, emphasises the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, but that is because he believes that value or essence explains existence or being, and "being" itself is a form of value. But Śaṅkara never holds that the upa lakṣaṇa gives an "accidental" definition of Brahman, as some of the later Vedāntins believed and many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara believe even now. Padmapāda, true to the master and his value standpoint, believes that value and reality are one and cannot be abstracted from each other; and affirms that Śaṅkara's comments on the Second Sūtra, while professing to give upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, do not fail to mention its viśeṣa lakṣaṇa also and without this latter the sense of the sūtra would remain incomplete. As reality and value always go together, so should the upa lakṣaṇa and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa. Neither is negligible, though both are not equally significant. It is the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa which gives meaning and justification to the upa lakṣaṇa. Brahman as creativity is the same as Brahman the Supreme Value, the Unbounded Bliss. "The word Brahman", says Padmapāda, "is not properly used when intended to signify the Supreme Cause of the Universe which is devoid of Bliss."¹ The word Brahman signifies, according to Padmapāda, the Infinite and Unbounded Source of the Universe, and in this he is in entire agreement with Śaṅkara.² But this Brahman is identified by both Śaṅkara and Padmapāda with Bliss. Both of them, like Plato, interpret the world by the Idea of the Good. "From Bliss alone" these beings are born.⁴ The word "hi" in the above passage, which is quoted by Śaṅkara as giving the "final conclusion" (nirṇyavakyama) brings out, says Padmapāda, the unity of the axiological and the cosmological principle i.e. of value and

1 Ibid., P. 81. तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरेवात्रये जन्मादिभर्मवानस्योपलक्षणत्वात् ब्रह्मस्य-
गमिवात्सर्वजंसर्वशक्तिसमन्वित परमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति जन्मादिसूत्रेण ब्रह्मस्वरूप-
लक्षितमिति सिद्धम् ।....अनानन्दके हि जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मजन्मप्रयोगो न गृह्यते ।

2 Ibid., P. 81. सर्वतोऽ नवच्छिन्नस्वभावं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मपदस्यायं इति गम्यते ।
S.B., I. 2.1. यत्सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु ब्रह्मपदस्यालम्बनं जगत्कारणं इह न 'सर्वं सत्त्वि-
यं ब्रह्म' इति वाक्योपक्रमे श्रुतम् ।

3 Tallit. S.B., III. 6.

creativity. Brahman is the Supreme Value and also the Supreme Creative Principle.

IX

PRAKĀŚĀTMAN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAṬASTHA
AND SVARŪPA LAKṢAṆA : THE DISSOCIATION
OF VALUE AND REALITY

When we pass on to Prakāśātman we find that the centuries which divide him from Śaṅkara and Padmapāda have brought about an extraordinary change in the philosophical perspective of the school founded by the master. The creative period in the history of the Advaita Vedānta seems to have come to an end, and the system gives signs of advancing age with its failing sight, its weakened limbs, and its vanishing cohesive power. There is differentiation, but want of integration makes itself felt. Complexity appears to have crept in, but the power of cohesion has fled away. Thinkers are able to see things at a distance, but things which are near them are blurred and dim. They profess to follow the master and to continue the tradition creatively; they think they have seized the tradition and are living themselves into it. But they are able neither to follow it whole-heartedly nor to develop it. Professing to develop it while remaining faithful to it, they not only arrest it but give it a set-back. The system, instead of moving forward, either moves backward or stagnates. In certain vital respects, instead of progression we have retrogression; and as the tide of evolution proceeds we meet with the tape-worm in its inglorious ease, instead of the lark at heaven's gate.

Prakāśātman appears before us as one who wishes to remain faithful to Padmapāda's axiom of the inseparability of value and reality, but in spite of his wish he is not able to do so and ends by becoming an existential philosopher. He earnestly wishes to belong to the group of value philosophers with Śaṅkara at their head, and tries to be faithful to the view that reality and value are one and inseparable, that Brahman is the highest reality and the highest value. But his faith in this axiom is wavering, and he begins to entertain serious

doubts about value being creativity also, with the consequence that he has to turn attention elsewhere in search of a principle which, when joined to value, should be able to turn it into a truly creative principle. He begins by laying down that Brahman is the highest value, but the way in which he develops his philosophy, especially with reference to the problem of creation and the creative aspect of reality, is virtually an admission that Brahman is mere existence. Thus Prakāśātman's last word turns out to be a contradiction of the first. The problem of creation is the point at which Prakāśātman's allegiance to Padmapāda and Śāṅkara ceases, and the history of the Advaita Vedānta begins an entirely new chapter with his famous pronouncement that creatorship is the *taṭastha* lakṣaṇa of Brahman, which is so constituted that its very nature excludes all possibility of the evolutionary process. In order to understand the change introduced by Prakāśātman in the system of the Vedānta, which brought about the reduction of the value-system of Śāṅkara to an existential philosophy, we must turn our attention to his distinction between the "*taṭastha*" and the "*svarūpa*" lakṣaṇa of Brahman.

Prakāśātman distinguishes between the "*taṭastha*" and the "*svarūpa*" lakṣaṇa of Brahman instead of between the "*upa* lakṣaṇa" and the "*viśeṣa* lakṣaṇa". What Prakāśātman means by *svarūpa* lakṣaṇa is exactly what Padmapāda understands by *viśeṣa* lakṣaṇa, that is, the essential nature of Brahman. Padmapāda, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya all believe that the *svarūpa* lakṣaṇa of Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda. All of them agree that Brahman is the highest value. But while Padmapāda further holds that value is also the creative principle, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya say that because Brahman is mere value, it cannot be creativity also. It cannot be Brahman's nature to be the creative principle, because value and dynamism are incompatible. Creativity is thus foreign to value. It is, therefore, an accidental aspect of Brahman, which is the Supreme Value. It is not grounded in Brahman's nature, it is a mere incident in its existence. Creativity is thus the *taṭastha* lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Brahman in its real nature is powerless to be a self-communicating

principle. But in thus depriving value of creativity, of dynamic activity, or, in other words, viewing value as mere value and not reality also, Prakāśātman reduced value to mere existence. By saying that creatorship is the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, Padmapāda simply meant that this way of thinking only points to the reality of Brahman and the necessity of acknowledging such a reality. Borrowing the words of Prakāśātman which he uses in a different context, we may say that according to Padmapāda the upa lakṣaṇa affirms the "bare existence of the Cause" and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa points out the nature of this Cause, that it is "Truth, Knowledge, Bliss, Infinite, Omniscient, and the Self of every one".¹ But to Prakāśātman the taṭastha lakṣaṇa implies that creation is foreign to Brahman's nature, that is, a matter of indifference to it. Padmapāda, though he does not use the term "taṭastha lakṣaṇa", speaks of "taṭastha Brahman" or "taṭasthamevaja-gatkāraṇam", meaning thereby that the mere knowledge of Brahman being the general cause, unaccompanied by the realization that it is the supreme Bliss and the Self of every one, is not conducive to liberation or summum bonum. It seems that Prakāśātman was misled by the word "taṭastha", which also means "indifferent or unconcerned", and came to regard Brahman as unconcerned with or indifferent about the creative process of the world. The tendency to relapse into the existential view which was making itself felt in Prakāśātman, and the difficulties regarding the origin of multiplicity and variety, natural to the existential view of reality and pressing for solution, may also have hastened the conclusion and brought an easy conquest to him. The price which Prakāśātman had to pay was to utter a mere "Nay"—to deny that there was anything common between Brahman and the creation; or, if a "yea" was insisted upon, to affirm that the relation between Brahman and the world was external and almost accidental. The term "taṭastha lakṣaṇa", had Prakāśātman stuck to its root meaning, could very well have expressed what Padmapāda intended to convey by it. It would signify a "lakṣaṇa" which only takes one to the "bank of the river" but does not place one in the heart of the

1 Pancapadika Vivarana. P. 219, कारणसद्भावमात्रं सिद्धयति नाधिकमिह तु सत्यज्ञानानन्दान्तसर्वज्ञप्रत्यगात्मब्रह्मावगतिविवक्षिता ।

river; in other words, a lakṣaṇa which could point to the "bare existence" of Brahman, but could not let one "in" or "within" Brahman, could not tell what that essence of Brahman is the existence of which is assured by the upa lakṣaṇa.

Prakāśātman's attempt to introduce the conception of Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman in the metaphysics of the Vedānta is an innovation. But in introducing and insisting upon the necessity of an auxiliary metaphysical principle in the form of Māyāśabala Brahman he has not been faithful either to Śāṅkara or to Padmapāda, and has considerably weakened the position of the Vedānta. As circumstances would have it, the axiom of the oneness and inseparability of value and reality which was an article of faith with Śāṅkara, a faith as much illumined by the light of reason as deepened by the warmth of intuition, was lost sight of by Prakāśātman, and Brahman came to be viewed as value merely, value abstracted from reality; and metaphysics was called upon to discover a principle which, when joined to Brahman, could turn it into a really creative principle which could account for the actual and the existent. The task which was assigned to this new principle was the reconciliation of existence to essence by bringing them together.

According to Śāṅkara, for whom essence was one with existence and Brahman the oneness of the two, such a principle was a superfluity. Brahman is the highest value and the highest reality, and what is absolutely real should not find it difficult to bring forth other realities and existents. For Śāṅkara value is creativity also; his Monism of the Good is Creative Monism as well. Because Prakāśātman was not fully alive to the significance of this thought of Śāṅkara he was troubled by the question, how a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam Brahman can be the creator, because creation requires a plurality of powers and these stand in contradiction to such a Brahman. Prakāśātman first divests value of reality and then attempts to restore what he has taken away by adding a creative power to it. It is not difficult to see that if it is not the essential nature of value to be creativity also, the simple device of grafting a creative power on value from without cannot turn it into creativity. First Prakāśātman says "Value

is not creativity; Brahman is mere value, being pure and perfect Bliss". But then the existence of the universe remains unexplained. Value, then, must be joined to creativity if we are to account for the universe. He is thus led to conclude that "value plus creativity" = "the productive source of the universe". There is identity-in-essence between the Śaktimat and Śakti.¹ If Brahman is the Śaktimat and Māyā is the Śakti, we have to admit that they are identical in essence and it is a misuse of thought as well as language to speak of both as constituting, in cooperation with each other, the upādāna or material cause of the universe.² Prakāśātman begins by disclosing his faith that Brahman is the highest value. It is Satyam, Jñānam, and Ānandam. If he had remained faithful to the standpoint of value, he would have seen that the conception of cause is but a development of the value of reality. Brahman, being sat, is the Mūlakāraṇa also. But in arguing that Brahman, being perfect and changeless (nirvikāra; śuddha), cannot be the seat of the multiplicity of powers which creation implies and presupposes, and we must recognize some other "reality" (vastvantara) which should be able to supply this want, he abandoned the standpoint of value and paved the way for the reduction of the value philosophy of Śāṅkara to an existential philosophy.

Prakāśātman and Vidyāraṇya are at one with Padmapāda in holding that the Second Sūtra, while originally meant to point out the taṭastha lakṣaṇa of Brahman, gives the svarūpa lakṣaṇa also and these two are not mutually inconsistent.³ Though from what they have said about the illogicality of Brahman being regarded as the creative principle, it would

1. Gita. S. B., XIV. 27, शक्तिशक्तिमतोरनन्यत्वात् ।

2. Vidyāraṇya : Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, P. 684, मायाब्रह्म च मिलित्वैकमेवोपादनम् ।

3. Pañcapādika, Vivaraṇa, P. 210, अनेन सर्वज्ञशब्देन.....विज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणं विवक्ष्यत् इत्यविरोधः । P. 208, उपलक्षणत्वेऽपि नाद्वितीयस्वरूपलक्षणविरोधः ।

Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, PP. 661, 662, अतः प्रपञ्चजन्मादिकारणत्वेन तटस्थेन जिज्ञास्यविशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपं निर्विघ्नमुपलक्षते.....तच्च कारणत्वं तटस्थलक्षणत्वेन यद्यपि लक्ष्याद्ब्रह्मणः पृथग्भूतं तथापि तस्यमिध्यात्वाच्च लक्षस्याद्वितीयत्वविरोधः ।

seem difficult to accept the view that the *taṭastha* and *svarūpa* *lakṣaṇas* refer to one and the same reality, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya try to justify this, for they are not able to give up the traditional viewpoint that reality and value are one. But as their allegiance to this standpoint is not whole-hearted, the way which Padmapāda had recourse to, namely that of affirming that value is creativity also, was not open to them. The result is that their method of reconciliation bears the stamp of artificiality and their logic that of barrenness. The *taṭastha* *lakṣaṇa* which points to the creative source can, according to them, be the *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, whose essence is constituted by Sat, Cit and Ānanda, in spite of the fact that creativity is denied to it as being inconsistent with its nature, because even false characteristics can very well play the part of a *lakṣaṇa*. The essence of a *lakṣaṇa* consists not in its being true and representing truth, but in its being connected with the thing in an uncommon manner. "That which looks like silver is 'pearl'" — in this instance, though the existence of the silver is false, is very well contained the *upa lakṣaṇa* of pearl. Similarly creatorship, though it cannot be ascribed to Brahman, can very well point to Brahman and be viewed as its *upa* or *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.¹ The abandonment of the standpoint of value which began with Prakāśātman gave birth to a process of thought which revelled in raising false philosophical issues and sought satisfaction in discovering what, to a discriminating eye, would appear to be artificial answers. The artificiality of the answers is seen to have reached its climax in Vidyāranya's attempt to ascertain and fix the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Mayaviśiṣṭa Brahman also. If the Śuddha and the Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman are different their essential nature also must be different. Thus creativity was declared by Vidyāranya to be the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman, while it continued to be the *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* of the Śuddha Brahman, the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of the latter being Sat, Cit and Ānanda. The Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman came to be viewed as the "Real" Material or Constitutive cause,

1 *Pāncapadika Vivaraṇa*, p. 208. 'यद्वज्रतमित्यभावात् शुक्तिः' इति वन्मिथ्या भूतेनापि प्रपञ्चकारणत्वेनोपलक्षणयोगात् । असाधारणसम्बन्धो हि लक्षणनिमित्तम् न लक्षणसत्यत्वं ।

and the Śuddha Brahman as the 'Figurative' Material cause.¹ Deussen only carried this teaching to its logical conclusion when he said that the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, an exoteric and an esoteric and made a zealous effort to trace this distinction in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely its theology, cosmology, psychology, doctrine of transmigration, and doctrine of liberation. But in Deussen we hear the voice, not of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda, but of Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya. The only thesis to which the Advaitism of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda is committed is that Brahman, the Highest Value, is also the Supreme Creativity; and this position has found its true representative not in Prakāśātman but in Sarvajñātmamuni. Long before Prakāśātman, Śarvajñātmamuni had, in his Śaṅkṣepa Śārīraka, held the view that the Śuddha or Pāra Brāhman is the source and origin of the universe. It is the constitutive stuff of the world as well the directive power behind it.²

X

THE VIVARAṆA IŚVARA AND THE PLATONIC GOD

The modern interpreters of Śaṅkara do not seem to me to be faithful to him when, following Prakāśātman, they feel the necessity of recognizing a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman or a Personal God, who is himself phenomenal, in order to explain the phenomenal existence of the world. The line of argument which leads them to recognize the necessity of such an intermediate reality ends in reducing the position of the Vedānta to Platonism, which, too, insists upon the need of a God, who is the supremely good Soul, who is other than the Good and on a lower level of reality than it, who is the intermediate link between the eternal and unchanging world of Ideas and the world in which birth and death, death and birth, succeed one another in a perpetual cycle, and by whose agency the participation of the creatures in the Good

1 Vivaranaprameya Sangraha. P. 643, जन्मादिकारणत्वं मायाविशिष्टब्रह्मणः स्वरूपलक्षणत्वेऽप्यविरुद्धम् । शुद्धब्रह्मणस्तु तत् तदस्थलक्षणम् । P. 686, तत्र मुख्योपादानस्य जगत्कारणत्वं स्वरूपलक्षणम् औपचारिकोपादानस्य तु तत्तदस्थलक्षणम् ।

2 Sanksepa Sariraka, I. 553.

is made possible. In Plato's philosophy God is the "creator" or "maker", the "artisan" or "craftsman", and is other than the Good. God is a Soul; Good is the Supreme "Form". The creator or maker in Platonic philosophy is thought of definitely as a "personal God" whose activity produces a world like the forms. The position of God in Plato's philosophy is dubious and not fully thought out. The current interpretations of Śaṅkara which follow the Vivaraṇa line suffer from the same fault. Both Burnet and Taylor point out that if the description of Plato's God in the "Laws" as a perfectly good Soul is taken seriously, it will mean that God too is only half-real, and belongs on one side to the realm of the mutable. Īśvara in the philosophy of Śaṅkara has been placed in the same perilous position by the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, who declare him to be phenomenal and even illusory, and to be not above time but subject to time. He is said to be different from Brahman and to have less of reality than it, and, as creator and destroyer, to belong to the empirical world. As I have said above, it is difficult to reconcile such a conception of Īśvara with the religious insistence on the eternal, immutable, perfectly real and absolutely blissful character of Īśvara which meets us everywhere in Śaṅkara. We could not meet the difficulty by supposing that Īśvara is an imaginative symbol of the Absolute Good which is Brahman, since the whole thesis which the modern interpreters intend to prove is that Īśvara is "different from" and "other than" Brahman, "has less of reality" than absolute Being, and is "the mediating principle" between Brahman and the world, sharing the natures of both, the immutability and non-temporality of the one and the ceaseless change and becoming of the other. Thus Brahman, it is said, is not identical with Īśvara. But it seems equally impossible to suppose that Īśvara is merely a "creature" of Māyā. The author of the whole creation cannot himself be a creation. The only conclusion to which one is led is that the modern interpreters, in their anxiety to be faithful to tradition, have not only introduced a dualism into the Vedāntic metaphysics by accepting two metaphysical principles, the one axiological and the other cosmological, but have also created a conflict between the Vedāntic metaphysics and the Vedāntic religion. The way

out of this difficulty in which the Vedāntic position has been landed is not to appeal to different standpoints in the "confusion" of which the difficulty is said to have its genesis, but to return to the standpoint of value and recognize that, Value and Reality being one, Value is Creativity also.

Professor Taylor draws our attention to a similar "unsolved conflict" between the Platonic metaphysics and the Platonic religion, and points out that the adjustment of the two became a cardinal problem for Plotinus and his Neo-Platonic successor. So far as the problem of relation between value and reality is concerned, the last word of the Vedāntic constructive thought was said not by Prakāśātman but by Śaṅkara and Padmapāda, just as on the same point the last word of Greek philosophy was said not by Plato but by Plotinus. In order to understand Śaṅkara and what Śaṅkara stands for, we must not stay with Prakāśātman but must go back to Padmapāda. The age of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda is the golden age of Vedāntic philosophy; the age which saw the rise of the Prakāśātman marks the evening of constructive thought in the history of the Advaita Vedānta. In the former Philosophy is self-conscious, in the latter it begins to forget itself. The stars which twinkle in the sky after the evening shades fall are not able to reveal the Truth in its eternal glory as the Sun at midday did. The difficulty of Thibaut and others that, if we follow Śaṅkara's explanation, it is not possible to explain why the Sūtras should open with the definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, is an imaginary difficulty. It has its source in ignorance of the valuational standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara, for whom Brahman is the highest good, which is essentially and intrinsically creative.

XI

MEDITATION UPON BRAHMAN AS THE CREATIVE SOURCE

Brahman which is a truly creative reality according to Śaṅkara can also be meditated upon as the cause of the

universe including myself. In this case the individual will be performing upāsana, implying a difference between the upāsaka and the upāsya, the meditator and the meditable, a difference in the creation of which time and space and name and form play an important role. But the axiological and ontological truth that Brahman is the Ātman or the cause should be sharply distinguished from the meditation on the same Brahman as the Kāraṇa or the Kārī or the Cause. The former is jñāna, the latter is a variety of karma. In the first Brahman and Self coalesce into one; in the second they stand apart as mutually exclusive though also correlated. The deficiency that clings to the first is a deficiency of language, but the truth that is to be expressed is an absolute truth, namely that Brahman is the Ātman of everything. It is not a deficiency in the realization of the truth, but one in the mode of expression of the realized truth. The deficiency that clings to the latter is a deficiency in the realization of the truth about Brahman's nature.

In the Second Sūtra, the author and the commentator only just begin to give an outline of the realized truth. The progressive way in which this truth has ultimately to be realized is yet to follow. The Saguna Brahman is the embodiment of the progressive realization of the truth which the Nirguna Brahman stands for. The statement that "Brahman is my Ātman" may very well stand for the axiological truth as well as signify a form of meditation or upāsana according to the attitude of the soul towards Brahman. Śaṅkara points out that the statements, "That thou art"¹ and "All this is Self alone"² in the Chāndogya embody absolute realization and express the nature of Nirguna Brahman. But the realization of the same Brahman "as my Self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds, smaller than an ear of corn, than barley, than mustard, than the kernel of the mustard seed"³ is mere upāsana, as it rests upon and presupposes a distinction between the Self and Brahman and is possible only with

1 Chand., VI. 16. 3. तत्त्वमसि ।

2 Ibid., VII. 25. 2. अहमेवैव सर्वम् ।

3 Ibid., III. 14. 3.


the help of the limiting adjuncts which are treated as other than Brahman. It is because Brahman is treated as other than the Self and the manifested universe as other than Brahman, that it is meditated upon as "having all actions, having all desires, having all odours, having all tastes, pervading all this, without speech, without confusion and the Self within the heart". The worshipper hopes that he "shall attain it on departing from this world".¹

Everywhere in Śaṅkara we meet with the distinctions between Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahman, Saguṇa and Śuddha Brahman, Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, Para and Apara Brahman, Nirupādhika and Sopādhika Brahman. But these distinctions cannot be said to introduce into his metaphysical system any irreconcilable dualism. The Saguṇa Brahman is Brahman conceived as limited by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, whose very existence is bound up with Brahman as a truly creative reality. It represents a view of Brahman taken by the individual for purposes of worship or upāsana and has reference to Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā. According to Śaṅkara Īśvara is the Upāsya Brahman, Brahman worshipped as the Īśvara (Lord), the Antaryāmin (Inner Controller) who controls and rules the worshipper (upāsaka, īśitavya). But, according to Śaṅkara, there is possible a higher state of religious realization wherein the difference between the worshipper and the worshipped (upāsya and upāsaka), the ruler and the ruled (īśa and īśitavya), the controller and the controlled, vanishes. This is the state wherein Brahman is experienced as our inmost self. It is a state wherein one has experience of undivided existence. This feeling of Īśvara being the worshipped and the soul being the worshipper, of Īśvara being the ruler and the soul being the ruled, lasts only so long as the complete realization of the oneness of Reality, that there is no difference either within it or without it, does not take place. This is the reason why Śaṅkara says that the view that Brahman, the ultimate reality which is the Self (Ātman) of every one, is Īśvara, the ruler, controller, governor, is erroneous (avidyātmaka) and will disappear on the dawn of right knowledge. The view

¹ Chand., III. 14. 4.

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that Brahman is *Īśvara*, the controller, or ruler, is erroneous, because it rests upon an unreconciled opposition between Self and Brahman. The fundamental truth of the Vedānta of Śāṅkara, upon which rests the whole system, is the acknowledgement of the identity of the two. The conception of Brahman as the controller and the individual as controlled rests upon the view that there will always remain an unreconciled opposition between the two. But according to Śāṅkara, this view flagrantly contradicts the deliverances of intuition as well as reason. This view of the Real as *Īśvara* or *Īśī* is therefore *avidyātmaka*.¹



1 S.B., II. 1. 14. एवमविवक्षाकृतनामरूपोपाध्यन्रोषोऽत्रो भवति नानामेव षट्कर-
काद्युपाध्यन्रोषि ।

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
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The
VEDĀNTA OF ŚĀṆKARA
A METAPHYSICS OF VALUE

BY
RAM PRATAP SINGH, M.A., D.Litt.,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, MAHARAJA'S COLLEGE,
JAIPUR

4627

VOLUME I

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Śaṅkara, born at Kaladi, a village in the Malabar district in South India, in 788. Father's name was Śivaguru and mother's name Aryambā. Became the pupil of Govinda Bhagavatpāda at an early age and was formally initiated by him into Sanyāsa. Travelled widely and established maths at Śringeri, Dwarakā, Puri and Badarikāshram. Died in 820 at the age of thirty-two.

३३

यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं
यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै ।
तं हं देवमात्मबुद्धिप्रकाशं
मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ॥

Svet. VI. 18

DEDICATION

At the Feet of the Masters who showed me the
light when it was all dark around me
and gave me strength when
despair stared me in
the face.

ॐ नमो ब्रह्मादिभ्यो ब्रह्मविद्यासंप्रदायकृद्भ्यो
वशरूपिभ्यो नमो गुरुभ्यः ।
श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामात्मन्यं करुणालयम् ।
नमामिभगवत्पादं शकरं लोकशंकरम् ॥

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PREFACE

Śaṅkara is the central thinker in the history of Indian Philosophy. In him all lines of thought converge : idealism and realism, pragmatism and rationalism, naturalism and mysticism, agnosticism and faith-philosophy. For this very reason his philosophy is difficult to characterize. This fact also explains the divergent interpretations that have been put upon his teachings. But Śaṅkara binds together the different strands of thought present in his writings with the help of the unique point of view from which he looks at the problems of philosophy, namely, the standpoint of Value. The present work is an attempt to make explicit this point of view and give an account of his teachings in the light of it. Every line that Śaṅkara has written bears the stamp of this point of view and I believe its discovery and adoption have enabled me to clear up some of the major tangles left by the previous interpreters, tangles which seriously affected the unity of Śaṅkara's thought and which refused to be resolved from any other point of view.

The relation of value to being, the ontological status of value, this is the question to which Śaṅkara is driven; and it is in connection with the working out of the relation of "value" to "reality" and of "value and reality" to "existence" as a whole that the more original features of Śaṅkara's philosophy are to be found. That the metaphysical notion of "reality" is the notion of "value" is the fundamental contention of Śaṅkara; and in consonance with this very viewpoint he develops his doctrine of ontological predicates which brings out the value character of the predicate of reality, emphasizes that cognition is valuational, affirms that valuation has something of the noetic in it, determines the character of the spatio-temporal world as representing at once the duality as well as the oneness and inseparability of value and existence (*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyatva*), and finally reiterates, after the Upaniṣads, the identity of the most supremely "real" and the most supremely "good", both these being but forms of "value". According to Śaṅkara, the duality of value and existence is the most persistent of all dualities and the final paradox of philosophical thought; in the words of Windelband, the "sacred mystery" marking the limits of

our nature and of our knowledge. But Śaṅkara also believes that there is a point where value and existence come together and meet and fuse in one. That point is what he calls Brahman; or Atman or Mokṣa. But this point cannot be experienced without "trenching on the mystical". Thought can have access only to the "axiom" of the oneness and inseparability of value and existence and not to their "identity". Life alone is capable of it, a life of Brahma-bhāva. This is the meaning of Śaṅkara's repeated insistence that "knowing" Brahman and "being" Brahman are the same.

In pursuance of the above fundamental truths, Śaṅkara comes to grips with the rival systems of thought treated of in the Tarkapāda. His complaint against them is that either the notion of "reality" with which they work is not the notion of "value" or there is a wilful dissociation of "reality" from what they conceive to be the highest "value." This is the case with the Nirvāṇa and the Self of Buddhism, the Prakṛti and Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya, the matter of the Cārvākas and the God of the Naiyāyikas. This explains the anxiety on the part of the dualistic systems to find out a complementary something which will make up the deficiency in the conception of "reality" with which they start on their philosophic enterprise. It is one of my cardinal contentions that the Vedāntism of Śaṅkara is not inspired by Buddhism and it is unconstructive to affiliate it to Idealism and Nihilism of the Buddhist type. Behind this eagerness to draw parallelism between Vedāntism and Buddhism lies the tendency to view Śaṅkara as an arch-rationalist. But Śaṅkara's so-called rationalism is at every step suffused with mysticism; and this mysticism should be read as part and parcel of his metaphysical views. "In ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from logic to religion." But every page of Śaṅkara's works bears witness to the belief in their identity. Śaṅkara deliberately accepts the position of an orthodox Vedic thinker and believes that "a philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith does not illuminate may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the latter an alien to faith". The fact that Śaṅkara appears before us in the role of a commentator lends

a peculiar interest to his writings, making them a vehicle of the traditional cultural spirit of Hinduism. But Śaṅkara also rises above it and refuses to be content with a literal repetition of the past. I have based my interpretation upon Śaṅkara's own writings and not upon those of his followers, whether they happen to be his commentators or writers of independent works on the Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself is his best commentator, and any one who is not content with stray "selections" from his writings will bear out this truth. I have avoided working upon the assumption that the original ācāryas of a particular system preached exactly the same doctrines as their later followers, and the latter simply make explicit what was implicit in the work of the original master, more intelligible what does not appear to be sufficiently clear in the founder's own teachings. It will appear to the reader that this is a reversal of the method consciously adopted by Dr. Dasgupta and unconsciously by the medieval ācāryas, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara being the more prominent among them. I do not share Dr. Dasgupta's view that the interpretations offered by Śaṅkara's followers are nowhere in conflict with his doctrines. The development of the philosophy of Śaṅkara in the hands of his followers exhibits both progression and retrogression. One can easily discover in this later development instances of parasitism, of degenerate development, of foreign excrescences and outgrowths, of what Professor Arthur Thomson calls "the tape-worm in its inglorious ease". These are "as much an outcome of evolution as the lark at heaven's gate". In any interpretation of Śaṅkara's meaning we must look at his doctrine as a whole and the details ought to be interpreted as elements in such a whole. Many of the expositors of Śaṅkara have allowed themselves to be carried away by stray passages in his writings and have tried to squeeze out of them a system of philosophy. I have joined issue with such expositors and have contended that these isolated passages are not able to bear the weight of a whole system.

In the preparation of this work I have found the writings of Thibaut and Deussen, Ranade and Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar and Dasgupta, Hiriyanna and Kokilashwar Sastri, B. L. Atreya, S. K. Das, and A. C. Mukerjee, Swami Madhvananda and Ganganathi Jha, very helpful. Had these works not

been written before and their interpretations already in the field, perhaps the idea of the need of a fresh attempt to understand Śāṅkara would never have suggested itself to me. Hence I must not be thought ungrateful or wanting in respect because I have criticised them at places, nor must it be supposed that I am unmindful of those obligations which I have not expressly acknowledged. My formulation of the notion of Value has been chiefly determined by the teachings of Windelband, Pringle-Pattison and Urban, and a careful reader of the book, especially the second and third chapters wherein I have tried to explain the exact sense in which Śāṅkara's notion of Reality is that of value, will discover their influence.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude which I owe to my teachers, Professor P.B. Adhikari, Dr. S.K. Maitra, Pt I. D. Tiwari, and Dr. B. L. Atreya, at present University Professor of Philosophy and Chief Warden, Birla Hostel, Banaras Hindu University, at whose feet I had the privilege to sit as a student at the University of Banaras. I am glad to mention especially the name of Dr. S.K. Maitra and acknowledge the constant and ungrudging help and the many valuable suggestions which I received from him in the final preparation of this work for the press, especially on points connected with the problem of value. My thanks are due to Dr. D.M. Datta of Patna University who was good enough to favour me with his critical comments both in private conversation and through correspondence.

The completion of the work owes not a little to Mr. J. C. Rollo and Dr. G. S. Mahajani whom the young University of Rajputana was fortunate to have as its first University officer and first Vice-Chancellor respectively. They have introduced a "liberal" and a "human" atmosphere in the University which is the very soul of University life and which will most likely continue to determine the future "go" of events. And certainly in a University it is the life which is "lived" that counts and not the tables of stone on which the statutes and ordinances are engraved and which require to be periodically broken up. The work would not have been completed but for the increased facilities for research work which were provided to us in the college for the first time in its history by

the Jaipur Government largely as the result of Mr. Rollo's efforts when he came to stay with us as its head. This liberal atmosphere owed not a little to Sir Mirza Ismail and Sir V.T. Krishnamachari, Prime Ministers of Jaipur, and Pt. Devi Shankar Tiwari, Education Minister, Jaipur, who were at the helm of affairs during the most fateful years when a wave of idealism had swept over Jaipur and it was witnessing a renaissance.

But for the generous grant-in aid of Rs 1500 made to me by the University of Rajputana towards the publication of the work, the liberal offer of Messrs Dwarika Das and Madho Das, proprietors of the Bharat Publishing House, Jaipur, to defray the remaining expenses and undertake its publication during these difficult, almost trying, times, and the constant vigilance and anxiety of Mr S. L. Jain, Manager, Modern Art Printers to finish the printing of the work in as short a time as possible, the work would not have seen the light at so early a date. I am grateful to the University for this grant-in-aid and have to thank the publishers and the printer for their generous co-operation. My thanks are also due to Rai Bahadur Madan Mohan Varma, Registrar, University of Rajputana and and to my friend and colleague Professor R. K. Shukla, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, for their valuable advice in connection with the printing of the work.

There are three debts of a more or less personal nature which I owe to Dr. B. L. Atreya, to Professor R. D. Ranade, formerly Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University, and to Mr. J. C. Rollo, Special Education officer, Jaipur. It was under the supervision of Dr. Atreya that I first began my systematic study of the Vedānta as an undergraduate student at the University and since then everything about him and his life has been an inspiration to me. My association with Professor Ranade has widened my intellectual horizon and deepened my faith in the value of spiritual life; it inspired me at a time when research was taboo in Jaipur. His love and reverence for Śaṅkara and all that Śaṅkara stood for always drew me nearer him. To Mr. J. C. Rollo I owe a lasting debt. At great personal inconvenience and as a pure labour of love he went through the whole of the book in manuscript, revised it carefully and suggested distinct improvements in expression.

I hope my readers will not feel the absence of a biographical sketch in the book. In the case of master minds their work is the best commentary on their life; and few, I hope, will be reluctant to allow that Śaṅkara is a master mind and deserves "a place among the immortals"

If this book succeeds in persuading some of the readers to take up afresh a study of the works of Śaṅkara and thus acquire some of the respect and admiration for him which has grown upon me the more. I have examined his work, I shall have reason to feel, in the words of Paton, that my long and at times depressing labours have not failed to find an appropriate reward.

Maharaja's College,
JAIPUR

R. P. Singh.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A. U. S.	Allahabad University Studies.
B. B.	Bhāskara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra.
B. S.	Brahma Sūtra.
Belvalkar.	English Translation of Brahma Sūtra Adhyāya II, Padas 1 and 2 by S. K. Belvalkar.
Brhad.	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Chand	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
D. S. V.	Deussen's System of the Vedānta.
History.	Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy.
I. P.	Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan.
Mand. S. B.	Śaṅkara's commentary on Māṇḍūkya Kārika by Gauḍapāda.
Mund.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
P. R.	Process and Reality by Whitehead.
R. B.	Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra.
S. B.	Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra (If the abbreviation is used along with the name of an Upaniṣad, it denotes Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on that Upaniṣad)
Taitt.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
Thibaut.	Thibaut's Introduction to his "Translation of Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra", Vol. I.
Upadesa.	Upadeśasāhāsrī by Śaṅkara.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
CONFLICTING ESTIMATES

Śaṅkara is one of the greatest systematic thinkers that India has produced; his "Advaitism is a system of great speculative daring and logical subtlety"¹; his doctrine "is from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil"²; his system, "equal in rank to Plato and Kant, is one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in its search for the eternal truth"³, and has won him "a place among the immortals".

But the student who cares to know something definite about Śaṅkara's philosophy is bewildered by the contradictory views which have been taken of it. Śaṅkarian interpretation is, to borrow the words of Professor Paton which he said about Kantian interpretation, "an inevitable welter of conflicting opinions." Kant and Śaṅkara are the two greatest thinkers which Europe and India have respectively produced. As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Śaṅkara. The greatness of these two thinkers lies not only in the fact that both of them gave us a system of philosophy which is a rare and wonderful specimen of the creative activity of the human mind but (and this is more important) in that their thoughts had a potentiality which continued to inspire philosophical reflection in Europe and India long after their death, which process has not ceased even now.

Śaṅkara has played a very important part in contributing to the growth and development of philosophical thought in India. Professor Whitehead, speaking of Plato, says that "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to

1 Radhakrishnan : I. P. Vol. II, P. 445.

2 Thibaut : P. XIV.

3 Aspects of the Vedanta, P. 120.

Plato." Professor Whitehead's meaning is that Plato's writings are an inexhaustible mine of suggestion, containing as they do a wealth of general ideas.

In this sense, it may be said of Śaṅkara without any fear of exaggeration that philosophical development in India after him consists of a series of footnotes to him. Any one who cares to read the history of the growth of post-Śaṅkara philosophic thought, not only within the orthodox Advaita fold, but outside also in the rival Vedāntic Camps of Bhedābheda-vāda, of Viśiṣṭādvaitism, Dvaitism, and Śuddhādvaitism, will realize that philosophy in India owes an incalculable debt to Śaṅkara. The universality of his mind was never allowed by him to be obscured by excessive systematization, and a spirit of catholicism, which is not mere eclecticism, pervades his writings. It is no wonder that even the enemies of Śaṅkara have drawn upon his writings and their works bear the unmistakable stamp of the informing spirit of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara, more than any other single thinker, inspired and quickened philosophic thought in India. Advaitism, the foundations of which were laid by Śaṅkara, in its growth assumed several forms and its history is yet in progress. He was followed by a host of illustrious thinkers who developed his system in different directions. Suresvara and Padmapāda, Vācaspati Miśra and Sarvajñātma Muni, Vidyāranya and Appayadīkṣita are names which would be a matter of pride to any history of thought. Śaṅkara's influence did not end here. His views served to provoke controversy with the rival schools of Vedānta, and the philosophical systems of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha owe their inception and development not a little to their conflict with Śaṅkara's Vedānta.

In spite of the important position thus occupied by Śaṅkara and Kant in the history of Indian and European philosophy respectively, it is to be much regretted that the interpretations of their philosophies should be an "inevitable welter of conflicting opinions." Even today Śaṅkarian interpretation is in very much the same position as Kantian

interpretation. Professor Lindsay, speaking of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, says, "Ever since it has been published it has been commented on, and the process of commenting on it has produced different schools of interpretation. Kantian interpretation is in very much the position in which Kant describes metaphysics to be. It has certainly not reached 'the sure path of Science,' and, as one dogmatic interpretation of what Kant meant is opposed by another, the place of both is taken by a scepticism which says that the book is so muddled and confused that it is not worth understanding." These words of Professor Lindsay exactly describe the state in which Śāṅkarian interpretation finds itself today.

His Advaitism is regarded as a system of great speculative daring and logical subtility. It is represented as having a self-satisfying wholeness characteristic of works of art, expounding its own presuppositions, being ruled by its own end, and having all its elements in a stable, reasoned equipoise;² yet it is believed, on the other hand, that, in an endeavour to preserve continuity of thought, Śāṅkara attempted to combine logically incompatible ideas and this has affected the logical rigour of his thought, so much so that the theory of Māyā which is "the chief characteristic of the Advaita system"³ and the "orthodoxy" of which was established by Śāṅkara, merely serves as a cloak to cover the inner rifts of his system.⁴ It is said that at the centre of Śāṅkara's system is the eternal mystery of creation; but the very explanation which is offered by Śāṅkara to resolve this mystery, his doctrine of Māyā, is asserted to be a "Buddhistic element" which was incorporated into the Vedānta philosophy of Śāṅkara.⁵

Śāṅkara is described as a man of "illustrious personality" having "illustrious followers"; his works, it is said, abound in "subtle and deep" ideas which have rightly attained wonderful celebrity.⁶ But, on the next page, we are told that

1 Kani, P. 37.

2 Radhakrishnan: I. P. Vol. II, P. 446. 3 *ibid.* P. 565.

4 *ibid.*, PP. 471, 472.

5 *ibid.*, P. 471.

6 Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 429.

Śaṅkara was a hidden Buddhist himself, that he and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists, and that his philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upanisad notion of the permanence of self superadded.¹ Many of the doctrines peculiar to Śaṅkara "were anticipated by the idealistic Buddhists, and looked at from this point of view, there would be very little which could be regarded as original in Śaṅkara."² While on the one hand it is agreed that Śaṅkara was a hidden Buddhist himself, it is admitted on the same page that Śaṅkara tried as best he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhistic traits found in the exposition of Gauṛṅapāda and to formulate the philosophy as a direct interpretation of the older Upanisad texts, and in this he achieved remarkable success.³ While it is held that Vijñānabhikṣu was right in his accusation against Śaṅkara that the latter was a hidden Buddhist, it is at the same time recognized that "his influence on Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine person or an incarnation."⁴

Śaṅkara is extolled as a thinker equal in rank to Plato and Kant, and his system of the Vedānta is recognized as one of the most valuable products of the genius of mankind in its search for the eternal truth;⁵ yet it is believed that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which alone can render it possible for metaphysics to attain its content only through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, and consequently we find that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara "helps itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge."⁶ It is acknowledged that the tenets of Śaṅkara are true, but it is pointed out that he is not able to prove them; he has grasped the metaphysical truth by intuition, but he does not know the "way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof", and in this respect Vedāntism is "defective."⁷

1 Ibid., PP. 431, 432.

2 Dasgupta : Indian Idealism, P. 195.

3 Dasgupta : History, Vol. I. P. 437.

4 Ibid., P. 437.

5 Deussen in Aspects of the Vedānta, P. 120.

6 Deussen : System of the Vedānta, P. 90.

7 Aspects of the Vedānta, P. 127.

It is asserted that the doctrine advocated by Śaṅkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil, and that neither the other Vedāntic, nor the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with it in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation.¹ But it is again pointed out that it has not had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India, that it is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which does not rejoice "to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite", that its absolute Brahman is inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies; that its substitute, the Lord, is a "shadowy lord"; and that as a religion, it is a mockery, because "the very breath and spirit" of religion which consists in devotion to Lord who lends a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper, is conspicuously absent from it.²

While, on the one hand, it is held that Śaṅkara's Advaitism is "a great example of a purely philosophical scheme"³, and that Śaṅkara himself is not a theologian, and his arguments are all logical and philosophical and the references to the Vedas are only meant to support the conclusions of his independent thought, on the other, there are others who say that "Śaṅkara was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upaniṣads"; that he does not prove the Vedānta to be a consistent system of metaphysics complete in all parts; and that reason with him occupied a subordinate place and could be used either for the "right understanding of the revealed scriptures" or "for the refutation of other systems of thought."⁴ I will conclude by mentioning what a modern Buddhist missionary and scholar, the Rev. Rahula Sankrityayana, who has attracted the notice of learned Indologists very recently and is held in very high esteem by them, says about Śaṅkara. The judgement, however, which he passes on Śaṅkara gives evidence of more heat than light in him. The following is a free translation of what

1 Thibaut, P. XIV

2 Ibid. P. cxxvii

3 Radhakrishnan: I.P. Vol. II P. 445.

4 Dasgupta: History, Vol. I, PP. 434, 435

he says about Śaṅkara in the introduction to his Buddhacaryā, written in Hindi: "The truth is that Śaṅkara was a man of great genius and learning. He wrote his commentary called the Śārīraka Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra. Though this commentary was unique of its type and contained discussions about several philosophical systems, yet it was not a work of a very high quality for the age which saw the rise of thinkers like Diṇnāga, Udyotakara, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti..... The scholars of Northern India who really constituted the learned assembly of that age did not recognize Śaṅkara as an Ācārya until VācaspatiMiśra, who was learned in all the sacred lores and whose pre-eminence as a philosophical thinker was unrivalled in Mithila, then the seat of philosophical learning and scholarship, wrote his commentary on the Śārīraka Bhāṣya and brought into bold relief the truths which even Śaṅkara's genius had failed to see. To speak the truth, the reputation which Śaṅkara enjoys today he owes to Vācaspati, who advocated his cause before the learned minds of India. Had Vācaspati not written his Bhāmāṭī on Śaṅkara's commentary, the latter would have long been neglected and lost in oblivion."

II

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

The following summary account of the different interpretations of Śaṅkara's philosophy will reveal to us that Śaṅkarian interpretation even today is a "welter of conflicting opinions:"

(A) — General estimate:

1. Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of (Vi)jñāna-vāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism, and he borrows his dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. (Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Dasgupta and Belvalkar).
2. His philosophy is most aptly described as Māyāvāda. (Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Belvalkar, Dasgupta, Hiriyanna, Radhakrishnan and Thibaut.)

3. His philosophy is unrivalled in boldness and depth of speculation (Radhakrishnan, Thibaut). But he has incorporated certain Buddhistic elements, and Buddhism exercised a far-reaching influence on Śaṅkara. (Radhakrishnan).
4. He sometimes combines incompatible ideas and contradicts himself. (Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar).
5. Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which is required by philosophy. He fails to attack the philosophical problem by having recourse to natural means of knowledge, and constantly substitutes a theological for a philosophical means of knowledge. He knows the way of intuition but not of abstract reasoning and scientific proof. (Deussen).
6. Śaṅkara's religion has no influence on the masses, and is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart. (Thibaut).
7. Śaṅkara's reputation is more due to Vācaspati's commentary on his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* than to anything which is intrinsically his own. (Rahula Sankrityāna).

(B)—Metaphysical position :

1. Brahman is pure, undifferentenced, perfectly indeterminate homogeneous Being. It is Nirguṇa or Śuddha Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Hiriyanna, Belvalkar, Rāmanuja and Bhaskara).
2. Brahman is pure, undifferentenced and homogeneous Being, but it is not an indeterminate blank. (Radhakrishnan).
3. Brahman, being pure Being, is the same as Non-Being. (Dasgupta)
4. Brahman is both Nirguṇa and Saguṇa, Transcendent and Immanent; neither purely Immanent nor purely

Transcendent. The same truth can be expressed by saying that Brahman is the Efficient as well as the Material cause of the world. (Kokileshwar Sastri).

5. Brahman is not a "differenceless Being" Brahman contains its other, its opposite, its negations within it. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
6. Brahman does not unfold, express, develop, manifest, grow. It cannot, therefore, be said to be the creator. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.)
7. Brahman is the creator. It differentiates itself into the multiplicity of names and forms. The world is produced out of Brahman. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
8. Creation proceeds from Brahman in association with Māyā and not from the Śuddha Brahman. Brahman in association with Māyā is technically called the "Īśvara," the "Māyā-Śābala Brahman." Īśvara is the lower, the Apara Brahman; the empirical Brahman. It is an inferior principle. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar and Hiriyanna.)
9. Brahman (Nirguṇa Brahman) and Īśvara (Saguṇa Brahman) are different. (Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Thibaut, Deussen, Belvalkar and Hiriyanna.)
10. Brahman and Īśvara are not different, but one and the same. Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. Īśvara is not an inferior principle (Kokileshwar Sastri).
11. The concept of Īśvara as put forward by Śāṅkara is that of a creator. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Hiriyanna, Belvalkar and Kokileshwar Sastri.)
12. But from the true point of view creation is illusory, a magic show and unreal, and so the creator, i. e., Īśvara, also is illusory and unreal. Jiva, Īśvara and the world are illusory impositions on Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Deussen, Belvalkar, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.)

13. Īśvara is not illusory and unreal (Radhakrishnan and Kokileshwar Sastri).
14. Īśvara is real in the empirical sense (Radhakrishnan).
15. Īśvara is real in all possible senses (Kokileshwar Sastri).
16. Īśvara is phenomenal, not above time, but subject to time. He belongs to the empirical world. He is the Saguna Brahman or the conceived Brahman. (Radhakrishnan).
17. Īśvara is not phenomenal; nor is he illusory or unreal. He is not the lower or the empirical Brahman. He is Brahman conceived as the creator. (Kokileshwar Sastri).
18. The world is not only unsubstantial but a magic-show of illusion, and is falsely imposed upon Brahman. (Dasgupta, Thibaut, Daussen, Belvalkar, Ramanuja and Bhāskara.)
19. The world is phenomenal but not illusory. (Radhakrishnan, Kokileshwar Sastri).
20. External objects are merely phases of the perceiver's consciousness, are momentary, and without essence. (Bhaskara).
21. (a) Īśvara is the first cause, the creator. Creation and destruction are real movements in the life of God. Maya is the śakti of Īśvara, the unmanifested principle of multiplicity and basis of all evolution.
(b) But, again, Śaṅkara supports the theory of ajāti or non-evolution. The world is not evolved or produced but seems to be so on account of limited insight. (Radhakrishnan).
22. Śaṅkara does not accept the view of Parināma. He endorses Vivartavāda. (Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, Hiriyanna, Rāmanuja, Bhāskara and Daussen).
23. There is no conflict between Parināmavāda and Vivartavāda according to Śaṅkara. (Kokileshwar Sastri)

24. Śaṅkara's doctrine of casuality is Satkāryavāda. (Kokileshwar Sastri). The ultimate view endorsed by Śaṅkara is not Satkāryavāda, but Satkāraṇavāda (Dasgupta, Belvalkar).
25. Śaṅkara says nothing definite regarding the relation of māyā or avidyā to Brahman (Dasgupta).
26. Māyā is a power of Brahman, is neither being nor non-being. It is a principle of illusion. It is an unreal principle, is of a non-intelligent nature, but at the same time the upādāna of the world (Thibaut).
27. (a) Māyā is the śakti of Īśvara; the unmanifested principle of multiplicity and basis of all evolution.
 (b) Māyā expresses that the relation between the real Brahman and the unreal world is indefinable through logical categories.
 (c) Brahman and the world are non-different and so the relation between the two is an inadmissible one.
 (d) Māyā is neither real as Brahman nor unreal as the flower of the sky (Radhakrishnan).

Such are the divergent estimates in which Śaṅkara has been held and the different ways in which he has been understood. The views which have been taken of him do not all seem to do justice to him. The hidden Buddhist summarising the pages of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhistic works or the eclectic incorporating the Buddhistic doctrines and establishing their orthodoxy, seems hardly the sort of man to set all India in a philosophical ferment and to initiate a series of movements whose repercussions are far from having ceased even at the present time.

III

THE MISSING TRUTH

The one great truth which has escaped the attention of the interpreters of Śaṅkara who have consequently found in his

works a system of pure and undiluted rationalism is that it is primarily and pre-eminently a philosophy of Value. This ignorance of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy has resulted in an unconscious reduction of it to an existential system. This existential bias has paved the way for the affiliation of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara to systems of Buddhistic idealism and nihilism, thus rendering plausible all those interpretations which have to do in some way or other with the forgetting of the value-side of Śaṅkara's system. The critics of Śaṅkara proceed upon the assumption that he is taking what may be called the "existential" view of the universe. Their arguments derive plausibility from their confusion of "existential" and "axiological" categories. Śaṅkara's philosophy concerns itself with the problem of "appearance and reality" only in so far as this is necessary to bring out in bolder relief the value-side of the universe. For Śaṅkara the truth of the universe is constituted by the value it possesses. This aspect of his philosophy must not be lost sight of in any attempt to understand his meaning.

Rāmānuja interprets Śaṅkara's Brahman as "mere" i.e. nondifferenced Being. This notion of Brahman as Being is interpreted as Existence merely after the fashion of spatio-temporal existences. It is argued on behalf of Śaṅkara that creation, so diversified in nature, cannot be ascribed to Brahman, which is without differences. It is but the natural consequence of the existential standpoint unconsciously, but in all seriousness, attributed to Śaṅkara, that a reality which is non-differenced cannot be harmonized with a reality which is made of differences and differentiations. This, in all conscience, is putting Brahman and the world of existence or the spatio-temporal order on the same level, treating Brahman, which is more than, and the source of, all existence, as existence merely. The same existential bias reflects itself in Rāmānuja's repeated assertion that the advaitin proves the non otherness of the effect from the cause by proving the falsity of the effect. The reality of the effect is believed by Rāmānuja to consist in its existence. He equates reality with existence. This very standpoint determines the attitude of Bhāskara towards Śaṅkara's system in general and his

conception of the universe in particular. Bhāskara, not being able to realize the value character of the categories used by Śaṅkara, interprets him as denying even existential status to the objects of name and form. External objects, fire, earth, etc., says Bhāskara, have, according to Śaṅkara, no existence. The same existential prejudice leads Bhāskara to the view that the unity of Brahman and the diversity of the phenomenal world are opposed to each other like heat and cold. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, makes it clear that unity and plurality are contradictory only when applied to the self, which is eternal and without parts, but not to effects, which have parts.¹

The modern interpreters also, while recognizing that Śaṅkara's philosophy is based on an idea of value, are not able to realize that it is out and out a Value philosophy and that his notion of reality itself is that of value, value and reality being identical in his system. They admit that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is ruled by the idea of a highest Good, a Summum Bonum, a perfection which it is the great business of life to attain, and they try, in their own way, to define this Good after Śaṅkara. But they are not able to see that this Good is not merely ethical or religious good but is identical with what the metaphysicians call the highest reality. Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara describe Śaṅkara's Brahman in such a way that it is reduced to mere Existence in spite of their intention to the contrary. But this reduction is inevitable unless it is realized from the very beginning that reality for Śaṅkara is nothing but value and this is the only notion of reality to be met with in Śaṅkara. Dr. Dasgupta in describing Śaṅkara's Brahman as pure being and identifying it with non-being or the Śūnya of Nāgārjuna reduces it to mere Existence. His difficulty that it is difficult to distinguish between "pure being" and "non-being" as a category defies solution only so long as we persist in conceiving absolute reality, which is what Dr. Dasgupta means by "pure being", after the manner of objects which exist in space and time. Pure being appears as non-being because we want to catch it in its fulness by means of our sense-organs,

1 Brhad. S. B. II I. 1.

which are meant to reveal objects which are differentiated. When the sense-organs fail us we think there is no such thing as pure being and its notion is that of a non-entity or non-being. The description of the world as an illusion or a magic show is connected with the forgetting of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy and, with it, of the instrumental or intermediary function of the universe.

Thibaut also interprets Śaṅkara's Brahman as "pure being" which is the Absolute Reality for him. But from the way in which Thibaut's further characterization of Brahman proceeds it is clear that he is not able to shake off what we have called above the existential bias, and fails to draw and maintain the subtle and much-needed distinction between the notions of 'reality' and 'existence'. When Thibaut attributes to Śaṅkara the view that the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence but in so far as the latter is associated with Māyā, he is surrendering the claim of the Absolute Reality to absoluteness and admitting that the non-intelligent things are foreign to Reality or Brahman. This is tantamount to presenting a section of the whole reality as the whole. To identify reality with a section is to place it on the level of other existents. This is a prejudice, the existential prejudice, as we have said above. If the concept of "reality" is treated as an existential concept, and not as one of value implying the notion of degrees of value, and if existence is equated with space and time and spatio-temporal objects, and if in the highest state of realization this type of reality is not to be met with, there is nothing else for the existential consciousness but to say, as Thibaut does, that "the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of pralaya than during the period of its subsistence" and that it is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake in the rope.

All the interpreters speak of the world as neither "existing" nor "not-existing", as neither "being" nor "non-being", as neither "real" nor "unreal", without suspecting in the least that the notions of "reality" in the sense of "absolute being" and of "existence" are not interchangeable. They

lapse into the existential standpoint when they say that "only unity exists; plurality does not exist."¹ It is an *adhyāsa* between the axiological and existential standpoints and the categories appropriate to them to assign "existence" to the Absolute and the spatio-temporal world in the same sense. The examples and illustrations adduced by Śaṅkara have frequently been misunderstood by his unsympathetic critics precisely because it has never struck them that the axiological standpoint is organic to Śaṅkara's system.

IV

VEDĀNTA THE BASIC CULTURE OF INDIA
ŚAṅKARA'S CONTRIBUTION

The root of the whole difficulty about the interpretation of Śaṅkara's teaching is that his true position in the history of Hindu thought has been missed. His philosophy is an embodiment of the cultural spirit of Hinduism and he appears before us as an exponent and as guardian of this cultural spirit. The system of thought which he has bequeathed to us is an attempt to supply the philosophical foundation on which the superstructure of Hindu culture rests. The interpreters of Śaṅkara do not realize this sufficiently and his critics do not seem to be aware of it.

Śruti is a repository of the truths realized by the ṛṣis, truths which constitute the very life-blood of the Hindu race. The history of Hinduism from the very early times when Manu and Vyās, Buddha and Śaṅkara, appear on the Indian soil, down to our own age, the age of Tagore and Gandhi, of Aurobindo Ghosh, Bhagavata Das and Radhakrishnan, has been the history of the reaffirmations and fresh declarations of those eternal truths and of attempts to embody them in the social, religious and political institutions of the race. Śaṅkara associates himself with the long line of Vedic seers and emphasizes the traditional way of looking at things. But in insisting upon tradition he does not forget that no generation can merely reproduce its ancestors. Tradition for him is life and movement and perpetual re-interpretation.

1 Deussen: *System*, P. 270.

The preservation of this cultural spirit which is permanent and abiding and the defence of it are the tasks which Śaṅkara's philosophy imposes upon itself. The preservation of this spirit which is the spirit of the Vedas means the preservation of Brāhmaṇatva. Śaṅkara's philosophy is an exposition and also a defence of that supreme Reality and supreme Value from which Brāhmaṇatva gets its meaning and its justification. The Vedic religion has always stood for the truth that there is an Eternal Good, an Absolute Value, a Supreme Perfection, an Infinite Life, a Universal Existence. What "exists" here and now draws its substance and its value from this reality which the Vedas call Brahman. Brahman is the most perfect Reality and the most supreme Value. In it value and what appears to us mortals as bare "existence" meet and fuse in one. But the duality of, which also means the discrepancy between, Value and Existence is an inalienable feature of finite life. There is a gulf between the Ideal and the Actual. Hence all willing and striving on the part of man who is aware of the Ideal and also of the distance which divides the Actual from the Ideal. Hence the striving to know also. Hence all the problems man has to face in his life. Hence also the problem of all problems which philosophy has to solve, the problem, namely how Reality, Value and Existence are related to each other and how they are to be comprehended in the unity of a system. The story of the way in which Value, Reality and Existence are to be conceived as related is the story of the development of the different speculative systems of Hindu thought. These systems recognize that there is a supreme Reality. They have an unshakable faith in the reality of a supreme Good without which human life is as naught. They admit that there is a spatio-temporal order of existence and there are finite individuals struggling their way to a region where the fetters of time fall away and time becomes "the moving image of Eternity". The systems firmly believe in these. And how could they not? Do they not derive their inspiration from the Vedas? But when it is a question of preparing an intellectual scheme which will supply the philosophical foundation of the triple faith of the *ṛis*, faith in Reality, in Value and in a world of spatio-temporal existence, the different systems diverge.

Śaṅkara's philosophy is an attempt to show that Brahman is the supreme reality and also the supreme value and the spatio-temporal world which represents the duality of value and existence is finally rooted in Brahman; and the individual self which at present finds itself to be part and parcel of the world of existence is, in substance, one with Brahman. Śaṅkara criticizes the different systems of thought which claim to be Vedic but which, in Śaṅkara's view, are not so either because they ignore the ultimacy of Reality or dissociate Reality from Value. Sāṅkhya and Yoga do not find favour with Śaṅkara. The Puruṣa which is the supreme Value lacks the fullness of reality; it is not the source of any thing. The Prakṛti which is the type of all reality has in it no trace of intrinsic value. The insistence on the atomic, instead of the divine, constitution of the world in the Nyāya & Vaiśeṣika systems detracts from the full reality of God. Both these systems offer a conception of the supreme Value which is just the opposite of that with which the ṛṣis make us familiar. The only absolute value for the seers is the absolute Life in which the Self is reconciled to the world and the world to the Self. Śaṅkara expresses this by saying that Brahman is the Ātman and the expanding universe nothing other than Brahman. There is no anātmavastu, no not-self. What appears as the not-self is really the Self. The Self thus becomes the supreme value and the centre of every other value. The Universe is substantially one with us—this is the fundamental contention of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

This truth is the imperishable insight of the Vedic seers. This insight is the true religion. Philosophy is a reflective activity. It did not have its birth so long as there was an inexhaustible faith in the reality of the vision and in the whole cosmic process having its end in that vision. The Vedic mantras represent this stage of Hindu culture. When there was a slackening of faith, the spirit of enquiry which is what is meant by philosophy had its birth, and the task which it found as already assigned to it was to prepare an intellectual scheme in which these imperishable insights of the ṛṣis could be preserved and harmonized in the unity of a system. Śaṅkara belongs to this age of philosophical construction.

He shares the faith of the ṛṣis that there is something which man recognizes as the greatest value when his life is fullest and his soul at its highest pitch. He feels that his existence cannot be abstracted from it and his life is as naught without it. It is Value par excellence; but it is also Reality par excellence. The relation of value to being-this is the key problem of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

That the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara is primarily a philosophy of Value is the fundamental contention of the author; and the whole work is one long-drawn argument in support of this claim. It is a long neglected truth and its revival has been long overdue. Ignorance of that truth has tended to lead writers on Śaṅkara to affiliate his Vedāntism to Idealism and Nihilism of the Buddhist type. But from the contention that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of Value follows as a natural corollary the repudiation of the view that "Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavāda. Buddhism with the Upaniṣad notion of the permanence of self superadded." Śaṅkara's conception of the Self or Ātman as the supreme value and as the supreme reality has nothing in common with the Buddhist view of the Self as a perpetual flux of sensations & thoughts.

It is high time that we learned to distinguish between Vedāntism and Buddhism. And this we shall not be in a position to do unless we realize with Urban that the problem of reality in order to be solvable at all must be turned from a merely existential or logical problem into an axiological problem. This is exactly what Śaṅkara has done. He has impressed upon us that the metaphysical notion of Reality is the notion of Value. Buddhism starts with the conception of Self as an aggregate or saṃghāta of certain factors. It occupies no privileged position in the world of facts; it is itself a fact among other facts. Accordingly Buddhism ends by offering a notion of the highest Good which is no more than disappearance once for all of the constant procession of the fivefold aggregate which is the self according to it. The starting point of the Vedānta is Brahman or Ātman which is the supreme Value and Reality in a world of facts,

with a claim "to be" in its own right. The highest Good for the Vedānta is not the attainment of the "heaven of nothingness," not "blowing out" or "becoming cool" but the regaining of the absolute life by man which is his own intrinsically. It is this insistence on the profound significance of human life and of the self as a value and a centre of value, which distinguishes the Vedānta of Śaṅkara from Buddhism; for "the man to whom his own life is a triviality is not likely to find a meaning in anything else." History has yet to show how the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara came to be confounded with Buddhist Idealism and Nihilism. If the truths about Śaṅkara's philosophy which I have tried to bring out and emphasize in this work are realized, it will be seen that his philosophy has sufficient vitality to provide the philosophical foundation of a world religion and a world culture which are today in the process of evolution. For there is no uncertainty that the religion and culture of tomorrow is neither going to be an eclecticism nor is it going to be built up around the personality of any especially chosen prophet or divine. Man's awareness of a world of Value from which his own life is inseparable and an inherent and insistent craving to "conserve" value are sufficient guarantee for the reality of religion and culture and their power to promote human happiness.

CHAPTER II.

ŚAṆKARA AND THE NOTION OF REALITY AS VALUE

I THE NOTION OF VALUE

It has been said above that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of Value. But the word value has been used in so many different senses and now carries with it so many divergent implications that, without a word or two of explanation as to what the word exactly stands for, the reader may not have a definite idea of the sense in which we can speak of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy. What the modern philosophic consciousness calls axiology represents for Śaṅkara a specific point of view from which he looks at the ultimate problems of philosophy. His insistence on this point of view means making the evaluational consciousness ultimate and subordinating the claims of logic and the scientific understanding to the more pressing demands of the former. The formulation of the exact concept of value in the light of which Śaṅkara's whole philosophy will be understood is a necessary prolegomenon.

The category of, if not the word, value is as old as philosophy itself. From Plato to Hegel and from the Upaniṣadic thinkers down to Vidyāraṇya, the deliberate and reiterated identification of being and value has been the hidden spring of traditional thought. Even when the thinkers think of their philosophies as systems of existences, and regard Being or Reality as the goal of true knowledge, they always recognize the value character of the predicate of reality, and never think of "being" in abstraction from value. This conception of intrinsic value as the clue to the ultimate nature of reality has been, as Pringle-Pattison says, the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophy since Kant's time. Reality must be what the ethical, aesthetic or religious consciousness demands. For Kant the universe is essentially what the moral consciousness of man implies—what

ought to be: the real world must be a spiritual realm, a kingdom of ends. Fichte's world-view is similar to this. Lotze, too, is guided in his thought by the conception of the good; for him "the whole sum of nature can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of the Good".

But, in another sense, as Urban says, the realm of values is new to exploration. In the words of Münsterberg, "through the world of things shimmered first weakly, then ever more clearly, the world of values". Against the rationalistic view it is pointed out by the value philosophers that the logical impulse has not the primacy over the demands of our moral, aesthetic or religious nature, & no explanation of reality can be said to be adequate and complete if it does not do justice to them all. The characteristic problem of philosophy, then, is to ascertain the relation between what seems to us men the highest value and existence. Philosophy becomes the reflection upon those permanent values which have their foundation in a higher spiritual life above the changing interests of the times.

The modern philosophy of value has been inspired by the second Critique of Kant, wherein he subordinates the claims of "pure" reason to have a determining voice in the final make-up of the universe to the demands of the "practical" reason. Kant's second Critique is a protest against what it takes to be "the usurpation of authority by the pure intellect". But if value is set in opposition to reason it must inevitably appear, as Pringle-Pattison points out, as a subjective and arbitrary judgment, implying a dualism and a conflict between two sides of our nature. He, therefore, wants us "to avoid the tendency to slip into an anti-intellectualistic and irrationalistic mode of statement in expressing the principle of value." The principle will be true only when taken as inherent in our experience as a whole. Accordingly the word value should be taken as standing not only for the a-logical values of utility, goodness and beauty but also for the logical or the theoretical values of existence, truth, etc. In other words, we must also recognize the value character of the theoretical itself.

The problem of the definition has presented some difficulty, and consequently there are in the field many

alternative conceptions of value. The crucial issue, so far as the definition is concerned, lies between those who define value in relational terms and those for whom it is ultimately indefinable either because it is a unique quality or essence, cognizable through a unique type of cognition, namely feeling and emotion, or because it cannot be reduced to non-value terms and its nature cannot be grasped by such general propositions as express scientific truths.

The relational definitions of value view it as a complex derivative, and imply that it can be reduced to simple entities or relations of such entities. Thus Perry defines value in terms of interest. It is the fulfilment of desire. It is attached to anything and to all things in which we feel interest. It is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object." Anything, what-so-ever, acquires value when it is desired. Perry, therefore, also defines value as "that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it." The object acquires this special character only after it enters into relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. It is interest (feeling and desire) which creates values. Value is sometimes defined as an adaptation to environment, a relation between the organism and its environment. It consists in the fulfilment of the biological tendencies and instincts which lie behind all desire and feeling. Others again offer a more objective cosmological conception of value. It is conceived by them to be a relation of universal harmony. Values arise in relationships. The more fundamental and the more completely integrated the relationships between the individual and the world the more comprehensive will be his experience of values. Value is the sense of this harmony which unites within itself the entire universe.

All these definitions, in so far as they are relational and attempt to define value in terms of something which is a non-value, are really circular in character. Instead of accounting for value they all presuppose value. When value is defined as fulfilment of desire or interest it is assumed that fulfilment of desire or interest is good, that the interest itself is worthy of being satisfied. The value concept is already

this essence has on existence. It is "worth existing" or "ought to be." This unique relation to being constitutes the essence of value. In the case of value *its being is its validity*. Values are real and objective, but the status of this objectivity cannot be described in terms of mere ontological predicates, such as "existence" or "subsistence." The value judgment does not predicate 'being' in this sense, but only in the sense of "worthiness to be" or "ought to be." Therefore, the predication of value is different from the attributive predication of existence also.

The very test of that which is existent or non-existent, real or unreal, true or false is precisely an acknowledgment of the values involved in and the validity of the value judgments and distinctions. These distinctions depend upon, presuppose, and will not be possible without the ideals and norms of truth and reality. To realize the value character of the ontological predicates is to recognize that reality and value are one and inseparable, that to separate reality from value becomes meaningless, that the question, "What is the real?" is futile question if being is abstracted from value, for as Urban points out, the question "How ought I to conceive the real?" is logically prior to the question, "What is the real itself?" To say all this is to say that the notion of Reality is that of Value. From this standpoint the truly ontological judgments are the axiological and the contrast between judgments of reality and value judgments in any absolute sense will break down. We shall cease to separate ontology from axiology and, instead, we will have an axiological ontology and an axiological epistemology.

II

THE NOTION OF REALITY AS THAT OF VALUE

It is at this point that we realize the greatness of Śaṅkara and the uniqueness of his contribution to philosophic thought. The relation of value to being—the ontological status of value as we have defined it above—this is the question to which Śaṅkara is driven and it is in connection with the working out of the relation of "value" to "reality" and of

value and reality to existence as a whole that the more original features of Śaṅkara's philosophy are to be found. We have said above that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of value, but from what we have said there about the nature of value and of reality it will appear that we do not mean to suggest that his philosophy does not concern itself with "reality". For Śaṅkara Being or Reality is the goal of true knowledge, and philosophy a well-trodden path which takes us to the gates of the Real, having prepared us for that vision of it which is the consummation of the process of knowledge. The ontological motive has been the constant driving force of his philosophy. But it has been so because he has always recognized the value character of the ontological predicates, and has never allowed himself to forget that for an ultimate reflection value and reality must be one. For Śaṅkara Axiology would be a collective name for a group of problems—epistemological, ontological and cosmological; and the entire group of problems is focussed by him into one—the metaphysical status of value. The two fundamental theses of Śaṅkara's Axiology are (i) that the philosophical notion of reality should be that of "value" and (ii) that the ens realissimum is also the summum bonum, the possibility of realizing the true nature of reality being also the possibility of attaining the highest good. These two theses are, according to him, bound up together.

Philosophy for Śaṅkara is Brahṃavidyā. Śaṅkara indifferently formulates the problem of Brahṃavidyā as "inquiry into Brahman", "inquiry into Ātman", "inquiry into Liberation (Mokṣa)", "inquiry into the highest Good" (Nirṇeyasa).² This statement of the problem of philosophy in different modes by Śaṅkara is not the result of any carelessness or want of insight on his part; it is the fruit of his intellectual maturity. Śaṅkara is here striking out a new path and making a singularly bold and strikingly original attempt to write idealism in an entirely new language. In asking "What is the highest value?" and "What is the most truly real?", Śaṅkara is raising a very momentous issue the solution of which is of perennial interest

1 S. B. I 11.

2 S. B. I 14

to philosophy. This issue is regarding the metaphysical status of values, i.e., the relation in which the eternal values can be conceived to stand to the most truly real. By this conscious recognition of the centrality of the value problem in philosophic thought, Śaṅkara has brought about an extraordinary change, the importance of which has not at all been realized by his interpreters, whether ancient or modern. But this is the key to many a perplexing problem connected with the right interpretation of Śaṅkara's real meaning; and it is this alone which clears up many of the major tangles which, in the eyes of many interpreters, disfigure Śaṅkara's philosophic enterprise. It is Axiology which constitutes the heart of Śaṅkara's philosophy; and by assigning it its central place in the scheme of philosophy, he has altered the entire philosophical perspective. "It expresses an entirely new situation", so far as systematic Indian philosophic thought is concerned. Śaṅkara undertakes to *discuss* an entirely new question; new, because it had not been put, from the point of view at which he put it, by any ancient or modern; and according to him, there is no rest for the philosophic mind unless it has found an answer to this New Question: "How are the highest value and the most truly real related to each other?". Śaṅkara throughout his works adopts the standpoint of value. The driving force of his thought is never merely ontological, but rather axiological; and to think that Śaṅkara's real intention was to expound any strict form of rationalism is to miss the true inwardness of his thought. As the question is an entirely new one, so is the answer that Śaṅkara gives to it. It is that "Reality and value are one and inseparable; Brahman is the highest value and the most truly real." Brahman is the param Atman and the param Nitya, and the notion of Atman itself, which is the very type of reality, according to Śaṅkara, is the notion of value as we have defined it above. Those who, like Professor Dasgupta, are disposed to trace "the roots of a very through-going subjective idealism... in the writings of Śaṅkara himself"¹ fail to see that the centre of gravity of Śaṅkara's philosophical thought has shifted from being to value and the problem of reality or a world-whole has turned in his hands "from a merely existential or logical problem

1 History. Vol. II, P. 48.

into an axiological problem". Śaṅkara's entire philosophy is a philosophy of value, and we shall now proceed to learn what he has to say regarding the nature of values, their metaphysical status, and the relation in which they stand to the world of existence.

Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four sūtras contains in a nutshell the essence of his entire philosophy of value, and the rest of his work on the Brahma Sūtra is but an elaboration of this. Here in we meet with the unique contribution made by him to Indian philosophy by insisting that thinkers must shift the centre of gravity of their thought from mere being to value, by making them realize that philosophy deals with meaning and value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from meaning and value, by reminding them that there is some eternal "Good" which can actually be experienced and which should be the supreme object of the philosopher's study.¹ Likewise it contains his famous pronouncement regarding the oneness and inseparability of the highest value and the highest reality; his explanation why Brahman should be regarded as the most truly real and also the most supremely valuable; and, lastly, his deep-rooted conviction regarding the nature of the "eternal values", a conviction born of an intimately personal realization through a life dedicated to the pursuit of values. Śaṅkara's commentary on the catuṣṣūtrī since the time when it was written, has been regarded, and rightly so, as a work complete in itself, needing an after only when this "after" is to take the form of a ratiocination to substantiate the thesis outlined in it. His commentary on the first sūtra contains the thesis that the presupposition of an ultimate reality is the a priori of intelligible thought, this being one of those presuppositions whose denial refutes itself. Atman is this foundational reality and Brahman is the ātman. *This notion of Brahman as reality, which is a value notion in the hands of Śaṅkara, is further developed in his commentary on the second sūtra, wherein he points out that the notion of ātman*

1 S. B. I. 14. अमलद्वन्ता यम्येय विज्ञाना प्रस्तुता S. B. I. 11 ब्रह्मावगतिदि
पुष्टयार्थः ।

is the notion of ultimate ground or cause, and Brahman is the source of everything only in being the self or Ātman of everything. Herein he also mentions that a complete account of reality will conceive it not only as Consciousness but also as Bliss. The notion of Brahman as the ens realissimum which is the notion of reality as value is further elaborated in his commentary on the fourth sūtra, wherein Brahman is identified with the Summum Bonum. The thesis of the first two sūtras is amplified and substantiated, and the supreme principle of reality shown to be one with the supreme principle of value in the sense of summum bonum also, the principle of both of reality and value being the principle of wholeness, completeness, or sarvātmabhīva. The highest principle of value is the nature of reality itself. In order to get a true and complete insight into the metaphysical position of Śāṅkara, his comments on the three sūtras should be read together, and the statements made at one place understood in the light of statements made at another. But this is exactly what his interpreters, both ancient and modern, have not done. There prevails today a host of incorrect opinions about his real position.

Śāṅkara is in acute disagreement with those modern value philosophers who insist upon drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the realm of value and that of reality and keeping them absolutely distinct. For the majority of the modern value philosophers reality and value are strangers to each other. This contrast has been given different names by different value philosophers. It is the contrast between "Essence and Fact," between "Philosophy and Science," between "History and Nature", between "Value and Reality." If facts have monopolized the name "reality," these value philosophers are prepared even to call the region of values unreal, rather than admit any kinship between value and fact. The metaphysical systems of these value philosophers are haunted by an irreconcilable dualism between value and reality; and their endeavour to overcome this opposition by uniting them in a third something which is neither the one nor the other has resulted in an abandonment of the standpoint of value and a consequent return to the standpoint of existence.

Munsterberg tries to unite value and reality in a higher principle which he calls the Overself. He begins by defining value as satisfaction; but after stating that value is satisfaction, he asks the question "Whose satisfaction?" and gives the answer, "Satisfaction, of an Over-Person or Over-Self." But in doing so he makes a return to the standpoint of existence and becomes, as Dr. Maitra points out, "an existential philosopher."¹ "Whose" belongs to the dimension of existence and satisfaction to the dimension of value, and there cannot be any definition of the latter by the former.² Likewise Rickert, first having created a gulf between value and reality, tries to make a synthesis of them in some higher totality *which is not a value, with the consequence that reality* in his system is degraded to the level of a mere existence, beyond any hope of restoration to its original position unless the standpoint of dualism is abandoned. Rickert gives us a four-fold realm composed of the Real, the Value, the Subject and the Absolute or the World-Whole which is the ultimate unity of the Real, the Value, and the Subject. Value is not Rickert's ultimate. It is not even his penultimate. It is one of the two regions of which the world of experience (*Erleben*) is composed. A similar dualism marks the system of Husserl. He makes a contrast between Essence and Fact, just as Rickert makes one between Value and Reality. So wide is the gulf between Essence and Fact that Husserl even calls Essence unreal exactly as Rickert calls Value unreal. Essence is Husserl's name for a value.

Śaṅkara does not believe in a dualism of value and reality. Śaṅkara's position is similar to that of Hegel and Plato, for the former of whom the ultimate value is the absolute, just as the ultimate reality is the absolute; and for the latter of whom the Good is not only the supreme value but also the transcendent source of all the reality and intelligibility of everything other than itself, the *ens realissimum* of Christian philosophy. He is opposed to all attempts made by modern value philosophers to unite the kingdom of Being and the kingdom of Ought, the realm of Reality and the realm of Value, in something which is not a value. Śaṅkara

¹ Review of philosophy and Religion, Vol. vii, No. 1, P. 25.

² *ibid.*

does not consider the priority of the "Sollen" over the "Sein" as Rickert does. Value is not external to Being for Śaṅkara. He puts aside the concept of absolute transcendence of value, unrelated to any form of being and consciousness, as inherently absurd. Likewise he does not favour the view that metaphysic which, according to Aristotle, is the science of Being qua Being, can be defined as the science of real being in the sense that it is concerned with value-free existences. As Śaṅkara finds it difficult to think of value without implying some kind of reality and without giving it some form of being; so he holds that thought is not oriented towards "pure being", being abstracted from value, but towards absolutely valid values of which being is a form. The principle of all value in the universe is also the principle of all order and existence; and the problem of the totality of existence or the world-whole is not a merely logical or existential problem for Śaṅkara. For him values are real, they alone possess reality; but for him reality also is a value. It is neither an "existent" nor a "subsistent". The ontological status of this value of reality, as of all other absolute values, cannot be described in terms of predicates borrowed from the world of existence.

The relation of value to being—the ontological status of value—this is the ultimate metaphysical question to which Śaṅkara is driven. It is the central and ultimate problem of his Advaita Vedānta. How can it be said at the same time that the notion of reality is that of value and that values are real?—this is the question of which Śaṅkara's metaphysics constitutes the solution, and upon a right understanding of this solution will depend the place which will be assigned to him in the history of human thought by the historian of tomorrow.

III.

REALITY AN ULTIMATE NOTION

The establishment and solution of the philosophical problem, as Hoffding says, is determined by the consistency with which initial assumptions are laid down and maintained. Like Descartes, Śaṅkara raises the question: Where shall I get a fixed foundation for my knowledge? Descartes was of the

opinion that since in all knowledge, whatever be its object, we use our understanding, it is of the greatest importance to inquire closely into the nature of this. For Śaṅkara our thought or intellect is the only means of comprehension of the real nature of truth and falsehood.¹ His answer to the question whether there is anything foundational in our experience is that the presupposition of an ultimate reality, of an ens realissimum, is a necessary presupposition of intelligible thought. Nothingness, the absolute negation of being, is the negation of thought. Our thought refuses to conceive of an absolute non-existence, and a philosophy which is self-conscious and alive to its ideal and its mission feels itself unable to work with such a slippery concept as that of nothingness. The first deliverance of human reason is that the affirmation of "being" is immanent in every act of judgment. The concept of an ultimate reality is the a priori of intelligible thought and its communication. There is an essence to everything, and this essence cannot be the subject of doubt or denial.

Śaṅkara says that we can think of the complete annihilation of the entire universe and the extinction of all life in it, but we cannot think of "reality" itself as ceasing to be or being reduced to empty nothing. Nihilism refutes itself; it ultimately rests on Realism, Realism of the absolutely real. This presupposition of an ultimate reality, of ens realissimum, is called by Śaṅkara "astitvaniṣṭhā"; "sadbuddhiniṣṭhā," and rational thought, for which this acknowledgement is a necessity, is "satpratya-yagarbhābuddhiḥ" for him.² Even the rank nihilist has to be a satvādin.³ It is impossible to live a rational life, either of thought or feeling or activity, without first being convinced that the notion of an absolute reality is one of those a priori notions which render life itself meaningful and intelligible. This "sat" or reality is Brahman. It is the "great reality", mahadbhūtam according to Śaṅkara.⁴ "It is

1 Kotha. S. B., II. 3. 12, बुद्धिः हि नः प्रमाणं सदसतो याथात्म्यावगमे ।

2 Ibid. कार्यविलापनस्यास्तित्वं निष्ठत्वात् । तथा हीदं कार्यं सक्षमतारतम्यपार-
म्ययेणानुगम्यमानं सदबुद्धिनिष्ठामेवावगमयति । येदापिविषयप्रविलापनेन प्रविला-
प्यमाना बुद्धिः तदापि सा सत्प्रत्ययगर्भेव विलीयते ।

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12; S. B., II. 3. 9, सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म ।

mahat, great, because it is greater than everything else and is the cause of the ether, etc.; reality, for it never deviates from its nature."¹ It is the essence of Śaṅkara's criticism of Buddhistic Nihilism that, in its very attempt to make its position secure, it undermines the very foundation upon which it bases itself. Non-being cannot explain existence or being, whatever be the order or level of reality belonging to this existence or being.² We cannot deny existential status to the objects of our experience; the minimum that we must say about them is that they *exist*, they *are* in some sense. But if they are, they *are* by virtue of being grounded in reality. The notion of reality is an ultimate notion and this ultimate notion is the notion of an absolute reality.³ "Brahman" is the word used by Śaṅkara to designate this "reality" which is the bed-rock of all certainty, the presupposition of all intelligible thought, the foundation of all law and order.⁴ The reality of Brahman is thus implicated in the very possibility of there existing anything. Existence is grounded in a reality to which it bears testimony in every act of mind's awareness of it.

IV

ATMAN, THE ABSOLUTE REALITY.

An alternative way of giving expression to the above truth is that Atman cannot be denied, nor can there be any doubt about its reality. It has to be acknowledged even in the course of doubting or denying. To say that Brahman is Sat is to say that Brahman is the Atman of everything. Śaṅkara's conception of the Atman is the conception of the essence, of that which makes a thing what it is, that without which a thing cannot be. This essence is the Atman.⁵ The notion of

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12.

2 S. B., II. 2. 26, नाभावाद्भाव उत्पद्यते ।

3 S. B., II. 2. 6. सर्वस्य च वस्तुनः स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण भावात्मनैवोपलभ्य मानत्वात् ।
Katha, S. B., II. 3. 12, मूलञ्चेज्जगतो न स्यादमदन्वितमेवैदं कार्यमसदित्येवं
गृह्येत । नत्वेनदस्ति । सत्सदित्येव गृह्यते । यथा मृदादि कार्यं घटादि मृदाद्यन्वितम् ।
तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः ।

4 Tatit. S. B., II. 6. 1; तस्मादस्ति ब्रह्म तस्मात्सदेव ब्रह्म ।

5 S. B., I. 1. 6, आत्मा हि नाम स्वरूपम् । Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 7, यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणग्रहणं यस्य तस्य तदात्मत्वमेव लोके दृष्टम् ।

reality becomes the notion of the Ātman. This Atman cannot be denied, for to deny it would be to deny the very essence which makes a thing what it is. The notion of the essence is logically prior to and presupposed by the notion of the thing. If there could be things without there being an essence to them, non-existence would explain existence and non-being would render being intelligible.¹ The irrefutability of the Ātman, the doctrine of an absolute reality, or of the absoluteness of reality, is alike forced upon us by the very logic of our thought, says Śaṅkara, whether it moves along the negative way of denying everything outright or follows the saner path of discovering the essence, the truth, the quintessence of things. Both the pathways lead us back to reality, to the Ātman. We have shown how, according to Śaṅkara, nothing is nirātmaka, and things are real only by virtue of having their root in reality and their resting place in it, by participating in it and having their consummation in it.² But the negative logic also, such as was employed by the Buddhists, takes us to the same reality. In the very denial of the postulate of reality he who denies it also affirms it. All denial presupposes a positive background which must be affirmed.³ Atman has not to be proved, it is to be acknowledged. Its reality is a self-evident axiom.⁴ The following passage from Śaṅkara, summing up his classic argument against the soundness of a nihilistic philosophy, and laying at the same time the solid foundation of the doctrine of absolute reality, is worth quoting: "Just because it is the essence (Atman), it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. The essence of a thing cannot be looked upon as adventitious; it is rather self-established..... It is impossible to refute such a self-established entity. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essence; for it is the very essence of him who

1 S. B., II. 3. 7, तथा च शून्यवादः प्रसज्येत ।

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 8. 7, सदाख्येनात्मना आत्मवत्सर्वमिदं जगत् ।

Kaṭha. S. B., II. 3. 12. तस्माद ज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्ति ।

3 S. B., III. 2. 33, कंचिद्धि परमार्थमालम्ब्यापरमार्थः प्रतिषिध्यते ।

4 S. B., II. 3. 7, स्वयसिद्धत्वात् ।

attempts the refutation. The heat of fire cannot be refuted by the fire itself."¹

Śaṅkara's notion of the Ātman is the notion of the cause. In his system the concept of cause, in its metaphysical use, is identical with the concept of the ātman or self. The cause is the very Ātman, the very essence, the very self of the effect; and as essence and existence are not separable, either by time or by space, the effect is not separate from the cause and, being derived from it, is not other than it.² The concept of the Ātman is the concept of the highest substance (sat), as well as the supreme source and ground of everything. Śaṅkara whole-heartedly agrees with Hegel that in speculative knowledge "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well."³ According to Hegel, the truth that substance is essentially subject is expressed in the idea which represents the Absolute as Spirit; according to Śaṅkara, in the idea which represents Brahman as the Ātman. As the notion of the cause is identified with the notion of the Ātman, causality for Śaṅkara is not a case of temporal sequence between events; and to have recourse to spatial and temporal ways of explaining the relation between the two is to misunderstand his treatment of it. What have been generally regarded as the Cosmological and Ontological proofs of the existence of God are but slightly different ways, according to Śaṅkara, of bringing home to our mind the truth that the assumption of the Ātman is an indispensable assumption for metaphysics. The argument for a First Cause in Śaṅkara's philosophy turns out, on close examination, to be an argument for the recognition of an absolute reality as the very a priori of intelligible thought and as the final explanation of existence. Brahman's causality is implicated in its substantiality. To say that

1 S. B., II. 3.7, आत्मत्वाच्चात्मनो निराकरणं शक्यं नुपपत्तिः । न हि आगन्तुकः कस्यचित् स्वयंमिदृशत्वात् ।.....आगन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियते न स्वरूपम् । येष्वेव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम् । न हि अग्नेरोष्णमग्निना निराक्रियते ।

2 Chand. S. B., VIII. 4.1, कारणं हि आत्मा । S. B., IV.3.14, विकारेणापि विकारिणो नित्यप्राप्तत्वात् ।

3 Phenomenology, Translated by Baille, P. 80.

Brahman is Sat is to say that it is the original ground of everything.¹ Looked at from this point of view, the controversy among the interpreters as to whether the second sūtra (Janmādyasya Yatah) is a definition of the Nirguṇa or Saṅguṇa Brahman, of Nirviṣeṣa or Saviṣeṣa Brahman, of Brahman as such or of Īvara, will appear to be an idle controversy which draws its inspiration from ignorance of the truth that the notion of the Ātman in Śaṅkara's metaphysics is also the notion of the cause.

But what is the nature of the world in whose existence is involved the reality of the Ātman or Brahman as foundational to it, and what does the nature of the world say about the character of this foundational reality? The picture which Śaṅkara has before his mind when he begins his philosophical inquiry is the picture of a world cannot correctly, or even with a show of correctness, be described as consisting of atomic dances or shiftings of cosmic dust. It is not a scheme of mathematical phenomena, and it cannot be handled as a geometrical problem is by the geometrician. The central feature of the universe is the presence within it of conscious centres of experience, who not only take note of the fact of its being there in a cold, dispassionate and impersonal way which has a ring of indifference about it, but who also enjoy its many riches and whose attitude towards it is always one of appreciation. The existence of such living centres, capable of feeling the beauty and grandeur of the world and tasting its manifold qualities, is what is really significant in the world. All processes in the world have their being in consciousness, and their consummation in consciousness.² This is not all. The living souls are always striving after the attainment of ideals which are present and operative in their life, and which are drawing them on and on. Human experience is not limited to the mere "is". It is in its nature always to look beyond till it is in possession of something which will give it

1 Tatil. S. B., II. 1. Introduction, एवं सदेव सत्यमित्यवधारणात् । अतः सत्यं ब्रह्मेति । अतः कारणत्व प्राप्तं ब्रह्मणः । . . कारणस्य च कारकत्वं वस्तुत्वात् ।

2 Gita. S. B., ix, 10. जगतः सर्वा प्रवृत्तिः इत्याद्या अवगतिनिष्ठया अवगत्यवसाना ।

complete satisfaction, will satisfy its whole being. The attainment of this will be the attainment of *summum bonum*.¹

If this living experience, steeped in feeling and instinct with action, both inspired by the presence of the ideal within it, from which ideal we should draw our criterion of reality and our conviction of the nature of the system in which we live, is the real fact in the universe, a philosophical doctrine of reality cannot be satisfactorily based upon a "contemplation of the works of nature merely, that is to say, of the order and adjustment of the material system to the exclusion of human nature and human experience". But a purposive conscious experience which is itself a centre of value cannot have its explanation in a reality which is blind and, by its very nature and constitution, incapable of being in any way aware of the presence of what is termed goal, purpose, end, or ideal. "An unconscious something cannot be the self or essence or *Ātman* of a conscious entity."² The individual soul who carries on the reflective activity of understanding the meaning of the world and the significance of the world-process is a "conscious entity".³ For a human philosophy written by an intelligent human being, the search for the essence or reality is the search for a principle which constitutes the truth or essence or reality of his own self. It is doubtful if the essence or *Ātman* of a conscious and also self-conscious entity, as that of the enquirer who starts the philosophical investigation (*Brahmajī jñāśā*), can be found in an unconscious reality. Brahman which is the self or *Ātman* must not only be *Sat* but also *Cit*.⁴ A reality which is merely *Sat* and not also *Cit* may very well explain the inanimate order of reality, but it cannot be adequate to account for one which is animate and conscious and from which what is merely "*Sat*" draws its significance and value.

But perhaps for a reality which is merely *Sat* the philosophical problem would never arise unless it were to deve-

1 S. B., I. 1. 7. चेतनस्य श्वेतकेतोमेक्षितव्यस्य, etc.

2 S. B., I. 1. 7. न हि चेतनस्त श्वेतकेतोरचेतन आत्मा संभवति । S. B. I. 1. 9. न च चेतन आत्मा ऽचेतनप्रधानं स्वरूपत्वेन प्रतिपद्येत् ।

3 S. B., I. 1. 6. जीवो हि नाम चेतनः शरीराध्यक्षः प्राणानां धारीयता ।

4 S. B., III. 2. 21. कथं निरस्तचेतन्यं ब्रह्म चेतनस्य जीवस्य आत्मत्वोपदिश्येत् ।

lop consciousness with power of reflection. How the essence or reality and its nature would be conceived by an inanimate atomic particle, or whether it would be able to form any notion of it at all, we cannot even guess. Perhaps it would not be able to give us any philosophy, even a philosophy of materialism. For man, for whom the universe and all its processes exist only as an object of experience which has not only its cognitive side but also its feeling-aspect, the significance of the universe consists in being an object of whole-hearted enjoyment by a conscious mind. The human mind does not view the universe merely as a fact of interrelated facts existing in its own right; its awareness of the world is the awareness of something which has meaning, which is intelligible. Meaning, intelligibility, presupposes a conscious life appreciative of value. Accordingly, for Śaṅkara, the problem of the discovery of the essence, the self or Ātman of the universe is the problem of discovering the self of the conscious individual from whom they draw their substance, their meaning. Therefore, when he identifies Sat and Ātman and regards Brahman indifferently as the "reality" and as the "self", by self or Ātman he especially means the conscious self, and Ātmavidyā for him is the inquiry into and the knowledge of the "self" or Ātman of the conscious individual.¹ Likewise Brahmanavidyā is an inquiry into the nature of the pratyagātman.² As the pratyagātman is a conscious entity, and the notion of the self or Ātman is the notion of the ground or essence, Śaṅkara designates his system as Cetanākāraṇavāda.³ This use of the word Ātman to mean especially the conscious self, however, does not cancel the general meaning of "essence" or "self" applied to the word Ātman. Śaṅkara speaks of the earthen pot having for its self the earth, and vāk or sound in general as the Brahman or self of all names from which they derive their substance.⁴ We shall subsequently develop the line of argument

1 S. B., I. 1-7. तस्मान्चेतनविषय एव मुख्य आत्मशब्दः । S. B., I. 1. 10. आत्मशब्दश्च चेतनवचन न इत्यवोचाम ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 1. एवं प्रत्यगात्मा ब्रह्मविद्याविषय ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 21: 1-10. समानेय हि सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु, चेतनकारणावगतिः ।

4 S. B., IV. 3. 14. न हि घटो मृदात्मतां परित्यज्यावतिष्ठते । Brhad. S. B., I. 6. 1. यत्ते एतरेषां वाक्शब्दवाच्यं वस्तु ब्रह्मात्मा ततो हि आत्मनामो नाम्ना ।

followed by Śaṅkara to prove that Brahman is the self of the whole universe.

Brahman is the Ātman or self of every conscious being. "Every one is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks 'I am not'." If the existence of the self were not an ascertained fact every one would think 'I am not'.¹ Of this Ātman it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; it is the self, and that the self is cannot be denied, for it is the self of that very person who might deny it.² The reality of the Ātman is a self-evident axiom. It is the basis of all epistemological enquiry. The reality of Ātman cannot in any way be proved by having recourse to any process of reasoning or any special means of knowledge; for all operation of the means of knowledge, whether pratyakṣa or anumāna, all thinking and reasoning proceed on the assumption that the self is. Even the self cannot prove its own existence. It provides the possibility of any proof and its process taking place, without itself being the object of such proof or process of thinking. The fundamental condition of all thinking and reasoning cannot be conditioned by such thinking and reasoning. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that the Ātman is svayamsiddha, svataḥsiddha, self-evident or self-established.³

V

ATMAN AND THE VALUE CHARACTER OF THE PREDICATE OF REALITY.

Śaṅkara has been able to find a fixed foundation for our knowledge in the reality of the Self or the Ātman, or in the acknowledgment of an absolute Reality which for him is Brahman. The primacy of the Ātman seems inescapable, whatever turn or twist of thought we take. But it is just at this point when we have been assured of the objectivity of the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4. आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।

3 Gita. S. B., II. 18., आत्मनः स्वतः सिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धे ह्यात्मनि प्रमातरि प्रमित्योः प्रमाणान्वेषणं भवति । S. B., II. 3. 7. स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् । न हि आत्माऽऽत्मनः प्रमाणमप्यस्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि अप्रसिद्धप्रमेयं सिद्धये उपादीयन्ते । आत्मा तु प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराम्यत्वात् सिध्यति । न हीदृशस्य निराकरणं संभवति ।

Ātman and its essential irrefutability even by the most dam-
 natory logic of nihilism, that the crux of the whole difficulty
 about the reality of the Ātman appears. Ātman is, Reality is
 But what is the sense in which Ātman or Reality is? What
 is the status of the objectivity of the Ātman? What should we
 exactly understand by predicating reality in an ultimate sense
 to anything? What should be the character of the ontological
 predicates for an ultimate reflection? The problem of the
 sense in which Ātman is has been, and continues to be, the
 great problem of philosophy. This was the great problem of
 Śaṅkara's philosophy also, and it continues to be the press-
 ing question for his interpreters as well, and upon a right
 solution of this question depends the insight we shall have
 into the essentials and the essential greatness of Śaṅkara's
 contribution to constructive thought. In the acknowledge-
 ment that Ātman is and that it cannot be denied without at
 the same time affirming its reality in the very act of denial,
 there is involved a knowledge of the Ātman. But when we
 predicate reality to the Ātman, what is the sense in which we
 do so? Do we predicate reality to the Ātman in the same
 sense in which we predicate reality to the "jar" or to the
 "cow" or to the "mountain", or, for the matter of that, to any
 differentiated object existing in space and lasting through
 time? The jar, the cow, the mountain are real objects; they
 are characterized by objectivity; their *esse* is not merely
percepti. They are, in the words of Śaṅkara, *bhūtavastus*,
 already existent realities. They are not to be made. They have
 a coercive nature and compel recognition. But their reality
 is not absolute. With the destruction of the jar and the
 mountain and the death of the cow, they cease to possess
 any reality. We do not then say—we cannot do so—that
 these objects have a right to independent and eternal exis-
 tence, that they can exist in their own right, no matter what.
 To say that the reality of an object is not eternal and absolute
 that it is an object which cannot justify its own existence, is
 to admit that the object has an existential status only, that it
 is something whose reality consists in its characterization by
 spatio-temporal differences and its relation to a sentient
 experience which has awareness of it. Any value which is
 attributed to it is derived from its relation to the conscious

life and its needs and requirements. It is not a self-justifying end.

But when we say that the "Ātman is real", that "Brahman is", though the verbal form by means of which reality is predicated to the Ātman or Brahman is the same, there is a real difference in the mode of predication not brought out by the verbal expression. When we predicate reality to the Ātman and emphasize its absolute objectivity, we mean to bring out the truth that Ātman is "worth existing", that Ātman is "what ought to be." The status of the objectivity of the Ātman is not describable in terms of ontological predicates such as existence or subsistence. Its ontological status can be described in terms of a value predicates only, or, as Urban puts it, "in terms of a validity." In the case of the Ātman, as in the case of value, its being is its validity, its "worthiness to be." For some realists value is an indefinable quale analogous to sense-data, and for them there is a unique type of cognition of these essences, namely, through feeling and emotion. The awareness of the Ātman is not like the perception or awareness of a quale or of an existent something. The predication of reality to the Ātman is not like the predication of a quality to a thing, for instance, sweetness to sugar or redness to stone. It is different from the attributive predication of existence, for instance, when we say, "there is a cow", "there is a pot." It is Ātman's "worthiness to be" which constitutes its validity and confers upon the Ātman the status of an ens realissimum and an ultimate value whose denial results in contradiction. When we judge that "Ātman is Sat" we not merely bring the subject and the predicate together as we do in the judgment "fire is hot". The latter is an existential judgment; but the former is a value judgment, in which, in addition to the act of bringing together the subject and predicate, there is the further act of acknowledgement that "Ātman ought to be" that "it is worthy to be". It is this act of acknowledgement that brings out the value character of the reality of the Ātman and also of the judgment in which Ātman's nature as a value is embodied.

By emphasizing the impossibility of the denial of the Ātman, Śaṅkara intends to bring out the value character of

the predicate of reality. When he says that the reality of the Ātman cannot be denied, that it is self-established, and that it is the basis of all epistemological inquiry and the presupposition of the operation of the *pramāṇas* or means of right knowledge, that it is *aprameya*, what he wants to impress upon our mind is that there are certain absolute values which must be acknowledged as such in any attempt to offer a rational explanation of the universe, and "reality" is one of these absolute values.

Man's experience, according to Śaṅkara, is not limited to the mere "is". Ideals are present and operative in man's life. Reason in him demands not merely the "is" of bare fact but the "ought-to-be", the "deserves-to-be" of absolute value. He puts in the fore-front of his philosophy this value of "reality" which explains every other thing but is not itself explained by anything. He is not content to take the universe as a fact or set of interrelated facts, and philosophy for him does not fulfil its mission in merely "giving us a theoretic scheme of the world" or a "necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be explained". The philosopher, in him, does not seek mere intellectual coherence. Śaṅkara is of Pringle-Pattison's mind that the most perfect realisation of unity in variety is as naught if there is nowhere anything to which we can attach this predicate of value, or of which we can say that it is worth existing, that it ought to be. The value of "being" or "reality" is an absolute value for him. This is why he says that "Brahman, whose very essence is being, cannot be suspected to have been derived from anything else."¹ Without acknowledging the absolute value of reality our thought will be moving in a vicious circle. Brahman or Ātman is this absolute value of *Sat*.²

We have explained the sense in which, according to Śaṅkara, Ātman *is* or is real. But the sense in which Ātman is largely connected with the question of the awareness of the Ātman. The Ātman is the object of a unique form of

1. S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म । न खलु ब्रह्मणः सत्तात्मकस्य कुतश्चिदन्यतः संभव उत्पत्तिराशङ्कितव्यः ।

2 1 id.

knowledge. The knowledge process is intuitive as well as judgmental. Being the *pratyagātman*, the inner self, it is not known as an existent something is known. *Ātman* is known as the "knower" in every act of knowledge, never as an object "known". It is also known as the fundamental condition of the knowing process itself. In this awareness of the reality of the *Ātman* the distinction, involved everywhere else in every process of knowledge, between the knower, the known, and the knowledge, is non-existent.¹ The noetic character of the awareness of the *Ātman* can be described only as the "recognition of or assent to a form of objectivity". The word acknowledgement (*svayamsiddha*, *svataḥsiddha*) brings out this aspect of the awareness of the *Ātman*. Accordingly, for Śaṅkara, the *Ātman* is neither "something to be rejected nor something to be accepted even"; it is neither *heya* nor *upādeya*.² One can reject something other than oneself; there is also no intelligible sense in which one can speak of "accepting" oneself. Perhaps the best we can say (alike the least and the most) is that "every one is aware of his own existence", and this is mere assent to or recognition of the objectivity of the *Ātman*.³ The noetic, according to Śaṅkara, has something of the valuational in it, namely, that no knowledge is possible without acknowledging that *Ātman* is, that there is a foundational reality as the basis of all epistemological inquiry and all knowledge.⁴ While recognizing the valuational character of cognition itself, Śaṅkara is careful to draw our attention to the fact that the valuing involved in the awareness of the *Ātman* is not an operation supplementary to knowing as Sellar holds it is. In being aware of the *Ātman* in acknowledging an absolute reality, we have the consciousness that it is a value, that it is something which "deserves to be" or "ought to be", that it is worth existing, that it is something which cannot but be. Valuing is part and parcel of the

1 S. B., I. 1. 4. नहि शास्त्रमिदं तथा विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपपादयिषति । किं तर्हि प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्या कल्पितं वेद्य-वेदित्यवेदनादिभेदमपनयति ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 *ibid.*, आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः । *Upa.*, II. 16. 41, अनुपात्तं स्वरूपं हि स्वेनात्यक्तं तथैव च । *ibid.*, II. 7. 2; S. B., I. 1. 1, सर्वो हि आत्मास्ति त्वं प्रत्येति ।

4 *Gita*. S. B., II. 18, नहि पूर्वं इत्थं 'अहं इति' आत्मानं अप्रमाय पश्चात् प्रमेय परिच्छेदाय प्रवर्तते । न हि आत्मा नाम कस्यचित् अप्रसिद्धो भवति ।

cognitional process. This is the doctrine known in contemporary Value philosophy as the doctrine of the value character of the theoretical. Not only is valuation noetic; cognition itself is valuational.¹

The Ātman, the conception of which is put forward by Śaṅkara as central to his metaphysics, is not the conception of an All-knower who, by knowing or being aware of things, maintains them, so to speak, in existence. *The Ātman is not the pramāṇī or the veditī. It is the absolute reality, which maintains and supports the knower, knowledge, and the known. It is the supreme value, which lends significance to the knower, the act of knowing, and the object which is known.* Śaṅkara recognizes the fallacious character of any argument which passes from the conditions of knowledge to the presence of an All-thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought. The conception of the Ātman as the knower belongs to a stage of thought where the duality of value and existence has not been overcome and the opposition between the ideal and the actual is unreconciled. Such a halting principle is not adequate to explain the being and becoming of the universe. It cannot be viewed as the absolutely real. The conception of the Ātman as the pramāṇī belongs to the region of Avidyā where the Self is opposed to the Not-Self, the Ideal to the Actual, and Ought to Is.² Brahman or Ātman is the Supreme Reality and Value upon which the universe with its distinctions ultimately hangs. It is hardly correct to think, as Deussen does, that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara "pushes aside everything objective, and relies on the Subject only"³. Much of the misunderstanding which has gathered round the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is due to the ignorance of the fact that his idealism takes its stand on the essential truth of the objectivity of our judgments of value, and the fundamental contention of his idealistic philosophy about the objectivity of the Ātman is really a contention about the objectivity of

1 Gita. S. B., II. 69, न हि आत्मनः स्वात्मनि प्रवर्तकं प्रमाणपेक्षता आत्मत्वादेव तदन्तत्वात् च सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वस्य । स्वात्मविषयत्वात् आत्मज्ञानस्य ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 1, न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन्नस्ति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते ।

3 D. S. V., P. 213.

value. Śaṅkara's approach to the problem of reality is neither subjective nor objective, as Professor Radhakrishnan points out; it is rather an axiological approach which is neither purely epistemological, nor purely ontological. He inquires into the nature of the Ātman not as the knower, but as the ground and source of all the reality and intelligibility of the universe. In this sense his approach is entirely objective. Ignorance of the valuational standpoint of Śaṅkara's philosophy has led the critics to put fanciful interpretations upon his utterances, and to view his system as a species of Subjective Idealism. If we once begin to believe with Deussen that in the state of liberation all plurality is annihilated, and "only the knower in us and therefore the Ātman remains as the unit", then naturally his system will appear to us as nothing more than a variety of Subjective Idealism or Mentalism.

Śaṅkara's philosophy is definitely concerned with the repudiation of all such views as insist upon regarding the Ātman as a definite "this" or "that". It is no doubt true that occasionally, in establishing the reality of the Ātman, he speaks of it as the *pramāṇī*, and argues that only when the Ātman, the knower (*pramāṇī*), has been determined as real, is any inquiry on the part of the knower with a view to obtaining right knowledge possible, that "without determining the self — 'I am I' — none seeks to determine the knowable objects".¹ But he never allows himself to forget that this conception of the Ātman is relative to the standpoint of finite experience, which experience, in its turn, is ultimately dependent upon the Ātman, which is above the duality of the subject and the object. The Ātman which is the central topic of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is the Ātman which is the Absolute Good, and the attainment and realization of which results in the enjoyment of infinitely blissful and eternally real existence. It is the Ātman which is the goal of the operation of the varied means of knowledge, and the comprehension of which annuls all empirical dealings implying objects and means of knowledge. It is this Ātman which is the bedrock of certainty, and upon which Śaṅkara builds his edifice of Advaitism, which, in words

¹ D. S. V., P. 214.

² Gita. S. B., II. 18.

borrowed from Platonic metaphysics, may be said to be the Monism of the Good.¹

There is not much in common between the argument put forward by Descartes and the conclusion drawn therefrom regarding the existence of the self as an indubitable certainty, and the insistence on the part of Śaṅkara, that the reality of the Ātman, which is the essence, the ultimate value, the basis of all epistemological inquiry, is a matter of acknowledgement, as it is one of those acknowledgements without which the rationality of the universe will be seriously affected. The approach to the problem of the self through the gateway of axiology is foreign to Descartes's system. This also explains the difference between the conceptions of self to which both Descartes and Śaṅkara are led by their thoughts. Descartes's logical argument leads him to the reality of a Self as a thinking being. But the Self of whose reality Descartes is indubitably certain through an immediate intuition is not able to bear the weight of his epistemological speculation and metaphysical construction. He is led, instead, to appeal to theology in order to get a sure foundation for the reality of his knowledge. The singularly bold attempt, on the part of Śaṅkara, to lay the foundations of a sound theory of knowledge with the help of the principle of the reality of the Self or Ātman has nothing in common with Descartes's attempt to provide a theological foundation for the validity of our knowledge. The Self which is the presupposition of all knowledge and the sure foundation of its validity, and whose reality is affirmed in the very act of denying it, has, according to Śaṅkara, an absolute existence and possesses all the characteristics which an absolute reality ought to possess. According to Śaṅkara, if the reality of the Self is accepted, the validity of the theory of knowledge requires no theological guarantee, and the epistemological application of the concept of God becomes superfluous.

In Śaṅkara the concept of God blends with the concept of the Self or Ātman. "Ātman is Brahman and the Brahman is Ātman."² Throughout his works Śaṅkara uses the words

¹ Gita. S. B., II. 69.

² Chand. S. B., V II. 1., S. B., I. 1. 1.

Ātman and Brahman interchangeably, and he takes special care to draw our attention to this use of the words.¹ Nor does he omit to explain the significance which attaches to his alternative use of the words to designate one and the same entity. In equating Ātman with Brahman Śaṅkara has two classes of readers in mind, one consisting of those who are of Descartes's way of thinking and hold that the self of which we are indubitably certain is a finite and imperfect being, convinced of his finitude and imperfection by his doubts and his desires; the other made up of those who are like the deists in thinking that the self and God are entirely different realities belonging to different orders. Against the former Śaṅkara points out that the "Self" is not a finite and limited being in its essential nature; to the latter his rejoinder is that the God or Brahman who should be the proper object of religious devotion is not something other than the Self. The metaphysical truth as well as the religious ideal is summed up in the formula "Ātman is Brahman." The same truth is revealed to us whether we look back or direct our gaze forward.² By emphasizing that Ātman is Brahman Śaṅkara does away with the necessity, felt by Descartes, of adding what is merely a superfluous theological sanction to his doctrine of the absolute priority and indispensability of the Self or the objectivity of the absolute value of "Sat" or "reality." Had Descartes been consistent in developing the implication of the foundational character of the awareness of the Self he would have been led to revise his conception of it as a finite being in favour of a conception of the Self as a continuous, all-embracing unity of existence and consciousness in which everything that possesses reality must find a place and for which it must exist.

VI

ŚANKARA'S DOCTRINE OF ONTOLOGICAL PREDICATES

Śaṅkara's notion of reality as that of value gives us a clue to his doctrine of ontological predicates. As for him reality

1 Brhad S. B., I 4. 10. इति सहस्रसो ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः समानाधिकरण्यादेकार्थत्वमेवेत्यवगम्येत् । *ibid.*, II. 1. 20, सर्वश्रुतिषु च ब्रह्मण्यात्मशब्दयोगात् ।

2 Chand. S. B., V. II. 1, 'आत्मब्रह्मशब्दयोरितरेतरविशेषणविशेष्यत्वम् 'ब्रह्म' इति अध्यात्मपरिच्छिन्नमात्मानं निवर्तयति । 'आत्मा' इति च आत्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य आदित्यादिब्रह्मणः उपास्यत्वं निवर्तयति अभेदेन आत्मा एव ब्रह्म ब्रह्मवात्मा ।

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and value are one and inseparable, the predication of reality to a thing in the metaphysical sense has a value character, and the distinctions between truth and falsity, between reality and unreality, and between reality and appearance, turn out in his hands to be distinctions of value, presupposing certain ideals and norms of truth and reality. In order to understand fully Śaṅkara's views about the value character of the predicate of reality, we must learn to distinguish between the words "reality" and "existence", which are of frequent occurrence in contemporary philosophical discussions. The two concepts of "reality" and "existence" should not be identified. There are things which are real but do not enjoy the same, or even a similar, status of objectivity as is enjoyed by many other objects. There are realities whose nature cannot be defined in spatial and temporal terms, and whose peculiar character cannot be completely characterized by their determination as mere "being" or "existence". There are, on the other hand, many things for whose description a spatial and temporal idiom is the only proper idiom. With a view to avoiding confusion of thought and misunderstanding and attaining clarity and consistency, the two concepts of "reality" and "existence" should be distinguished; and this can be done by using the word "existence" in the narrower sense, i.e., by equating existence with "position" in "space" and "time". In this sense of the word, things whose nature is neither definable nor communicable in spatial and temporal terms will be said "to be real" but not "to exist". Likewise there may be many things which exist but are not "real", the word "real" and its corresponding noun "reality", being for us axiological concepts, and their proper use being only in a metaphysical reference.

For Śaṅkara "Sat" and "Asat" are value concepts and the distinction between them is a value distinction. In their metaphysical use they are not existential concepts, and when employed to describe the ontological character of reality they are not meant to convey any idea to the reader about the existential status of the object which is the subject-matter of reflection. "Sat", for Śaṅkara is "what always maintains its nature", "what is true no matter what", "what ought

to be", "what must be acknowledged".¹ In this sense of the word Sat, the Absolute Reality alone can be said to be Sat, for the notion of such a reality is one of those fundamental notions whose acknowledgement is a necessity of rational thought. This intelligible thought, by the very nature of the case, is a form, not of the factual or existential, but of the evaluational consciousness. The factual consciousness never makes—it can never make—any demand; it is not in its nature to do so. The demand for an absolute reality (Sat), which is the demand for an absolute value, has its source in the value consciousness, which enjoys the prerogative of legislating even for the factual consciousness.² The notion of the Asat is the notion of something about which it cannot be said that "it ought to be no matter what". The "pot", the "cow", the "horse" are, in this metaphysical sense of the word, Asat, because of them it cannot be said that they cannot be dispensed with, what they ought to be. But the case with Brahman or Ātman is different. It is its essence to be "Sat". It is the very nature of reality to maintain and affirm itself. With the destruction of the cow, the horse and the elephant, reality is not destroyed; on the contrary, it alone renders any notion of extinction or destruction possible. For an ultimate philosophical reflection the distinction between reality and unreality is a value distinction, and for Śāṅkara the same is the case with the distinction between the concepts of Sat and Asat and the corresponding consciousnesses, namely the sadbuddhi and asadbuddhi.³ Avyabhicāra, which is the test of reality according to Śāṅkara, is a value notion in his metaphysics.

But Śāṅkara knows that to deny reality to a thing is not to deny existence to it, and a thing may be actual without possessing reality. Śāṅkara's statements in his works about the unreality of the world (in the axiological sense) are cons-

1 Gita. S. B. II. 16, यद्विषया बुद्धिः न व्यभिचरति तत् सत् ।

2 ibid., XIII. 14, सदास्पदं हि सर्वं सर्वत्र सद्बुद्धयनुगमात् । न हि मृगतृष्णिकादयः अपि निगम्यता भवन्ति ।

3 Gita. S. B. II. 16, सर्वत्र बुद्धिद्वयोपनन्देः सद बुद्धिः असदबुद्धिः । सदसद्विभागे बुद्धि तन्नेस्थिते । घटादिवुद्धि विषयः असत् । व्यभिचारात् । न तु सदबुद्धिः विषयः अव्यभिचारात् । घटे विनष्टो घटबुद्धौ व्यभिचरन्त्यां सदबुद्धिरपि व्यभिचरति इति वत् । न । घटादौ अपि सदबुद्धि दर्शनात् । विशेषण विषया एव सा सदबुद्धिः ।

tantly punctuated by references which purport to confer at least existential status upon it. Sat and asat are words which are also used by us in our ordinary everyday discourse without our intending to burden them with any metaphysical significance. When so used, they are merely existential concepts and have reference to our factual consciousness, to the mere sense-perceptive aspect of our experience in abstraction from its value aspect. The import of our judgments, then, is not axiological but only existential. Śaṅkara has "to think with the learned" but occasionally "to speak with the vulgar", and we find him using the words sat and asat in an existential sense also. But he does not keep us in the dark about this, and the ways in which he speaks of the things leave no room for doubt about the exact import of the words, unless we deliberately forget that his standpoint is the standpoint of value. A sensible reality which is the object of affirmative factual consciousness is known as sat; and one which is the object of negative consciousness is asat.¹ It is this existential import which Śaṅkara intends to convey when he says that the "created effects" are apprehended "as existing, as existing", that the "external objects" are cognized as external to the experiencer, that the pot is made out of the clay that even when the effects are mere name and form the clay is real.² "Grhyate", "Upalabhyate" are the words used by Śaṅkara to express this factual awareness. They do not carry either any axiological significance or any metaphysical association.

The reality of value is not to be understood after the fashion of the reality of objects existing in space and time. The real is sometimes regarded as equivalent to the actual or the existent. In this sense of the term, value cannot be said to be existent or real according to Śaṅkara. Brahman is not, in this sense, sat, for it is not a sensible reality.³ This is the inner meaning of Śaṅkara's insistence on characterizing reality by

1 Gita. S. B., XIII. 12. यत् हि इन्द्रियगम्यं वस्तु घटादिकं तत् अस्ति बुद्धयनुगतप्रत्यय-
विषयं वा स्यात् नास्ति बुद्धयनुगतं प्रत्यय विषयं वा स्यात् । Chand. S. B.,
VII. 17. 1. इन्द्रियविषयापेक्षं सच्च त्यच्चेति सत्यमित्युक्तम् । उक्तं

मत्यत्वं श्रुत्यन्तरे विकारस्य, न तु परमायपिक्षमुक्तम् ।
2 Katha. S. B., II. 3. 12. मत्सदित्येव तु गृह्यते यथा मृदादिकार्यं घटादि मृदाय-
न्वितम् । Taiit. S. B., II. 6. 1; S. B., II. 2. 28; II. 3. 9.

3 Kena. S. B. II. 1, अनीन्द्रियमात्मतत्त्वम् । Gita. S. B., XIII. 12.

means of what he calls *viśaṃpratiṣedha*, i.e., by denying to it all finite characteristics. *Viśaṃpratiṣedha* means that the nature of value is not describable in terms of an existent or a subsistent. But Śaṅkara warns us against thinking that Brahman is wholly unreal. It is true that it is not apprehended as a particular "this" or "that", but we cannot call it *asat* absolutely.¹ Brahman represents a non-existent form of objectivity. Śaṅkara cannot think of a value which is not real. The position of a pure norm, the absolute ought, the transcendent "sollen", the concept of a value in itself divorced from every form of being, is untenable according to him. Value may be real but it may not exist. Difference from "being" or "existence" does not mean absolute nothing. As against Rickert, he would say that we are not justified in calling value "unreal"; in fact, he avoids the mistake committed by Rickert in identifying existence with reality. It is this identification of the two which has led Rickert to accept the position that values are unreal. By saying that Brahman is not *sat* Śaṅkara is simply disclosing to us a sphere of reality whose nature is describable only in a non-spatial and non-temporal idiom.

It is the reality or unreality of the absolute values which is the fundamental issue dividing the *Āstika* from the *Nāstika*. According to Śaṅkara, the *Āstitvavādin* is one who believes in the absoluteness of the intrinsic value of Reality.² The *Nāstikavādin* is one who has no faith in the reality of the absolute values as the foundation of all law and order in the universe, who argues that there is no *Ātman*, the source of this universe, and believes that all this effect is not connected with any cause and is finally dissolved into nothingness.³ In this sense of the word *Nāstika*, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* cannot be regarded as an *Āstika* system of thought, because it refuses to have anything to do with that very principle which for

1. Tat. S.B., II. 7. 1. न पुनरत्यन्तमेव असत् । न हि अज्ञतः सङ्गममस्ति । Gita. S. B., XIII. 12. न तावत् न अस्ति, नास्तिबुद्धयविपर्ययात् । *ibid.* IX. 19. न पुनरत्यन्तमेवासत् भगवान् कार्यकारणं वा सदसती ।

2. Katha. S. B., II. 3. 12. जगन्मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपपन्नव्यं । अस्तीतिबुद्धोऽस्तित्ववादिन ।

3. *ibid.* नास्तिवादिनि नास्तिजगन्मूलमात्मा निरन्तरमेवेदं कार्यमभावन्तं प्रविशोयते ।

Śaṅkara is central to it. It is one of the contradictions of history that the Advaita Vedānta for which reality is the absolute value came to be viewed as a Nīstika system of thought by some of the later writers.

VII

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As the notion of the Ātman is the notion of the Absolute ground or cause, and Ātman is the Absolute value of Reality, the categories of cause and substance, in their metaphysical use, are axiological categories and belong to philosophical intelligibility as distinct from scientific description and explanation. The category of cause is an embodiment of the value of reality or sat. In the same way it is impossible to develop and communicate the value of "Sat" without the concept of substance. Brahman, the supreme value of Sat, is the highest substance as well as the supreme source of everything.

Thus have we been led to acknowledge reality as an absolute value, or, if we are to talk plain ontological language, to recognize Brahman as the absolute reality. That is the True.¹ The text "tattvamasi"—That art Thou—sums up the value of reality as constituting the essence of the universe.² There appears to be little justification for Deussen's remark that the Indians were never ensnared into an ontological proof.³ Professor Radhakrishnan rightly points out that so far as any logical proof of Brahman is available in Śaṅkara's writings it is undoubtedly the ontological proof. But as in Śaṅkara being is inseparable from and the same as value, the ontological proof is really the axiological proof which asserts the absoluteness of the values not merely of sat but also of cit and ānanda. The "new proof" for the existence of God of which Deussen speaks and which he calls "the psychological", in which the concept of God blends with the concept of the soul, is but an unintelligible variation of the axiological

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 16. 3. नमस्तस्यम्

2 ibid. सदात्मभावमपदिगति ।

3 D. S. V., P. 213.

proof, which is the only proof we meet with in Śaṅkara, and the essence of which is that Brahman, as the supreme value, is the "Self" of everything, nothing being without a Self. It is because Deussen misses the truth that the standpoint of Śaṅkara is axiological, that he interprets the Sūtra II.3.9 and Śaṅkara's comments thereon as containing the substance of the "cosmological proof".¹ This sūtra merely aims at bringing out that the acknowledgment of the value of Sat and its absoluteness is the first demand which an intelligible philosophy, which knows its business, must concede. "There is no origin of that which is (i.e. Brahman) on account of the impossibility (of such an origin)".²

Brahman is Sat. It alone can explain existence. Non-existence cannot account for existence. This Absolute Reality is Brahman for Śaṅkara; and the concepts of the Absolutely Real, the Original Ground or Source, the Pare Brahman or Ātman, the First Cause and the Ultimate Substance, are interchangeable concepts.³

VIII

THE ABSOLUTE REALITY AS EXISTENCE-FOR-ITSELF (SVĀRTHA)

We have explained above how, according to Śaṅkara, for an ultimate reflection the notion of reality must be that of value, and intrinsic worth or absolute value must give the clue to the nature of what can be regarded as ultimately real. Śaṅkara develops further the implications of this axiological ontology, and argues that intrinsic worth or absolute value must belong to what can be called an end-in-itself. It is only a self-justifying end that can be said to possess inherent worth. The demand for an absolute reality is the demand for what is an end-in-itself, what exists-for-itself, what Śaṅkara calls "svārtha".

The line of argument followed by Śaṅkara is as follows. The svabhāva or nature of a thing, and it alone, is eternal

1 *ibid.*, P. 124.

2 असंभवस्तु सत्तास्तुपपत्तेः ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म 'कथमसतः सज्जायेत्' (छां ८।७।१)

मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थाप्रसंगात् । या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदत्र च नो ब्रह्म ।

because it is not made. A thing can never give up its nature and become other than what it is. Fire, for instance, can never part with its natural light or heat. The truly real has a conservative nature¹. All means of knowledge concur in establishing this². This principle is, for Śaṅkara, an axiomatic principle, for to deny the truth of this is to accept that the thing can be itself and other than itself. But this would be to deny the very principle of thought without which no intelligible reflection about any intelligible reality is possible. The principle is frequently stated in his writings, and is always implied in his utterances and his reflections³. "The Sun cannot be both bright and dark, for these are contradictory features."⁴ Similarly it would be a flat contradiction to say that "a woman is one-half young and one-half old" or that "fire is both hot and cold"⁵.

If the real always maintains itself and can never give up its nature and become other than itself, it is because the *svabhāva* or nature of a thing is not made and is not the result or effect of activity. Śaṅkara is of Lotze's mind that to ask the question how being is made is to ask an absurd question. "The heat or light of fire surely is not a consequence of the activity of fire; it is a contradiction in terms to say that they are, and yet that they are the natural properties of fire".⁶ "As the heat of fire lasts as long as the fire, so is the witness, the self immortal, and because of this its vision too is immortal; it lasts as long as the witness does."⁷ Only that which is not made, which is natural, which has not been produced by action can be said to be absolutely real and also eternal. It alone is real, because it is not relative to and is independent

1 *Mand. S. B.*, II. 3. 9, स्वभाववैपरीत्यमनं सर्वप्रमाणविरोधात् । *ibid.* III. 21,

प्रकृतेः स्वाभावस्यान्यथाभावः स्वतः प्रच्युतिर्न कश्चिद्भ्रविष्यति ।

2 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 3. 20, न हि स्वाभाविकस्योच्छितिः कदाचिदप्युपपद्यते । सवितु-
र्बोष्णप्रकाशयोः ।

3 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 3. 7; II. 1. 20; I. 4. 10; *S. B.*, II. 2. 29; *Upadesa*, I. 2. 45,
स्वभावस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्; *ibid.* I. 2. 89, न हि यस्य यत्स्वरूपतत् तद्वचमिचारि-
दृष्टम् ।

4 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 10.

5 *ibid.*, III. 2. 1; II. 1. 20; I. 4. 10.

6 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, IV. 4. 6.

7 *ibid.*, IV. 3. 23.

of any activity or any operation extraneous to itself. The real is what is self-existent.¹

What is not relative to anything is a reality which exists for itself, which is an end-in-itself, which is its own justification. In the spirit of Kant Śaṅkara writes that intrinsic worth or absolute value can belong to an end-in-itself, to what is a self-justifying end. "Svārtha" is the word used by Śaṅkara to indicate this self-justifying end which for him is identical with the absolutely real. What is svārtha is also svataḥstddha, self-established for him; its being is also its validity.² What exists for the sake of another can but possess a derivative being and a deficient value. It cannot be its own justification. Its own measure and its own value. Only a reality which is svārtha can be so.³

In offering this as the test of all reality and the measure of all value, Śaṅkara intends to guard us against the validity of any attempt to give a relational definition of value. If the real is what does not exist for another but for itself, and in existing thus not only maintains itself but also renders itself an end-in-itself, the possibility of defining the nature of value in relational terms is ruled out once for all. Value cannot be the effect of any possible combination of factors; its life cannot be said to consist in a net-work of relations.⁴ But we should also be on our guard against misunderstanding the above test of reality offered to us by Śaṅkara. When he says that the real is what does not give up its nature, what does not change, what maintains itself, he is not attempting to identify the "real" with any of the 'particular ontological prejudices', such as the prejudice in favour of the "permanent" or the prejudice

1. Taill. S. B., II. 8. 5. द्वयस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया परानपेक्षत्वात् । विक्रिया न तत्त्वम् परापेक्षत्वात् । न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वम्यदि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वस्य तत्त्वस्य तत्त्वम् यदप्यापेक्षं न तत्त्वम् अन्यथाऽभावेऽभावात् ।

2. Upad. I. 2. 91. स्वतःसिद्धयभावोऽद्वैतस्य । चैतन्यस्वरूपस्य तु आत्मनः स्वतःसिद्धेः अग्यानपेक्षत्वं न केनचित् नागवितुं शक्यम् ।

3. Ibid., I. 2. 70. न च तपोः स्वार्थता युक्ता ।; I. 2. 56. संहृतत्वात् परार्थत्वं अनित्यत्वं च वशस्तम्भादिवदेव ।; Brhad S. B., IV. 3. 7.

4. S. B., II. 2. 29. न च यो यस्य स्वतो वर्णो न संभवति सोऽप्यस्य साधर्म्यात् तस्य संभवति ।

in favour of the "changing", the prejudice in favour of the "dynamic" or that in favour of the "static", of which we hear so much in contemporary European philosophy. The real is what is eternally true, the *kūlasthanitya*, and, being so, explains both permanence and change. In itself it is above both. It is always itself but renders possible what appears to be other than its own self.¹

For Śaṅkara the above principle, which, as we have said, embodies the conservative nature of reality has no other implications. To think that the formula of this principle is "A is A", and to interpret it to mean that only identity is real and differences are illusory, that the Ultimate Reality is a purely indeterminate analytic unity, altogether free from determinations and exclusive of difference, and all plurality a mere unsubstantial show, is to misunderstand the true import of the law. It undertakes neither to affirm nor to deny that Brahman is a creative reality or that it is a perfectly indeterminate pure existence devoid of the principle of differentiation. It neither says the one nor the other. The principle cannot compel reality to evolve, if it is not the nature of reality to be a self-communicating Life; nor can it prevent reality from so doing, if it is its nature to be self-fulfilled as well as self-fulfilling. Any attempt so to interpret it as to make it say something either for or against the creative aspect of reality is to misinterpret it.

Accordingly, to contrast this principle of Identity with the Hegelian principle of Identity-in-difference or of opposites is to institute a false contrast. They are incomparables and so do not admit of being contrasted. Śaṅkara's principle speaks of the formal character of reality only. The Hegelian principle states a truth about the material constitution of reality. The one simply affirms that a thing can never give up its nature; the other seeks to assure us that all difference presupposes a unity and is indeed an expression of that unity, that the real is a real which expresses itself in differences and at the same time overcomes those differences. The

1 S. B., II, 1 27. यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिः भूयत एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते ।

principle of Identity-in-difference is an embodiment not only of the conservative but of the creative aspect of reality also; Śaṅkara's principle of Identity confines itself to the conservative aspect. Śaṅkara's principle neither stands in the way of Brahman's revealing itself nor does it compel Brahman to do so, if it is not its nature to be creative. It only says that if it is the nature of reality to be a self-consistent unity and ever to realise this unity, it can never give up its nature of thus being a self-consistent unity in realizing itself or cease realizing itself in being a complete unity. In other words, it affirms that the revelation of name and form cannot tamper with the unity of reality and its power to reveal and to overcome differentiation, if the Real is essentially of this nature. That the real is essentially so, that the Ātman is infinite and perfect consciousness which is eternally aware of its infinitude is a truth which this principle does not profess to embody according to Śaṅkara. That Brahman is creativity is an independent truth which has its rationale in Brahman or Value being identical with the Ātman which is Consciousness, as will be explained later on. Śaṅkara's principle of Identity is not meant to say anything about this aspect of truth. The Hegelian principle of Identity-in-difference is constructive and constitutive. It says that the real is not abstract identity but a unity which is a complete process of differentiation and integration. The differentiation being an expression of the unity, all differences *return* into the unity.

IX

ABSOLUTE REALITY AS ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS
OR SELF.

Brahman as Sat is that which exists eternally, which is independent of any other condition, which is the same at all times and for all men. Only what fulfils these conditions can be said to be absolutely real. But Śaṅkara further maintains that the concept of a value in itself, without any reference to consciousness, is inconceivable. He puts aside the absurd concept of the absolute transcendence of value, which, as Aliotta has pointed out, is the bane of some of the

modern systems of value philosophy, especially that of Rickert. Śaṅkara goes much further and maintains that the concept of an absolute reality which is not also an absolute consciousness is an unintelligible concept. Such a reality lacks the fulness which it would possess if it realized eternally and uninterruptedly its absolute being. For Śaṅkara, then, absolute reality is also absolute consciousness. Brahman is not merely Sat but also Cit. Like Sat, Cit also constitutes the very essence of Brahman, its very svarūpa.¹ Brahman is caitanyamītram. It is alike throughout its structure, and has no difference either within it or without it. "As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, similarly the Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of consciousness. That means that the Ātman has neither inside nor outside any other nature except consciousness; consciousness eternally constitutes its essence, just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste."²

Brahman is indifferently described by Śaṅkara as Samītram and Cinnātram, because Sat and Cit are identically the same for him.³ True to the standpoint of the oneness of reality and value he maintains, unlike Rāmānuja and others, that Brahman and Consciousness are neither distinguishable nor separable. The logical category of Substance and Attribute is inadequate to express the relation between Brahman and Consciousness, because the former is not a separate and independent something which somehow owns and possesses the attribute of consciousness, or in which this attribute inheres. Consciousness, being the essence of Brahman, is not separable from it either in time or in space, just as the light and heat of fire cannot be abstracted from fire itself. We speak of Brahman and of Consciousness, of Sat and of Cit, because thinking and reflection belong to a region which is marked by the duality of value and existence or of essence and fact. It is a necessity which is characteristic

1 S. B., III. 2. 16. चैतन्यमेव त निरन्तरमस्य स्वरूपम् ।

2 Ibid.

3 S. B., III. 2. 21. सत्तैव बोधो बोध एव च सत्ता । S. B., II. 3. 9: B. had. S. B., II. 4. 7.

of our thought. The Absolute life as lived is the life of infinite awareness of its infinite being.¹

Consciousness, which, like the light of the sun and the heat of fire, is the inseparable essence of Brahman, is, if we are to use human language, which always retains the associations of time, coeval with divine existence. It is eternally present with Brahman. Consequently Śaṅkara says that there is no intelligible sense in which we can speak of Brahman as knowing or being aware of itself. If Brahman ever knows itself it is superfluous to distinguish between awareness and unawareness, and there is no sense in maintaining that it knows itself. Such a view would be tenable if ever there was the possibility of Brahman not knowing itself. In the case of Brahman the distinction between knower and knowledge is non-existent. "The knower is eternal knowledge only. The knower and knowledge are not different as they are in the philosophy of the Naiyāyikas."² The knowledge of which Brahman is the object is non-different from Brahman, as is the heat from the fire. The essence of the Self, which is the object of knowledge, verily knows itself by means of unborn knowledge which is of the very nature of the Ātman. Brahman, which is of the nature of one homogeneous mass of eternal consciousness, does not depend upon another instrument of knowledge "for its illumination, as is the case with the sun, which, being of the nature of continuous light, does not require any instrument to illumine itself."³

The Self being of the nature of consciousness, is the witness of all things existing and non-existing and of all the changes that take place during the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. "The consciousness owing to whose presence you deny (the existence of things in deep sleep) by saying 'I was conscious of nothing' is the Knowledge, the Consciousness which is your Self."⁴ It never ceases to exist even when the objects known by it are in course of

1 S. B., II. 3. 18; II. 3. 29.

2 Upadeśa, I. 2. 79.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 25; III. 34., S. B., II. 3. 29.

4 Upadeśa, I. 2. 94.

(§ X.) THE DUALITY OF SELF AND NOT-SELF: VALUE AND EXISTENCE

constant flux. When everything else changes and also ceases to be the Self persists as eternally immutable.¹ One's own nature is never seen to cease to persist while one is persisting. This is the inherent character of what is absolutely real. The Self or Consciousness is "free from change and perpetually the same."² If the Self were changeful it would not simultaneously know all the modifications and the objects of its knowledge. "As Pure Consciousness, the Self, never ceases to exist, it is self-existent and no one can prevent its independence of other things."³ Its eternal immutability is self-evident and does not depend on any evidence; for an object of knowledge different from the self-evident knower depends on an evidence to be known, but the self, being of the nature of pure knowledge, does not depend on an evidence to prove that it exists or that it is the knower.⁴ The Self is, therefore, of the nature of eternal and self-effulgent knowledge.⁵

X

THE DUALITY OF SELF AND NOT-SELF:
VALUE AND EXISTENCE

Śaṅkara calls this Atman Saccinmātram, Being-Consciousness, reminding us that the absolute reality is also absolute consciousness.⁶ If our awareness of the world-fact presented to us only conscious selves, the above argument combined with the one outlined in the preceding pages, which bases itself upon the impossibility of finding the essence of a conscious entity anywhere else except in Consciousness, would have been sufficient to justify Śaṅkara's demand for Consciousness as the foundational reality. But our experience presents to us something other than our selves. My self is confronted with a not-self; the Atman finds an anātmavastu; consciousness is called upon

1 S. B., II. 3. 7.

2 Upadeśa, I. 2. 91.

3 *ibid.*, I. 2. 91.

4 *ibid.*, I. 2. 94.

5 *ibid.*, I. 2. 101.

6 *ibid.*, II. 17, 13.

to adjust itself to something other than itself. This duality of Ātman and anātman, or Self and not-self, is the most persistent of all dualisms and the final paradox of philosophical thought. As the notion of the Ātman is the notion of value, which is identical with reality, we may call it the dualism between value and something which is not a value but which may possess it or between value and existence. This dualism at once sets up a problem, namely, the problem of reconciling the self and the not-self, the Ātman and the anātman. If the self is faced with a not-self which it simply cannot ignore, how can the self be said to be the absolute reality and the absolute value? But this dualism also introduces the note of interpretation, and gives the hint of a solution in revealing that the not-self gets its meaning from, and is valued only in relation to, the Self. Śaṅkara's celebrated commentary on the Brahma Sūtra opens with the exhibition of the dualism between the Self and the not-self, the Ātman and the anātman, value and fact, and ends with the revelation that they are not strangers to each other, that the not-self is an expression of the self, the anātman of the Ātman, fact of value, and that the not-self, the anātman and the fact, while they are not themselves values, possess value which is derived from the Ātman, the 'Self, which is the supreme reality and the supreme value.

The problem of the reconciliation of the Self and the not-self is not a merely epistemological problem, nor is Śaṅkara's solution a merely logical solution. The problem of the nature of the totality of the world itself is not a merely logical or existential problem for Śaṅkara. In his hands it has turned into an axiological problem. Accordingly, the solution also is an axiological one. This demand for the reconciliation of the self and the not-self is the demand, not of the cognitive faculty, but of the total self, of the living individual as a whole. The knowing faculty can make no demand. It is the will, the willing individual, which demands, and for willing the duality of Self and not-self is an indispensable condition.

To say that there *is* something other than the Self, something other than Brahman, is to admit that "that other thing" has a right to independence existence. It is tantamount to

setting up another world in opposition to the world of Brahman, which is the realm of values, whatever be the name we give to this other world, whether we call it the world of "existence", or of "fact" or the world of "Not-Self". This other world will be a non-value world in any case. If the world of Self or Brahman is the world of supreme value, the world of not-self cannot be said to possess inherent worth, unless we regard it as identical with the former; in which case the distinction between the two will vanish. With the disappearance of the distinction between the two will disappear all activity on the part of man. Human experience presents a very intriguing situation according to Śāṅkara; it implies not only a discrepancy between value and existence, between Self and not-self, but also a confusion between the worlds constituted respectively by them, a confusion between the world of value and the world of existence, the world of Self and the world of not-self. This confusion is what Śāṅkara calls *adhyāsa*, and without this *adhyāsa* no practical activity on the part of man is possible. Human experience is essentially conative according to Śāṅkara: perception, reasoning, desiring, knowing, etc., are all activities because they are *puruṣātāntra*, relative to the man. Activity is pragmatic in character, always directed towards the fulfilment of certain human needs and desires. When a man strives to know something, to attain some end, to possess some object—in short, when he entertains any desire—his desiring presupposes not only that the object of desire possesses value for him, but also that it possesses *greater value* than his present self. This means the subordination of his present self with all its accumulated past to the object of his desire which he regards as "good", thus virtually acknowledging that the object desired possesses greater worth than the present self.

But the same act of desiring implies that our love for objects is secondary, since they contribute to the pleasure of the self and are liked only in so far as they are in harmony with the nature of the Self. Our love for the Self alone is primary. It is a fact that the self does possess greater value than any object of desire. "All processes of the world arise by way of forming an object of experience such as 'I shall enjoy this', 'I see this', 'I hear this'. They have

their being in experience and their end in experience."¹ Thus, "It is not for the sake of the husband that he is loved, but for one's own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife that she is loved, but for one's own sake that she is loved. It is not for the sake of wealth that it is loved, but for one's own sake that it is loved".² Ultimately the Self alone possesses value; but when an object is desired, it is implied that the not-self is intrinsically valuable and the Self has only a derived worth. This is the confusion between the world of value and that of fact, and this is the basis of all the practical dealings of life. Where this duality is absent and consequently the confusion between the world of value and that of existence, between the Self and the not-self, is not possible, as during the state of Liberation where everything becomes the Self and the Ideal and the Actual fuse in one, or, relatively speaking, as during the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*), where all the sense-organs are merged in the Self, and the Self shines in its purity, alone and without another, *adhyāsa* is not possible because the conditions appropriate for it are not present. But according to Śaṅkara, there is an experience, which may be called integral experience, where in all distinctions, which constitute the very life-blood of finite existence fall away, the distinction between fact and value, value and existence, the Self and not-self, the *Ātman* and the *anātmān*. This experience is nothing other than *Mokṣa* and this *Mokṣa* is for Śaṅkara the same as Brahman, the highest reality as well as the greatest value. This is the meeting-point where the ideal and the actual come together and fuse in one. The highest reality or, what is the same, the highest experience, transcends the distinction, which is sometimes treated as absolute between what is and what ought to be. The meaning of the finite experience is that there is a gulf between the ideal and the actual, with a tendency in the actual to move up to the ideal. In the sphere where there is complete absence of duality between the two, there can be no will, and no event. There is nothing which is unattained; what ought to be is an eternally realized fact, and what is is nothing other than what ought to be. Knowing, desiring,

1 Gita S. B., IX, 10.

2 Brhad. S. 4.5.

willing, thinking, reasoning, philosophizing, speculating, theorizing, these are all human activities, It is the nature of activity that it involves an unrealized end towards the attainment of which it is directed. The activity lasts so long as the end is not achieved, and the attainment of the end marks the extinction of the activity. Activity implies a distinction between the man who owns the activity, the end which his activity involves, and the means to the realization of that end. The consciousness for which value and existence are identical is a matter of direct experience (Anubhava). Anubhava guarantees its reality and logic demands its actuality. Śaṅkara points out that we can know it though only "by trenching on the mystical." This identity of value and existence, of the ideal and the actual, is not attainable for thought and logical understanding, because for the latter their duality is a necessary prerequisite. But the logical intellect, when consistently followed, does lead to the conclusion that value and being cannot be separated from each other, that they are one and identical. Brahman is the same as the Highest Self, the same as the Absolute Good, the same as Mokṣa, the same as the Supreme Reality. In other words, the "axiom" of the inseparability of value and reality is thus attainable. Śaṅkara's own experience and that of the seers recorded in the Upanisads bear direct testimony to its reality.¹ It can be grasped by direct vision and apprehended by the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight. During this state of realization one perceives one's identity with the Highest Reality itself and with all; and this is but another name for liberation. One enjoys perfect Being, perfect Awareness, and perfect Bliss. One sees oneself in everything and everything in one's own self.

The above way of formulating the philosophical problem embodies the demand of the spiritual life also, and is peculiarly Indian in colouring. How to reconcile the world to the Self and the Self to the world—this is the great problem of life and of the living soul who has awakened to the needs of that life. An intensely religious soul, like that of Śaṅkara, who is keenly conscious of the distance which divides him from

¹ S. B., IV. 1. 15.

his Ideal self, craves for that meeting-point where the Ideal and the Actual fuse into one. Human life, as the craving soul finds it, "is not free, sacred, immortal." It "must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be one".¹ This way of expressing the problem has much to do with the personality of Śaṅkara. The personal element, as Hoffding says, is of greater significance in philosophy than in any other department of science. Its presence, he points out, is often a condition for the arising of a problem; there are thoughts which can only spring up on a particular psychological soil. It is the sense of discord between what the self really is and what it appears to be, this "sacred mystery" as Windelband calls it—which has determined the characteristically religious way in which Śaṅkara raises the problem of philosophy.

The great merit of Śaṅkara's approach to the problem is that he is looking at everything, the whole universe and the entire totality of existence, from the standpoint of the Atman or Self, which he has discovered to be the foundational reality. In what relation can the rest of the universe be conceived to stand to the Self? The rest of the universe appears to be an *anātmavastu*, a not-self. But the *Ātman* is the supreme reality and the supreme value. It must, then, be the measure of all reality and of all value. How are the two to be brought together? The claims of the Self, whose very negation proves its reality, cannot be surrendered. It must be the *ens realissimum*. Śaṅkara, it must be noted, does not lay emphasis on the manyness or oneness of the universe; for him the pressing problem is not how the experienced world can be both "one" and "many". To think that the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is preoccupied with determining the numerical strength of the ultimate constituents of the universe is to miss the true inwardness of his thought. To think that the terms 'advaita' and 'dvaita' in his system signify quantitative concepts is to open the door to a series of misunderstandings. The important question for Śaṅkara is: How does the world appear to be other than myself? Is it independent of the Self? If so, why does my self appear

1 Hoffding: *Types of philosophy*, P. 450.

anxious to reconcile itself to the world and the world to itself, to bring everything in the unity of one world ? The fundamental philosophical problem assumes the following form for Śaṅkara: What specific form should my awareness of the world-fact, of the not-self, of the *anātmavastu* take ? What is the most intelligible way of giving expression to my consciousness of it ? This, in other words, is the question about the metaphysical status of the Self in a world of meanings and values, the question, namely of the measure of reality and value.

XI

THE IDEALISTIC SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY: CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXISTENCE-FOR-ITSELF

The test of reality, the notion of which is the notion of value for Śaṅkara, is that it must exist for itself, be an end in itself. It must be *svārtha*. What exists for another, what is not self-existent, what is *parārtha*, is not real in the metaphysical sense. Keeping this test in mind, Śaṅkara says that Consciousness or Self alone exists for itself; it alone is *svārtha*. Everything else in the world, the world itself and the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth, exists for the sake of another, namely the self and is *parārtha*. This is the nerve of Śaṅkara's idealism. In insisting upon the necessity of recognizing consciousness as central to our notion of reality and the impossibility of banishing it from any conception of an intelligible world, Śaṅkara is aligning himself with the great idealists of all times. But this consciousness, whose foundational nature is the fundamental tenet of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and the recognition of the central character of which turns his creed into a creed of Idealism, is not merely a more refined kind of fact for Śaṅkara. Nor is the consciousness which is aware of itself a factual consciousness. The whole idealistic argument of Śaṅkara turns on his view of consciousness or self as not merely a "bearer" of the ideal values of which there is human awareness, but as essentially evaluational in character and constitution. The Self or Coconsciousness is the supreme value; it is worth existing; its being is its validity.

This "Cit" which is said to be svārtha by Śaṅkara is not bare awareness which has facts for its objects, as was the case with Berkeley's "consciousness", upon whose perceptions the whole world was made to rest by him. The consciousness which Śaṅkara puts in the forefront of his philosophy and which supplies the pivot of it is the self or Ātman which in being aware of itself, is aware of it as something which cannot but be there, which ought to be, whose being is its validity, and whose existence is its own justification and its own law and order. It is neither to be rejected nor to be endeavoured after, it is neither heya nor upādeya. It is the centre of all reference and so the centre of all value. The consciousness in which the whole material world is grounded according to Berkeley is a consciousness which derives its explanatory value solely from its character as perceptual awareness. If the esse of a thing is its percipi, the esse of mind or consciousness is its percipere. But in mere perception of heat or cold or of roughness or smoothness or of colour or smell or size or shape, no valuation is involved. The character of the self's awareness of its reality is not describable, according to Śaṅkara, as any kind of perception, intuition or apprehension of a quale or mere existence. The status of the Ātman's objectivity can be described only in terms of a validity or value.

Consciousness alone can be said to exist for itself, and only a self-conscious reality can be said to be absolutely real.¹ This is the supreme idealistic principle of reality and value, and when made ultimately determinative in a philosophical reference it gives us, as Pringle-Pattison says, an intelligible world which sets limits to the exclusive pretensions of the world of sense-perception, and defines the mode or degree of reality which belongs to that world in the total scheme of things. The distinction between svārtha and parārtha is fundamental for Śaṅkara's philosophy, and is expressly drawn not only in his Upadeśasāhasrī but also in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad.² It is implied in all

1 Upadeśa, I. 2. 71. एवं तर्हि स्वायंस्त्व चित्तिमत्त्वात् । *ibid.*, I. 2. 90, अस्वार्थस्य स्वतः सिद्ध्यभावात् ।

2 IV. 3. 7.

the important discussions in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* and other *Upaniṣads*¹ It alone justifies his distinction between what is *pratipīḍya* and what is mere *anuvāda*.² In conformity with this distinction between *svārtha* and *parārtha* Śaṅkara proceeds to define the mode or degree of reality which belongs to the world of not-self. The whole world of not-self is for the sake of the Self, which alone is eternal, self-existent and thus an end-in-itself.³ Śaṅkara's meaning is that existence apart from value is an artificial abstraction. The spatio-temporal order of events in its ultimate nature implies a Mind or Spirit as foundational to it.

According to him Spirit is the *terminus ad quem* of nature; the world of not-self, the *anātmavastu*, gets its meaning, its significance, its value and its justification from spirit or consciousness, of which it becomes an object. There is nothing in the world of not-self which fulfils Śaṅkara's test of reality. The reality of the world of things consists in its forming an object of experience for the conscious self. "The sun and other lights" are spoken of by Śaṅkara as *parārtha*, existing for another; and even the body and organs, being unconscious are not said to be *svārtha*, to be self-existent or end-in-themselves. The Self, the *Ātman*, alone is the light that exists for itself.⁴ An unconscious entity, according to Śaṅkara, cannot exist for itself.⁵ Nor again can it be said that two unconscious things exist for each other; wood and wall do not serve each other's purpose.⁶ Consciousness, therefore, is the centre of all value and the source of all reality, as everything is to be reconciled to the Self and measured in terms of the same Self.

If Śaṅkara puts consciousness in the centre and insists that apart from it everything is non-existent, it is because he

1 S. B., I. 4. 14; II. 1. 14; II. 6. 27; *Altareya*, II. 6. 6; *Mand. S. B.*, III. 65.

2 S. B., I. 3. 19; III. 2. 29; *Mand. S. B.*, III. 14.

3 *Upadesa*, II. 16. 43, आत्मार्थत्वाच्च सर्वस्य नित्य आत्मैव केवलः ।

4 *Brhad. S. B.*, IX. 3. 7, आदित्यादि ज्योतिषां परार्थत्वात् कार्यकरणसंघातस्या-
चैतन्ये स्वार्थानुपपत्तेः स्वार्थज्योतिष आत्मनोऽनुग्रहाभावेऽयं कार्यकरणसंघातो न
व्यवहाराय कल्पते । *Upadesa*, I. 2. 105.

5 *Upadesa*, I. 2. 71, अचित्तिमतोऽचित्तिमत्त्वादेव स्वार्थसम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः । *ibid.*, I.
2. 105

6 *ibid.*, I. 2. 71.

offers a conception of it which turns it into an absolute and intrinsic value. For him the philosophical interest of consciousness lies in its being the supreme value, and not merely in its existing as a fact among other facts. Śaṅkara cannot be said to believe that things are changed by giving them Greek names, and he is far from subscribing to the view that the philosophical position of Materialism is altered by infusing, as it were, into each occurrence a drop of consciousness. Consciousness is not presented by Śaṅkara as a mere running accompaniment of every material object. It exists as one setting up an ideal, a standard, to which everything must submit; it makes itself felt as a law which is sufficient unto itself; it is conscious of itself as a self-justifying end, an end-in-itself. In other words, Consciousness or Self, for Śaṅkara, is essentially evaluational. But there are specific forms of consciousness which are merely factual in character, according to Śaṅkara. Sense-perceptive awareness is of this kind. But this is a merely sectional consciousness. Pure Consciousness, Consciousness as such, which is *saccinmātram* or *cidrūpam* according to Śaṅkara,¹ and which is identical with Brahman or Ātman, is above all sectional divisions and differentiations. It is non-dual and homogeneous in nature, and abides in its purity in the midst of all flux that seems to accompany and sometimes to overwhelm it. Pure consciousness, which is the same as the Self and which may be said, in the plain man's language, to belong to the self, is the very essence of the seer; as heat and light are of fire. Being the very essence of the Self, it has neither beginning nor end.² But pure consciousness assumes different forms on account of the various adjuncts; and "when it performs the function of living, it is called the vital force; when it speaks, the organ of speech; when it sees, the eye; when it hears, the ear; and when it thinks, the mind."³ "The powers of seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, thinking, knowing and so on, though of the nature of pure consciousness, differ on account of adjuncts."⁴ These specific forms of consciousness may be

1 Upadeśa & II, 17 54.

2 Brhad, S.B., III. 4.2,

3 ibid, I. 4,7,

4 Upadeśa. II. 17,54,

enlivened and infused by the evaluational consciousness, but in themselves they are merely factual in nature and "incomplete". They do not "express the entity of the Self as a whole."¹ Pure consciousness is the whole, and being the whole it is not merely a fact but the reality, the supreme value, which affirms itself as valid.

It is of this pure consciousness that Śaṅkara has said that it exists for itself. Being an end-in-itself, "it cannot exist for the sake of another having no consciousness." Śaṅkara, true to the principle which he laid down, developed the idea of Self as essentially one with God, and the realization of its own nature as the goal of human endeavour and the perfection of its achievement. Kant lags behind, and falls short of the greatness of the principle which he, in common with Śaṅkara, laid down, namely the principle that the rational self is an end-in-itself. Kant, on account of the deistic habit of thought which characterized the age he lived in, was prevented from developing fully the implications of the fruitful idea of the rational self as the author of moral legislation with which he opens his second Critique. He is unable to offer us a better conception of God than that of a paymaster who brings about the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to the virtue that there is in a man. If the Self is a rational self and is competent to lay down a law not only for a particular individual but for all rational beings, the question arises whether such a Self can be treated as an isolated individual and whether metaphysics can be content with viewing Self and God as standing in the more or less external relation in which Kant put them. The whole Vedānta of Śaṅkara is a prolonged protest against such a conception of the self and the external tie which binds the self to his God. "As Pure Consciousness, the self, is self-subsistent, no one can prevent its independence of other things inasmuch as it never cease to exist."²

Therefore "the Self is of the nature of eternal and self-effulgent Consciousness."³ This is Śaṅkara's idealism, and it

1 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

2 Upadeśa. I. 2.91.

3 ibid., I. 2.1

is value which constitutes the nerve of it. Śaṅkara never allowed himself to be obsessed by the epistemological discussions which occupy so central a place in contemporary English and American philosophy. Epistemological idealism or realism—this was not the fundamental issue before Śaṅkara. The issue was a much deeper one, namely, the relation in which Reality, Consciousness and Value can be consistently conceived to stand to each other—certainly a question which is one "of life and death for metaphysics". If Śaṅkara were present in our midst he would have been the first to point out that "the truths for which Idealism has stood are not bound up with particular epistemological theories"; that "the nerve of Idealism is not to be found in the egocentric predicament"; that Idealism is not another word for Subjectivism, Mentalism, and Solipsism. Śaṅkara was in a very important sense always above the battle which has been so keenly fought between epistemological idealism and realism in modern times. He frankly made it clear that the Idealism for which he stood had nothing in common with the view that "the object and the sensation are the same" or that the "esse" of a thing is its "percipi".¹ He rejects Subjective Idealism, and in his rejection of it is as sincere and vehement as any of the modern Realists, and in exposing its follies as outspoken as the more modern Perry or Moore. His idealism is essentially objective or absolute. It rests upon the objectivity of consciousness as supreme value.

Unconscious of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy, Dr. Dasgupta has been led to discover "the roots of a thoroughgoing subjective idealism" in his works. But this is to miss the true inwardness of Śaṅkara's thought. Śaṅkara does speak of the "incomprehensibility" as well as "impossibility" of the existence of things apart and in abstraction from the Self or Consciousness; but this is true of the intellect which, by its very nature, is oriented towards value. The intellect oriented towards the "Good" finds the world, taken by itself and without any reference to values which give it meaning and significance, to be a senseless

1 Selections from Berkeley' by Frazer, PP. 34, 36; Principles, Sections, 3 and 5.

spectacle, a vicious circle of existence, quite unintelligible and incomprehensible.² But so far as the factual consciousness is concerned, Śaṅkara is far from subscribing to the view that the world depends upon the perceiver for its existence. The perception of man only reveals that a thing is there and possesses particular qualities; it cannot explain the presence of the thing itself. Śaṅkara's appeal to Prajñānam or to Ātman in order to explain the very being of the world-fact is an appeal to a principle whose very being is its validity and whose awareness constitutes its reality. At any rate, the argument in favour of Consciousness being the foundational reality does not proceed upon the principle "*esse est percipi*", and its validity is not bound up with the disappearance of the world for the perceptual consciousness.

The Buddhist Idealist holds that nothing can exist independently of the mind; everything that can be said to exist in any way is an idea or sensation in the mind. Every object exists only in relation to an act of perception on the part of the mind, and it is this act of perception on the part of the mind which sustains the object. Śaṅkara joins issue with the Buddhist Idealist, and, in reply to him, points out that things exist independently of their being perceived by a mind; it is not the acts of perception which make up the object. It is rather the objects which make the acts possible, and in the absence of these the act itself would be absent. It is not because we perceive it that the object exists, but it is rather because the object exists that we perceive it. Śaṅkara does not believe that the world is his idea. 'In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist—That the outward thing exists apart from perception has necessarily to be admitted, and this on the ground of the nature of perception itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall thinks that the perception itself is the post or the wall; on the contrary all men are conscious of the post and

2 Bṛhad. S.B., II. 4.6; II. 4.11.

the wall and the like as objects of their perception."¹ Śaṅkara knows that the perception has the same form as the object, but he points out that "this is no reason for denying the object. For were there no objects there could not be a similarity of form; and that the object exists follows from the fact that we perceive it as external."² Thus the nerve of his idealism is to be found not in the ego-centric predicament but in the presence of a value-centric situation.

Buddhism, like Human empiricism, treats the Self as a fact merely and hopes to catch it in its fullness by having recourse to introspective observation; and it is no wonder that the "existential" standpoint adopted by it and the introspective method incidental to this standpoint enable it only to "stumble on some particular perception or other—of heat or cold, love or hatred, pain or pleasure". Buddhism is never able to catch the self as a stable entity and becomes content with a fluid self. It is not able to do so because it seeks it where it cannot be found and tries to know it in a way which is foreign to its nature. The Self is a value. Buddhism is not able to grasp the metaphysical status of Self or Value in a world of Facts. This difference in the axiological and existential standpoints adopted respectively by Vedāntism and Buddhism explains the difference in their watchwords. The watchword of Buddhism is: *sarvamanātmam*, all this is non-self; that of Vedāntism is: *ātmatvedam sarvam*, all this is Self. Buddhism, no doubt, offers us a notion of the highest value; *nirvāṇa* is this supreme value and it is similar in some respects to Vedāntic *Mokṣa*. But Buddhism dissociates this supreme value from reality and does not show how value and reality can be brought together in the unity of one Self. For Śaṅkara *Mokṣa*, Self and Brahman are identical. The supreme value is the supremely real also. *Ātman* is both.

Ātman or Self has been shown to be the supreme reality and the supreme value, and what appears to be an *anātmavastu* or not-self has turned out to be an entity which has its self in the *Ātman*.³ In a more modern idiom, according to

¹ S.B., II.1.18.

² *ibid.*

³ *Trist.* S.B., II. 6.1.

Śaṅkara existence is grounded in value, and when dissociated from it becomes an artificial abstraction, possessing no status, not even the existential. We cannot legitimately speak of any reality which belongs to the anātman *in itself*; for it has its self in another, in the Ātman or Brahman. Therefore, when we look at "existence" as having its self in Brahman or Sat, which is the reality, there is no other option before us except to recognize its reality, but it is so because "existence" gives up its "existential" character and becomes an involution of Brahman's life, a mode or form in which Brahman exists.¹ Śaṅkara does not mean to say that existence *is* value; but, he says, existence possesses value, the world is brahmāt-maka. The value which belongs to existence is derived from Brahman. But the nature of value cannot be understood in terms of existence.² Existence has its self in Brahman, the supreme value. But if we persist in holding that existence has its self in itself, that it is svārtha, an end-in-itself, and is self-explanatory, Śaṅkara would say that our experience does not present any such reality.³ If Ātman is the highest reality, the highest experience is the one which the Ātman has. For the Ātman, the Pure Consciousness, there is nothing like a not-self, an anātmavastu, separated from it in time or space or having in any way any independent subsistence.⁴ Whatever can be regarded by us as constituting an "other" for the Ātman is felt by the Ātman as itself, as its own life and its own glory. For such an Experience, there exists no "auxiliary force", as there is nothing other than the Ātman, no "second reality" like the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya or the Atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas, completing that "Absolute Experience" and itself being completed by it; with the denial of the "anātmavastu", the "vastvantara", the "sahkāraṇam dvitīyam" by its reduction to the Ātman, the Ekam, the Advitīyam, the laying of the foundation-stone of the superstructure of Advaitism is over.⁵

1 Chand. S. B: VI. 3. 3. सदात्मना सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्त्वत्वम् ।

2 Talit. S. B. II. 6. 1. न ब्रह्म तदात्मकम् ।

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 3. स्वतस्त्वनृतमेव । सतोऽन्यत्वे चानृतत्वमिति ।

4 Talit. S. B: II. 6. 1. न ह्यात्मनोऽन्यदनात्ममूर्तं तत्प्रतिभक्तदेशकालं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टभूतं भवद्भुविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ।

5 Chand S. B: VI. 2. 1. Atareya, S. B., I. 1. 1; Brhad. S. B., III. 5. 1.

Śāṅkara's dissatisfaction with the systems considered in the Tarkapāda is rooted in his conviction about the impossibility of the denial of the absolute values and the utter irrationality in which a wilful dissociation of reality and value will ultimately result. The value of Reality or Sat is the first value which we are forced to acknowledge both by the logic of our thought and the logic of our life. The inner movement of the same logic brings us to the conviction that Reality and Consciousness are inseparable, and the Self which is one as well as the other becomes the centre of reflection and the goal of true knowledge. Buddhism does not find favour with Śāṅkara, because it either reduces both Self and not-self to non-being, to an airy nothing, or dissolves the Self, which is the only reality which can be said to be an end-in-itself according to Śāṅkara, into a series of passing states which only exist for the Self. The Vijñānavāda Buddhism puts the two types of realities, the parārth and svārtha, on the same footing as regards their reality and their value. Materialism is rejected for putting the cart before the horse. For Śāṅkara, it is the Self which explains the not-self and not vice versa. The fault from which these systems of Monism suffer is that their notion of reality is that of an existent and not of a value. Even when the Buddhist Idealism makes consciousness the sole and central explanatory principle, its conception of consciousness is that of a fact or at most that of a deed, never of a value, certainly not of an eternal and absolute value. The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, and the Vaiśeṣika systems recognize a supreme value and reality either in God or Puruṣa, but they always have to fall back upon a not-self as the complementary reality. The result is that the systems end by introducing a dualism which is their lasting weakness. While recognizing God or the Puruṣa as the supreme value, they suggest, by accepting another constitutive stuff in the form of Prakṛti or the Atoms, that their principle of value is not also the supreme principle of reality. Śāṅkara would say that the reality which they recognize is blind, and the Value which they give us is barren. But a blind reality and a barren value—this cannot be the last word of constructive metaphysics. Śāṅkara gives a reality which is the supreme consciousness and the supreme value. The dualism of the systems criticized is replaced by the

monism of the Self which is also the monism of the Good. This is the Ātmādvaita of Śaṅkara. This Ātmādvaita is both an Axiological and a Creative Monism.¹

XII

THE ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS AS ABSOLUTE BLISS

A slightly different, but substantially the same, way of expressing the truth that Ātman is advaita is to say that Ātman is Ānandam, pure and perfect bliss. In insisting upon the non-dual nature of the Ātman, in emphasizing that besides the Ātman there is no anātmavastu, in repeatedly pointing out, wherever there is occasion to do so, that apart from the Ātman nothing has any being or value, that Ātman is the measure of all reality and all value, Śaṅkara intends to bring out that the supreme principle of reality and value is "wholeness", "completeness", "individuality"; anything which falls short of this can possess but deficient value and deficient reality. The principle is called by different names. It is known as the principle of Sarvātmabhāva, Brahmatmabhāva, Advaitabhāva or Sarvabhāva. The principle is most beautifully laid down at one place in his commentary on one of the Upaniṣads: 'This (universe) is myself who am all—this identity with all is his highest state, the Ātman's own natural, supreme state'.² This is the nirupādhika svarūpa of the Ātman according to Śaṅkara, and describes it as it is in its essential nature.³ This is the principle of absoluteness or wholeness, or of Bhūmā as the Upaniṣads call it.⁴ This "wholeness" is identified with Bliss.⁵ The Ātman's own nature state of being pure, absolute Consciousness which exists for itself and is an end-in-itself—this is what is known in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara as

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- 1 Chand. S.B., VI.8.7, एतेन सदाख्यनात्मना आत्मवत्सर्वमिदं जगत् ।
Altareya. S.B., I. 1.1. सर्वज्ञो देवः आत्मानमेव आत्मानतरत्वेन जगद्रूपेण निमित्त-
मीत ।
- 2 Brhad. S.B., IV, 3. 20. अहमेवेदं सर्वोऽस्मीति मन्दते । स यः सर्वात्मभावः
सोऽस्यात्मनः परमोलोकः परम आत्मभावः स्वाभाविकः । Ibid. IV. 3. 21. सर्वक-
त्वमेवास्य रूपम् । Ibid.V. 1.1. यत्स्वरूपं पूर्णत्वं परमात्मभावम् ।
- 3 S. B., I. 1. 12.
- 4 Chand., VII. 23. 1; Brhad. IV. 3. 33.
- 5 Chand., VII. 23. 1.

Bliss. This Bliss is the supreme reality as also the supreme value. Knowledge cannot aspire after any reality which is more complete, more coherent, more expansive and more all-inclusive, in short, which has better claim to be an End-in-Itself. Will cannot hope for the attainment of an end which represents, in a better and more perfect way, the realization of our most sustained purposes and the satisfaction of our deepest and most permanent need, namely the need for liberation. This alone is fit to be an end-in-itself; and this alone is fit to be the end of a perfect Being, if we are permitted to extend the use of human language, which always retains the associations of time, to the timeless also.

The absolute consciousness which is called *Bhūmā* the great, is the consciousness which sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, except itself, for everything is its own self and "otherness" has no meaning for it. It is of the nature of the absolute consciousness to live an absolute life. *Ānanda* is another word for such a life with such a consciousness. The absolute consciousness, *Śaṅkara* points out, may be viewed as being "without any limiting adjuncts," as all the limiting adjuncts are its own expressions and a reality cannot be limited by its own self; it may alternatively regard itself as the self of all and identify itself with all as its limiting adjuncts, and thus be all.¹ Both the ways of expressing the principle of reality and value, according to *Śaṅkara*, mean the same, and are equally necessary and significant, as our judgments are always double-edged and both affirm and deny. Both the ways of characterizing the *Ātman* keep their eye on the truth that everything is the *Ātman*, that the so-called *anātman* is an expression of the *Ātman* and so, properly speaking, not an *anātman* at all. The principle of *Sarvātmabhāva* means that *Ātman* is *nirupādhiḥ* as well as *sarvopādhiḥ*.² It means that "I" am the "Self" of the entire universe in the same way as "I" am the "Self" of this particular body. To view the Self in this way is to view the Self in its "*nrvṛtṣeṣa*" form.³ Everything that does not stand the

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, II. 5. 15.

2 *ibid.*

3 *Ioa. S. B.*, 7.

test of wholeness, completeness, or individuality, or, in the words of Śaṅkara, falls short of the principle of Sarvātmabhāva or Sarvabhāva or Pūrṇatva, which for him is identical with the principle of Svārtha, is "little", is "mortal", i. e., imperfect, and possesses only a degree of reality and value. Brahman, which is the whole, the perfect, the sampūrṇam, is the reality itself, as also the supreme value. Of this it is not proper to say that it possesses reality or value.¹

Śaṅkara's principle of Sarvātmabhāva invites comparison with Bradley's principle of "inclusiveness", "harmony", or "internal coherence". The principle as treated by Bradley is a formal and abstract principle, purely intellectualistic in nature. The principle gives us no guidance as to the mode in which the harmony is realized in the Absolute Experience, because Bradley wants to define the Absolute on the basis of an empty principle of inclusiveness and harmony apart from our experience of the concrete worlds of morality, beauty, holiness, etc. Śaṅkara's principle of Sarvātmabhāva or Pūrṇatva is not an empty form of totality, and it does not represent a merely intellectualistic criterion. The principle is an embodiment of the nature of reality as it reveals itself to us in our own selves. Brahman is the *pratyagātman*, the inner self of every one of us, and it is this in its completeness and wholeness; and its absolute, non-dual, perfectly harmonious, and complete nature can be immediately experienced also. It is our Self. Bradley tries to extract from his logical principle of non-contradiction much more than it seems capable of yielding, and this he is able to do only by turning his logical principle into a metaphysical principle of perfection. Bradley uses "harmony", "non-contradiction", and "satisfaction" as alternative terms. Reality for him is not merely an internally coherent whole, it is *perfect* in every respect; it satisfies our whole being. But this metamorphosis of a logical principle into a principle of perfection is based on an act of faith for Bradley. He writes, "It is, after all, an enormous assumption that what satisfies us is real and reality has got to satisfy us." Śaṅkara is not required to base his metaphysics on any such "assumption" or act of

1 S. B. I. 1. 12.

faith because the principle of reality and value which he lays down expresses the very nature of the self, which represents for him the very type of what can be regarded as perfectly real and supremely valuable. This being the nature of the Self, the Self alone can satisfy itself, but only when it becomes *ātmaratīḥ*, *ātmakridaḥ*, *ātmamithuna* and *atmānanda*.¹ Bradley's passage from the definition of the real as internally coherent and harmonious to its conception as satisfying our whole being is based upon the assumption that "what satisfies is real." But this assumption is ultimately made to rest by Bradley on another principle, namely, "that the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole feels and wills and knows itself within us". This principle is the starting point of Śaṅkara's metaphysics, Brahman is to be realized as the *pratyagātman*, and only thus can it be known.² The merit of Śaṅkara's starting-point is that he begins with a principle about which there is the greatest logical certainty and axiological necessity and makes this the centre of reference in all further discussions. The Self is the *sarvam*, the *pūnam*, the test of all other reality and the measure of every other value. The Self in its infinite nature is *Ānanda* itself.

Just as heat and light constitute the very essence of fire and the sun, so Bliss is the very essence, the very *svarūpa*, of Brahman. Śaṅkara, agreeing with the Upaniṣads, says that Bliss is Brahman. The texts "Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman"³, "Bliss Brahman"⁴, describe the very nature of Brahman. That very knowledge of Pure Intelligence which has been described above as Brahman is also Bliss.⁵ There is nothing in Śaṅkara to support Deussen's view that "besides Existence as the only positive quality of the esoteric Brahman, remains intelligence".⁶ Śaṅkara takes seriously that passage of the

1 Chand., VI. 25. 12.

2 Kena. S. B. II. 4. अतः प्रत्यगात्मतया विदितं ब्रह्म यदा तदा तन्मतं तत्सम्पन्नं नम् । Ibid., I. 4. आत्मानमेव निविशेयं ब्रह्म विद्धि ।

3 Brhad. S. B. III. 9. 28. 7.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 12. 1.

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 28, 7.

6 D. S. V., P. 212.

Upaniṣad in which everything is declared to come out of Bliss, to rest in it, and finally to dissolve in it. This Bliss, again, is not merely a negative something, as Deussen thinks. Bliss is the Absolute value and is also the Absolute reality. It is a state of perfect existence whose reality is not dependent upon the fulfilment of any other extraneous condition and derived from a source foreign to itself. This Bliss or Ānanda is the same as Mokṣa or Muktyavasthā. Śaṅkara rejects the Buddhistic conception of Mokṣa which consists in the extinction of consciousness. "This bliss which is the highest reality and which is characterized by the knowledge of the Ātman is centred in the Self. It is all peace. It is the same as liberation... It is unborn, because it is not produced like anything resulting from empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn which is the object sought by Knowledge. The knowers of Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brahman, as it is identical with that Reality which is omniscient."¹

In this Bliss the distinction between value and existence, is absent. This Bliss transcends the duality which is a characteristic feature of the world of finite existence. For it the distinction between the knower of the bliss and the bliss itself, which is valid everywhere else, loses all significance. As Brahman is advaita, non-dual, the oneness of value and fact, it is ill described as Ānandin in which ānanda inheres. Rāmānuja and others who insist upon viewing Brahman as Ānandamaya and also as Ānandavān are not able to give up the standpoint of the duality of value and reality. Śaṅkara takes care to point out that as bliss constitutes the very essence of Brahman, which is also eternal consciousness, "there is no sense in maintaining that it cognizes its own Bliss."² It is superfluous, he adds, in this case to distinguish between awareness and unawareness. If it is constantly aware of this bliss, then that is its nature. The above mode of stating the fact would be justified, if ever there was the possibility of its not knowing that Bliss, as for instance, a man knows himself

1 Mend. S. B., III. 47.

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 28, 7.

and another (by an act of will). Hence Brahman is Bliss itself, and not the owner or cognizer of it.¹

XIII

BRAHMAN AS SACCIDĀNANDA

The universe is thus grounded in the supreme values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda; it has being by participation in divine life, divine wisdom, and divine bliss. It is an involution of the one life of the Absolute Good. "The subtle essence that has been described as 'Being', the root of the Universe, in that has all this its Self; and not any other belonging to the world...And that in which all this has its Self is what is called 'Being', the cause of the Universe, the True, the Supreme Being. Hence that is the Self of the universe."² The universe has its roots in Being, it rests in Being, and is ultimately resolved into Being. Things are sanmūlā, sadāyatanā, sadāśryā, satpratiṣṭhā.³ Brahman is Satyasya Satyam. Brahman is not only the Being which sustains everything; it is also the Light which illumines the universe.⁴ The universe lives on particles or fractions of the supreme Bliss. "The lower degrees of Bliss have only emanated from the supreme bliss in the dual form of subject and object."⁵ In the supreme bliss all differences cease; even the distinction between bliss and its possessor vanishes; the anandin becomes one with ānanda itself.⁶

Brahman is thus Saccidānanda and as such is the very Self or essence of the universe, which is grounded in the absolute values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss. That passage of the Upaniṣad which speaks of Ānanda as the highest reality and, as such, the source of all existence, is quoted by Śaṅkara as the final word (nirṇayavākyam) regard-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 33, आनन्दानन्दिनोरभेद निर्देशान्नार्थान्तरभूत, etc; Taill. S. B., II. 8. 4, स एष परमानन्दः स्वाभाविकोऽद्वैतत्वादानन्दानन्दिनोऽश्वा-विभागोऽत्र ।

2 Chand S. B., VI. 8 7.

3 ibid, VI. 8. 4

4 S. B., II. 3. 22; I. 1. 24.

5 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 33, परमानन्दस्यैवेयं विषयविषय्याकारेण मात्रा प्रसूतेति ।

6 ibid.; Chand. S. B., VIII. 12. 1.

ing the truth about Brahman. "From Bliss these beings are born; by Bliss, when born, they live; into Bliss they enter and become one with it."¹ Infinite Bliss embodies within it perfect Existence and absolute Awareness. Existence is not thinkable except in relation to an absolute Consciousness. Bliss, similarly, will be a word without meaning, unless it is the perfect embodiment of a conscious experience. "The Buddhistic assumption that the extinction of consciousness is the highest end of human life is untenable", according to Śaṅkara.² Brahman, thus, is the oneness and inseparability, in one indivisible and perfect consciousness, of the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. It is Saccidānanda.

Dāussen misses the truth in Śaṅkara when he is led to the view that the characterization of Brahman as Saccidānanda is nowhere found in Śaṅkara's commentary and appears to be as yet unknown to the author; and that this mode of naming Brahman is peculiar to "the later Vedānta."³ Śaṅkara is definite on the point that the scriptural texts which aim at intimating the nature of Brahman ascribe to it various characteristics such as "having bliss" for its nature, being one "mass of consciousness, being omnipresent, being the Self of all; and these characteristics, bliss and the rest, are all of them to be understood in each place wherever Brahman is spoken of."⁴ Accordingly Thibaut's contention that the definition of Brahman as Saccidānanda which is "current" in "later Vedāntic writings" is "of an altogether different type" from what we have when it is defined in the *Brahma Sūtra* as "Janmādyasya Yataḥ, "is without any force."⁵ For Śaṅkara the definition of Brahman as "that from which the origin", etc.,⁶ is only meant to bring out that the value of "Existence" is an absolute and intrinsic value and the category of causality is a development of it. Govindānanda has been able to catch the real spirit of Śaṅkara's thought, when he says that Truth, Consciousness, Bliss, Ātman, and Brahman—these five words are

1 S. B., I. 1. 2.

2 Brhad.S.B., IV. 3.7.

3 D.S.V., P. 212.

4 S.B., III.3.11.

5 P. XCII.

6 S.B., I. 1.2.

always to be understood as going together in any characterization of the real.¹

These values can be directly intuited. Intuition alone can give us a direct, first-hand awareness of the reality and substantiality of these values. To one who had never had an immediate acquaintance with the values of sat, cit, and ānanda, neither Śaṅkara nor any one else could intelligibly convey what these values are, because they can be apprehended only by the most incommunicable and intimate personal intuition. They are grasped by direct vision and apprehended by immediate acquaintance, and not by discursive reasoning.² Anubhava is the only means of knowledge so far as these values are concerned.³

According to Śaṅkara, Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are not qualities or properties which are possessed by Brahman as their substance or substratum. Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṅkara's explanation of Brahman's nature as Saccidānanda misses the truth which Śaṅkara is intending to bring out, namely that in the absolute the distinction between essence and existence is transcended and the latter is inseparable from the former. Rāmānuja attempts to explain the relation between Brahman and the qualities of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda by his theory of viśeṣya and viśeṣaṇa or substance and attribute. According to Rāmānuja the unity of these attributes is not an absolute unity, but one of inherence. Brahman is the substance in which the qualities of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda inhere. There is distinction between the substance and the attributes as well as between the attributes themselves. Brahman, for Rāmānuja, is not jñānasvarūpa merely: it will not do to say simply that jñāna is the very essence of Brahman. Brahman is jñānaguṇāśraya, the substance which supports the attribute of jñāna, the two being different from each other, the substance being the basis and the quality that which depends upon it or inheres in it. For Śaṅkara the reality of a thing consists in its essence and is inseparable from it; the reality of the substance is inseparable from the attributes

1 Ratnaprabha on S.B., III, 3.13.

2 S.B., I.1.2; IV, 1.2

3 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

which are regarded by discursive thought as depending upon or inhering in it. To view the reality of a thing as a substance possessing qualities which are other than it is not to view the thing as it knows itself or would know itself, if it could; it is to impose a distinction upon the real which is foreign to it but which, according to Śaṅkara, the real takes upon itself without giving up its nature. To understand the meaning of this self-imposed distinction is, according to Śaṅkara, to understand the mystery of the process of creation. Accordingly, Śaṅkara regards Brahman not as the underlying substance in which the attributes of Sat, Cit and Ānanda inhere, but as these values themselves in their absolute and inseparable oneness and unity, which unity is not marred by the flux of events and the flow of time. Rāmānuja, while believing that Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are the very essence (svarūpa) of Brahman, and thus virtually acknowledging the position adopted by Śaṅkara, namely, that essence and reality are one and inseparable, is still haunted by the opposite idea of the duality of the two. Rāmānuja's explanation of the characterization of Brahman as Saccidananda is determined and necessitated by the feeling, which he is not able to shake off, that Sat, Cit and Ānanda are, after all, mere values or essences, and need something real to support them or render their actuality possible. The metaphysics of Rāmānuja betrays that he is trying to serve two masters. On the one hand, he tries to persuade himself to believe that in God all oppositions and conflicts are overcome, and all distinctions transcended; in other words, that in Him essence and existence become one and inseparable; on the other hand, he likes to think that He is more real than his essence. There is an unreconciled opposition in Rāmānuja's mind between two rival tendencies of thought. His metaphysics bears the unmistakable stamp of the duality of value and reality; and the word "Viśiṣṭādvaita" sums up the zealous effort on his part to continue to remain faithful to both masters. If Brahman is to be conceived as a Substance possessing quality, the dualistic standpoint has reinforced itself. This unreconciled opposition between value and reality is the bane of all the metaphysical systems discussed and criticized by Śaṅkara in the Tarkapada.

Rāmānuja wrongly thinks that Śaṅkara, in insisting that Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are not the qualities of Brahman but its very essence, is laying himself open to the charge that Brahman becomes characterless. Śaṅkara knows as well as Rāmānuja that everything which is said to be known must have some character by which it is known. We cannot say that things have no natural properties at all.¹ Everything has a nature of its own.² When Śaṅkara says that Brahman is nirguṇa, he does not mean that it is characterless. He simply means that in Brahman essence cannot be distinguished from existence. The ruling idea of Rāmānuja's metaphysics, that things have a definite nature as distinct from their existence, prevents him from appreciating the point which Śaṅkara is endeavouring to emphasize, that essence and existence are one and inseparable. Accordingly his criticism that Upaniṣadic passages like "Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" do not relate to the absolute and unqualified Brahman is wide of the mark. Sat, Cit and Ānanda are the very essence of a thing and the thing itself. Brahman is the same as Brahmanbhāva; the reality of a thing consists in its essence.³ Brahmanbhāva is Mokṣa or Liberation; this Mokṣa is Brahman itself.⁴ The characterization of Brahman as Saccidānanda sums up Śaṅkara's monism of the Good. Far from rendering Brahman characterless, it explains the character of Brahman, so far as it is possible for human language, with its inherent limitations to, do so.

The words Sat, Cit and Ānanda do not merely describe what Brahman is not, as Rāmānuja supposes. These values are realities and as such positive in essence. Rāmānuja understands Śaṅkara to mean that "all things, which are by nature opposed to Brahman, are negated by these three words (Existence, Knowledge, Infinity).⁵ According to him Sat means that Brahman is other than that which is unreal; Cit means that Brahman is other than that which is non-intelli-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 6.

2 *ibid.* IV. 3. 20.

3 Gita. S. B., II. 16. तद्भावाः तत्त्वम् ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 4, ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । S. B., III. 4. 52, ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्त्यवस्था ।

5 R. B., I. 1. 1.

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gent; Ānanda means that Brahman is not of the nature of pain. Śāṅkara does not believe that Brahman can only be negatively described as the other of its own otherness. The values are bhāvarūpa; Mokṣa, which is Brahman itself, the absolute Reality and the absolute Good, is something positive.¹ Śāṅkara anticipates this misunderstanding and takes care to remove it. He is aware that "it may be argued that the words Satyam, etc., are used only as mere negations of 'falsehood,' etc."² His rejoinder is that the words Satyam, etc., are meant to point out the nature of Brahman. The words 'Satya' and "Jñāna" indicate something positive; the word Ananta, of course, is negative, as it purports to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman.³ According to Śāṅkara, Brahman is not to be described in a negative way merely. It can also be positively characterized, as it is an existent reality (bhūta-vastu).⁴ The words "Knowledge", 'Bliss', directly describe Brahman.⁵

XIV

THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE VALUES OF SAT

CIT AND ĀNANDA

The values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda are absolute and intrinsic values. Brahman as the embodiment of these absolute values is said to be ananta, infinite, unlimited. According to Śāṅkara the limiting conditions of objects are time, space, and substance. These conditions do not affect the reality of the values, which, on the other hand, are foundational to any conception of a spatio-temporal order of phenomena. Brahman is thus said to be above the distinctions and limitations of space and time; and its nature can be expressed only in a non-spatial and non-temporal idiom.⁶ When he says that Brahman is above the distinctions of space and time, what

1 Tatt. S. B., I. 1. 1. मोक्षस्य भावस्वरूपम् ।

2 Ibid., II. 1. 1.

3 Ibid., I. 1. 1.

4 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 27.

5 Ibid., III. 9. 28. 7.

6 Chond. S. B., VIII. 1. 1. दिग्देशकालादिभेदशून्यं ब्रह्म । S. B., I. 1. 4.

he means to bring out is that the reality of a thing is constituted by its value and the thing is inseparable from the value. At no point of time is it possible to have a real thing which is without its value. Time cannot rend asunder value and existence. That is why, according to Śaṅkara, the essence of a thing is eternal and can never be made; and the essence or *svabhāva* of a thing alone can be said to be eternal. It cannot be the result of activity. Even if we suppose that the real is made at a particular hour and the essence created at some point of time, the intelligibility of our supposition will depend upon the acknowledgement of the value of Existence or Sat. The conception of an individual thing already presupposes the reality of the value of existence. The idea of substance is but a development of this value. Creation, implying the idea of temporal sequence, does not explain existence and render it intelligible. On the other hand, the very rationality of the idea of creation or change and succession is bound up with the acknowledgement of the value of Existence, that is, of a reality which is not subject to change but which renders change possible. Brahman is not explained by time. Time itself stands in need of Brahman. Eternity is not rendered intelligible by temporality. The latter itself stands in need of the former. Change does not explain essence. Essence, on the other hand, is needed to account for change. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that Brahman is not something which is 'effected' or created, and hence it is something which is unlimited in time.¹

The values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda, being the very essence of Brahman, cannot be deduced from anything else. They are irreducible to existential or non-value terms. They are not something which is to be accomplished, but which is eternally real. "Mokṣa (which is the same as Brahman) differs from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state; it is eternal in the sense that it does not undergo any change; it is self-sufficient and not relative to anything."² The absolute value is not something which is derivative; it is not the effect of religious merit. If it were

1 Taiit, S. B., II. 1. 1. अकार्यं च ब्रह्म तस्मात्कालतोऽस्यानन्तम् ।

2 S.B., I. 1.4. अनुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणम् ।

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assumed to be the effect of some action, it would be non-eternal, and the deliverance of consciousness, on the one hand, and the rationality of the intellect oriented towards the Good, on the other, would be set at nought. This absolute Good is not relative to time, place and any special causes.¹ For Śaṅkara the values are solely a matter of acknowledgment. They are realities, and the function of knowledge is simply to reveal them. Scripture cannot create these values; it can only reveal them as they are.

Nor is it within the power and scope of human agency to create them. Values are not *karmasādhya*, says Śaṅkara. They are intrinsic and absolute. Ātman, being the same as Mokṣa or Brahman, is spoken of by Śaṅkara as "akarmaśeṣa".² One who is not able to see that the driving force of Śaṅkara's thought is not merely ontological, but rather axiological, will be bewildered by his statement that Ātman is not the effect of activity. Śaṅkara's language here is made up of a value idiom; and in other passages also we find him speaking the same language. Thus Brahman is said to be *asādhya*, not something to be brought about; it is *nityasiddha svabhāva*, something the nature of which is permanently established; it is *muktyavasthā* itself, the state of final release; it is the *param puruṣārtha*, the highest good; it is *heyopadeyaśunya*, not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after; it is *āśarīratvam*, disembodied state of existence; it is *sarvātma-bhāva*, consciousness of universal self-hood; it is *ānanda*, bliss and *abhyaya*, fearlessness.

More generally Śaṅkara makes use of what may be called ontological language, but his essential insight is not darkened by this change in the expression. Brahman is primarily the axiological principle in Śaṅkara, and is ontological only in being the former, because the identity of value and reality is the essence of his Advaitism. Thus on the same page where Brahman's nature is described in a language which derives its idiom from the realm of values, we find Śaṅkara indifferently making use of qualifications and characterizations which

1 S.B., IV 1.13. न देशकालनिमित्तापेक्षो ।

2 Iia S.B., Introduction. तेषामकर्मण्यस्यात्मना यावात्प्रकाशकृत्वात् ।

are suited to a reality the truth of which is constituted by substance and not by essence. But in the case of Brahman both the idioms are equally significant and equally necessary. They serve to remind the reader constantly that here we have to do with a reality in which essence and existence or value and fact come together and meet in one. Śaṅkara's commentary on the fourth sūtra is an illustrious example of a style in which both kinds of idioms, axiological and ontological, alternate and mingle and fuse in one. The same Brahman which has been described above in a language which reminds us that it is an essence is spoken of as a bhūtavastu, an existent reality; as the Ātman, the Self of every one; as the Puruṣa, as the Sākṣin, the Witness; as Nityasuddhabuddhamukta Svabhāvam, one who is permanent in all beings, uniform, imperishable, eternally unchanging and pure and free. It is one of the cardinal contentions of Śaṅkara against the Mīmāṃsakas that there is an eternally existent reality and an eternally accomplished good. Brahman is this reality as well as this good. It is the Mukta as well as Muktyavasthā. It is Asādhyam as well as Nityasiddhasvabhāvam. It is Existence as well as the Existent. It is Consciousness as well as the Conscious Being. It is both these, because both are one ultimately.

If this Good or Bliss which is liberation were an effect or modification of something else, if it depended upon the action of body, mind or speech it would be non-eternal, for we observe in life that things which are modifications, curd and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, are noneternal.¹ Śaṅkara is opposed to every attempt to give relational definitions of value. Values, according to him, are presupposed in any attempt to define them or to derive them. They cannot, therefore, be said to be a consequence of human activity. They must then be regarded as eternal, and this must be their inherent nature. Every philosophy of value will have to acknowledge the absoluteness and eternality of it.² This acknowledgement will form the starting point of every philosophic enterprise. Value is not something which is to be acquired, or to be ceremonially purified.

1 Tat. S. B., I. 1.1. S. B., I. 1.4,

2 S. B., I. 1.4. नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैः मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

Ceremonial purification will consist either in the accretion of some excellence or the removal of some blemish. There is nothing which can add excellence to the absolute good; all objects in the universe derive the gift of being valued from this absolute good. Our thought and conduct are forced to accept the view, and act upon the conviction, that value is a logically and ontologically primitive concept, and that any attempt to define it by relating it to anything which is not a value is bound to be a failure, because it will already take for granted valuableness as an intrinsic quality.¹ We cannot think of purifying the absolute good by "the removal of some blemish". This definition will likewise be circular in character. Therefore Śaṅkara says that "it is not possible to show any other way in which Liberation could be connected with action; it is impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge".² In one word, Śaṅkara's meaning is that values are intrinsic, absolute, and to be acknowledged as such. The organic relation which Śaṅkara has established between Mokṣa and knowledge is simply another way of expressing the truth that values are solely a matter of acknowledgement. The function of jñāna is only to reveal things and it is only an already existent reality that can be revealed. Jñāna or knowledge alone has relevance so far as the realization of the Supreme Good is concerned. The criticism levelled against Śaṅkara that knowledge alone cannot bring about the attainment of the summum bonum and must be aided by action or karma misses the real truth which he wants to emphasize, namely that Value is not relative to anything and is solely a matter of acknowledgement. His criticism of jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda is really a criticism of the view which is satisfied with a relational definition of value.

Just as Values are not limited by time and defy temporal characterizations, similarly they enjoy infinity in space and in substance also. Spatial relations do not enter into the constitution of the nature of the values, and consequently they cannot render it intelligible. On the other hand, space

1 *ibid.* अनाध्यातिशयस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।

2 *ibid.* ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियायामन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ।

itself presupposes these values. All possible positions in space presuppose the value of Existence or Sat. Values cannot be located in space. The idea of space itself derives its intelligibility from the value of Existence. Brahman is thus the ground and source and presupposition of space. It is, therefore, not limited by it. Living organisms, stellar formations, the building up of cosmos, destruction and catastrophe, all presuppose space, which, in its turn, presupposes Existence as an absolute value. Values are unlimited in substance also, because they are the essence of all individual substances. Beginning with the mineral and vegetable kingdoms, and passing through the animal to the human, we find a progressive embodiment of the values of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. These very values form the essence of other orders of beings, the manes, the celestial minstrels, the karmadevas, the ajānadevas, that is the gods by birth the Virāj, and the Hiranyagarbha. Brahman, the absolute value, is not wholly different from its individual embodiments. It is the existence of a thing different from another which limits this latter thing. Where there is the cognizance of a different thing, there we turn away from that thing. When we turn away from a thing, there is the end of that thing. Since the consciousness of a cow is turned away by that of a horse, the "cow" marks the limit or end of the "horse." But Brahman is not other than anything else, because it is the essence of everything, its very self, and a thing is nothing, apart from its essence. Brahman is thus unlimited in substance also.¹

Brahman, being the cause of space, is unlimited in space; it is unlimited in time, because it is not the effect of a cause; and it is unlimited in substance, because there is nothing distinct from it. Hence also it is pre-eminent truth.² Values are above all distinctions of space and time. They are thus infinite. Being the presuppositions of all rational thinking and living, they are absolute and solely to be acknowledged as such. This is why Śaṅkara says that Brahman is 'free from all limitations of space and time and without a second'; and

1 Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1. वस्तुतोऽप्यानन्त्यम् ।

2 *ibid.*

spatial and temporal differences cannot even be imagined to enter into the supreme Self.¹

The way in which Śāṅkara characterizes Ātman, Brahman and Mokṣa leaves no room for doubt about their identity and their nature as values and not mere existents. Thus Mokṣa is spoken of "as different from all the fruits of action, and as an eternally and essentially disembodied state; eternal without undergoing any change, omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature[it is the same as Brahman, and if it were regarded as supplementary to certain actions and be assumed to be their effect, it would be non-eternal. Release is not something to be ceremonially purified. It is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added.² Ātman is characterized in the same way: "Ātman is not connected with karma or action. The true nature of it consists in its purity being untouched by sin, oneness, being eternal, having no body, omnipresence. Nor is the true nature of the Ātman thus defined, a product, a modification, a thing to be attained or a thing to be refined; nor is it of the nature of a doer or enjoyer so that it may be viewed as connected with action."³ "The Puruṣa which is the subject of the Upaniṣads is not a complement to anything else...It is permanent in all transitory beings, uniform, one, eternally unchanging, the Self of everything. It can neither be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided."⁴ Brahman is spoken of in the same way. "Brahman is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions. Brahman is Release itself. It is the Ātman.⁵ The consciousness of universal selfhood is the very essence of Brahman beyond all the attributes of saṁsāra."⁶

1 Chānd. S. B., VIII. 1. 1; S. B., IV. 3. 14.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 Isa. S. B., 1.

4 S. B., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid.

6 Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1.

Is Value definable? Śaṅkara's answer would be both "yes" and "no". Value cannot be defined in terms of anything else. It can only be defined in terms of itself. If we stick to the traditional view that definition should be per genus et differentiam, values are indefinable. Brahman is not a species which can be referred to a higher class and differentiated from other species included in it with the help of differentia. "Differentia" is what Śaṅkara calls viśeṣaṇa. A viśeṣaṇa is defined by him as a quality which serves to distinguish the qualified thing from all others belonging to the same class.¹ When there are many things of the same class having various attributes, then only has any of these qualifications a meaning, and not when the thing qualified is only one of its class, for in this latter case, there is no necessity of any limitation by way of definition. Satyam, Jñānam and Ānandam are not meant to qualify Brahman; they are not its differentia.² They constitute its very nature. They can, therefore, be regarded as the lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Lakṣaṇa, according to Śaṅkara, serves to distinguish that of which it is a lakṣaṇa from the whole world.³ Though Brahman cannot be defined in terms of a concept or of an existent, it is not true to say that its nature cannot be made intelligible to us. These values constitute the very essence of every one of us, and thus we have an inward awareness of them.

As in Brahman value and being come together and fuse in one, Brahman is said to be advaita by Śaṅkara. Brahman is above all duality, duality of value and existence, of Self and not-self, of ideal and actual, of is and ought.⁴ This is variously described by calling it advaita, nirguṇa, nirupādhika, nirviśeṣa, advayam.⁵ Because it is above all duality, its nature cannot be described in terms of any of the particulars. Its nature is occasionally explained by calling it "neti", "neti", "not this", "not this".⁶ As it is advaita, the supreme value, it is a matter of acknowledgement, and not proof. It

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 *Chand. S. B.*, VII. 24. 1.

5 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, III. 8. 12.

6 *ibid.*, II. 3. 2.

is the basis of all proof. It is aprameya, i. e., not an object of any of the means of knowledge.

XV

THE NINTH-CENTURY DUEL BETWEEN

VEDĀNTA AND MIMĀṂSA

"Value cannot be defined in relational terms": this is the essence of Śāṅkara's criticism of the position of the Mimāṃsakas in his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra of the First Adhyāya.¹ The problem was hotly discussed in the history of Indian philosophy as far back as the ninth century. It formed the real issue between the Mimāṃsakas on the one hand and the Vedāntins with Śāṅkara at their head, on the other. The point of controversy between them was the following; "Does Scripture deal with 'action' merely or with 'existing realities' also?" And when it deals with existing realities, does it deal with them as having independent significance or as being connected with and subordinate to injunctions of action?² At first sight the controversy appears to be a barren one, because it centres round a problem which is nothing more than the right interpretation of the texts of the Vedas; and the student of philosophy is not likely to take it seriously, considering it to be a relic of scholasticism. But the point at issue is of the greatest philosophical interest, only its manner of formulation is antiquated. It only needs expression in a more modern idiom before it can make us realize the deep philosophical issue involved.

According to the Mimāṃsakas no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning except in so far as it is related to an action; only Vedic sentences signifying an action have authority as Śabda pramāṇa. A sentence is devoted to an action when it says that a certain thing is to be done through such and such means in a particular way. Injunctions which are defined by them as having "actions" for their objects cannot refer to "accomplished existent things";

¹ तत्तुल्यमन्वयात् ।

² S. B., I. 1. 4.

'hence such terms as the Supreme Self God, Brahman have not the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences'. The Vedānta passages whose purport is not action are purportless; and if they are to have any sense, they should be considered to be either supplementary to the passages enjoining action, or themselves enjoining a new class of actions such as devout meditation. "Existent reality" (bhūta-vastu) is not the subject-matter of the Vedas. And whenever they teach about Brahman, they do so only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. Just as the Agnihoṭa oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so devout meditation (Upāsana, which is a kind of action) on Brahman is enjoined upon one who wants to attain final release. Final release, or Mokṣa, which is the Summum Bonum, is the fruit of "action" implying agent and means. This Summum Bonum is not a thing which is actually existent, but is to be brought about by effort. It is something which is "bhavya" and not "bhūta".

According to Śaṅkara, on the other hand, the Vedas deal not only with "actions" and injunctions and prohibitions in connection with them but also with eternally existing objects. "To say that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things is a mere bold assertion."¹ There are parts of the Vedas which purport to make statements about mere existent things which are not relative to "action"; and these parts of the Vedas are neither an injunction nor a prohibition, nor supplementary to either. There are also prohibitions which have just the aim of communicating the real nature of a thing; there is not the least connection of human activity with them.² Brahman is such an existent thing (bhūta vastu), and it is the same as eternal liberation (Mokṣa). It is the aim of the Vedas to impart instruction about this Brahman. It is not to be brought about but is an accomplished fact, is different from fruits of action, is not subject to time, and is independent of human effort and volition. "It follows that the Śāstra cannot be the means of knowing Brāhman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions; and the doctrine that,

1 S.B., I. 1. 4.

2 Brhad. S.B., I. 3. 13.

on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedānta texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted,¹ is thereby fully established. Hence there is justification for beginning the new Śītra indicated in the First Sūtra, 'Then, therefore the inquiry into Brahman'."

Translated into a more modern idiom, the position of the Mimāṃsakas amounts to this: Value can be defined only in relational terms. Values are to be achieved by effort; they are dependent upon human activity, and are relative to sādhanā. The statement "that no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning except in so far as it is related to action, and that no part of the Vedas deals with 'existent reality' except when it treats that reality as relative to action" is but another way of saying that there is no absolute Value. Value is relative to volitional life of man. It is the fruit of human effort and endeavour. Value is the sādhya; human effort is the sādhana. This relativity of value is expressed in different ways. Value is not an accomplished object;² it is something which has to be brought about; it is relative to activity;³ it is dependent upon human effort and volition;⁴ it is a product,⁵ an effect,⁶ something depending on modification⁷, and a result of meritorious action.⁸ Here Śaṅkara joins issue with the Mimāṃsakas and proceeds to establish his theory that value is a logically primitive concept and cannot be defined in terms of any thing else nor can it be reduced to simple entities or relations of such entities. Śaṅkara's contention is that the halting logic of the Mimāṃsaka does not enable him to see that any definition of value in relational terms is bound to be circular in character. In any such definition the concept of value is already presupposed. A value which is the product of human activity, the result of

1 S. B. I. 1. 4. स्वतन्त्रमयं ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकम् ।

2 मध्य

3 अनुष्ठानापेक्षम्

4 पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्

5 उत्पाद्य

6 विकार्य

7 संस्कार्य

8 धर्मकार्य

meritorious action, cannot but be relative, and therefore unable to stand alone. Therefore Śaṅkara says that there can be no stability in such a value. "Noneternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions"—namely that Release is "something to be effected" or "a mere modification." For Śaṅkara inquiry into Brahman has nothing in common with the inquiry into religious duty. The subject-matter of the one is absolute value, or inherent worth; and the other concerns itself with values which are extrinsic, instrumental, and relative. The "good" which the Mīmāṃsaka points out is the relative good. "The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make themselves felt to body, speech and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the object, and affect all animate beings from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all embodied creatures from man upward to Brahmā....Those who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation (vidyāsamādhiviśeṣāt), on the northern path; while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path."² The main thesis of Śaṅkara in his commentary on B. S. 1. 1. 4. is the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā position that value is relational in character, and the substantiation of his own claim that it is absolute and underivable.

The issue raised here is a very vital one, but it is significant that Śaṅkara's remarks are confined to a review of the Mīmāṃsā position, and he is silent so far as other orthodox system of Hindu thought are concerned. What is the explanation of this? Why is it that Śaṅkara reserves his criticism of these systems for a later chapter? Has Śaṅkara's silence any meaning in it? Or is it the result of an accident? In the Tarkapāda, where he examines the metaphysical position of other systems and finds them wanting, he says nothing

1 S. B., I. 1. 4.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

regarding the position of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Is this omission also the result of chance, or is it deliberate? Śaṅkara's silence in both these places has a significance which it will be impossible to discover unless we remind ourselves that Śaṅkara's whole philosophy is a philosophy of value, and the central question of his metaphysics is the relation between the highest value and the most truly real.

I have pointed out above that in his commentary on the first four sūtras he is giving an outline of his main thesis that value is a logically primitive concept. Value and reality are one and inseparable. All the orthodox systems of Hindu thought criticised in the *Tarkapāda* recognise in some sense or other that there are absolute values which are not reducible to relational terms. There is some absolute good—this is their common thesis. All of them, without any exception, agree in holding that the Vedas deal with "eternally existing realities".¹ So far as their belief in the reality of this absolute good is concerned, Śaṅkara whole-heartedly agrees with them and has nothing to say against it. This is exactly what he himself is endeavouring to establish. There was thus no occasion to introduce a discussion of the philosophical position of these systems at a stage where he was solely concerned with the substantiation of the doctrine of absolute values, and the refutation of the position that they can be defined only in relational terms. *Mīmāṃsā* is the only system of orthodox Hindu thought which does not believe in a value which is real in itself and not dependent upon human effort and volition. The *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* believe in the reality of an order of existence which is nothing but the state of the self in its original and natural purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. *Sāṅkhya* believes that *puruṣa* is eternally free; its bondage is only phenomenal. *Yoga* has a firm faith in the possibility of *Kaivalya* or absolute independence, and its *Īśvara* is an embodiment of this perfection, being beyond both good and evil.

According to Śaṅkara, this is the essence of the entire teaching of the Vedas, and in the realisation of this absolute Good lies the perfection of human achievement. But the

1 S.B., I. 1.5.

task of philosophy does not end with the recognition that there are absolute values; it has also to define the relation in which values should be conceived to be standing to what can be regarded as the ultimately real. What is the relation in which Conscious life stands to this absolute Good? Is there any point where these two come together? Is there a permanent divorce between reality and value; and do they always remain strangers to each other? Śaṅkara merely mentions in his commentary on the Catuṣṣūtrī that value and reality are one; Brahman who is the source of all reality is also that which is most highly valuable. The development of this idea is reserved for the subsequent chapters. Śaṅkara does not agree with the other orthodox systems in their views regarding the relation in which reality and value stand to each other: they, according to Śaṅkara, are always haunted by an irreconcilable dualism between the two, and this is the bane of their systems. They are all systems of dvaita. But the truth is advaita, oneness of value and reality. It is this dualism, a permanent feature of these systems, with which Śaṅkara cannot reconcile himself; and it is this which constitutes the subject-matter of his attack in the Tarkapāda.

Herein he establishes his position by advancing arguments to show that Brahman which is the highest Good is the cause of the entire universe of name and form, and is the *Atman* of everything and everybeing. Herein he also demolishes the position of the rival thinkers who, while agreeing with him in admitting the reality of an absolute and transcendent good, differ from him vitally in their insisience that the ultimately real is different from the "Self" of living beings, thus virtually accepting the creed that there is a discrepancy between value and reality, the ideal and the real, which can never be overcome. The Mīmāṃsā system of thought does not believe in the absolute nature of value, and therefore the question of the relation between value and reality does not arise for it. Hence also Śaṅkara's silence in the Tarkapāda about the Mīmāṃsā system, which does not call for any comment because it has nothing to say regarding the problem which Śaṅkara is discussing there, the problem, namely, of the relation between the highest good and the most supremely Real.

CHAPTER III

THE REAL AS THE SUMMUM BONUM

THE GOAL OF HUMAN ENDEAVOUR

As reality or self cannot be denied, its acknowledgement being a necessity of rational thought, similarly it cannot be denied that there is some highest Good towards the realization of which our whole endeavour is directed and in whose attainment consists the perfection of human achievement. According to Śaṅkara there is some supreme value which represents the realization of our most sustained purposes and the satisfaction of our deepest and most permanent desires. "How does a man attain or forfeit eternal salvation?"—this is the central problem of Śaṅkara's philosophy. The earnestness with which an endeavour is made to reach a solution and the seriousness and sincerity with which the whole inquiry is conducted lend to his writings a grandeur and grace which are rarely to be met with in philosophical works. Śaṅkara has himself realized that supreme good, and, animated by that certainty of self-realization, calls upon others to attain it for themselves. It is the one thing in life which, when attained, makes it meaningful, and leaves nothing further to be attained.

This highest good has been variously described by Śaṅkara. It is the summum bonum (*ātyantika niḥśreyasa*); it is the highest human good (*ātyantika puruṣārtha*); it is the eternally supreme value (*nitya niratiśaya śreyasa*); it constitutes the natural and therefore the timelessly real freedom (*svārājyam*); it is the cessation of man's transmigratory existence, and his elevation to a region above human cares and conflicts (*ātyantika saṃsārābhāvaḥ*); it is the realization of Brahman (*Brahmāvagatiḥ*), which is the same as the attainment of Brahman-consciousness (*Brahmabhū*). It is at once the removal of false knowledge and the knowing of the true nature of the self; it is the attainment of what is most beneficial

to man (*hitātama prāptih*); it is the eternally perfect good (*nityasiddha niḥśreyasa*); and the real immortality (*amṛtatva*). Those who have been able to realize this supreme good in their life bear testimony to the fact that its attainment is accompanied by a state which is one of supreme bliss and perfect peace. It is a state wherein one enjoys the consciousness of undivided existence, undivided from the Supreme Being (*pareṇavibhakta eva*), and of one's own universal selfhood (*sarvātmabhāva*). In short, it is the attainment of a state wherein one sees nothing other than one's own self and thus realizes everything in every possible way; and thus all striving after unattained ideals, all struggle and strife, is brought to a cessation.

For Śāṅkara it is the task of philosophy to give articulated expression to the nature of this supreme good and to point out the means which are best calculated to realise it in the conscious personal life of the individual. Philosophy, when it takes upon itself this supreme task of leading the individual directly to the vision of this good, is entitled to the name of *Paramārthavidyā*, the science of the Highest Good; and for Śāṅkara philosophy is nothing if it does not justify its claim to be *Paramārthavidyā*. Thus conceived, philosophy is indistinguishable from religion, and the highest principles of philosophy are the same as the highest principles of religion. As for Plato, so for Śāṅkara, the Good is the supreme object of the philosopher's study. For Plato it is the function of that ultimate discipline, "dialectic", to lead directly to the vision of the Good; for Śāṅkara the same is the mission of *Brahmavidyā*. For both the philosopher is "the spectator of all time and all existence", who sets his affections on that which really exists. The inquiry into Brahman has for its aim the highest beatitude" (*Niḥśreyasa-prayojana*), and Brahman, which is the object of the inquiry, "is that which really exists, is eternal and does not depend on human energy" (*lihatu bhūtam Brahma jīṇāśyam nityatvāṇna puruṣavyāparatantram* S. B. 1. 1. 1.)

Complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest Good, since it destroys the root of all evil such as *avidyā*,

seed of the entire transmigratory, existence.¹ It is not the satisfaction of mere intellectual curiosity which constitutes the motive of Śaṅkara's investigation, which has its root in a far more deeply felt need of the spirit, the need for attaining the summum bonum. Śaṅkara's inquiry into the nature of Brahman is really an inquiry into the nature of the Summum Bonum, the Highest Good, the state of Liberation. This is the highest value and this alone possesses intrinsic significance. It is this Liberation (Mokṣa) which is the subject-matter of Śaṅkara's Vedānta.

II

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NOTION OF THE GOOD

In identifying Brahman, Ātman, Nihāreyasa, Mokṣa and Ānanda, Śaṅkara is taking a very momentous step such as was not taken by any systematic thinker previous to him. His is an entirely new way of approach to the fundamental problem of religion and philosophy. Like the Upaniṣadic thinkers, he reduces the problem of the realization of the summum bonum, of the highest good, of eternal beatitude, of oneness with God, which, in short, is the problem of religion, to the problem of knowing the true nature of the Ātman, which is the essence of the individual and the universe; and in doing this he created a revolution in the sphere of Hindu philosophic thought. The possibility of realizing the true nature of the Ātman alone, which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, is the possibility of realizing the summum bonum of life, which is the same as the realization of God or the attainment of Brahman.

This is an entirely fresh and original way of giving expression to the deepest need of the religious life and the philosophic consciousness alike. The essence of the former is the conservation, on the one hand, of conscious life, and, on the other, of those eternal values which have their foundation in that spiritual and conscious life. The demand of the

1 S. B., I. I. I

latter is the recognition of the reality of those supreme values in which the whole universe is grounded. In announcing to us that "the knowledge of Self is the only means of attaining absolute and supreme good"¹, and that "apart from the knowledge of self, there is nothing else that can accomplish absolute and supreme good"², he discloses his most intimate conviction regarding the inseparability of the highest good from the most truly real. The identity of Parmārthavidyā, Ātmavidyā and Brahmaidya is but the expression of the deeper identity of the "real" and the "good".

Śaṅkara's method of approach to the problem is essentially different from those of the rival systems of thought. The essence of religion, for Śaṅkara, is the realization of the supreme values of Existence, Bliss and Consciousness by the individual. Brahman is Existence, Bliss and Consciousness; and so the real problem of religion comes to be: what is the form in which the realization of Brahman should take place? Is Brahman to be realized as the controlling or the efficient cause of the world and all that it contains? Is it to be conceived as the divine architect who fashions the universe out of pre-existing materials by bending the recalcitrant nature of that material to his own sweet will by virtue of his superior skill and power? Is it to be regarded as a powerful monarch exercising unlimited sway over human souls, who have no choice but to bend their will to the "lawdry wrappings of his regal pomp"? Is it an indifferent Puruṣa unconcerned with human weal and woe? How, then, can such a God be a matter of human concern? Is he a God who is to be propitiated by offering worship and prayer and who, in return, will grant to the worshipper his choicest gifts and a permanent abode in his kingdom? Is the God of religion something foreign to and substantially different from the worshipper, like Viṣṇu, Īśvara, Indra, Prāṇa? Is he one who can be humoured by performing sacrifices in his name? Is Brahman to be realized as the Upāsya or as the very Ātman of the individual? This, then, is the issue which Śaṅkara raises in his philosophy of religion, and Brahmaidya is the

1 Chand. S. B. VIII. 1. 1.

2 ib.d.

discipline which at once contains the attempt to resolve it and constitutes the resolution.

The realization of the supreme good which is possible only in the personal life of the conscious individual is represented by a state of existence or an experience in which everything, even what appeared to be non-self, is fully reconciled to the Self. In the words of the Upaniṣads, it is an experience in which everything becomes the Self or Ātman. This renders the realization of the supreme good dependent on the comprehension of the true nature of the Ātman, and Śaṅkara, accordingly, reduces the former to the latter. *Parmārthavidyā* becomes *Ātmavidyā*.¹ The question: "What is the highest good?" resolves itself into the question: "What is the real nature of the Ātman?"² The rationality of the aspiration and the possibility of its realization are based upon the conviction that reality satisfies our whole being, and this carries with it the further conviction that the real is substantially one with each one of us and the real and the good are, in essence, identical. We cannot know the real except in our own Self, for it is the Self of every one of us.

Śaṅkara formulates the problem of philosophy sometimes as the realization of Ātman and sometimes as that of Brahman. While, in the introduction to his *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, he announces the purpose of the Vedānta to be "to teach the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman" (*Ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye*), in his commentary on the first sūtra of the work he lays down that "the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man. Hence inquiry into the nature of Brahman is desirable."³ The identity of the two vidyās and the oneness of their subject-matter is repeatedly shown to be the truth, and one can find innumerable statements to this effect dispersed throughout his works. (1) "The aim of knowledge and its relation to that aim have been stated in the sentence, 'It knew only itself, as, 'I am Brahman'. Therefore it became

1 S. B., I. 1. 1; Keno. S. B., II. 4; Chand. S. B., VII. 1. 1; *Alitareya*. S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1; I. 3. 19; II. 1. 3; III. 4. 2; Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3; VII. 1. 1; VIII. 11. 3; *Brhad.* S. B., I. 4. 7; II. 4. 1; Keno. S. B., I. 1.

3 S. B., I. 1. 1.

all. Thus it has been mentioned that the inner self (pratyagatman) is the subject-matter of Brahmanvidyā.¹ (2) "Brahman is the Supreme Self. That through which it is known is the Brahmanvidyā. Men think, "through that Brahmanvidyā we shall become all, excluding nothingBrahmanvidyā is sure to lead to identity with all."² (3) "The individual self is no other than the supreme Brahman, and all the Upaniṣads end by giving out this sole meaning."³ (4) "But the cause of that desire to attain the good and avoid the evil, that is, ignorance regarding the Self, has not been removed by the knowledge of the nature of the self as being identical with Brahman (Brahmātmāsvarūpa vijñānena).....Hence this Upaniṣad is commenced in order to inculcate the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmanvidyā pratipattiyarth) which is the very opposite of that."⁴ (5) "The Scripture itself excludes all other means of obtaining the highest beatitude except the knowledge of the oneness of the Ātman."⁵ (6) "Liberation follows immediately on the knowledge of Brahman."⁶ (7) "From the knowledge of Brahman as the Ātman, there results the cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest end."⁷ (8) "The realization of the oneness of the Ātman is the culmination of all knowledge."⁸ and "without a comprehension of Brahman, there is no fulfilment of the ends (puruṣārtha) of man."⁹ "Apart from the knowledge of Paramātmā a man cannot attain what is most beneficial to him...It is only the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajñāna) which consumes all works."¹⁰ It is on account of the identity of the two vidyās that Śaṅkara uses the following terms indifferently to indicate one and the same discipline. Philosophy is Brahmanvidyā.¹¹ It is Brahmātmākatvavidyā,¹² Brahmātmākatvavijñāna¹³, Brahmavijñāna.¹⁴ It is likewise Ātmanavidyā,¹⁵ Ātmavi-

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 1.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 9.

3 Ibid., II. 3. 6.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 1.

5 S. B., II. 1. 3.

6 Ibid. I. 1. 4.

7 Ibid.

8 Katha. S. B., I. 2. P.

9 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

10 S. B., I. 1. 28

11 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 1. I. 4. 9., S. B., I. 2. 22., I. 3. 33., III. 1. 4., Taitt. S. B., II. 1. 1., Alitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1.

12 Alitareya. S. B., III. 1. 1.

13 S. B., I. 1. 4.

14 S. B., I. 1. 28., III. 3. 1.

15 Kena. S. B., II. 4., Alitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1.

jñāna¹, Ātmaikatvavidyā², Parmātma-jñāna³, Ātmatattva⁴, Parmātmavidyā⁵. It may be called Vidyā alone.⁶ In a corresponding way the Sumum Bonum also is indifferently described in several ways. It is at once Brahmāvagatiḥ⁷, Brahmapratipattiḥ⁸, Brahmabhāva⁹, Brahmātmabhāva¹⁰. It is, likewise, Ātmalābha¹¹, Ātmaikatvadarśana¹², Ātmāvabodha¹³ and Sarvātmabhāva.¹⁴

III

ATMAN AS THE HIGHEST GOAL:

PURPOSE THE TIME-FORM OF VALUE

But it is just at this point, when we are assured that Ātman is the highest reality and the highest good, that a difficulty presents itself. The difficulty is that Ātman has been shown to be an already existent reality, a siddhavastu, which is solely a matter of acknowledgement; and if the summum bonum is identical with Brahman or Ātman, how can it be spoken of as something to be realized or to be attained? The justification of this way of thinking and this mode of speech lies in the fact that human experience, as we find it, presents and is marked by the duality of value and existence, of the Ātman and the anātman. With the consciousness of an "other", distinct and divided from the Self, there is a movement on the part of the self towards the attainment of what is away from and other than the self. The duality of the self and the not-self or of value and existence is the innermost meaning of time and of all forms of willing. Time-experience itself is an expression of unfulfilled craving. If there is no difference between "what is" and "what ought to be", there will be neither any willing nor any desiring. Where value and existence come together, where

1 S.B., I. 1.4., I. 1.12.

2 S.B., I. 1.1.

3 S.B., I. 1, 28.

4 Chand. S.B., VII. 1.1., VIII. 7.3.

5 S.B., III. 3.31., III. 3.34.

6 Kena S.B., III. 12., Chand S.B., VIII. 7.2., S.B., III. 4. 52,

7 S.B., I. 1.1., I. 1.5.

8 Kena. S.B., II. 1.

9 S.B., I. 1.4.

10 Ibid

11 Mund. S.B., III. 2.3.

12 S.B., I. 3.19.

13 Atareya. S.B., II. 1.1.

14 Ibid.

the Self and the not-self fuse into one, there is neither any willing nor any event.

But, as has already been shown in the previous chapter, according to Śaṅkara, the Self, the Ātman, alone can be regarded as ultimately real, as it alone can be said to exist for itself and to possess intrinsic value. Everything else has being in and through the Self. What appears as not-Self, as an anātmavastu, has its being in the Ātman. On account of the duality of value and existence or of Self and not-self, there is volition. As the Self is the only reality, and it is the Self which possesses intrinsic worth, it becomes the proper object of volition. So soon as the Self is valued and becomes the object of volition, it is turned into an end. The Self, which was a bhūtavastu and a matter of acknowledgement, becomes the paraśārtha, the highest end of man's endeavour. What was the supreme value becomes a purpose for the conative consciousness. This purpose is the time-form of value. The Ātman, which is the ens realissimum for the value-charged cognitive consciousness, becomes the summum bonum for the value-charged conative consciousness. The idea of "purpose" or "end", when we divest it of its temporal incidents, will pass into that of value.

The Ātman, which is the absolute reality, and which, being self-existent, is a matter of acknowledgement, becomes an "end" for the finite consciousness. It is the goal of human knowledge as well as the goal of human endeavour. Śaṅkara, therefore, says alternatively that the Ātman is to be known and that it is to be attained, and emphasizes that knowing the Ātman is the same as attaining it. Śaṅkara uses the words "jñāna" and "lābha" in the same sense.¹

In identifying the goal of knowledge with the goal of human endeavour, Śaṅkara has drawn his inspiration from the Upaniṣads, which view the real as a siddhavastu, as an accomplished reality, and also regard it as the sādhyā, one

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 4. तस्मिन्निराशङ्कमेव ज्ञानताभयोरेकार्थत्वं विवक्षन्नाह ज्ञानं प्रकृत्य अनुविन्देदिति । विन्देते ताभाषत्वात् । Mand. S. B. IV. 100; Mund. S. B., I. 1. 5.

to be realized. Brahman or Ātman is presented in the Upaniṣads as an already existent reality as well as something which is to be attained. The view of Brahman as the absolute reality is the view of an absolute value which is the ultimate ground of the universe, and in its cognition consists the highest achievement of the knowing faculty. Brahman is to be seen, known, cognized, comprehended. It is stated to be the knowable.¹ The verbs of which Brahman is made the object in the sentences which purport to describe its nature and call upon us to realize it are verbs which bear the significance of knowing.² The same Brahman is described as the highest good, and is presented as the object of the conative consciousness. In itself a siddhavastu, an already accomplished reality, it becomes the sādhyā for the aspiring soul. Śaṅkara speaks of the attainment of niḥśreyasa and the accomplishment of the good, of niḥśreyasaprāptiḥ and puruṣārtha-siddhiḥ. Brahman becomes the "labhya", as it is also the "veditavya".

The nature of this "good" as something worthy of being attained is expressed in different ways by the Upaniṣads. It is viewed as immortality (amṛtam), as eternal bliss (paramam sukham) and perpetual peace (śāntiḥ śāśvatī), as the final abode (paramam dhāma), as the supreme goal (parā gatiḥ), as the great place of Viṣṇu and the bridge of immortality (viṣṇoḥ paramam padam amṛtasya setuḥ).

Even the most casual reader of Śaṅkara's works, especially his Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya, cannot fail to observe that the knowledge of Brahman is said to be the only means to the attainment of the summum bonum, and, in its absence, there cannot follow the accomplishment of the highest end of man; and this Brahman is repeatedly said to be "the essence of things." He says, "As practical religious duty has to be inquired into, because it is the cause of an increase of prosperity, so Brahman has to be inquired into, because it is the cause of the attainment of absolute beatitude". And Brahman

1 Mund. S.B., III. 1.9; Chand. S.B., VII. 16.1.

2 पश्यति, ज्ञातुम्, मत्वा, वेद, दृश्यते, निबोधत, निवाच्य, ऐक्षत, विदित्वा, जानय, विजिज्ञागस्व, अनुविद्य ।

has been declared to be "that from which the origin, &c., of this world."¹ The inquiry into the nature of Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world, is really an attempt to discover a principle which is the source of all reality, which "holds all things together", and in doing so explains each and all of them. Philosophy is largely an effort to seek that one principle "by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known"², the principle through which, if it is known, all other things become known. This is the great "promise" of the Vedānta; and the fulfilment of this promise is the task which Śāṅkara sets before himself.

IV

TWO-FOLD REALIZATION OF BRAHMAN THE JNEYA AND THEU PASYA

As Brahman is the param Niḥśreyasa and the param Ātman, the truest and consequently the highest type of realization will be one in which the Self is experienced as an embodiment of the greatest good and the intensest reality; a realization in which the otherness of the absolute reality drops out, and the individual becomes one with the universal. The highest realization will be one in which Brahman is experienced as the very essence, the very Self, the very Ātman. But as our life and the world of our experience are marked not only by the oneness of essence and existence, but also by their duality and discrepancy, the realization of the oneness of Brahman and the individual self, or, in other words, the realization of Brahman as our very Self or essence and not something other, does not normally take place. Brahman is experienced and consequently viewed as something other than ourself. This experience of "otherness" embodies itself in different conceptions formed of Godhead and man's relations to it. The Real, which in essence is nothing other than or apart from Self, is experienced and conceived as the creator, the governor, the ruler, and as being wiser, more power-

¹ S. B., I. 4.23.

² Chand., VI. 1.3.

ful and more plentiful. It is worshipped as the Lord, as the Father in the heaven, as the mysterious and unknown Power, as the Law-giver who makes for righteousness. All these conceptions of God and Godhead imply that He is viewed as something other than our Self or Ātman.

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman can be realized in two and only two ways, and the diverse modes of worship and prayer-offering and supplication which are possible within human experience can ultimately be reduced to these two. Brahman can either be realized (i) as our very Self or Ātman, or (ii) as something other than and different from our Self or Ātman. There is no third way in which it is possible for man to have experience of God, and no other mode of experience which does not ultimately resolve itself into one or other of these two. The former mode of realizing Brahman is called Jñāna by Śaṅkara because it consists in experiencing and viewing Brahman as it is; and Jñāna according to Śaṅkara is vastutantram and means self-accordance or the accordance of anything with its real nature, its notion. The Brahman which is the subject-matter of this experience is called by him Jñeya Brahman. The latter mode of realizing Brahman is called Upāsana by Śaṅkara, Upāsana being conceived by him as an activity, and implying an effort on the part of the individual to view Brahman in a particular way, in terms of and with the help of certain qualities and characteristics borrowed from the world of our experience.

It follows from the very nature of upāsana, which is an activity, that upāsana presupposes and is inconceivable without an element of distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, and has meaning only in that sphere which is marked by the duality of value and existence, or, as Śaṅkara says, Self and its other, which, truly speaking, is not quite other. The Brahman which is the subject-matter of this type of experience is called by Śaṅkara Upāsya Brahman. The distinction which he draws between Nirguṇa and Saṅguṇa Brahman is really a distinction between Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, which distinction ultimately rests upon and is bound up with the two diverse ways in which one and the same reality is experienced. One is the way of Intuition, which

gives us an insight into the nature of the reality when we become one with it and experience it as it experiences itself. The other is the way of experiencing the reality in a semi-intuitive way, as particularized by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, which retains the otherness of the real in some sense. The first is the experiencing of Brahman absolutely, that is, as it is in itself, without having recourse to any medium or special form, which, according to Śaṅkara, is supplied by nāma and rūpa, the upādhis of Brahman. The second is the experiencing of Brahman as limited by name and form. The first is the Jñāna; the second, the Upāsanā of Brahman. "One and the same Brahman is taught by the Vedānta as forming an object of meditation or of knowledge, as the meditable or the knowable, according as it is connected with the limiting adjuncts or is free from such connections."

The distinction between Jñāna and Upāsanā is not a distinction between the cognitive experience on the one hand, and the emotive on the other. What Śaṅkara understands by Jñāna is not by its very nature opposed to what later writers mean by Bhakti. The real opposition which is relevant to Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is not the opposition between Jñāna and Bhakti but between different grades of Jñāna or different grades of Bhakti. Parā Bhakti is the same as Samyagjñāna or the Absolute Experience. It is experiencing God as He is. The distinction between Jñāna and Upāsanā is a distinction between absolute experience and relative or finite experience. The latter is grounded in distinction and differentiation, especially the distinction between the Self and the experienced real. This distinction, however, has its roots in the upādhis which are the limiting adjuncts of Brahman; these upādhis, in the last resort, have their genesis in Avidyā or ignorance, which is another word in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara for the creative energy. "Brahman is apprehended in two ways, as qualified by the limiting adjuncts which consist of the differentiations of evolved names and forms and as being the opposite of this, that is,

1 S. B., I. 1. 12, एवमेकमपि ब्रह्मापेक्षितोपाधिसम्बन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धं चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते ।

free from all limiting conditions whatever."¹ The realization of Brahman as the Ātman is not in any way dependent upon or affected by spatial or temporal relations or, in the words of Śaṅkara, by upādhis which consist of the differentiated names and forms. The Upāśya Brahman, the Brahman realized or to be realized as other than our Self, is the object of the act of contemplation and meditation. No mental activity is possible if the otherness of the contemplated or meditated object drops out all together as it does in the case of the realization of Brahman as our very self.

V

BRAHMAN AS THE VERY SELF

A serious misunderstanding exists in the minds of the interpreters of Śaṅkara regarding his conception of the Saguna Brahman which has been viewed not only as an object of meditation but also as a metaphysical reality. The Saguna Brahman of Śaṅkara is merely the Upāśya Brahman and not a metaphysical entity. But to view it as the Upāśya, which means viewing it as other than the upāsaka and greater than it, is ignorance. Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is summed up by him in the following words: "Realize the Self or Ātman as the Absolute Brahman. This is the meaning. Brahman is not what people here worship, such as Īśvara, the Lord, which is other than and different from the Self, and, being conditioned by the limiting adjuncts which consist of the differentiations, is referred to as 'this'."² What is not the Ātman is not Brahman. The conception of Saguna Brahman is the conception of a Reality which is other than the Self. But neither in his metaphysics nor in his philosophy of sādhanā is there any room for any other principle than Brahman. Brahman is the essence of the universe and also the essence of the Self, and it is to be realized accordingly. The duality of the two is the essential feature of the world of experience. To get rid of this duality by overcoming it is the essence of sādhanā. Where there is unresolved conflict between.

1 *ibid.*

2 *Kand. S. B., I. 4.* आत्मानमेव निविशन् ब्रह्म विद्धि । नन्द ब्रह्म यदिदं इत्युपाधि भेदविशिष्टमनात्मेनैवराटि उपासते ध्यायन्ति ।

the two, here we are in the region of Avidyā. The realization of Brahman as other than the Self, grounded as it is in the consciousness of duality, is marked by ignorance. To realize Brahman as the Creator, Controller, Governor, is to realize it as other than the Self. But this is what upāsana implies. Upāsya Brahman is thus the subject-matter of Avidyā. Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā, on the one hand, does away with the idea of the externality of Brahman, and on the other enlarges the conception of the self by equating it with the cosmic principle, thus bringing it in line with his metaphysics of value. That Brahman is to be realized as the Ātman is but a natural corollary of his principle of the identity of value and reality.

The one idea which Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā constantly repudiates is the idea of the otherness of the upāsya, and the one thought which he unhesitatingly reiterates is the realization of Brahman as the very essence or Self of us. Śaṅkara is familiar with the view that the distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped is foundational to any philosophy of sādhanā, and seeks to controvert it and establish the opposite view that the overcoming of the gulf between the two and their becoming one is the very meaning of sādhanā. He states the opposite view in the following words: "The Ātman, as is well known, being entitled to perform karma and worship, and being subject to births and re-births, seeks to attain Brahmā or other gods or heaven by means of karma or worship. Therefore someone other than the Ātman, such as Viṣṇu, Īśvara, Indra, or Prāṇa entitled to be worshipped, may well be Brahman; but the Ātman can never be, for it is contrary to popular belief. Just as the logicians (tāṅkika) contend that the Ātman is distinct from Īśvara, so the votaries of Karma worship gods as other than the Ātman, saying: "Propitiate this deva by sacrifice", and "Propitiate that deva by sacrifice". Therefore it is only reasonable that what is known and entitled to be worshipped is Brahman, and that the worshipper is other than that." Against this view Śaṅkara insists upon our "realizing this Ātman to be Brahman unsurpassable, known as Bhūmā. The

1 Ibid.

following expressions, 'speech of speech', 'eye of the eye', 'ear of the ear', 'mind of the mind', 'doer', 'enjoyer', 'knower', 'controller', 'governor', 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss', etc., are used in popular language of the unspeakable Brahman, devoid of attributes, highest of all, unchangeable. Disregarding these realize the Ātman itself as the unconditioned Brahman. What is not Ātman is not Brahman."¹ The realization of Brahman as the Ātman is the realization of Brahman as devoid of all differentiations and limiting adjuncts.² This is because existence is nothing other than essence. Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā is a reversal of the philosophy which stands for the distinction between the individual and the universal. It is a repudiation of what Śaṅkara calls bheda darśana.³ He who, deluded by ignorance, thinks "I am other than that Highest Brahman and the Highest is other than I" goes from death to death.⁴

VI

BRAHMAN AS THE UPASYA

But the realization of Brahman as our very Ātman does not take place all at once. Several stages of imperfect realization have to be passed through before the soul awakens to the truth of Brahman being the very essence of it. Before this consciousness dawns, the individual has to tread the path of Upāsana wherein the thought of the otherness of Brahman does not completely drop out, and the individual exists as being circumscribed by the several limiting adjuncts of "name, form, and action". The individual cannot rise higher to a conception of Brahman devoid of spatial and temporal characterizations, and is of necessity tied down to a lower one where Brahman is viewed as "this" or "that". This is the sphere of Upāsana as distinct from that of Jñāna. For the sake of such people who are of "dull intellect" Brahman

1 Ibid. अनात्मनोऽब्रह्मत्वं पुनरुच्यते ।

2 Tatit. S. B., II. 1. 1.

3 Katha. S. B., II. 1. 13.

4 Ibid. II. 1. 10.

5 S. B., IV. 1. 4. कर्तृत्वादितत्त्वसंसारमनिराकरणेन हि ब्रह्मणः आत्मत्वोपदेशः । तदनिराकरणेनोपासनविधानम् ।

is taught under the limitations of name and form. "Though, in reality, the Self-Principle is the sole object of the one true notion of Being, and as such is free from qualities, yet people of duller intellects always look upon It as qualified; hence for the sake of these people such qualities as 'truthfulness of desire' and the like are described in connection with it."¹ Thus Brahman is realized as the Lord of all, being the controller (īśitā) of the entire physical and superphysical universe of differentiations; as Omniscient, being the knower of all beings in their different conditions (sarvajña); as the Inner Controller (antarayāmin), because entering into all it directs everything from within; as the Origin of all, because from it proceeds the entire universe with all its diversity (yonih sarvasya). But this realization of Brahman presupposes the duality of Brahman and the rest of the universe, that is, of the entire aggregate of name and form; and of Brahman and the individual. This is why it is during the state of ignorance alone that the relation of the worshipper and the worshipped exists between the individual self and Brahman. Brahman may thus be realized either as the very Self of us or as our controller or governor according to the degree of light or darkness that is in us.²

This conception of Upāśya Brahman is to be discarded, according to Śaṅkara, as it cannot stand finally, being irreconcilable with the non-dual nature of Brahman or Ātman.³ The conception of Brahman as upāśya is born of ignorance, and this Brahman is called by Śaṅkara "Kṣudra Brahman", or "Jāta Brahman", and the individual who rests in such a Brahman is disparaged by him as "helpless and narrow-minded".⁴ because he knows only a partial aspect of Brahman.⁵ Śaṅkara is not to be understood as ridiculing deity or throwing cold water on the time-honoured institutions of prayer and worship. He simply wants to draw our attention to higher and higher grades of realization, and convince us that the highest

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 1.

4 Ibid., कृपणो दीनोऽल्पकः ।

5 Ibid., क्षुद्रब्रह्मवित्तेनासौ कारणेन ।

type of realization is one in which the highest reality is experienced as the very Self or essence. This experience cannot be expressed in relational terms as essence and existence are not related, being one and inseparable. Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with the form of realization which the word *Upāsana* summarizes is the result of his awareness of a reality in which all duality is overcome, and which is experienced as the very *ātman*. As compared with this type of realization, the realization in which Brahman figures as the Ruler, the Controller, the Governor, the Giver of the fruits of actions, as *Annāda* or *Vasudāna*, as the Light or the Bridge, falls far short of it and is regarded by him as imperfect, deficient, one-sided, and therefore infected with ignorance. But to those who are unable to rise to this highest conception of Divinity, Śaṅkara offers conceptions of Brahman as limited by name and form, through gradual realizations of which an approach may be made towards the absolute truth of the non-duality of Brahman and *Ātman*. The idea behind this is that Brahman, which in reality is absolute Being, one without a second, free from all limitations of space and time, appears to people of duller comprehension to be non-existing, and Śaṅkara thinks, "Let such people come to the proper path; later on we shall make them comprehend the real truth".¹

In this sense *Upāsana* is a necessary stage that has to be passed through on the way that leads to knowledge, i. e., the realization that Brahman is the essence of myself. It seems as if the pilgrim, unable to ascend the heights of Brahman-*Ātman* realization, or unable to remain long in that highly rarefied atmosphere of the realm of pure value, feels and prays:

Keep thou my feet; I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me.

We never find in Śaṅkara a downright condemnation of *Upāsana*, as is generally believed to be the case by those who regard his "Īśvara" as phenomenal and illusory and see in it a "a pinchbeck deity." Śaṅkara has nothing to say against *Īśvara* when he is viewed as the highest *Ātman* and

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 1. 1.

the highest Value. He plainly confesses that his system of the Vedānta does not know of any higher or greater reality than Īśvara. What pains him is the thought that people realize Īśvara not as the very Self but as other than and external to them, and controlling and guiding them from without. Illusory or false is the idea of Brahman being treated as an external something which always retains its otherness. The conception of Brahman as controller or governor (Īśvara, īṣṭṛ, antarayāmin) can never be reconciled with its conception as the highest essence or value, if we assign them the same place in the scale of values. The discrepancy disappears the moment we recognize that there is a regular order of values and upāsanā occupies a lower place in this order, which leads on to the higher and the highest value, this according to Śaṅkara being nothing other than Samyag-jñāna or Mokṣa.

Upāsanā cannot be equated with absolute experience or Samyagjñāna. Nor is the man who takes to and rests content with Upāsanā, the "upāsanāśrita", as Śaṅkara calls him in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad Kārikā¹, the embodiment of absolute realization, because his religious life is infected with an unresolved conflict and an unreconciled dualism between "Ātman" and "Īśvara." But Śaṅkara, true to the standpoint of value, to which the idea of degree or gradation is organic, consciously also recognizes that all forms of Upāsanā are not equally valuable, and holds that there are some varieties of it which lead to "gradual liberation" and finally to perfection. "The different modes of Upāsanā lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works; these modes are distinct on account of the distinction of the limiting adjuncts, consisting of different qualities."² Accordingly the scriptural texts speak of 'meditation', the subject of Samhitā, which does not clash with Karma; then they proceed to teach about the knowledge of the conditioned Ātman through the vyāhṛtis, which results in self-realization. Since by these it is impossible to destroy completely the root of transmigratory

1 III. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

existence, the teaching of the knowledge of Ātman, devoid of all limiting adjuncts, is begun with a view to removing that ignorance which is the seed of all miseries.¹ Śaṅkara's discussion of the nature of the upādhis or limiting adjuncts would verge on a farce if he had simply mentioned them in order to condemn them ultimately as mere floating air-bubbles. They, on the other hand, supply the medium through which Brahman's nature is meant to be comprehended. This is the implication of Śaṅkara's statement, that not all the scriptural texts speaking of phenomenal diversity are meant to convey the idea of its dissolution in Brahman. "Where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of devout meditation we have no right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set aside. This is the case, e. g., in the passage "He who consists of mind, whose body is prāṇa, whose form is light", which is connected with an injunction of devout meditation. In passages of the latter kind the determinations attributed to Brahman may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the purpose of devout meditation. These meditations on Brahman as characterized by form have results of their own, either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps."²

Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with Upāsana and with the religious conception of Upāśya Brahman is due to the one-sidedness of the conception and the form of realization which it embodies. "One unable to realize Ātman, which is both within and without and birthless and therefore believing himself to be helpless through avidyā, thinks, 'I am born, I subsist in the Brahman with attributes, and through devotion to it I shall become Brahman' and thus becomes Kripana (narrow-minded).³ This man is the 'upāsaneśrita', one who belakes himself to devotion as means to the attainment of liberation, and who further thinks that he is the devotee and Brahman is his object of worship. This jīva or embodied being further thinks that through devotional practices, he at present related to the evolved Brahman would attain to the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B. III. 2. 21.

3 Mand. S. B., III. 2.

ultimate Brahman after the dissolution of the body In other words he thinks I shall, through devotional practices, regain that which was my real nature before manifestation, though at present I subsist in the Brahman that appears in the form of the manifold. Such a jīva, that is, the aspirant, betaking itself to devotion, inasmuch as it knows only a partial aspect of Brahman, is said to be of narrow or poor intellect by those who regard Brahman as eternal and unchanging."¹ Thus it is during the state of Avidyā alone that the relation of worshipper and worshipped exists.²

By insisting upon the fragmentariness of the conception of Upāsana as distinguished from that of Jñāna Śaṅkara does not intend to discourage or discard worship and meditation. He simply wants us to move further and not stop with it, move till we realize that Brahman is our very Self and we are one with it. Śaṅkara attempts to restore to man his lost dignity by making him aware of his great origin. It is only he who is not a knower of Brahman "who worships another god, a god different from himself and approaches him in a subordinate position, offering him praises, salutations, sacrifices, presents, self-surrender, meditation, etc., thinking, 'He is one, different from me, and I am another, his subordinate, and I must serve him like a debtor'. "³ Conscious of man's divine ancestry, Śaṅkara hesitates to recommend a form of worship to us, children of the immortals, in which we think, "This Indra and the other gods are different from us and are our masters. We shall worship them like servants through praises, salutations and sacrifices, and shall attain as results prosperity and liberation granted by them."⁴ The logic of the real as well as of religion forbids such a conception of Upāsana as having any finality about it. Nor can it bear the highest fruits of religion.

VII

SAGUNA BRAHMAN AND THE METAPHYSICAL REALITY

The distinction, therefore, which Śaṅkara draws between Nirguṇa and Saguna Brahman or Nirupādhika and Sopādhika

1 *ibid.*, III. 1

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 *Brhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 10.

4 *ibid.*

Brahman is a distinction between Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman. Īśvara is not a metaphysical principle in the philosophy of Śaṅkara, sharing the natures of both being and becoming, which accounts for the existence of the world. It is Brahman qualified by the limiting adjuncts of name and form for purposes of meditation and realization. The Saguna or Upāśya Brahman of Śaṅkara is not the Brahman "as indicated or pointed out by the qualifications"; it is the Brahman "as qualified by them". Śaṅkara's philosophy of language should not be confused with his philosophy of Upāśanā. Language can operate in relation to Brahman and Brahman can be made the subject-matter of intelligible discourse only by having recourse to an act of abstraction, or, as Śaṅkara says, by imposing name and form upon the Inexpressible Brahman.¹ This is the minimum which language demands. But the fulfilment of this demand only renders intelligible discourse about Brahman possible. It is not the fulfilment of the requirements of Upāśanā. In imposing name and form it is the Nirguṇa Brahman which is being pointed out. This Nirguṇa Brahman, when it is "qualified" by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, is turned into the Upāśya Brahman.² Śaṅkara rejects the view, "that the Lord is to be meditated upon as pointed out by the aforesaid qualifications, and not as qualified by them", and lays down his own view that "it is the Lord as qualified by the above-described properties of intelligence and the rest, that is to be mediated upon"³. Only when thus qualified does the Nirguṇa Brahman become the Upāśya Brahman. Therefore when Śaṅkara speaks of Brahman as the cause of the universe, because it is the Self or essence of it, as for example, in the Second sūtra (Janmādyasya Yataḥ), he is not to be understood as outlining the nature of the Saguna Brahman. His is simply an endeavour to give expression to the truth that Brahman is the absolute essence of the universe, and this he does by calling it the cause or the source and identifying the cause with the Ātman or Self. It is but *ignoratio elenchi* to think that the Second Sūtra can be accepted only as a definition of Īśvara and then to argue against

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 3. 6.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12.

3 Chand. S. B., III. 14. 4.

Śaṅkara "that it is improbable that the sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit."¹

It is not till we come to the end of the commentary on the Eleventh Sūtra of the First Adhyāya that Śaṅkara raises the question of the nature and significance of the Saguṇa or Sopādhika Brahman. In his commentary on the first eleven sūtras he is busy laying the foundations of his philosophy of Value and his Idealism.² "The Vedānta texts exhibited under Sūtras 1. 1 1-11 have shown that the all-knowing, all powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. It has been shown by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view that all the Vedānta texts maintain an intelligent cause."³ It is only after this that Śaṅkara raises the question, 'what reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedānta Sūtra?'⁴ The answer which Śaṅkara gives to this question should be sufficient to demolish the view that Śaṅkara opens his commentary with the definition of Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman, which is an inferior principle. The answer of Śaṅkara, which at the same time reminds us that philosophy in India is a way of life and not merely a way of thought, and that here philosophy and religion do not stand sundered, is that Brahman is realized in two ways, as qualified by the limiting adjuncts of name and form and as free from all limiting adjuncts. "One and the same Brahman is taught as the Jñeya (knowable) or as the Upāśya in the Vedānta, according as it is connected (i e., qualified) by limiting adjuncts or is free from such conditions. This is the special aim of the subsequent portion of the Vedānta Sūtra."⁵ In the whole of the Second Pāda and also in the first Pāda (Sūtras 12-31) Śaṅkara is concerned with exhibiting the truth that Brahman can be realized either as Ātman or as the Upāśya and when as the latter, it is only by qualifying Brahman by name and form that the possibility of it can be thought.

1 Thibaut, P. Xcii.

2 S. B., I. 1. 11.

3 *ibid.*, I. 1. 12.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

This dual way of realizing Brahman's nature is everywhere insisted upon by Śaṅkara, as he, likewise, enlarges upon the theme that the Upāsana of Brahman prepares the way for the "knowing" of it or the realizing of it as the Ātman or the very essence. "Where instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities, there the expression is 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay'. But the Lord, as he is the cause of everything, is taught as an object of meditation and possessing some of the qualities of his effects, as, for instance, in the following passage: 'He who has all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes'. Accordingly he is also spoken of as having a bright beard, bright as gold and so on".¹ "The assignment of a special locality to Brahman is not contrary to reason, because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor is it impossible to assign any place to Brahman for the reason that Brahman is out of all connection with all place. It is possible to make such an assumption when Brahman is connected with certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly scripture speaks of different kinds of meditations (Upāsanaṇi) on Brahman as especially connected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart... Wherever the highest Brahman, which is devoid of all differentiating qualities, is spoken of as the Self (ātmatvena), it is understood that the result of that realization is one only, final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught as connected with distinguishing qualities or outward symbols, there we see all the various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; for instance, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver of wealth'. Everywhere the same idea is reiterated. It is the highest Brahman which is to be meditated upon as qualified by the attributes consisting of mind, etc."² "The passage, 'without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the Pure and Unqualified Brahman. The expressions, 'consisting of mind', 'having breath for its body,' refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, the

1 S. B., I. 1. 20.

2 *ibid.*, I. 1. 24.

3 *ibid.*, I. 2. 1.

highest Brahman is here represented as an object of meditation."¹

"Brahman, although devoid of qualities, is spoken of for the purposes of meditation as possessing qualities depending on name and form. To attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subverts the purpose of meditation and is, therefore, not contrary to reason; no more than to contemplate Viṣṇu in Śālagrāma"². If the Saguṇa Brahman were a metaphysical principle, it could not be the Upāśya Brahman, because Upāśanā is an activity and option is the very life of activity. It is only the object of Upāśanā which can be conceived in this way and also in that way. Where the real nature of an object is concerned, no option is possible and the truth has to be cognized in a single, uniform way. The possibility of the realization of Brahman as Saguṇa is bound up with the recognition of the limiting adjuncts as qualifying the Absolute and Nirguṇa Brahman.

The distinction between Para and Apra Brahman is in Śaṅkara the distinction between Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman, Brahman realized as the very Ātman or self and Brahman realized as other than the Self, and not the distinction between acosmic and cosmic principles. The modern interpreters are far from truth when they insist "that only a saguṇam saviśeṣam, not a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam Brahman can be a creator"³, and "the act of creation...can only be ascribed to the Apram Brahman"⁴. The Apra Brahman is the Upāśya Brahman, Brahman realized as limited by name and form. "As the Apra Brahman is in proximity to the Para Brahman, there is nothing unreasonable in the word 'Brahman' being applied to the former also. For when the Para Brahman is, for the purposes of meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualitiessuch as 'consisting of mind' and

1 S. B., I. 2. 2.

2 S. B., I. 2. 14, निगुणमपि सद्ब्रह्म नामरूपगतगुणैः सगुणमुपासनार्थं तत्र तत्रोपदिश्यते ।

3 D. S. V., P. 102.

4 ibid., P. 460.

the rest...which qualities depend on its connection with certain pure limiting adjuncts, then it is what we call the Apra or Lower Brahman."¹

The following statement of Śaṅkara should once for all put an end to the prevalent view that the conception of Saguna Brahman has been put forward by him as a solution to the metaphysical difficulty of accounting for the evolution of the world from the Absolute Brahman: "Where the texts, negating all distinctions founded on name, form and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as 'that which is not coarse' and so on, the Para Brahman is spoken of. Where again, for the purpose of meditation the texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name, form and so on, using such terms as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prāṇa, whose form is light,' that is the Apra Brahman.....The fruit of such meditation on the Apra Brahman is lordship over the worlds; a fruit falling within the sphere of saṁsāra, ignorance having not as yet been finally removed."²

The words Apra Brahman, Saguna Brahman are used synonymously in Śaṅkara's writings, and they indicate the Upāśya Brahman.³ Upāśanā, accordingly, has reference to Brahman as having revealed itself in name and form. Saguna Brahman cannot be regarded as the explanation of that upon which the formation of the conception of Saguna Brahman itself rests.

VIII

JÑANANIṢṬHĀ, PARĀBHAKTI AND UPĀSANĀ

There is an extremely wonderful unity of thought characterizing all the writings of Śaṅkara. In his commentary on the Gītā the same distinction between Jñana and Upāsanā and Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman meets us everywhere. The difference in the terminology in which this distinction is

1 S. B., IV. 3. 9.

2 S. B., IV. 3. 14. सगुणस्यैवोपास्यत्वात् ।

3 S. B., IV. 3. 7.

expressed is due to the difference in the language of the texts which treat of this distinction and on which Śaṅkara is commenting. True to the role of commentator in which he appears before us, he adopts the terminology of the texts, but he never allows the difference in terminology to hide the identity of thought which it is his endeavour to make explicit. Accordingly in his commentary on the Gītā, Śaṅkara, instead of speaking about Jñāna and Upāsana and Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, speaks of Upāsana alone and its various grades with their qualitative differences. What is called Jñāna in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra is, in his commentary on the Gītā, given the name of Akṣaropāsana, and this kind of Upāsana is identified with Samyagjñāna or Advaitajñāna, which is said to bring about final beatitude; and what receives the name of Upāsana in the former is here called "Īśvaropāsana".¹ The underlying idea behind the distinction which meets us in the commentary on the Gītā is the same. Brahman is to be realized as the very Self or essence of us. Where this is not possible on account of ignorance clouding the soul and its intellect, Brahman is experienced as other than and different from the self, and standing in the relation of the meditable or the adorable to the soul, which regards itself as the meditator or the upāsaka. In other words, Brahman is to be realized as the Ātman or as Īśvara, i.e., Lord or Controller. The former annuls all distinctions; in the latter they are perpetuated, as the traces of Avidyā which divide the Self from Brahman still persist. Nirguṇa jñāna is the same as Upāsana of Akṣara Brahman. This is the worship of the Supreme Self, the Imperishable Brahman, devoid of all limiting adjuncts.² This is the realization of jñeya brahman.³ Those who realize Brahman in this way are called "Akṣaropāsakāḥ" and are regarded as possessing perfect knowledge or Samyagdarśana. Such worshippers of Akṣara Brahman are called by Śaṅkara "Abhedadarśina", those who perceive no distinction between the Lord and the Self.⁴ This kind of Upāsana is distinguished from the

1 Gīta. S.B., XII. 1.; XI'. 12.

2 *ibid.*, XII. 1. परमात्मनो ब्रह्मणः अक्षरस्य विध्वस्तसर्वविशेषणस्य उपासनमुक्तम् ।

3 S.B. I. 1. 12. निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धं ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तोपपदिश्यते ।

4 Gīta. S.B., XII. 1.; XII. 12.

one in which Brahman is worshipped as "the Lord of the universe and as associated with the limiting adjuncts of supreme knowledge and power." The characteristic feature of this kind of worship is that it is based upon a fundamental distinction between Īśvara and Ātman, the Lord and the Self, and, making this distinction the basis of further instruction, the individual is asked "to concentrate thought on the Lord, on the Universal Form, and to perform works for the sake of the Lord".¹

A misunderstanding prevails in the minds of many interpreters of Śaṅkara that in him Jñāna and Bhakti are fundamentally opposed to each other. But the real opposition which is relevant to Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana is not the opposition between Jñāna and Bhakti, but one between different grades of Jñāna or different grades of Bhakti. Parā Bhakti, in which God is realized as our very Self, all distinctions of time and space having been annulled, in which the individual "is possessed with the thought that all that he sees or hears or touches is nothing but the Lord Vāsudeva"², is identified by Śaṅkara with Samyagjñāna.³ Parā Bhakti, or the highest devotion, is spoken of by Śaṅkara as consisting in the actual experience of the highest Truth.⁴ Jñāna, as Śaṅkara understands it, is not mere intellectual cognition. It is Experience of Reality, as it is; and because Jñāna, as distinguished from Karma or activity, is under the control of the object of knowledge and being so is uniform and one and represents the real as it is, the absolute experience is called Jñāna by Śaṅkara. By using the word Jñāna Śaṅkara does not at all intend to suggest any thought of pitting the cognitive experience against the emotional, which is generally regarded as constituting the essence of "bhakti". Parā Jñānaniṣṭhā is identical with Parā Bhakti. That state of realization which is marked by the experience of the oneness of the individual with the Supreme Self, and which is accom-

1 *ibid.*, XII, 1. 12.

2 *ibid.*, XIII. 18.

3 *ibid.*, IX. 1; XIII. 10.

4 *ibid.*, XIII. 20, उत्तमां परमार्थज्ञानलक्षणां भक्तिमाश्रिताः ।

panied with the renunciation of all works associated with the idea of distinctions such as the agent, is called *Parā Jñāna-niṣṭhā* by Śaṅkara. This absolute knowledge or experience is also referred to by Śaṅkara as *Parā Bhakti*, "the supreme or fourth kind of devotion as compared with the remaining three kinds of devotion, the devotion of the distressed (*ārta*), etc." "By this supreme devotion the aspirant knows the Lord as He is, and immediately afterwards all consciousness of difference between *Īśvara* and the individual self disappears altogether." This *Parā Bhakti* or supreme devotion is suffused with absolute awareness, and is called by Śaṅkara *Jñāna-Niṣṭhālakṣaṇā Bhakti*.² This absolute experience or awareness is *Mokṣa* itself, for which *Brahman* is but another word. The alternatives presented by Śaṅkara to the individual aspiring after the summum bonum of life are not *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* but (i) *Nirupādhika Jñāna* and *Sopādhika Jñāna*, (ii) *Parā Bhakti* and *Aparā Bhakti*, (iii) *Upāsana* grounded in *Ātmeśvarabheda* and *Akṣaropasanā*, which is done by those who are called by Śaṅkara *Abhedadarśina*.³

It only remains to emphasize that *Īśvara*, according to Śaṅkara, is neither illusory nor phenomenal nor unreal. To continue to marshal an array of arguments to prove that *Īśvara*, in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is real, is to labour an imaginary issue. Pt. Kōkileśwar Sastri is occupied with labouring such an issue in his *Advaita Philosophy*. The truth is that both the classes of interpreters, those who deny the reality of *Īśvara* and emphasize his phenomenality and those who insist upon his reality, are busy answering a wrong question. And as the question is put in a wrong way, the answer which it receives is bound to be wrong. The proper way to defend Śaṅkara's position against the attack of the critics is not to contradict what the critics say in answer to the wrong issue which they raise. The right way of meeting the critic is to point out to him that the question: Is *Īśvara* real? is not rightly put. The proper question would be: 'What is Śaṅkara's conception of *Īśvara*?' The answer to this is that the conception of *Īśvara* is the

1 *ibid.*, XVIII. 55

2 *ibid.*, XVIII. 55

3 *ibid.*, XIII. 12

conception of Brahman as limited by name and form, and as controlling or governing the individual and the universe to which the individual belongs. But the relation between Brahman and the individual is not one of controller and controlled, but of essence and reality. Brahman is the Ātman of every one. This truth cannot be expressed in terms of spatio-temporal relations. Pt. Kokilleshwar Sastri sticks to the view held by the rival interpreters that Īśvara is the creative principle, but rejects the other half of their thesis, namely, that he is unreal. Īśvara or Saguṇa Brahman is the Upādhiviśiṣṭa Brahman, Brahman so conceived for purposes of meditation and contemplation, and not any metaphysical reality; and Kokilleshwar Sastri is far from truth when he emphatically asserts that "Śaṅkara has made no distinction between the two—Brahman and Īśvara."¹ The distinction between the realization of Brahman as Ātman or as Īśvara or Īśitr is at the root of Śaṅkara's philosophy of Sādhana. The realization of the summum bonum of life is bound up with the realization of Brahman as the Ātman or essence, as it is in this realization alone that the duality which mars the integrity of the religious life is overcome and subdued. What is wrong or illusory or avidyātmaka is the conception of Brahman as Lord, as Controller, as Governor. When the truth dawns, Brahman is realized as our very Ātman, and as one with us.² But when we are in the region of Avidyā, which is marked by the duality of value and existence, of the ideal and the real, of the Self and the Non-Self, the individual can form no higher conception of Brahman than as "the Lord of all, the Master of all beings, the Guardian of the creation, the embankment that steadies all these worlds so as to prevent their falling into utter confusion."³ But one should not hesitate to call a spade a spade and admit in all frankness that to realize Brahman thus is to realize it in an imperfect way. This is what Śaṅkara means when he tells us that it is during the state of ignorance alone that the relation of upāsaka and upāsya subsists

¹ *Advaita Philosophy*, P. 36.

² S.B., II.1.14.

³ *Ibid.*

IX

ĀTMAVIDYĀ AND THE SUPREME GOOD

We have thus been led to the view that knowledge of the self is the only means to immortality. "There is no other means of realizing the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the oneness of the Self."¹ "Through the independent knowledge of the Self enjoined in the Vedānt is accomplished the highest end of man."² "Knowledge of the Self is the means to immortality."³ Wealth, incantation, medicine, austerity, yoga, none of these can bring immortality to man; all of them prove ineffective to conquer mortality, because there is no permanence about any of them, and a thing which is itself not permanent cannot be the source of an effect which is permanent. The potency which is born of the knowledge of the Self (Ātmavidyā) flows from the very nature of the Self and not from any other thing. It is the only means, which can overcome mortality, and lead to immortality. "We may study all the vedas, and acquire knowledge of everything else that is knowable, but if we do not know the truth with regard to the Self, our ends will still remain unaccomplished."⁴ Apart from the knowledge of Self (Ātmañāna; Ātmaattva) there is nothing else that can accomplish absolute and supreme good. We read of the divine sage, Nārada, in the Upaniṣads. He had fulfilled all his duties and was versed in all the lore of the time. He knew "the R̥gveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, Atharvaveda, the fourth Veda of the Vedas, the Rites of the Fathers, Mathematics, the science of numbers, the science of portents, the science of Time, Logic, the science of reasoning, Ethics and Politics, Etymology, the Ceremonials and Prosody, the science of the elementals, the science of war, Astronomy, the science of the stars, the science of snake-charming and the fine arts."⁵ But all these endowments could not help him in

1 S.B. II. 1.3.

2 S.B., III. 4.1.

3 Brhad. S.B., II. 4.4; I. 4.7; II. 4.1; Chand. S.B., VII. 1.1; VII. 1.5; VII. 7.3; VIII. 11.3; Kena. S.B., II. 4; Mund.S.B., III. 2.3.

4 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3.

5 Ibid. VII., 1. 2.

attaining the supreme good. He did not know the Self, and "for this reason, having renounced all his pride of excellent lineage, knowledge, conduct and capabilities, like any ordinary person he approached Sanatakumāra for the purpose of attaining supreme good." All that Nārada knew was mere name. But certainly there is "something greater than the name." It is the function of Ātmavidyā to tell us about that "something greater than the name". That is one's own Ātman, and "insight into the oneness of this Ātman is the culmination of all knowledge."¹

Śaṅkara's attitude towards this Ātmavidyā is one of great reverence. Ātmavidyā for him is not only a science among other sciences. It has a dignity of its own²; it is the most shining among the shining things³; it is even higher than the status of Indra, who obtained it only after he had toiled and toiled for it for a full hundred and one years.⁴ It is the benign mother⁵ and the greatest good.⁶ Śaṅkara's passage from Brahmaidhyā to Ātmavidyā, his reduction of the problem of knowing the nature of Brahman to the problem of knowing the nature of the Self, and his formulation of the nature of Summum Bonum indifferently either as Ātmaprāpti or Brahmaprāpti is highly significant. Śaṅkara is impressing upon us his conviction that the problems of reality and value are inseparable, and a metaphysics which, at the same time, claims to be a metaphysics of religion can only ignore these at its own peril.

1 Katha. S. B., I. 2. 8.

2 Chand. S. B., VIII. 7. 3.

3 Kena. S. B., III. 12.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 11. 3.

5 Katha. S. B., I. 3. 14.

6 S. B., I. 1. 28.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY AS PARĀVIDYĀ

ŚĀṆKARA'S BRAHMAVĀDA IS BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is both philosophy and religion. It is a religious philosophy, and is concerned with the interpretation of the religious experiences recorded in the scriptures of the Hindus—the Vedas and the Upaniṣads—with a view to determining the real nature of the universe and man's place in that universe. It approaches the problem of the ultimate reality from the side of religion, and aims at finding out what the values, the existence of which is guaranteed by religious experience, have to say about the constitution of the universe of which man happens to form a part. As a religion Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is a philosophical religion. His investigation into the nature of reality is throughout motivated and guided by the single aim of finding out the supreme and final good for man, knowing and realizing which he may get eternal rest and peace. The principles of such a religion are in perfect accord with the dictates of reason, and in Śāṅkara both reason and revelation join hands to proclaim the truth. It would be truer to say that Śāṅkara's Brahmanvāda is religion and philosophy in one. In it religion is not separable from philosophy, nor philosophy from religion. Though they are not alienable from each other without doing violence to the integrity and solidarity of his Brahmanvāda, and without robbing it of many of the features but for which it would lose its uniqueness, the one is yet distinguishable from the other if we bear in mind that philosophy is concerned with giving an articulated expression to the nature of the supreme value by intellectually apprehending it, and religion with the realization of that value by actually living it.

Philosophy is a matter of intellectual apprehension and communication, religion one of spiritual comprehension and communion. It is one of the important tenets of Śāṅkara that

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both anubhava and tarka are indispensable for the complete realization of the summum bonum. The bearing of this on his conception of Brahmovāda is that both philosophy and religion as defined above constitute irreducible but inalienable elements of it. "Anubhava" points to the necessity of religion or practical realization and insight, or, what is the same, as actually sharing and partaking of the eternal values; "tarka" lays bare the necessity of a reasoned grasp of the truth so that doubt and error may not assail the aspirant who is treading the path of religion. Thus Śāṅkara's system is a noble and happy blend of religion and philosophy and both these have become "exalted" in this harmonious combination which his genus has succeeded in effecting. In his insistence on the possibility of a direct vision of the supreme good in the transformed life of the individual, Śāṅkara reveals himself as the author of a mystical philosophy and a mystical religion, the beauty and strength of which consist in the fact that his mysticism does not ignore the claims of understanding, and "departs from the standpoint of understanding only in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate".

There is nothing in Śāṅkara's writings to support the view that Śāṅkara has failed to reconcile religion and philosophy, but it has been seriously maintained by several students of Śāṅkara that his attempt to bring the two together has ended in failure. Professor Wadia is disposed to hold the view that in reconciling religion and philosophy, religion has been given the go-by and there is inconsistency between religious worship and Śāṅkara's philosophical convictions.¹ According to him Śāṅkara gives religion a place on sufferance; he regards it as a make-believe, a concession to the masses, a stage in the upward growth of man, something like a kindergarten, and of no more worth than fleeting sense-experience.² The argument for this view is that Śāṅkara identifies the God of religion with Īśvara, who is himself unreal and is in the world of Mayā. The worship of an unreal Īśvara is opposed to the deepest convictions of the truly religious, and therefore Śāṅkara's unreal Īśvara is the merest mockery of

1 Proceedings of the Second Indian Philosophical Congress, PP 400, 410.

2 Ibid., P. 410.

God and his logic regarding Īśvara's unreality altogether unconvincing.¹

The premises on which Professor Wadia bases his conclusion regarding Śaṅkara's failure to bring about a reconciliation between religion and philosophy are themselves not valid. Śaṅkara never identifies the God of religion with Īśvara, and he never recommends the worship of an unreal Īśvara even when he is making a "concession" in favour of what Professor Wadia seems to have in view, worship of a real Īśvara; and his concept of Īśvara symbolizes only a particular view taken of the religious ideal at a particular stage in religious advancement, and epitomizes the specific experience of that stage, namely, the stage where the worshipper "worships another god, thinking he is one and I am another", the stage where ignorance has not been completely removed and the worshipper is still haunted by the idea of a monarchical God who is the creator, the controller and the governor of the jīvas, and the spice of whose life is to command allegiance and obedience from the subject people of his kingdom who, in their turn, must be prepared to suffer for any act of disloyalty.

There can be no possibility of any doubt arising as regards Śaṅkara's attitude towards the relations and inter-relations between philosophy and religion, unless, in the first place, their office is misconceived or, in the second place, a wrong view is taken of Śaṅkara's philosophy of religion. It is true Śaṅkara himself does not make use of these terms; nor does he draw a line of demarcation between the element of philosophy and the element of religion in his system of Brahmanvāda. He does neither, because according to him neither philosophy nor religion can stand alone. The word religion can be used to signify either "the science of religion" or "the fact of communion between the finite individual and the Infinite God, wherein the former is elevated into union with the latter." If it is used in the second sense, it would be absurd to discuss whether Śaṅkara's system of Brahmanvāda is a philosophy or a religion or both; for obviously they cannot

1 *Ibid.*, P. 410.

2 *Bhāṣya*. S. B., I. 4, 10; *Taṭparyā*. S. B., II. 8. 5.

be treated as the cognate species of a common genus and consequently cannot be used either as conjunctive or disjunctive predicates to a common subject. If it is used to mean the science of religion, the "science of God", it is legitimate to raise a question of this type, but Śāṅkara's answer would be that as the highest principle of religious life is identical with the ultimate base of the universe, religion as the science of God is indistinguishable from philosophy as the science of the ultimate.

For Śāṅkara philosophy and religion alike constitute "tattvajñāna". In his commentary on the Gītā Śāṅkara explains the meaning of the term in the following way: "tat" is the name of Brahman, who is the all (sarvam); Brahmanhood (tadbhāvaḥ), the real nature of Brahman (Brahmaṇo Yāthātmyam) is the "tattvam"; those who attend only to truth, to the real nature of Brahman, the Absolute, the All, "That", are the tattvadarśinas.¹ Tattvadarśana, for Śāṅkara, includes not only the intellectual apprehension of the truth (tattvam), of the real nature of Brahman (Brahmaṇo Yāthātmyam), but also a practical appropriation of it by becoming Brahman. Śāṅkara knows that it is possible to know the truth in an intellectual way, but this knowing may not be accompanied by that practical realization of it in one's conduct, without which true liberation will be impossible. He has this in mind when he says that "some only, but not all, know as well as realize the truth", and recommends the seeker of truth to go to a teacher who not only knows the truth but has realized it himself, for that knowledge alone which is imparted by those who have realized the truth (samyagdarśināḥ)—and no other knowledge—can prove effective."² This gives us an insight into Śāṅkara's repeated insistence on the indispensability of both anubhava and tarka for the attainment of the summum bonum. It is a complete misunderstanding of Śāṅkara's position to say, as Rāmaṇuja has done, that he guarantees the liberation of the soul from the fetters of saṁsāra simply by an intellectual realization of great sayings like "Tattvamasi" and "Aham Brah-

1 Gītā. S.B., II. 15.

2 ib d., IV. 34.

māsmi"¹; and further it is an *ignoratio elenchi* to argue against him that such a means—understanding the meaning of the mahāvākyas—is never seen to produce liberation. Whenever Śaṅkara says that jñāna and jñāna alone is the cause of liberation, he understands by it not only the intellectual knowledge of truth, but also the practical realization of it. Jñāna is not only "knowing", but also "being and becoming" Brahman."² There is no difference between knowing the Great One and attaining the Great One."³ "Knowledge and attainment mean the same thing."⁴ "Knowing is realizing the Selfhood of Brahman."⁵

But if "religion" is used to mean the "realization of the oneness of the Ātman", "the communion of the individual with the universal", adopting Śaṅkara's standpoint we can say that philosophy is "reflection on those permanent values which have their foundation in a higher spiritual reality above the changing interests of the times"⁶; and religion is the practical appropriation of these values by the individual, raising itself to a point where it recognizes its true being as union with the whole, which is infinite being and infinite bliss. If these two aspects of Śaṅkara's Brahmvāda are kept in mind, the discussion of the question whether Śaṅkara's Advaitism is a philosophy or a religion or both, whether it is "matam" or "tattvam", and which of the two, whether philosophy or religion, is better entitled to be called "tattvam" will appear to be a fruitless and an idle one. It is indifferent whether we dub his system as philosophy or religion or both, provided we understand in what sense we use these terms. It would not be open to any objection if we said that Śaṅkara's advaitism is a philosophy of religion.

II

ŚAṅKARA'S ADVAITISM A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

But here we must not allow ourselves to forget the truth of which we are reminded by Professor Schaub, that meta-

1 R.B., I. 1.1.

2 Mand. S.B., IV. 100.

3 *ibid.*, I. 1.5.

4 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

5 S.B., I. 1.4.

6 Windelband quoted in Fringe Pattison's *Idea of God*, p. 39.

physics cannot vindicate its claim to being a philosophy of religion by the simple device of rebaptizing its terms and calling its Absolute God.¹ Philosophy should accept the specifically religious experience as such, and try to interpret it with a view to understanding the true nature and meaning of reality; it must use that experience as the clue to the nature of the universe in which we happen to live, and of which we happen to form a part, and to our status in that universe. This is exactly the task which philosophy as a thinking consideration of things is made to perform in Śaṅkara's system. For Śaṅkara, as for Bradley, there is nothing more real than what comes in religion and "the man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks."² If the religious consciousness and its deliverances were simply "a cloud-cuckoo-land of subjective fancy," philosophy would be ideally futile. Philosophy is thus reasoned knowledge of (vidyā) or reflection on the supreme values.

Though philosophy aspires to arrive at a knowledge of the Universe or reality as a whole, it is peculiarly circumscribed in its adventure inasmuch as it has "to start from some limited section of human experience—from epistemology, or from natural science, or from theology, or from mathematics."³ And as Professor Whitehead further points out, "the investigation always retains the taint of its starting point. Every starting point has its merits, and its selection must depend upon the individual philosopher."⁴ Śaṅkara has selected religious experience and the values of which it gives us intimations as the starting point of his philosophic adventure. If Śaṅkara had approached reality through another avenue, Śaṅkara's philosophy would have taken an entirely different turn. But as it stands, for Śaṅkara, to whom religious values supplied the clue to reality, the solution of the question, "How is everlasting beatitude possible?" was a question of life and death for philosophy, as for Kant, who approached

1 *Philosophy Today*, p. 109.

2 *Appearance and Reality*, p. 449, quoted in P. P. *Idea of God*, p. 252.

3 *Philosophical Review*, 1937, Vol. 4th, p. 185: Remarks by Prof. A. N. Whitehead.

4 *Ibid.*

the problem of philosophy through the gateway of epistemology, the solution of the question "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" was one for metaphysics. Śāṅkara's investigations retain throughout the taint of this starting point, which is visible as much in the manner as in the matter of his thought. It is visible in the prominence which certain aspects of the question receive, and the subsidiary place assigned to certain others. It can be seen in the wealth of detail with which the marshalling of arguments in support of certain theses takes place, no less than in the summary disposal of others. It is, likewise, open to observation in his effort to lift his insight into verbal expression, open to observation in the special language of his metaphysics, in the value-idiom which he constantly employs to express his most incommunicable supersensible intuition of spaceless and timeless realities, and in the categories of explanation and interpretation which he uses. The plastic stamp of this starting-point is traceable throughout the details of his system.

Śāṅkara's conception of philosophy is to be sharply distinguished from all those conceptions which find the essence of philosophy to consist exclusively in framing a hypothesis about the general nature of the universe, or even in "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."¹ Philosophy, for Śāṅkara, will forfeit much of its value and significance for man, if the philosophising instinct in him is not oriented towards the good. It is this conscious orientation of human reason towards the good which saves philosophy from lapsing into a barren intellectual pastime, and invests it with a sacredness which makes philosophy a pilgrimage, and the vision of the Good "the goal of the pilgrimage of the philosophic lover." While the formulation of "a theoretic scheme of the world, a synthesis of the results of the separate sciences, or a scheme harmoniously complete in itself" does not constitute the motive of Śāṅkara's philosophy, which regards as its true problem the inquiry into the nature of the highest value and its relation to existence as a whole, we find that, when we

¹ Whitehead. P. R., P. 3.

have taken stock of all that he has to say on this most momentous problem, none of the above questions remains unanswered. We have before us a system harmoniously complete in itself which can be viewed as giving us "a theoretic scheme of the world," "a necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be explained."

The possibility of the realization of this supreme good is the possibility of a free sacred human life which culminates in the cessation of transmigratory existence and its attendant evils. The reflective human soul finds itself bound up in the meshes of *saṃsāra*, and painfully realizes that human life as it finds it "is not free, sacred, immortal." It "must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be won." Śaṅkara compares this transmigratory human existence to a tree "which has one's actions as its seed and ignorance as the field where it grows"², and lays down that "in the uprooting of it lies the perfection of human achievement."³ Śaṅkara considers the goal of human life to be beyond the hedonistic ideal, and always declares that man, in subordinating the claims of spirit to those of sensibility and following the lead of the latter, is treading a path that leads to darkness, destruction, and death. "The enjoyment of the objects of the senses indeed constitutes pleasure (*sukha*), but not good (*hita*). (The attainment of *summum bonum*) is not only accompanied by pleasure but is also good."⁴ It constitutes according to Śaṅkara the true "health" of the soul (*svasthātā*); ignorance, and pain and misery born of it, are the accompaniments of a diseased soul.⁵ So far as the gratification of lower appetites and cravings is concerned man is in no way better than animals: and he raises himself above the level of beasts and the lower order of creation, when he chooses to lead a life dedicated to the pursuit of the Good and the attainment of the state where ignorance vanishes,

1 Hooking : *Types of Philosophy*, P. 450.

2 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I. 4. 7.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Mand. S. B.*, IV. 2.

5 *Ibid.* Introduction.

fearlessness follows, and immortality becomes an accomplished fact. The attainment of the summum bonum (niḥśreyasa-prāptiḥ) is the perfection of human achievement (puruṣārtha-parisamāptiḥ). It is a distinctively human concern, and men, "having a special aptitude for this, are especially entitled to the practice of prosperity and liberation. As those seekers think with regard to rites that they would bring sure results, similarly they think that the knowledge of Brahman is sure to lead to identity with all." This makes philosophising a duty on the part of man.

III

PHILOSOPHY A SEARCH FOR THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE

Genuine philosophy is always inspired by a sense of totality or unity. The ideal by which philosophy lives and which is its moving spirit is the discovery of a principle of unification, of integration, of continuity, of totality, of unity and order. Philosophy must be systematic, which means that it must conceive "the entire aggregate of things"¹ as having its origin and subsistence in and through² the system of the universe, and, at the same time, must show that no entity can exist in complete abstraction from this system.³ Philosophy is "a coherent, logical, necessary system" of knowledge, and the realization of this ideal (tatsāadhanāya) is the aim of philosophic inquiry.⁴ To philosophy is thus assigned the task of apprehending the world "as a totality", and then "the attribution of some quality or character" to this totality. This ideal of philosophy appears clearly from what Śaṅkara says in his commentary on B. S. II. 3. 6: "That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known.....this is the promise we meet with in the Vedānta. These promissory statements are not abandoned, only if the

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

2 S. B., II. 3. 6.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., अव्यतिरेकः कृत्स्नस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मणः ।

5 Ibid., चोत्तरे शब्दाः ।

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entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman.....
...This again is possible only if the entire aggregate of things (kṛtsanam vastujātam) originates from (utpadyate) the one Brahman.....This very promissory statement is proved to be true by the instances of clay, etc.....All the Vedānta-texts aim at proving the same promissory statement by means of various instances." The word "non-different" in the above passage, and everywhere when there is an occasion to use it, is employed by Śaṅkara to mean "non-independent of", "not in complete abstraction from."

The problem of philosophy, then, is the determination of the nature of that "One Source" of every thing¹, knowing which all other things become known,² and "highest beatitude becomes an accomplished fact".³ It is its business to tell us about the nature of the "Original Cause", the Root⁴ of every existing thing. The mission of science is confined to the solution of the problem of the nature of the manifested effects (vikāras, the viśeṣas) and the determination of the way in which "phenomena proceed from other phenomena".⁵ It is a regular feature of the spatio-temporal order, the universe of "name and form".⁶ Śaṅkara is fully aware of this. "The bird and the serpent are seen to be born from the bird and the serpent; hence a bird is the origin of another bird; and a serpent of another serpent. In the same way others which are born from the egg are the seed of their own species."⁷ The world presents innumerable other phenomena where we witness the operation of the law of cause and effect and where "phenomena are seen to be proceeding from other phenomena". It is in connection with such phenomena that Science has a useful function to perform by observing the laws of their occurrence. But this is exactly what philosophy is not called

1 प्रतिवेदान्तं ते ते शब्दास्तेन तेन दृष्टान्तेन तामेव प्रतिज्ञां ह्यापयन्ति ।

2 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 3.

3 Ibid.

4 Praśna. S. B., VI. 1.

5 S. B., II. 1. 18, Mulaśārana, Mulaśārakṛti; II. 3. 9; II. 4. 2.

6 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 1; Kātha. S. B., II. 3.

7 S. B., II. 3. 9.

8 Ibid.

9 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 1.

upon to do, and is not competent to do. Its investigation is to be confined to the nature of the First or Original cause, and consequently it can be no concern of philosophy to inquire "how the various stages of progress come to happen in time, in what order or orders they follow, and in each case from what causes".

In saying that it is the business of philosophy to seek that one principle by knowing which every other thing becomes known, Śaṅkara is not taking away from science its right to any independent existence. What we now call science is, according to Śaṅkara, concerned with the nature of the phenomena, the appearances, the names and forms, which are the manifestations of Brahman. The manifestations of Brahman are called by Śaṅkara "vikāra", and these vikāras the manifested effects, constitute the peculiar province of what today goes by the name of "science". The different sciences, like Mathematics, Logic, Ethics, Astronomy, the "science of Snake charming", have to do with the vikāras, i. e. the phenomenal aspect of reality. Consequently Śaṅkara says that the scientist is a "vikārajña"¹ only, i. e., one who has knowledge of phenomena only. Philosophy is concerned with the nature of ultimate reality, which is, at the same time, the highest value. It is therefore Brahmagvidyā and the philosopher is "Brahmagvid", or, what is the same, Ātmavid,² a knower of the Self.

As philosophy is concerned with the nature of the real tattva of the universe, it is called, tattvajñāna. Just as the scientist is a vikārajña, the philosopher is a tattvajña. Because it is the aim of philosophy to know that one principle, knowing which everything else becomes known, the philosopher, when he is able to comprehend that one principle, becomes a knower of all (sarvajña). Knowledge of this principle alone is to be sought for the purpose of attaining immortality; knowledge of the phenomena, of the vikāras, however deep and comprehensive it may be, is not calculated to the realization of the summum bonum.

1 Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*, P. 441.

2 Chend. S. B., VII. 1. 3.

3 *Ibid.*

Truth which Śaṅkara is trying to bring out is this. The finite, the particular, the *viśeṣa* as such has no veritable being. He fully agrees with Hegel that the finite does not exist independently but only as a moment; finitude is inseparable from inclusion within the whole. The "viewing of all things as mere particulars has its source in false cognition—all modifications being a mere name based upon words."¹ Philosophy deals with the whole, the ultimate, the real, the permanent within the flux, the eternal in the temporal, the absolute in the relative. We should not regard this attitude of Śaṅkara as one of downright condemnation of Science. He simply wants us to realize that scientific knowledge is not the type of knowledge which is conducive to the realization of the *sumum bonum* of life. It is only with reference to this that he says that "one knows all these things other than the Self through it, when the Self is known."² It is in the sphere of *sādhana* only that it is true that the knowledge of phenomena, of appearances, of everything other than the Self "does not require a separate knowledge over and above that of the Self."³ It is not his meaning that the knowledge of Brahman would be a substitute for the knowledge of the sciences, like "Mathematics, Logic, Ethics, Politics, Etymology, Astronomy."⁴ *Adhyātmavidyā* is not proposed by Śaṅkara as the panacea for any and every ill that man is heir to, though he has no misgiving that, when man is able to realize the highest end of life, all these ills will cease to have any sway over him, in the sense that he will no more be perturbed by them; nor is it presented to us as the universal key to any and every mystery.

IV

PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF THE GOOD: PARĀVIDYĀ

From what we have said above about the nature and ideal of philosophy, it is not difficult to realize the justice of

1 Chend. S.B., VIII. 5.4.

2 Brhad. S.B., I. 4.7.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Chend. S.B., VII. 1.2.

Śaṅkara's claim that philosophy is *Samyagdarśana* or *Samyagjñāna*. It is perfect or complete knowledge. But it is *Samyagdarśana* only in so far as it is concerned with the "value" of the universe. The solution of the riddle of the universe lies in the discovery of the relation between the existence of the universe as a spatio-temporal order of events and what is the highest value. To understand its value is to have *samyagdarśana* or *samyagjñāna*, and this type of knowledge alone is calculated to solve the world-riddle. An extension of scientific knowledge, however wide and deep, will never bring us nearer the solution of the problem, for all ultimate explanation must be in terms of value. The words *Samyagdarśana* and *Samyagjñāna* are Śaṅkara's favourite words; and he constantly uses these words to designate his philosophy. Śaṅkara has used these terms not less than 116 times in his different works; they occur not less than 60 times in his Commentary on the *Gītā*, and not less than 47 times in his commentary on the *Brahman Sūtra*, besides finding a place in his other works. It will give us a real insight into Śaṅkara's philosophy and the problems with which it is concerned, if we bring together the numerous senses in which these terms are used by him, all these senses completing and correcting one another.

The following are the different senses of the terms:

- (1) The Intelligent Brahman is both the instrumental and the material cause of the universe.¹
- (2) There is one Self in everything.² There is nothing other than Brahman.³
- (3) I am the Self of everyone.⁴
- (4) All this is Brahman.⁵
- (5) I am that Brahman.⁶
- (6) Brahmanhood is the real nature of *jīva*.⁷

1 S.B., II. 1.11.

2 S.B., II. 1.3; II. 2.10; II. 3.48; *Gītā*. S.B., IV. 29.

3 S.B., II. 3.36.

4 *Ibid.*, III. 3.42; *Gītā*. S.B., V. 7.

5 *Gītā*. S.B., IV. 24; IX. 1.

6 S.B., II. 3.47; *Gītā*. S.B., II. 59.

7 S.B., II. 3.46

- (7) Knowledge of this Tree of Samsāra and its Root¹ is Samyagjñāna.
- (8) Knowledge of kṣetra and kṣetrajña and Īśvara is Samyagjñāna.²
- (9) The kṣetrajña is one with Īśvara.³
- (10) To know the conditioned self as identical with the unconditioned Brahman is samyagjñāna.⁴

It is this Samyagjñāna which is everywhere declared by Śaṅkara to be the immediate and the only cause of liberation or summum bonum. "All those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge."⁵ And as philosophy is Samyagjñāna, one of its ideals will be the reconciliation of diverse forms of religious insight. Śaṅkara does not fail to keep this ideal constantly before him. This is why he repeatedly insists: "ekavākyatvāta sarvaśrutināma". In all his works he is endeavouring to lay down the foundational principles of religion itself, principles which every philosophy of religion should take into account and ignorance of which can only result in narrow sectarianism or blind dogmatism. His philosophy is an exhibition of the universal principles of religion and not of the dogmas of any particular party, creed or church. This is why, says Śaṅkara, there is no chance of his Advaitism coming into conflict with any particular philosophy or religion. "The Vedic philosophy, the cardinal principle of which is the oneness of the Self in everyone, is not opposed to any of these views because it is nondifferent from each of them, just as there is no opposition between one's own self, and one's hands, feet, etc."⁶ Śaṅkara claims that the principles of his philosophy are the only principles which can harmonize the warring creeds by bringing them into the unity of a system and assigning them their rightful and proper places in that system. In basing his philosophy on the Upaniṣads, which are a repository of possible "varieties of religious experience", Śaṅkara

1 Gita. S.B., XV. 1.

2 Ibid., XIII. 2.

3 Ibid., XIII. 26.

4 Ibid., IV. 25.

5 S. B., II. 1. 11; II. 1. 1; II. 1. 3; II. 2. 10; III. 3. 32.

6 Mond. S. B., III. 17.

avoids that "narrowness in the selection of evidence" which, as Professor Whitehead says, is "the chief danger to philosophy."¹

This Samyagdarśana which directly leads to and culminates in the immediate vision of the Good is the same as the Parāvidyā of the Upaniṣads. This is also the same as the Brahmavidyā; and accordingly its subject is the same as that of Brahmavidyā. Following the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara makes the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā, and this distinction which is adopted by him is identical with that which is present in the Upaniṣads. Parāvidyā is concerned with the understanding of the nature of the supreme Good, which is intrinsic, absolute and eternal (Niḥśreyasa); and other intellectual disciplines which concern themselves with the instrumental values, with the goods which are relative and extrinsic, are referred to as Aparāvidyā. Parāvidyā is the higher knowledge as it leads to and culminates in the vision of the Good; Aparāvidyā is the lower knowledge, as its fruit is confined to the relative goods, which are certainly lower in rank than the absolute and intrinsic Good. "The distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation (abhyudaya), the latter to eternal beatitude or summum bonum (niḥśreyasa)."²

This distinction between higher knowledge (Parāvidyā) and lower knowledge (Aparāvidyā) is the same as that between "dharmavijñāna" and "brahmavijñāna" which Śaṅkara makes at the very outset in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. "The results as well as the objects of the inquiry differ in the two cases; the knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit worldly exaltation, and that again is relative to and dependent upon human effort; knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal beatitude and this does not depend on human effort or volition. Religious merit is something to be accomplished, and does

1 P. R., P. 477.

2 S. B., I. 2. 21. परापर विभागो ह्यं विद्ययोरेभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसकलतया परिकल्प्यते ।

not exist at the time when knowledge is sought, because it is relative to human effort. In the Brahman-Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, the object of inquiry is Brahman, and it is something already existent, for it is eternal and is not relative to human volition."¹

Aparāvidyā is also called "Karmavidyā" by Śaṅkara, and is mentioned as a preliminary to the knowledge of Brahman.² It is so called because it deals with good and bad actions, their means and results, and consists merely of mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.³ This kind of knowledge is not at all directed towards the realization of the supreme values of life, and consequently is impotent to remove faults like ignorance, which are the cause of transmigratory existence. Śaṅkara, therefore, says that this "Aparāvidyā is avidyā", and insists upon its removal.⁴ According to him, when one has known all the contents of this Aparāvidyā, one has really known nothing that deserves to be called knowledge of truth (tattvataḥ).⁵ Likewise, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra (1.4.6) he points out that the distinction between Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā is the same as that between Vidyā and Avidyā, the former dealing with "the Good" (Niḥśreyasa), and the latter with "worldly exaltation (Abhyudaya)."⁶ Aparāvidyā is Avidyā because it leads to the attainment of relative values only.

Parāvidyā is also called Parmātmaavidyā by Śaṅkara⁷, according to whom philosophy deals not only with the highest value (Niḥśreyasa, Mokṣa) but also with the highest reality (Parmātman, Akṣara), because the one is inseparable from the other and both are one and the same. Thus in accordance with his belief in the oneness and inseparability of the highest value and the most truly real, he lays down, in entire agreement with the spirit of the Upaniṣads, that "the

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 S. B., I. 2. 21.

3 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 1.

4 Ibid., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid.

6 अमृतानि श्रेयसविभागप्रदर्शनेन विद्याविद्याविभागप्रदर्शनेन च ।

7 S. B., III. 3. 31; Mund. S. B., I. 1. 4.

subject-matter of Parāvidyā is that Akṣara-Brahman, also known as Puruṣa, which is the essence of the universe, from which as its immortal source the universe proceeds and into which it is again absorbed, the Puruṣa upon whose being known everything becomes known."¹ "By Parāvidyā is meant that knowledge of the Immutable (Akṣara) which is to be had through the Upaniṣads."² Thus we are led to the same conclusion as we have established previously, namely that philosophy deals not with reality as abstracted from value, but with value of which reality is a form. In Śāṅkara's language Philosophy deals with the nature of Brahman not only as the source of all reality and existence and as the Ātman of everyone, but also as the "param niḥśreyasa", the supreme Good, the eternal beatitude. And philosophy is nothing other than Parāvidyā. Thus we find Śāṅkara formulating the problem of Parāvidyā indifferently in either of these two ways:

1. (a) "The Indestructible is the subject of the higher knowledge."³
- (b) "Parāvidyā is really Parmātmavidyā, i. e., vidyā or knowledge dealing with the nature of the highest Self."⁴
- (c) "The Indestructible, who is the source of all beings and the Self of everyone, is the subject-matter of Parāvidyā."⁵
2. (a) "Parāvidyā deals with the highest Good (Niḥśreyasa)."⁶
- (b) "Mokṣa is the subject-matter of Parāvidyā."⁷
- (c) "Mokṣa, which is the highest Bliss, is the subject of Parāvidyā."⁸

1 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 1; I. 1. 5; S. B., I. 2. 21.

2 Mund. S. B. I. 1. 5.

3 S. B., I. 2. 21.

4 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 4.

5 Ibid., I. 1. 5.

6 S. B. I. 2. 21.

7 Mund. S. B., I. 2. 1.

8 Ibid.

Śaṅkara gives an admirable summary of his distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyās in the following words, in his commentary on the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: "The next text is begun to distinguish between the bondage of Saṁsāra and Mokṣa, the subject-matter of these two kinds of knowledge respectively (i.e. Parā and Aparā). Of these the subject of Aparāvidyā is saṁsāra, which consists in the variety of action, its means such as doer, and its results, which is without beginning or end, and which being misery in its nature, should be discarded by every embodied being. The subject of Parāvidyā is Mokṣa, which consists in the cessation of Saṁsāra, which is without beginning and end, undecaying, immortal, deathless, fearless, pure and clear, of the nature of being centred in the Self, and is transcendent bliss. These, Agnihotra and the rest, enjoined in the Vedas, form the road, the means for the attainment of the necessary fruits."¹ "These ignorant men, regarding the sacrificial and charitable acts as most important, do not know any other help of bliss (i.e., the other called knowledge of Self). Having enjoyed in the top of heaven—the place of pleasure—the fruits of their Karma, they enter again into this world of men or even an inferior world."² "But those who possess the knowledge contrary to that of the persons previously mentioned, the hermits of the forest and the sanyāsins, go through the orb of the sun, through the northern route indicated by the sun, their good and bad deeds being consumed, to Satyaloka, where is the immortal Puruṣa, the first-born undecaying Hiranyagarbha. With this end the movements within the pale of saṁsāra attainable through AparāvidyāBut this is not what is meant by Mokṣa.....The consumption of Karma spoken of is only relative; all the result of Aparāvidyā, being of the nature of ends and means and diversified by the difference of acts, means and fruits, and partaking of duality, is only this much which ends with reaching Hiranyagarbha."³

Śaṅkara draws exactly the same distinction in almost the same words between the fruits of Karma and Brahma-

1 Mund. S.B., I. 2. 21.

2 ibid., I. 2. 10.

3 ibid., I. 2.11.

vidyā in his commentary on B.S. 1.1.4,¹ and lays down that Mokṣa, which is the same as Brahman, is not something to be effected by having recourse to means. It is not the result of meritorious action, but is "asādhya" and "nityasiddhasvabhāva." And at another place in the same work² he identifies Aparāvidyā with Karma-vidyā, and Parāvidyā with Brahma-vidyā. Paravidyā is also called simply "Vidyā" and Aparavidyā receives the name of Avidyā.³ There is nothing in Śaṅkara's writings to lend support to Deussen's view⁴ that the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā, as outlined by him in his commentary on the Brāhma Sūtra, is different from that found in the "Introduction to Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad." This view misrepresents Śaṅkara's position. According to Śaṅkara the basis of the distinction between Parāvidyā and Aparāvidyā is their competency to lead to the realization of the summum bonum; the first succeeds in this mission, the second fails. This is the only view entertained by Śaṅkara in all his works. Aparāvidyā includes "Karma" and "Upāsana". Both of these fail to bring about eternal beatitude. 'Action (sacrifices), together with a full comprehension of the duties of Prāṇa and the rest, is a means to the attainment of Brahmaloḥa by the road known as 'Light' &c. Action by itself (without a knowledge of Duties) is a means to the world of Manes by the road known as 'Smoke' &c.....But in neither of these two roads is there an absolute accomplishment of the highest end of man. And hence that which is independent of Action, the knowledge of the secondless Self, ought to be explained. Apart from the knowledge of this secondless Self there is no absolute attainment of eternal beatitude."⁵ Paravidyā is this very knowledge of the secondless Self.

In his commentary on the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad the same distinction is present; there it appears as the distinction between Vidyā and Avidyā. The basis as well as the essence of the distinction is the same: Vidyā leading to "Niḥśreyaśa",

1 तत्तुमन्वयात् ।

2 S.B., I. 2. 21.

3 Ibid., I. 4.6.

4 D.C.V., p 131.

5 Chand. S.B., I. 1.1.

(§ IV.) PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE OF THE GOOD: PARAVIDYĀ

Avidyā to "Abhyudaya." The former is the absolute good, the latter merely instrumental and relative good. Avidyā presupposes the distinction of action, its factors and results; Vidyā teaches the non-difference of the universe from Brahman, and points out that diversity is ultimately false. A comparison of the following statements with Śaṅkara's utterances in his other works will confirm this:—

"The inner Self is the subject-matter of Brahma-vidyā. But that of ignorance is relative existence, which consists of the ends and means of rites with five factors, which again depend on the division of men into four castes, e'tc. It is by nature alternately manifest and unmanifest like the tree and the seed, and is made up of name, form and action. This relative existence has been dealt with in the passage beginning, 'He (who worships another god thinking) he is one, and I am another, does not know', and concluded in the passage, 'This indeed consists of three things: name, form, and action'." One aspect of it is in accordance with the scriptures and makes for progress, leading up to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha; while the other aspect is not in accordance with the scriptures and causes degradation down to the level of stationary objects."

"Rites with five factors, such as wife, son and wealth, are the subject-matter of avidyā because they do not lead to the attainment of the Self.....They have been prescribed in the Śruti as means to the attainment of the world of men, of the manes and of the gods, not as means to the attainment of the Self. They have been mentioned as producing those specific results." "The whole universe of action, its factors and its results, beginning with the Undifferentiated, comes within the category of Avidyā. And the supreme Self, which is beyond the Undifferentiated, does not consist of name, form and action and is the subject-matter of Vidyā."¹

Parāvidyā is also called Nirguṇāvidyā by Śaṅkara, and to Aparavidyā is given the name of Sugūṇāvidyā.² "In the

1 Brh. I. 3. 8., II. 4. 1.

2 Ibid. I. 3. 2.

3 S. B., III. 3. 31; IV. 1. 13.

case of *Saguṇāvidyā* there exists such an injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin..... We, therefore, conclude that the fruit of this *vidyā* is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the destruction of all sins. In the case of *Nirguṇāvidyā* there is no corresponding injunction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the knowledge that our true Self is not an agent.¹ The fruit attached to the *Saguṇāvidyā* is the same as that belonging to *Aparāvidyā*, namely worldly exaltation and acquisition of lordly power. There is no doubt that *Saguṇāvidyā* is regarded by Śaṅkara as *Avidyā*, and is possible only during the state when ignorance envelops the individual soul; for, says Śaṅkara, *Upāsana*, worship, implies a distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, and this feeling lasts only so long as the realization of the selfhood of Brahman does not take place.² As this worship of Brahman is tainted with ignorance, it cannot lead to the highest good. Its highest result is worldly exaltation. "The going on the path of the gods is connected equally with all those *Saguṇāvidyās* which have exaltation as their fruit Not by faith and austerities alone, unaided by knowledge, can that path be attained. Through knowledge they mount to that place from which all desires have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge."³

Parāvidyā is philosophy of value, one may say, eternal value, *par excellence*. *Aparāvidyā* falls far short of it. *Parāvidyā* is to *Aparāvidyā* what light is to darkness. When Śaṅkara calls *Aparāvidyā* *Avidyā* and regards it as "*nindanīyā*", as "*nirakartavyā*", he is not to be understood as giving vent to passion or prejudice. His dissatisfaction with *Aparāvidyā* is the result of his awareness of something which is the most perfect embodiment of the highest value and the greatest reality. It is a reality in which all contradictions and conflicts are resolved. It is possible for man to realize this state; or, to change the expression, to become this reality.

1 *Ibid.*, IV. 1. 13.

2 *S. B. I.* 1. 12.

3 *Ibid.*, III. 3.31

And when man attains it, the universe appears to him to be a necessary expression of Divine Life. God is reconciled to the universe and the universe to God. This something is Mokṣa, which is perfect Bliss, perfect Awareness, and perfect Being. Accordingly, Śaṅkara has no hesitation in giving expression to his deep-rooted conviction that "everything other than Mokṣa is the subject-matter of Avidyā".¹

V

DEUSSEN'S INTERPRETATION OF ŚAṅKARA'S
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARĀ AND APARĀ
VIDYĀ

It would not have been necessary to devote so much space to the truth that Parāvidyā deals with the intrinsic or highest value (Nihśreyasa) and Aparāvidyā with the instrumental value (Abhyudaya), had there not been a misunderstanding about the exact subject-matter of the two, as will appear from the discussions which are to follow immediately. One writer has even held the view that two different conceptions of Parāvidyā are to be met with in Śaṅkara's writings.² This is not all. The same writer authoritatively claims that the two conceptions of Parā and Aparā Vidyā are not very "clearly separated from each other" by Śaṅkara; they "rather meet us everywhere interwoven with each other".³ Thus there are "false connections" "in the organism of his system", and he "has fallen short of the greatness of his own point of view", and "lagged behind the full scope of his thoughts".⁴ Deussen takes "endless pains" to reconstruct Śaṅkara's views and place them in what he thinks a clearer light. We shall now proceed to examine whether there is any truth in Deussen's view regarding Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and Aparāvidyā. At any rate, the detailed discussion which we have undertaken above has shown one important thing, namely the inner unity of Śaṅkara's thought regarding the

1 Brahad. S.B., IV. 5.15.

2 D.S.V., P. 131.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 98.

4 *Ibid.*, P. 101.

proper subject-matter of Parāvidyā, as outlined in his different works.

Daussen gives the following account of Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā in his work, "The system of the Vedānta". The Metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, a theological, exoteric, and a philosophical, esoteric form. They are present in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration, and that of liberation. They stand in a continuous contradiction. These two conceptions are not clearly separated from each other, but rather meet us everywhere interwoven with each other.

In the province of Theology we find the contrast made between exoteric and esoteric doctrines under the names of Aparā or Saguṇā Vidyā and Parā or Nirguṇā Vidyā. The object of Parāvidyā is the higher Brahman, and of the Aparā the lower Brahman, the aim of the former is "samyagdarsana", and its one and only fruit is liberation; the aim of the latter is not knowledge but worship of Brahman, and its fruit is either "prospering of works (karmasamṛdhi)" or "heavenly happiness (abhyudaya)" or "gradual liberation (krama-mukti)".¹

When we pass to the sphere of Cosmology we find that "the question is here no longer the contrast between aparā and parā vidyā, but another, the contrast between two standpoints which are distinguished as the standpoint of worldly action (vyavahārāvasthā) and the standpoint of the highest reality (pārmārthāvasthā). The former is that of the Avidyā, and the latter that of the Vidyā."² The former is the "empirical" standpoint; the latter is the "metaphysical".³ These two standpoints are the counterparts in the sphere of Cosmology of the Parā and Aparā Vidyā of Theology.⁴ The standpoint of vyavahārāvasthā teaches "the creation of the world by Brahman and a wandering of the soul rendered individual by the Upadhis".⁵ From the standpoint of pārmārthāvasthā, "the

1 Ibid., pp. 102, 455.

2 Ibid., p. 106.

3 Ibid., p. 459.

4 Ibid., p. 459.

5 Ibid., p. 459.

possibility of a creation and a transmigration ceases along with plurality";¹ "there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different from the Brahman nor any plurality of things and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent....."² This standpoint "denies..... the validity of the ideas of creation and existence of the world as well as the individuality and wanderings of the soul".³

The Parāvidyā "is distinguished, on the one side, from empiric cosmology and psychology, Avidyā; and on the other from the doctrine of the apāram, saṁṣāra Brahman, of its worship and the entering into it by way of devayāna; this is the aparā vidyā, saṁṣāra vidyā".⁴ According to Deussen, "this aparā vidyā is nothing but metaphysics in an empiric dress, that is, Vidyā as it appears considered from the standpoint of avidyā" (the realism innate in us). Deussen is careful to point out that "this definition" of aparā vidyā is not, however, found in Śāṅkara, "as in general the distinction of the esoteric and the exoteric doctrine, and the inner connection of the latter as well as of the former, does not attain the clearness with which" he expresses it.⁵ He believes that unless this distinction is expressed in the way in which he expresses it, we shall "have to renounce a full comprehension of the system".

"The parmarthāvasthā of Cosmology and Psychology forms a whole with the parāvidyā of Theology and Eschatology"; and Śāṅkara has connected them together in the unity of an esoteric system.⁷ But he "was not so clearly conscious" of the fact "that quite analogously, the vyavahārāvasthā of the doctrine of creation and transmigration are to be connected with the aparāvidyā of..... a personal God and a soul which departs to him after death in the unity of an exoteric

1 Ibid., P. 106.

2 Ibid., P. 100.

3 Ibid., P. 459.

4 Ibid., P. 100.

5 Ibid., P. 100.

6 Ibid., P. 106.

7 Ibid., P. 101.

metaphysics."¹ "The aparāvidyā cannot exist without the vyavahārāvasthā. The reality of saṁsara and the reality of creation stand and fall togetherThe aparāvidyā demands, as its complement, the realism of the doctrine of creation.....In exactly the same way the vyavahārāvasthā of the teaching of creation cannot exist without the aparāvidyā of saguṇam Brahman, for in order to create, Brahman requires a plurality of.....powers.....but these stand in contradistinction to a nityāśesa brahma."² Unconscious of this ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics, Śaṅkara was "prevented.....from connecting together—as he did in the case of the paravidyā—the aparāvidyā also, with his doctrine of the creation of the world and Saṁsāra."³ But 'the inner necessary connection between the vyavahārāvasthā and the aparāvidyā', as "demonstrated" by Deussen, "comes more or less clearly to Śaṅkara's consciousness"⁴ in certain passages. From these facts Deussen has felt himself justified in "the weaving together of the teaching of the saguṇam brahma, of a world thereby created.....into a whole of exoteric metaphysics."⁵ But he reminds us again "that it must still be borne in mind that Śaṅkara did not reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the exoteric doctrines"⁶, and his "weaving together" of these was entirely essential and indispensable for "a full comprehension of the system."⁷

But, according to Deussen, what is most disappointing in Śaṅkara is that "to the detriment of clearness and logic this dual standpoint in Psychology and Cosmology is not always strictly adhered to. The system takes up the metaphysical standpoint as a rule and neglects the empirical without, however, denying or being able to deny its relative right of existence."⁸ Śaṅkara takes endless pains to maintain the

1 *ibid.* P. 106.

2 *ibid.* P. 107.

3 *ibid.* P. 121.

4 *ibid.* P. 107.

5 *ibid.* P. 108.

6 *ibid.* P. 108.

7 *ibid.* P. 100,

8 *ibid.* P. 460.

teaching of the creation of the world through the Brahman, and to unify it with his better insight into the identity of the two, by trying to show that the cause and effect are identical, and then constantly asserting that the doctrine of creation had only the aim of teaching this identity of the world with Brahman, a view which cannot be brought into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which he himself bestowed on it.¹ In Deussen's view creation is the subject-matter of aparāvidyā. "This aparāvidyā treats the creation in the Cosmology very fully and regards it as real."² Because "this dual standpoint in Psychology and Cosmology is not strictly adhered to" by Śaṅkara, Deussen speaks of "fluctuations between the empirical and metaphysical standpoints", and regards them "as historical monuments of a stage through which the philosopher first struggled to fuller clearness without entirely effacing from his work the traces of the intermediate stage he had passed through."³ Thus it is that "the solution of the cosmological problem is first sought from the empirical standpoint and only when this method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called in."⁴ This is the "shortcoming" in Śaṅkara⁵, and this is how he "has lagged behind the full scope of his thought"⁶, and in "the weaving together of the teachings" of aparāvidyā and vyavahārāvasthā lie the "improvements" made by Deussen, which, of course, are "suggested" by Śaṅkara himself.⁷ Deussen's view is shared by Professor Radhākṛiṣṇan in his "Indian Philosophy"⁸, and by Thibaut in his Introduction to the Translation of Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.⁹

VI CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF DEUSSEN'S VIEW THE UNITY OF ŚAṅKARA'S THOUGHT

Deussen, it must be said at the very outset, has missed the true import of Śaṅkara's distinction between Parā and

1 *Ibid.* P. 101.

2 *Ibid.* P. 460.

3 *Ibid.* P. 273.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.* P. 101.

7 *Ibid.*, P. 273.

8 Vol. II. PP. 468, 518-519

9 PP. CXIII. CXVI.

Aparā Vidyā, and as the result of this Śaṅkara's philosophical system has presented itself to him in an entirely false light. It is a persistent misreading of Śaṅkara's works which is responsible for the view that "the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms", that there are two "theologies", two "cosmologies", two "psychologies" and so on, and they stand in a continuous contradiction. To think so is to do violence to the inner systematic unity of Śaṅkara's thought. There is nothing in Śaṅkara's writings to show that the view held by Deussen regarding the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā is acceptable to him. As I have proved above, according to Śaṅkara the distinction between Parā and Aparā Vidyā is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation (abhyudaya), the latter to eternal beatitude or summum bonum (niḥśreyasa); and this distinction is maintained by him throughout his works. The distinction is an axiological one and is fully consistent with the value standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara. There is only one "metaphysics" in Śaṅkara and it is the metaphysics of value and its problem is the investigation of the nature of that supreme value and the relation in which it stands to what human consciousness regards as the highest reality. There is no other problem which Śaṅkara sets before himself. To think otherwise is to shut one's eyes to the opening pages of his Brahma Sutra Bhāṣya, in which he formulates the problem of Brahmanvidyā. Parāvidyā, according to Śaṅkara, is the same as Brahmanvidyā, the same as Vidyā, the same as Nirguṇa Vidyā; these terms have the same connotation and are interchangeable. Parāvidyā is Parmātmavidyā, the science of the Highest Self, and it is also science of the Highest Good. In Brahman these two come together and coincide.

Likewise we have failed to discover any evidence in support of Deussen's view that the contrast between "aparā" and "parā" Vidyā has reference to Theology, and that between vyavahārāvasthā and parmārthāvasthā has reference to Cosmology. The standpoint of vyavahārāvasthā is that of Āvidyā; this Āvidyā, according to Deussen, is "empiric Cosmology and Psychology", and is distinguished from

Aparāvidyā or Sagunā vidyā. This over-nice distinction between Parāvidyā and Parmarīhāvasthā, which together form an esoteric system of metaphysics, drawn with so meticulous care by Deussen, serves only to hide Śāṅkara's meaning and not clear it. Similarly Śāṅkara's meaning is misunderstood when a distinction is drawn by Deussen between Avidyā and Aprāvidyā or Sagunāvidyā. According to Śāṅkara, Aparāvidyā is nothing but Avidyā, and the content of Aparāvidyā, which is admitted by Deussen to be Upāsana, is possible only during the state when Avidyā or ignorance envelops the soul.¹ Aparāvidyā is Avidyā because it is wholly occupied with relative values which are the result of merit, and demerit, and does not take any account of the eternal values, which are absolute and not relative to human activity and so not karmasādhya. This Aprāvidyā is no "metaphysics", as Deussen thinks it is, not even "metaphysics in an empiric dress". Brahmaavidyā or Parmātmavidyā is the only "metaphysics" of which any systematic exposition is to be met with in Śāṅkara. Deussen's attempt to provide us with a definition of Aparāvidyā as "metaphysics in an empiric dress" does no justice to Śāṅkara's view. According to Śāṅkara even the highest truths, the truths which constitute the subject-matter of Parāvidyā, have to be expressed in an "empiric dress"; and this empiric dress is language. Language, Śāṅkara believes, in a very real sense creates "reality". It is no speciality of Aparāvidyā that it has an "empiric dress". Even the scriptures which deal with Brahman, with Mokṣa, with absolute truth, have got an empiric dress, and this is why Śāṅkara does not recognize them as completely transcending the sphere of Avidyā.² Deussen admits that this definition of Aparāvidyā "is not found in Śāṅkara".³ The truth is that this definition is not acceptable to him. His definition of Aparāvidyā we have given above. Śāṅkara has not left us in the dark regarding it, and we need not have recourse to guesses for inventing one.

1 Mind, S.B., I. 1.4.

2 Chand S B., VI. 1, 1. वाचार्थमज्ञं विकारो नामधेयम् ।

3 S. B. I. 1. 1.

4 D. S. V., P. 100.

The evils of this "dual standpoint" which has been made by Deussen the starting point for further investigation into Śaṅkara's philosophy are seen more prominently in his account of Śaṅkara's cosmological speculations. The most critical consequence of this line of thought has been that Deussen has been led to the view that creation is the subject-matter of Aparāvidyā. Starting with the assumption that the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, and both run parallel and are present in all the provinces of the Vedānta teaching, he has found it incumbent upon him to trace these two forms in the sphere of cosmology also. But, from the pārmāthika point of view, Śaṅkara denies that there is any multiplicity; "therefore, in the department of Cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence" from this point of view. From this arises also the necessity of referring creation to Aparāvidyā. All this, however, is contrary to Śaṅkara's teaching. The subject-matter of Parāvidyā is that Akṣara-Brahman who is the source as well as the essence of the universe and upon whose being known every other thing becomes known.²

A confusion arises in Deussen's mind, because he does not realize that the word "sṛṣṭi" in Śaṅkara's works is used to mean not only (i) phenomenal diversity, but also (ii) dependence upon Brahman and non-otherness from it. So far as the diversity is concerned, it is not ultimate, and sṛṣṭi śruti speaking of it is secondary; so far as the second sense of the word is concerned, scriptural texts speaking of it are primary and convey ultimate truth. Denial of "creation" (sṛṣṭi) in the first sense is perfectly consistent with its affirmation in the second sense, and one need not regard these as two different "doctrines" of creation and refer them to two different "vidyās". Because Deussen started with the presumption that there are two "cosmologies" in Śaṅkara, this line of speculation was not open to him, and he was prevented by this presumption from realizing the inner unity of Śaṅkara's apparently contradictory statements that "sṛṣṭi-Śruti" is "gauṇī" and at the same time it is "not gauṇī".

1. *ibid.*

2. *Mund. S. B.*, II. 1. 1.

If creation in the sense of "dependent emergence" were not a fact the very truth for which Vedānta stands, namely "that by knowledge of the one the many become known", would have to be given up.¹ It is the fundamental tenet of Śaṅkara's philosophy that the highest good results from the knowledge of that which is the one Source of the universe.² The "metaphysical" point of view, as Deussen interprets it, does not explain creation but explains it away; it is no doctrine of creation, but a denial of any doctrine of creation; and such a view was far removed from Śaṅkara's mind. Ultimately this confusion and misunderstanding is traceable to Deussen's ignorance of the fact that the standpoint which Śaṅkara adopts is the standpoint of value. There is nothing to be said against Deussen's view that "Śaṅkara's system takes up the metaphysical standpoint as a rule"³ provided that by it is understood "the standpoint of value"; but from this point of view there can arise no question of "neglecting" "the empirical" without, however, denying or being able to deny its relative right of existence.⁴ "Value" is of "facts", and facts are implied in it; though, of course, value is something more than the bare facts. "Value" does not negate the "fact"; it only demands that the "fact" be recognized as having its being in "value".

What Deussen calls the *parmirthāvasthā* of creation is not concerned with denying the "validity of the world" but with determining the "value" of the world of creation. And its value is that it is an expression of Divine life and Divine fulness. Creation thus signifies the Brahmanhood of the world and the Self-hood of Brahman; Brahman is the Ātman of the entire universe. It is only ignorance of the value character of Śaṅkara's philosophy and inability to draw out its consequences that can find any difficulty in reconciling the view that "the doctrine of creation had only the aim of teaching identity of the world with Brahman"⁵ with "the ample and

1 S. B., II. 3. 6.

2 Prasna. S. B., VI. 1.

3 D. S. V., P. 460.

4 *ibid.*

5 D. S. V., P. 101.

realistic treatment" which Śāṅkara "bestowed upon it".¹ One really fails to see how the "realism" of creation comes in conflict with its Brahmanhood, which is its "value". Deussen fails to rise to the height from which Śāṅkara is inviting him to view the universe. There can be no doubt about the greatness of Deussen's work. His "System of the Vedānta" is one of the best works that have been written up to this time on this subject and for a long time to come students of Śāṅkara will have to turn to it. But its great drawback is that it fails to recognize the value standpoint which is central to Śāṅkara's philosophy. From the existential point of view, which is what Deussen adopts, there can be no end to the "fluctuations" and "inconsistencies" which his interpreters find in him. It is again ignorance of the value point of view which is responsible for Deussen's view "that the solution of the cosmological problem is first sought from the empirical standpoint, and only when this method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called in".² The existence of the cosmos is perfectly reconcilable with its divineness; the latter constitutes its value. This is the strength of Śāṅkara's system rather than its "shortcoming" as Deussen supposes.

The upshot of this discussion is that there are not two rival systems of metaphysics struggling for mastery in Śāṅkara; there are not two theologies, two cosmologies, two psychologies, and creation is not the subject-matter of Aparāvidyā. It is incorrect to say that Parāvidyā denies the validity of the ideas of creation and of the existence of the world. Parāvidyā is solely concerned with the ascertainment of the meaning and the value of the world and of the creative process. What it denies is that these "infinite shiftings of cosmic dust" possess any trace of intrinsic value. It is likewise incorrect to say that it is Aparāvidyā, and not Parāvidyā, which has to take upon itself the task of treating the creation in Cosmology very fully and treating it as "real". Accordingly there is no point in Deussen's suggestion that the ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics demands that Śāṅkara should have connected the Aparāvidyā also with his

1 *ibid.*, P. 101.

2 *ibid.*, P. 273.

doctrine of the creation of the world and saṃsāra; and when Deussen takes "endless pains" to weave together an exoteric system of metaphysics running parallel to the esoteric one, and standing in a continuous contradiction with it, he is not aware of the fact that he is introducing a dualism in Śaṅkara's philosophy which considerably weakens rather than strengthens it. He claims that Śaṅkara did not reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the exoteric doctrines. The truth is that the ideal of an exoteric system of metaphysics with its own theology and cosmology was entirely absent from Śaṅkara's mind, and he cannot be expected to do a thing which he never proposed to do. And when Deussen attempts to lay down the reasons which "prevented" Śaṅkara "from connecting.....the aparāvidyā also with his doctrine of the creation of the world", he is simply offering an imaginary solution of an imaginary difficulty to the detriment of clearness and consistency. It is high time that we learned to give up the notion that Śaṅkara's metaphysics has two forms, running parallel and being present in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration, and that of libération. We need not fear that we should have to renounce a full comprehension of Śaṅkara's system but for this doctrine of dual metaphysics. The plausibility of the view that the Parmārthāvastha of cosmology and the Parāvidyā of theology together form rival esoteric systems of metaphysics arises from the fact that firstly Deussen wrongly understands Śaṅkara's explanation of the creation from the parmārthika point of view to consist merely in denying the origin of the world itself, and secondly he wrongly believes that there is an irreconcilable opposition between the "realism" of creation of the world and its identity with Brahman. Both these errors arise owing to neglect of the standpoint which is essential to Śaṅkara's system as a whole, namely the standpoint of Value. It is not Śaṅkara but Deussen that has "lagged behind the full scope of his thoughts" and "fallen short of the greatness of this.....point of view". The "false connections" which Deussen claims to have noted "in the organism of (Śaṅkara's) system"¹ do not constitute a discovery but an invention.

1 D. S. V., P. 101.

CHAPTER V
THE NATURE AND THE MEANS OF
KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters we have tried to explain the problems which Śaṅkara's philosophy sets before itself and of which it constitutes a solution. We have also given expression to our considered view that Śaṅkara stands among the greatest systematic thinkers of all times. But this is an "age of criticism", as Kant said of his own age, "a criticism from which nothing need hope to escape". Philosophy must justify itself at the bar of reason, if it does not intend to "lose all claims to the sincere respect which reason yields only to that which has been able to bear the test of its free and open scrutiny". Does Śaṅkara's philosophy do all this? Is it "philosophy" in the sense in which the modern age understands philosophy? It has been seriously maintained by many reputed scholars that Śaṅkara's philosophy "seeks to shelter itself behind its sanctity", and avoids facing the major epistemological issues "on the plea of the imbecility of human reason". It is, they would say, borrowing the words of Kant, dogmatic and not critical. Dr. Dasgupta holds that "Śaṅkara was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upanisads"; reason, according to him, could be used either for the "right understanding of the revealed scriptures", or "for the refutation of the other systems of thought". Likewise Deussen says that in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* there is not "any discussion of the *Pramāṇas* at all".² They are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the *Vedānta*".³ According to him, the *Vedānta* even in Śaṅkara had not attained that ripeness of thought which can enable metaphysics to "attain its contents only through a right

1 *History*, Vol. I, PP. 434, 435

2 *D. S. V.*, P. 89.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 90.

use of the natural means of knowledge".¹ The result is that the Vedānta in Śaṅkara has to "help itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge".² Śaṅkara has been able to grasp the metaphysical truth by intuition, but he does not know the "way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof".³ This is not all. He goes to the length of asserting that the Kantian analysis of the cognitive faculty is the only thing that can supply "the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system"⁴, and expresses the hope "that the Indians.....will accept the teachings of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', when it is brought to their knowledge, with grateful respect".⁵ Another Indian scholar, wholly agreeing with Deussen, writes that Śaṅkara keeps continually shifting from the vyavahārika to the pārmārthika standpoint, throws logic overboard, and is forced to take his stand upon pure scriptural authority whenever he has to answer logical objections against the Advaita position.⁶ It is nothing strange if to the European scholar who thinks his mind "is not bound by the doctrine of Śruti", any attempt to erect a metaphysical system on the basis of Śruti should "stand self-condemned".⁷

The question which an expositor of Śaṅkara has to face at the very outset is a very serious one, serious because an answer to this question will finally depend the position which history will assign to Śaṅkara in the hierarchy of the systematic thinkers of all times who have made an attempt to understand and expound the mystery of existence. The question is—is Śaṅkara's philosophy dogmatism with no rational basis? Is it mere "disquisition on the Vedānta-texts carried on with the help of arguments which are in conformity with such texts"?⁸ Is the task which Śaṅkara's philosophy places before itself nothing other than constructing a

1 *ibid.*, P. 90.

2 *ibid.*

3 *Aspects of the Vedānta*, P. 127.

4 D.S.V. P. 55.

5 *ibid.*

6 Belvalkar, P. 18.

7 Thibaut, P. ciii.

8 S. B., I. 1. 1.

system of "pure metaphysic", "without a previous criticism of pure reason", basing that system on principles "without first asking in what way reason has come into possession of them, and by what right it employs them"?¹ At first sight it seems that Śaṅkara's philosophy is nothing but dogmatism which has a naive simplicity about it and which does not trouble itself by any thought of examining the presuppositions on which the system is made to rest. For we find him confessing at the very outset in his Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*² that its aim is merely a "disquisition on the Vedānta texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments", and "the comprehension of Brahman takes place by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion of the sense of the Vedānta texts, and not by inference or any other means of valid knowledge".³ But the conclusion to which we shall be led in the subsequent discussions will be just the reverse of this. Śaṅkara's Advaitism is a rare example of a system which is throughout informed by a spirit in the highest degree critical and not merely speculative. There is not merely imaginative flight in Śaṅkara; there is also, in the same degree and to the same extent, that critical penetration without which philosophy would lose all the respect to which it is entitled as an intellectual discipline. We shall next proceed to an exposition of the epistemological basis of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The questions which will have to be discussed in this connection are the following—

- (i) Is there anything in Śaṅkara's writings which goes to substantiate the claim put forward on his behalf that he has an independent epistemological standpoint of his own on which he bases his world-views and from which these can be said to follow legitimately? What is this epistemological standpoint?
- (ii) In what way is his epistemological standpoint related to his theory of *Pramāṇas*, especially the *Śabda Pramāṇa*? What is the connection between his theory of the "Means" of Knowledge and his theory of the "Validity" of Knowledge?

1 Kant: *Selections from Kant* by Watson. P. 7.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1.

3 *Ibid.*, I. 1. 2.

There should be a harmony between the "theory of knowledge" and the "theory of reality", between epistemology and ontology. If we look into the history of philosophy, we shall find that this has been the driving force of all epistemological discussions. Realism and Rationalism, no less than Intuitionism and Mysticism, are inspired by this very ideal, however qualified by the success they are able to achieve. When Jacobi, Germany's apostle of intuition, recommended the intuitive way of knowing in metaphysics, and Schelling insisted that the genius of the artist is a gateway to metaphysical knowledge, and "art the organon of philosophy", they were emphasizing the self-same truth. The same ideal inspires the metaphysical construction of Henri Bergson in modern times. He gives expression to this conviction in numerous places. 'Theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable.'¹ 'The problem of knowledge is one with the metaphysical problem.'² And again, 'theory of knowledge must be dependent upon metaphysics.'³ He is under the impulse of the same ideal when he says that metaphysics claims to dispense with symbols and seizes reality without any expression, translation or symbolic representation. Realism stands for the same ideal, whether it believes in the independence of the immanent or the transcendence of the independent; and however polemical may be its attitude toward Idealism, both keep the same end in view, believing that there should be a harmony between the epistemological standpoint and the world-views which follow from it. The ideal has not always been achieved. Modern Realism is a case in point. It betrays the divorce between theory of knowledge and theory of reality in the most glaring way. James Bissett Pratt, one of the prominent realists of the present day, confesses this in his personal statement in "Contemporary American Philosophy".⁴ He writes, "Critical Realism was intended and is maintained as a purely epistemological doctrine. It would be strange, however, if it has no bearing on

1 *Creative Evolution: Introduction*, P. XIII.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 188.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Vol. II, PP. 216, 217.

the problems of ontology. There is, to be sure, little agreement among critical realists as to what this agreement may be. Several of the members of the group that wrote the "Essays" have developed out of their epistemological realism a naturalistic metaphysics. As I view the question the logic of the thing runs quite the other way. The concept of a mind that does transcend itself—which is the very centre of Critical Realism—would seem to me to imply a uniqueness on the part of mind such as to separate it rather sharply from the physical world and from mechanistic nature".

Theory of knowledge is the foundation-stone of philosophy and metaphysics is the structure built upon it. But at the same time theory of knowledge would degenerate into a mere wrangle of words and useless hair-splitting if metaphysical theory were not a direct issue of its special features. It stands to the credit of Śaṅkara that he has realized the greatness of the principle which we have laid down above, and uses it as the star to guide his way. The student of Śaṅkara need not go to Kant's "Critique of pure Reason" in order to discover the philosophical base of his Advaitism; a careful study of his commentary on the Brahm Sūtra and the Upaniṣads will supply all that is essential to support the superstructure of his system. His works, whatever else they may be, constitute, at the same time, a magnificent "Critique" of "Spiritual Reason", though not of "Pure Reason" as Kant understands it. The greatness of Śaṅkara consists in this, that his theory of knowledge is in perfect accord with his theory of reality. He recognizes, as Bergson does, that these are "inseparable" and the problem of knowledge is one with the metaphysical problem.¹ As we proceed in our exposition of Śaṅkara's theory of knowledge, we shall be able to refute the view that "there is neither in the text nor in the Commentary any discussion of the Pramaṇas at all"; that they are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedānta"; that the Vedānta is subversive of "the natural means of knowledge"; and that it is constantly engaged in "helping itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge."² In an exposition of

¹ Creative Evolution, P. 168.

² D. S. V., PP. 89, 90.

(§ II.) THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTANTRAM

Śāṅkara's theory of knowledge we must carefully separate the two questions of the source or means of valid knowledge and that of the test or criterion of validity. The former is the question of the origin of knowledge, the latter of its validity; and an answer to the first does not necessarily constitute an answer to the second. All the six orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy agree that perception, inference and vedic testimony are means of valid knowledge, but all of them do not give the same answer to the question what constitutes the validity of knowledge; nor do they always agree as to the sense in which one or other of the valid means of valid knowledge is to be understood. First we shall take up the mainly epistemological question which is concerned with the nature and significance of knowledge as such, and then discuss the significance of Śāṅkara's epistemological position and its bearing on his theory of pramāṇas or means of knowledge. Finally we shall endeavour to show the extent to which his world-views can be said to be in line with his epistemological conclusions.

II

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTANTRAM

According to Śāṅkara, the function of knowledge (jñānam) is to reveal the real nature of a thing. Knowledge or truth is an agreement of thought with reality¹; and in the absence of adequacy of thought to thing there can be no knowledge. Śāṅkara believes that no one can consistently deny relation of logic to reality; it would mean denying a relation of logic to truth. This shows his sharp disagreement with formal logic, which has no concern with reality. On this point Śāṅkara's view is similar to that of Bosanquet, who insists upon logic being regarded as dealing with reality. According to Śāṅkara, "the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on human notions. It depends on the thing itself."² "To say of a post that it is either a post or a man or something else is not to give its truth."³ The reason is that there can be no

1 S. B., I. 1. 2. वस्तु यायाः मयज्ञातम् ।

2 Ibid.. वस्तुतन्ममेव तत् ।

3 Ibid.

option regarding the real nature of a thing: it cannot be of this nature as well as of that nature and also of a third one. Knowledge which satisfies this condition, i. e, which reveals reality, which is controlled by it, and which is not relative to human notions, is real knowledge. It is *tattvajñāna*.¹ It is *samyajjñāna*, perfect knowledge.² It is perfect because it has the characteristic mark of uniformity, is identical, and always of the same nature, being always determined by and under the control of the real thing.

This characteristic is shared by all knowledge whether it is spiritual or sensuous, whether it is intuitional or perceptual. Knowledge is one, and its fundamental characteristic is the same whether the object of that knowledge is Brahman or a post or a milestone along the roadside, whether that knowledge is, as Śaṅkara says, *Brahmajñāna* or *Arthajñāna*. According to Śaṅkara, the judgment "Fire is hot" embodies as valid a knowledge as the judgment "Brahman is sat, cit and ānanda", or the judgment that "the world is transitory and without essence."

If the knowledge of a reality which is an already existing one is always *vastutantram*, there is nothing which can prevent us from comprehending the nature of that reality, provided we make use of the right *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge, which, in its turn, will be determined by the nature of the reality to be known. In one case sensuous perception may be the appropriate means of knowledge; in another case the nature of the thing may demand that recourse be had to spiritual perception or intuition (*anubhava*). Whatever be the *pramāṇa* employed, the resulting knowledge will have the characteristic explained above. The knowledge that "fire is hot" can be had only by having recourse to that "means of knowledge" known as *pratyakṣa* or perception. Even if "the theory of perception adopted by the Advaita Vedānta is rather crude on the scientific side", as Professor Radhakrishnan thinks it is³, the epistemological character of

1 *ibid.*

2 S.B., II. 1. 11, तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् ।

3 J. P., Vol. II, P. 492.

the perceptual knowledge, which it has in common with all knowledge or knowledge as such, emphasized by Śaṅkara, constitutes a valuable discovery. As the knowledge of the mountain, the molehill and the mustard seed is vastutantram, similarly that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is vastutantram and not relative to human notions or authoritative injunctions,¹ Brahman, in spite of the fact that it is a "bhutavastu" and being a bhutavastu its knowledge is vastutantram, cannot be the object of that means of knowledge which is competent to reveal the nature of sensible things, namely pratyakṣa. Every pramāṇa operates within a limited and well-defined sphere. While Pratyakṣa reveals sensible things, Anubhava is the pramāṇa to be resorted to in order to get insight into the nature of the supreme values of Being, Consciousness, and Bliss, for which Mokṣa or Brahman is but another word in Śaṅkara's philosophy.

III

KNOWLEDGE DISTINGUISHED FROM ACTIVITY

The characteristic of knowledge as vastutantram according to Śaṅkara, serves to distinguish it from "activity". Knowledge and activity are entirely different in nature. One of the negative marks of "activity" is that it is not concerned with revealing the nature of an already existing reality, nor is it required to answer to the nature of the thing like knowledge; accordingly it is not controlled by the nature of the thing. Positively it is wholly relative to and bound up with some human individual.² Compare the Vedic statement, "One who desires heaven must perform the new and full moon sacrifices". This sentence enjoining the sacrifice, when fully understood, gives rise to knowledge. But the knowledge arising from it is not the performance of the sacrifice, which alone constitutes "activity". With regard to the knowledge, no option is possible, but it is of the essence of "activity" to carry option with it. One may perform the new and full moon sacrifice, one may not perform it, one may

1 S.B., I. 1.1; I. 1.4.

2 S.B., I. 1.1.

perform it in a way contrary to the prescribed one. This is possible because "activity" is wholly "puruṣatantram", i.e. relative to man. One cannot know fire either as hot or cold, for no option is possible where "knowledge" of a thing is under consideration, because knowledge must answer to the nature of the thing. But an action whether of ordinary life or enjoined by the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man may, for instance, go either by means of a horse, or on foot, or by some other means, or not at all.

In this sense, meditation (dhyānam) and reflection (cintanam) are, according to Śaṅkara, activities, though they are mental. They are wholly dependent on the meditating or the reflecting person. Modern psychologists point out that the human mind must interpret the sensations and put meaning upon them from its inner resources, in order that perception may result. But according to Śaṅkara these processes cannot pass for knowledge; they are no doubt preliminary to knowledge, but they do not form the essence of it. These processes are "activities" (kriyā). "Knowledge is not a mental activity."¹ Therefore knowledge, although mental, widely differs from meditation and the like.² "The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire..... is merely an action and dependent on man; the viewing of the well-known fire as fire is not dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and not action."³ Upāsana, implying all the diverse forms of worship, meditation, prayer-offering, is a kind of "activity" because it is ultimately puruṣatantram. Because no option is possible with regard to the knowledge of a thing "it has never been observed either directly to remove some characteristic of a thing or to create one;It can neither create nor put a stop to real entity."⁴ Knowledge reveals reality and does not create it; the Vedas, which are the repository of

1 S. B., I. I. 4.

2 Ibid,

3 Ibid.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 10.

(§ IV) KNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF TIME, PLACE, CIRCUMSTANCES

perfect knowledge, "are only informative and not creative. A scriptural statement cannot impart any power to a thing."¹

IV

KNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF TIME, PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Because knowledge is controlled by the already existent reality, according to Śāṅkara "it is independent of place, time circumstances, etc, as 'fire is hot', and 'the ether is formless,'"² As the nature of a thing is eternal, because a thing can never divest itself of its natural property and be other than what it is, knowledge also, which is concerned with the revelation of the nature of the thing and which must answer to that nature, is characterized by universality and necessity. It is identical and uncontradictable. Truth means being of one and the same nature. "Fire is hot"—this knowledge, because it answers to the nature of reality and is bound up with it, is eternally true. The truth of the judgement is not relative to particular time, place, and attendant circumstances. This characteristic belongs in a way to all knowledge, as much to a priori as to a posteriori knowledge, as much to perceptual as to intuitional knowledge. Self-knowledge or knowledge of God has as much universality and necessity as the knowledge that fire is hot and ether is formless. The latter is as much independent of time, place and circumstances, as the former, because both are *vastutantram*. Time, place and circumstances are the necessary antecedents of knowledge, but they do not enter into its constitution as such.

This is also the dividing line between "knowledge" and "activity". "Activity, being bound up with persons, depends on place, time and circumstances."³ Let us explain the nature of activity as distinguished from knowledge by making a brief reference to Kant. According to Kant the character of

1 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

2 Ibid., IV. 5. 15. ज्ञान तु वस्तुत्वत्वात् न देशकालनिमित्तचपेक्षतं यथाज्ञानरूपेण आकाशोऽमृतं इति ।

3 Brhad. S.B., IV. 5. 15. क्रियायास्तु पुरुषत्ववत्त्वाद्देशकालनिमित्तचपेक्षितम् ।

the human mind (with its human sensibility and understanding) determines (along with things-in-themselves) our common objective world. The human sensibility impresses its own stamp, its own forms of space and time, upon the sensations which it receives, and thus makes the percept. But mere unrelated, disconnected percepts would not be knowledge; the human understanding connects these percepts by imposing upon them the categories which are the different forms of conceiving or relating or connecting percepts. The mind has to become active in thinking by contributing to the manifold of sense the categories; and in this way it prescribes its laws to the sensible universe. In this way, says Kant, reason makes the cosmos. According to Śaṅkara, so far as these functions of mind are concerned, they do not constitute knowledge; they are but operations or activities of mind. Śaṅkara is at one with Kant in his assertion that knowledge is judgment. But Śaṅkara would say that judgment may mean either of two things. It may mean (i) the mental activity of judging or (ii) the resulting knowledge, which, according to Kant, possesses (in certain cases) universality and necessity. According to Śaṅkara, the latter alone can be said to be "jñāna"; the former is "kriyā" merely; it is activity on the part of the mind. It is *puruṣatantram*. The further development of Śaṅkara's philosophy is bound up with the deduction of the consequences of this epistemological position.

V

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE

Though Śaṅkara holds that all knowledge is independent of time, place and circumstances, and there is a necessity and universality which characterizes knowledge as such, he is not unaware of the distinction between particular knowledge and universal knowledge. He fully recognizes that there is a knowledge which is merely particular, being confined to the differentiated objects, and is to be sharply distinguished from knowledge which is universal, just because it is concerned with reality in its absolute and infinite aspect and is conducive to the greatest good of man. This distinction between particular knowledge and universal knowledge

is, for Śaṅkara, a distinction of value and not only one of logical categories. Śaṅkara calls it the distinction between "Viśeṣa Vijñāna" and "Nirviśeṣa Vijñāna"; between "Upādhiviśiṣṭa Vijñāna" and "Sarvopādhivivarjita jñāna"¹, i. e. knowledge of reality as limited by name and form and reality as unlimited by any adjunct, because all limiting adjuncts are nothing other than Brahman which is the Reality and a thing cannot be limited by its own self. The knowledge that "fire is hot" is no doubt perfect knowledge, samyagjñāna, according to Śaṅkara, and is independent of time and place, just as is the case with the knowledge that 'Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, and is the Self of everyone'. But the former is the knowledge of a differentiated object, of reality as limited by name and form, of the absolute being infected with division and discrepancy.² Only that knowledge, which is the knowledge of Reality as it is in itself, is conducive to the attainment of the Highest Good. No such fruit attaches, according to Śaṅkara, to the knowledge of reality as differentiated by name and form.³ The knowledge that "fire is hot" and "ether is formless", though it is samyagjñāna, is not absolute or universal knowledge in the sense in which the knowledge that Brahman is the self of everyone is. The logical form of these judgments is the same, but they differ fundamentally in their axiological significance.

This is why, according to Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣadic knowledge alone deserves to be called universal knowledge, and apart from the Upaniṣads perfect knowledge is impossible.⁴ In other words, samyagjñāna or universal knowledge is knowledge of things as having their being in and through Brahman, and is identical with what Spinoza calls *scientia intuitiva*. "Fire is hot" is perfect knowledge,⁵ only in a certain sense and not absolutely. Fire is mere name and form, according to Śaṅkara, and fieriness from the "fire" vanishes

1 S. B., I. 3. 19; Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 19.

2 S. B., I. 1. 12. अवेक्षितोपाधिरुन्मूल्यम् । निरस्तोपाधिरुन्मूल्यम् ।

3 Ibid., II. 1. 14. ब्रह्मप्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव

4 S. B., II. 1. 1.

5 Ibid., II. 1. 11.

we realize that it is a modification based on words merely.¹ "Earth being only an effect of water, the only truth would be water, and earth would be a mere name. So too, the water being an effect of fire, would be a mere name; and the only truth would be the fire. Fire too, being an effect of Being, would be a mere name, the only truth being the Pure Being.....Thus, then, all things being only a modification of Pure Being, the knowledge of this makes all things known."² This knowledge alone is perfect knowledge, and "when a man realizes the whole variety of beings as resting in the one, and as an evolution from that (One) alone, then he becomes Brahman".³ Particular knowledge presents to us the passing, changing, particular and accidental. Universal knowledge reveals the universal, the changeless and the absolute, and is true knowledge. The particular knowledge, or *viśeṣajñāna*, is knowledge of the real through the limiting adjuncts or *upādhis*. The essence of the *upādhi* lies in its incompleteness. The knowledge of the particular, of the *viśeṣa*, is knowledge of a thing not having its being in and through the Absolute but having a self-subsisting independence and enjoying an existence in its own right and for its own self. To view a thing thus is to view it falsely.⁴ The particular knowledge is incomplete knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of an incomplete reality. The universal knowledge is knowledge of the reality in its absolute completeness.⁵

VI

ŚĀṆKARA AND KANT ON KNOWLEDGE

Kant's analysis of knowledge, with its assignment of a legislative function to the knowing mind, led him to the conclusion that the world we know is a world of appearance or phenomena, a world of things as they appear and must

1 Chand., S. B., VI. 4. 1. अग्रादग्नेरग्नित्वम् ।

2 Ibid., VI. 4. 4.

3 Gita. S. B., XIII. 20.

4 Chand. S. B., VIII. 5. 4.

5 B. had. S. B., II. 4. 12: विज्ञेयगज्ञा, विज्ञेयात्मनित्यभाव; IV. 3. 20. परिच्छिन्नात्मभाव; IV. 3. 23, विज्ञेयदर्शन; I. 4. 10, अविद्याकृत असत्त्व; IV. 3. 20, सर्वव्यापक, निर्विशेषज्ञान ।

appear to human minds, but not a world of these things as they are in themselves. Real things never appear to us as they are in themselves; what we know is their appearance only, whose character is affected throughout by the nature of the knowing mind. Śaṅkara's analysis of the nature of knowledge, with its emphasis upon its objective character (*vastutantratva*) and consequent independence of time, place, circumstances, etc., led him to an entirely different conclusion. For Śaṅkara, knowledge, even when its object is what Kant calls "appearance", can be valid knowledge. According to him in every act of perception human mind is in contact with a real object and not with the appearance of it. Both Śaṅkara and Kant believe that "the being of reality is not apprehended by us, what we grasp is an appearance thereof".¹ But they believe it in entirely different senses, and the ways in which they arrive at this conclusion have nothing in common.

Kant proceeded by an analysis of "the nature of our cognitive faculty"², and determined the a priori conditions of experience. The consciousness which he interrogates is the perceptual consciousness; the ideal of knowledge which he places before himself is the scientific knowledge which is confined to the discovery of connections and interconnections among the phenomena. Śaṅkara begins his enquiry not by analysing the perceptual consciousness, as Kant does; but the valuational consciousness. Kant's Immanent Metaphysics is a metaphysics of science merely, which is no metaphysics at all; Śaṅkara's metaphysics is a metaphysics of Value, the metaphysics which really matters for us. "Liberation, therefore, is the Brahman which is the object of our present enquiry."³ Kant's reason for his assertion that the human mind knows the real not as it is but as it appears to it, is that it looks at the things-in-themselves through certain coloured glasses, namely, the a priori forms of space and time and categories of understanding. The perception we have is a coloured perception, and as these a priori intuitions and categories are native to the human mind and

1 I. P., Vol. II, P. 521.

2 D. S. V. . P. 55.

3 S. B. I. I. 4.

cannot be dissociated from it without destroying the mind itself, human knowledge is eternally and unalterably confined to the appearances only. Śaṅkara's reason for his statement that what we grasp is an appearance of reality and not the being of it is that we fail to realize the inner significance of things, which consists in their being an expression of Divine Life and Divine Bliss.

It is an error to believe, as Deussen does, that an "analysis" of "the nature of our cognitive faculty", "as Kant undertook it, would in fact give the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system"¹. To think that there is any identity between the teachings of the above critique and those of Śaṅkara is to do an injustice to the latter. The resemblance between Kant's axiom that "the transcendental ideality of the world does not exclude its empiric reality" and Śaṅkara's maxim that from the vyavahārika point of view the world is real and from the Pāramārthika unreal is not deep-rooted. The latter is a judgment made from the standpoint of value. This standpoint is completely foreign to the first Critique of Kant, which is believed by Deussen to supply "the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system." If there is any similarity to be drawn between Śaṅkara and Kant, reference must be made to the latter two Critiques. It is not until we come to the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant lays bare his teaching that the universe is a Kingdom of Ends and exists for the fashioning of moral personalities, or is, in the words of Keats, "a vale of soul-making", that we can discover any great kinship between Śaṅkara and Kant. Kant analyses the moral consciousness which gives us intimations of certain moral values; Śaṅkara interrogates the highest religious consciousness, which includes within its sweep the moral consciousness, and, while sublimating it, at the same time transcends it. Both appeal to the value consciousness of man.

Thus we see that there is not much in common between Kant's first Critique and Śaṅkara's Vedānta. The upshot of the whole Critique of Pure Reason is that metaphysics which pretends to a knowledge of the

1 D. S. V., P. 55.

Absolute is doomed. The "Absolute" is the forbidden fruit for Kant in that Critique. But it is just with this forbidden fruit that Śaṅkara's philosophy deals. The metaphysics which Kant stigmatizes as "metaphysics as a natural disposition" is the metaphysics which really matters for Śaṅkara. Faithful to his analysis of knowledge and the discovery of its inherent nature as vastutantram, Śaṅkara is not led to the Kantian view that human knowledge is confined to appearances only, because it must of necessity come to man through certain coloured glasses which are native to the knowing mind. If the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding are part and parcel of the knowing mind, as Kant believes to be the case, a complaint against them is useless. According to Śaṅkara, the very nature of the knowing faculty cannot be used as an argument against its competence to give valid knowledge of the thing. This is why for Śaṅkara the judgments that "fire is hot" and "Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda" both constitute valid knowledge. In knowing that fire is hot we know the fire as it is and not the fire as it merely appears to us. Likewise in cognizing Brahman as the highest Reality, the greatest consciousness, and the intensest Bliss we know Brahman as it is and not merely as it appears to us.

VII

THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

If knowledge is vastutantram, the really important question to be asked and answered is: what is the means to the knowledge of the thing (vastu)? This is the question which Śaṅkara raises next. Śaṅkara holds that if knowledge is vastutantram, there is nothing to prevent man from knowing the nature of reality, provided he makes use of the right means of knowledge. Right knowledge is what Śaṅkara calls Pramā.¹ that through which right knowledge can be had is Pramāṇa, the Means or Source of Knowledge. "Knowledge is the result of the different means of knowledge and these have for their objects existing things."² "A means of knowledge

1 S. B., IV. 1. 2.

2 *ibid.*, I. 1. 4.

is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for instance, would be considered a means of knowledge in perceiving sound, etc.¹ Śaṅkara does not doubt the competence of the *pramāṇas* to produce right knowledge. Even Perception and Inference, to say nothing of the Scripture, are means of valid knowledge; "in the presence of Inference and Scripture leading to the knowledge of that (i.e., Self), it is sheer temerity to hold that knowledge cannot arise".² Śaṅkara nowhere speaks of "the perversity of ordinary means of knowledge" of which he is sometimes accused.³ On the contrary, he believes that if the means of knowledge are regarded as fundamentally defective and as infected with an innate "perversity", all our practical dealings will come to nought. Nothing would be further from Śaṅkara's thought than to believe that the means of knowledge are incompetent to give valid knowledge in their respective spheres. Speaking of the validity of Inference as a means of knowledge he writes as follows: "If we challenge the validity of an Inference of the kind based on general observation, all our activities, including eating and drinking, will be impossible. This no one desires. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance, are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt those means expecting similar results; all this would be impossible".⁴ All the means of knowledge produce "certain and fruitful knowledge".⁵ Perception produces the certain and fruitful knowledge that fire is hot; Anubhava produces the certain and fruitful knowledge that one's own self is pure, untainted with evil, consciousness, and bliss.⁶ "The possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of knowledge; the operation and non-operation of the means of knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossi-

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

2 Gita. S.B., II. 21.

3 A. C. Mukerjee, A. U. S., Vol. II. P. 388.

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3.7.

5 Ibid., I. 4.7.

6 Ibid., II. 1. 20; S.B., I. 1.4; II. 1.11.

bilities. What is apprehended by perception or some other means of knowledge is possible; what is not so apprehended is impossible."¹

It is, then, the question of the *pramāṇa* which comes to the forefront in Śāṅkara's philosophy. The nature of the *pramāṇa* to be used will be dependent upon the nature of the reality intended to be known. If the object to be known is an external material thing, *pratyakṣa* or sensuous Perception will have to be used. If we want to get an insight into the nature of a reality like the self or the Brahman, or the values, we shall have to depend upon *Anubhava* or Intuition.² This is true of all other objects of knowledge and their *pramāṇas*.³

Here also a comparison with Kant will be instructive. Kant's analysis of knowledge, directed towards the discovery of the a priori conditions of experience, led him to the conclusion that knowledge of the Unconditioned Reality is out of the question; the human mind must be content with the knowledge of the phenomena. Śāṅkara, with his main interest in the epistemological character of knowledge itself, was led to inquire into the nature of the *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge, as the result of his discovery that knowledge is *vastutantram* and is, inherently, independent of time, place, and circumstances. Śāṅkara boldly asserted that if the proper *pramāṇa* is depended upon, it will take us to the region of the Noumenal Reality also. That which stands in the way of our getting access to the Ultimate Reality is not the inherent nature of knowledge itself, but an injudicious use of the *pramāṇa* or the means of knowledge. The fault lies not with knowledge but with the means of knowledge and when Kant proposes Faith as an alternative to knowledge, what he is really doing is to substitute one *pramāṇa* by another *pramāṇa*, and not to change the nature of knowledge itself. Kant wrongly took knowledge to mean knowledge of the phenomena only. If it is the function of knowledge to reveal things, there is no reason why an

1 S.B., II. 2.28.

2 S. B: I. I. I, ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म।

3 S. B, I. I. 4. एकं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुषु, वेदितव्यम्

epistemological inquiry should start by equating knowledge with knowledge of the phenomena or sense-perception. Had Kant realized this from the very beginning, he would not have been forced to the irreconcilable dualism between faith and knowledge; instead, he would have been led, like Śāṅkara, to the oneness of knowledge whatever the type of it. The dualism of knowledge and faith, indicating a division in the sphere of knowledge itself, would have been replaced by a dualism of *pramāṇas*, based on a difference, not in knowledge, but in the nature of the objects of knowledge, each equally valid and equally valuable in its own sphere. He would not have been compelled to undo in the second Critique what he did in the first, and it would not have been necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality in order to make room for faith. Śāṅkara's view then is: there is unity of knowledge but diversity of *pramāṇas* resting on the manyness of objects.¹

The criterion or test of knowledge is the same everywhere; it is *vastutantram*. But the means to it differ with the difference in the object (*vastu*) of knowledge. Accordingly, it is doing less than justice to Śāṅkara to speak of "Intuition" as at once a "faculty of knowledge" and "the ultimate criterion" of truth.² To ask the question whether "the appeal to the *vedas* is nothing short of an extra-philosophical criterion" is to ask an awkward question³; and to say that "for the Vedāntist the ultimate criterion of truth is an immediate experience"⁴ is to miss the truth about Śāṅkara's epistemological standpoint. Scripture, Intuition, Perception and Inference are not the test of truth but means to it. The criterion of truth is that it is *vastutantram* and answers to the nature of reality. This is similar to Hegel's conception "of truth as self-accordance, the accordance of anything with its real nature, its notion".⁵ Śāṅkara's answer to the question what knowledge is valid is: "Knowledge which is *vastutantram*."

1 S. B. II. 1-11.

2 A. C. Mukerjee in A. U. S. Vol. III, PP. 385, 389.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 403.

4 *Ibid.*

5 Mure: Introduction to Hegel, P. 167.

This is the ultimate ground of the validity of knowledge, whatever be the source of it.

VIII

PRAMĀNAS AND THE REGION OF AVIDYĀ

We see how hollow is the contention of those who say that in Śāṅkara there is no discussion of the *pramāṇas* at all and they are "set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the Vedānta,"¹ Śāṅkara's remarks on the "inadequacy and perversity of the ordinary means of knowledge" have been declared to be "sweeping" and his epistemological position dubbed as "unqualified irrationalism".² The statement of Śāṅkara which has called forth these remarks is to the effect that "the means of knowledge, perception and the rest, and the scriptures belong to the province of Ignorance", one among many such others, dispersed throughout his works.³ The truth is that the meaning and force of Śāṅkara's statement has not been understood, and he has been made to say something which is as far removed from his mind as the north from the south pole. The misunderstanding is bound up with the ignorance of the standpoint which Śāṅkara adopts, namely, the standpoint of Value.

His assertion, in the very beginning of his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, that all the means of knowledge and all the scriptures, whether they deal with ordinary human ends or with intrinsic and eternal values, belong to the province of ignorance, simply means that these phenomena are bound up with finite existence. Knowing or cognizing, implying a distinction between the knower, the known, and the means of knowledge, is a pragmatic attitude of the man; and the concrete situation in which he finds himself and which is preeminently marked by the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual is its sole justification and the only sound explanation. All injunctions and prohibitions, all delineations of the nature of the Good and the means to the

1 D. S. V., P. 89.

2 A. C. Mukerjee, *A. U. S.*, Vol. III, P. 388.

3 S. B. I. I. 1.

attainment of it, have a meaning only in the region where the actual has not passed into the ideal. This is the region of struggle, of strife, of endeavour, and of effort; of effort issuing in success and hope in despair. When to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, the distinction between the knower, the known, and the object of knowledge vanishes, because there is nothing other than the knower and the conditions necessary for the operation of the means of knowledge are absent.

As knowing is a pragmatic activity, "we do not find any means of knowledge necessitating further operation (on the part of the Knower) when once the thing to be cognized by that means has been cognized".¹ "When to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what?"² When the Self has been realized, and, with the realization of it, the gulf between the Self and the Not-Self, between what ought to be and what is, between the realm of value and the region of existence, has been bridged, "no dealing implying means and objects of knowledge is possible". "This final authority does away with the cognitive-hood of the self, and, with the disappearance of it, the self ceases to be governed by the *pramāṇas*, just as the waking state by the dream-perception."³ There is no interest of the self which remains unsatisfied and to the satisfaction of which the *pramāṇas* can possibly be conducive. "When the awakening takes place that everything is the Self, perception, etc. cease to be operative".

Not only the secular means of knowledge, but the Scripture also ceases to be operative and have any sway over the man of realization who has transcended the duality of value and existence and raised himself to the point where they fuse in one. "When the awakening takes place the Scripture ceases to be authoritative."⁴ "So when they have attained

1 Gita. S. B., II. 69.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 14.

3 Gita. S. B., II. 69.

4 S. B., IV. 1. 3.

that result (i. e., the knowledge of Brahman consisting in the realization of the unity of the Self).....their real state of aloofness, their interest in the authoritative ness of the scripture, ceases. And in the absence of that the Scripture, too, just ceases to be Scripture to them."¹ True to his standpoint that the *pramāṇas* have a pragmatic value and are relative to the interests and needs of the *pramātṛ* or subject, Śāṅkara points out that when all duality is over, when knowledge reaches its perfection consisting in the realization of the oneness of the Self with Brahman, when only unity, the one without a second, the Good, stands, all differences such as scripture, disciple, and discipline are at an end.

To a man of realization scripture is no more a "means of knowledge"; it is his own knowledge. This is why the *Upaṇiṣad* says that to the man of realization "the Vedas are no Vedas".² The *śruti* loses its operation, not because the man of realization comes to adopt a defiant attitude towards it but because what the *śruti* intends to teach has already become an accomplished fact. It possesses no more value as a means, because the end to which it is a means is already realized. This is the real meaning of Śāṅkara's statement that the man who has realized Brahman as his *Ātman* is not subject to injunctions and cannot be commanded by them, because even the Vedas are born of him.³ "None can be commanded by his own words proceeding from his own knowledge; a wise master cannot be directed by an ignorant servant."⁴

The *adhyāsa* between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge with which Śāṅkara opens his Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* and which is declared therein to be the foundation of all the practical dealings involving the distinctions between the knower, the object and the means of knowledge, the doer, the action and the means of action, is but a natural consequence of the discrepancy which is the lot of the world of finite life. *Adhyāsa*, according to Śāṅkara,

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.* V. 1. 1.

2 *Bṛhad. S. B.* IV. 1. 3. श्रुतेर्व्यनाशः प्रबोधे ।

3 *Altareya. S. B.* I. 1.

4 *ibid.*

is "the notion of something in some other thing,"¹ as when mother-of pearl is taken for silver, or the rope for the snake, or when the moon appears as double. It is viewing a thing as other than what it is; this, in its turn, is bound up with the consciousness of variety or multiplicity, with the consciousness of this as distinguished from that, that as different from this, of both as contrasted with a third something, the third with a fourth something, and so on. It is relative to the consciousness of Self as distinguished from a not-self.

¹ S. B., I. I. I, Introduction.

CHAPTER VI

ANUBHAVA OR INTUITION

ANUBHAVA AS VALUATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In spite of the fact that the criterion of knowledge, according to Śaṅkara, is identically the same throughout, the means of knowledge are varied. All of them are valid means of knowledge. They tend to become invalid only when applied to a reality which, by its nature cannot be the subject-matter of that pramāṇa. "The several means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres", and "one means of knowledge does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other means".¹ Śaṅkara in his works refers to at least five sources of knowledge—Perception, Inference, Analogy (Upamāna), Implication (Arthāpatti) and Scriptural statement (Śabda).² At other places he refers to three sources only, namely Perception, Inference, and Scripture.³ Sometimes he cites Purāṇa and Smṛti as pramāṇa⁴, and refers to Itihāsa and Purāṇa also as sources of knowledge. Śaṅkara is not so much interested in enumerating the possible sources of knowledge as in determining the pramāṇa on which there is "any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities", "the natural means of knowledge" by making a "right use" of which metaphysics can attain its content.

For Śaṅkara there are no "metaphysical verities"; there is only one metaphysical verity, namely the Absolute Good which is also the highest Reality. This absolute Good is, in the first place, a bhūta vastu an existent reality; in the

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 2), स्वविषयभूतानि हि प्रमाणानि शेषादिदत् ।

2 Ibid., न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुद्धयते प्रमाणान्तर्विषयमेव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति ।

3 Ibid., III. 3. 1.

4 Ibid., III. 2. 1.

5 Chand S. B., V. 10. 2.

6 S. B., I. 3. 33; III. 3. 32.

second place, it is completely internal, inseparable from consciousness. A direct insight into an existent reality can be had only through Perception, whether it is external or internal. Knowledge of the Good can be had only through internal perception, but one important feature of this internal consciousness will be that it will, at the same time, be a consciousness of value. This is what, in contradistinction from sensuous perception, may be called Intuition. This intuitional consciousness is a value-consciousness.

Śaṅkara excludes Sensuous perception (Pratyakṣa) from a knowledge of the Absolute Good or Brahman, because the latter, though it is an existent reality (bhūtavastu), does not exist either in space or in time and sensuous perception is of no avail in the region inhabited by a reality which is timeless and spaceless. Śaṅkara says that Brahman—and for him Brahman is the same as the Absolute Good, i.e., Mokṣa or Muktyavasthā—"though it is of the nature of an already existent reality, cannot be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge".¹ It cannot be the object of Perception; "sense-organs cannot grasp it, because the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman".²

Anubhava is the pramāṇa through which direct access can be had to the nature of Brahman, or the absolutely real Good.³ The problem of the "means" of knowledge cannot be discussed in isolation from and without reference to the "reality" which is to be known. This is the meaning of Śaṅkara's statement that knowledge is vasiutantram. Śaṅkara does not believe in the possibility of an epistemology which will be completely neutral. He does not first independently fix the pramāṇa and afterwards make an attempt to write down the nature of reality by making use of that pramāṇa. The decision about one involves a decision about the other. The "pramāṇa" of Anubhava is not a key which will open any and every lock; it has been made to suit a particular lock.

Experience makes us aware of a reality which is the oneness of value and fact, of an absolute "good" which is

1 S.B., I. 1. 4.

2 S.B., I. 1.2.

3 *ibid.*

above all conflict and above all care. Śaṅkara discloses this fact to us and, basing his epistemological inquiry on the actuality of this experience, says that Anubhava or Intuition is the proper means to a knowledge of this reality. "How can one contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman, though still in the body, vouched as it is by his heart's conviction?"¹ We can experience this "good" in our personal life, because we are ultimately made of the same stuff. We share the divine life and the divine consciousness; we partake of the divine bliss, our self is, in its essence, Sat, Cit and Ānanda. This is the guarantee and this the explanation of the possibility of our having a direct experience of the good. To a self which is devoid of the experience of the good in however imperfect a way, it can never be explained what good is like. If he were told what it is like, he would not follow it. But as it is, every one of us does experience this good, in however imperfect a way, in our lives. We experience it in "passing perceptions of beauty in nature" or in completely satisfied love which neither asks nor doubts, which is both intimate and intelligent, or still more intensely in that feeling which accompanies the spirit of surrender to an ideal which we have made our own. This good is experienced in its natural purity and still more continuously by the yogin during what Śaṅkara calls "Samrāḍhanakāla".² This experience is characterized, according to Śaṅkara, in the first place by the feeling that "I am Brahman" and that "I am all". Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda; accordingly in the feeling that "I am Brahman", or, what is the same, "Brahman is my Ātman", there is the enjoyment of infinite Being, perfect Awareness, and unbounded Bliss. The feeling that "I am all" expresses but another side of this experience. In this state of Brahmānubhava everything becomes the Self. The distinction between Self and Not-Self vanishes and the Self is no more limited by another. This identification with all, in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, is the highest of all attainments and constitutes the greatest bliss, in comparison with which all joys that are

1 S.B., IV. 1.15.

2 *ibid.*, III. 2.25.

due to the contact of the organs with their objects appear paltry and mean.

According to Plato also the "good" is supposed to be grasped by direct vision only, and for that reason is strictly "ineffable". Taylor, commenting upon this, says that neither Plato nor any one else could tell another man what the good is, because it can only be apprehended by the most incommunicable and intimate personal insight. Socrates feels his inability to describe this good. Śaṅkara also emphasizes the "ineffable" character of Brahmanubhava. This experience, he tells us, is unique, is peculiarly subjective.¹ It gives one the conviction that one is completely blessed, and it requires no other witness than the testimony of one's own experience; so what can be better than this?"² One experiences not only that one has been "touched" by the good but also that one has "realized" it oneself. This is "anuvēdana". "Anuvēdana" is explained by Śaṅkara as "that attainment which, as knowledge ripens, culminates in the ultimate results, as eating culminates in satiety".³ The good can be apprehended by direct acquaintance only, not by discursive reasoning. It is open to what Spinoza calls *scientia intuitiva*. Śaṅkara does not make a secret of it; and in his insistence on the possibility of a knowledge of this good through intuition only, a faculty "which all possess but few use", he shows his fundamental agreement with the great mystics of all ages. He confesses plainly that the good can be grasped only by "trenching on the mystical", and in his avowed mysticism he does not lay himself open to the charge either of ignoring the claims of logical understanding or of claiming any "special inspiration" for himself, which, according to Caird, is an "anachronism" for the modern spirit. Śaṅkara agrees with McTaggart that none ever went about breaking logic but in the end logic broke him, and accepts Caird's dictum that "the saint should also be a man of the world and that the prophet should show the logical necessity of his vision".⁴

1 Brhad S. B., IV. 4. 8, आत्मसाक्षिकमनुत्तमम् ।

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 Caird : Hegel, P. 131.

Śaṅkara does not mean to put forward any special claim either on his own behalf or on behalf of those in whose footsteps he is treading. He is never tired of repeating that "the knowledge of Brahman is accessible to all"¹, that so far as its attainment is concerned there is no difference between giants like Vāmadeva and the human weaklings of today, that not even the gods can prevent a man who has known Brahman from becoming Brahman and all.² It is written, "Whoever among the gods knew it also became that"³. But it is not given to all to have a direct vision of this Good, just as it is not given to every eye, to that of the Bushman and the Hottentot also, to perceive the work of the categories in the making of the world of experience. For Śaṅkara the vision is the privilege and the prerogative of the disciplined soul, disciplined in the purest of virtues, in keenest discrimination, and in persistent meditation.⁴ All reasoning, all reflection is only preparatory to an immediate and intuitive vision of the good. It is an indispensable aid no doubt, according to Śaṅkara, but only as tending to prepare the way for the birth of that scientia visionis in which it is the lot of the pure souls to possess.

Śaṅkara's Anubhava is in essence the same as Spinoza's scientia intuitiva. Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of the existence of individual things in so far as they are in God. It is seeing God in all things and all things in God. To the man who has it all things appear in a transformed light; he sees things not as determined by space and time but as eternally involved in the idea of God, sees them, as Spinoza puts it, "under the form of eternity". This knowledge is just the opposite of what ordinary mortals have, which is partial, abstract, and disintegrated. Intuitive knowledge is knowing God as God knows Himself, and to this corresponds the culminating stage of the moral life, the essence of which is that "intellectual love of God" which is but another name for that constant, supreme, and perfect joy and blessedness which comes to him who beholds all things in God and God

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 8.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

3 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

4 Kena. S. B., II. 1.

in all things. This anubhava is the "divine eye", the "divya chakṣu" of which the Gītā speaks¹, "the consciousness that sees the whole variety of beings as resting in the One and as emanating from that one."² When this anubhava takes place, a man becomes Brahman. This Anubhava is identified by Śāṅkara with what he calls sarvātmabhāva³, identification with all and this is said to take place when a man intuitively realizes that all that he perceives is only the Self. "Intuition, then, consists in the knowledge that my Self is pure consciousness, free from all pain."⁴ There is freedom from all pain, because the intuitional consciousness is the consciousness of a reality in which the distinction between self and not-self is non-existent, in which the duality between the ideal and the real, has been overcome and pain follows only as the result of an unreconciled opposition between the above pairs of opposites. This alone constitutes that integral experience in which the whole universe is regarded as the fulfilment of a single, coherent, divine purpose. This alone can represent that "unique intuition" the search for which constitutes philosophy according to Bergson. This is the "true empiricism" of which he speaks, the empiricism which, as he says, proposes to get as near to the original itself as possible, to search deeply into its life, and so, by a kind of intellectual auscultation, to feel the throbbings of the soul.⁵ This alone is "true metaphysics".

Anubhava or intuition is characterized by immediacy, like feeling and quite unlike thought, which essentially consists in the separation of the subject and the predicate, the self and the not-self, or, as Bradley would put it, of the "what" and the "that". In every experience below the stage of Brahmanubhava or Ātmānubhava there are two aspects, the "that" and the "what"; these two can be explicitly distinguished from each other. In thinking or reflection the "what", after being distinguished from the 'that', is ascribed to it as something which can be truly said about it. This distinction is

1 XI. 8; XIII. 34.

2 Ibid., XIII. 30.

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 15.

4 S. B., III. 1. 1, सर्वदुःखविनिर्मुक्तं कर्तव्यं तन्मात्रमिदं आत्मानुभवः

5 Bergson : An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 31.

not peculiar to thought only, it is a characteristic of finite existence itself. Anubhava implies fusion at a higher level into a single directly apprehended whole of the vast complexity yielded by the process of thought and reflection. This means that the immediacy characteristic of Anubhava is not pre-reflective, but post-reflective. Anubhava is immediate experience, but "not at a level below distinction and relation." It includes everything but includes it "in such a way as to transform its character", as to make it appear to be the necessary expression of a transcendent Good, of a divine fulness, of a spiritual meaning. Anubhava is the experience of a reality possessing "a super-abundance in which all partial discrepancies are resolved and remain as higher concord."

Śaṅkara never represents anubhava as the consciousness of a reality which is a lion's den or of a light in which all colours are grey. Anubhava is an experience the central feature of which is constituted by value-consciousness. It is an experience of the reality and substantiality of values, of their being foundational to the universe, and of the universe resting in and through them. It is this experience which possesses the highest authority so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned; it is the highest *pramāṇa*, the final court to which appeal should be made when one is in doubt or darkness.¹

Anubhava, possessing these characteristics, is what Śaṅkara means by a completely adequate apprehension of reality, and the man who has this himself becomes Brahman. Brahman is nothing but this Integral experience. What Śaṅkara means by Anubhava is most adequately expressed by the śloka of the *Gītā* quoted above.² "When a man sees the whole variety of beings as resting in the one, and as emanating from that (one) alone, then he becomes Brahman." This anubhava is the same as *samyagdarśana*³ Śaṅkara, commenting upon it, says, "When a man sees that all the

1 *Bṛhad. S.B.*, I. 4.7, आत्मप्रत्ययः सार प्रमाण यस्य तु गीयस्याधिगमे तु गीयने क्वात्म-
प्रत्ययसार । *S.B.*, II. 1. 14 अपि चान्त्यमिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकम् ।
नातः पर किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति ।

2 XIII. 30.

3 *ibid.*

various classes of beings abide in the One, in the Self, i.e., when he intuitively realizes that all that we perceive is only the Self, and when he further sees that the origin, the evolution (of all), is from that One, the Self as stated in the passage 'From the Self is life, from the Self is desire, from the Self is love, from the Self is ākāśa, from the Self is light, from the Self are waters, from the Self is manifestation and disappearance, from the Self is food'—then he becomes Brahman".

Realization of this anubhava, then, will be an integral experience. It would be all-embracing and all-comprehending. It will see the Self in everything and everything in the Self, God in everything and everything in God. It will be systematic as embracing the totality of existence, all at once and in a perfect unity, as its content, without discord or discrepancy. This Anubhava is knowledge of the real as the real knows itself. Man can have it only when man becomes one with the real. This knowledge of the real alone is real knowledge. Anubhava is at once this knowledge and also the means to it.

II

ŚĀṆKARA AND KANT

Anubhava as knowledge of God as God knows himself has affinity with what Kant called intellectual intuition. It is that kind of intuition which, according to Kant, brings direct knowledge of the ultimate reality. But, in Kant's view, it is not given to man to possess this intuition. It is "the prerogative of the Original Being, and can never belong to a being which is dependent in its existence as well as in its perception, and in fact is conscious of its own existence only in relation to given objects".¹ This kind of intuition is "original" (*intuitus originarius*). In the case of human beings sensuous intuition alone is possible, and this never enables them to know the thing-in-itself but only the empirical object of experience. Human perception (i.e., under forms of space and time) is "sensuous simply because it is derivative (*intuitus*

¹ The Philosophy of Kant, selected by Watson, P. 38.

derivativus) and not original (*intuitus originarius*) and therefore is not an intellectual perception".¹ It is derivative because it is dependent upon the existence of the object and therefore is possible only if our perceptive consciousness is affected by the presence of the object. Were it original the very existence of the object would be given in the perception. But such a perception, so far as Kant sees, can belong only to the Original Being. Śaṅkara and Kant are at one in their belief in the reality of intellectual intuition. Both of them believe that a knowledge of the ultimate reality cannot be had through sensuous intuition. According to Kant, so far as the transcendental thing-in-itself is concerned, there is no possibility of ever making it an object of "knowledge"; for Śaṅkara Brahman, though it is an already existent reality, cannot be the object of sensuous intuition and the other ways of knowing.²

But the similarity between their thoughts on this point ends here. Kant says that intellectual intuition can never belong to man; for Śaṅkara *anubhava*, the synonym of the Kantian *intuitus originarius*, is foundational to his metaphysics. The transcendental reality is seen by the yogin during the state of *saṁrādhana*. It is open to immediate intuition, which is also the end of the enquiry into Brahman.³ Kant lays so much stress upon the impossibility of intellectual intuition for human consciousness that he distinguishes his own philosophy on this ground alone from other forms of Idealism which rest upon a belief in the possibility of intellectual intuition. His attitude is one of uncompromising hostility. According to Śaṅkara, human intuition is not mere sensuous intuition; it is also original or intellectual in the words of Kant. Man can have direct knowledge of his own Self, which is *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*; he can have an intellectual or original intuition of it along with the supreme values of "existence", "bliss" and "consciousness" of which it is an embodiment. The Self is identically the same as Brahman and Brahman is the Self of everyone. Man can thus have an intellectual intuition of God also. Perception is the fundamental means

1 *Ibid.*

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 S. B., I. 1. 2.

of knowledge, according to Śaṅkara. It may be sensuous or non-sensuous, i. e., spiritual. Material things are known through sensuous Perception; spiritual realities through spiritual Perception. Spiritual Perception is what Śaṅkara calls Anubhava. Kant's admission that God's knowledge of Himself takes the form of an intellectual intuition really amounts to saying that intellectual intuition is the true type of all knowledge. This also carries with it the implication that the main function of knowledge is to reveal reality, a truth duly emphasized by Śaṅkara in his conception of jñāna as vastu-tantram. But if it is so, Śaṅkara says that it does not stand to reason that a limitation should be imposed on human knowledge and doubt cast upon man's experience of the transcendental realities and values.¹ If God has access to the thing-in-itself through intellectual intuition, human beings must have access to it in the same way in which God has access to it.

For Śaṅkara there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of man's knowing God as He is, because God is the very Ātman, the very life and breath of every living being. God is not an external creator or designer of the universe; He is the self-communicating life. The universe is God realizing Himself. Man in trying to know God only tries to know his own Self, his own Ātman. If the object to be known, i. e. God, were something entirely alien to the knowing mind, the latter would never be in a position to have any knowledge of it. His quest would be the quest of the Holy Grail; he would, as Śaṅkara says, only dare to find the footprints of birds in the sky, to pull it with his clenched hands or to cover it as with a skin. "It is the definite conclusion of all the Upaniṣads that we are nothing but Ātman, the Brahman that is always the same, homogeneous, the one without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, immortal, deathless and free from fear."² This is the ground of the possibility of Anubhava in case of human beings. Kant was prevented by the deistic thought of his age from recognizing any such internal relation between the human soul on the one

1 S.B. IV. 1.15.

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 7.

hand and God on the other. He could not present a better and nobler conception of God than that of a "Paymaster" whose supreme function lay in the distribution of "doles of happiness", in exact proportion to virtue, among those who had worked for it.¹ Man and God belong to two entirely disparate realms; and it is not strange that, to Kant, what is a privilege for the one is a privation for the other.

Because Kant could not give up thinking that God and the human individual were alien to each other, he was forced to propose two different ways of knowing the reality of things. God knows the thing-in-itself through an intellectual intuition; man has access to it through faith. But if intellectual intuition is the true type of all knowledge, if it is the way in which God knows Himself as He really is, if it is the way which yields a direct knowledge of things-in-themselves, human beings can and will have access to the unconditioned reality not through faith, as Kant said, but, through "intellectual intuition". This dichotomy of intellectual intuition and faith is non-existent in Śaṅkara. There is only one way of knowing the unconditioned reality which is also the ultimate and absolute value. It is direct experience of it. It is Anubhava or Ātmapratyaya.² Accordingly, Śaṅkara does not find it necessary, as Kant does, to deny "knowledge" of God, freedom and immortality in order to make room for "faith". However, Kant in saying that reality is given to man by faith must not be understood to adopt an attitude of antagonism to intuition. The logic of the thing would point to a different conclusion. If the same unconditioned reality is known by God through "intellectual intuition" and given to man through "faith", ultimately intellectual intuition and faith must be one and the same. If they are entirely different in their nature, it will be difficult to be sure that the reality known through these means of knowledge is one and the same. Samyagjñāna is vasiutantram. It is of one and the same form (ekarūpam). Anubhava is the means to it.

III

ŚAṅKARA AND BERGSON

Śaṅkara's Anubhava is often compared to Bergson's Intuition, and there is no doubt that there are very close

1 Pringle Pattison: *Idea of God*, P. 35.

2 S. B., I. 4. 7.

resemblances between the two. According to Bergson, in intuition we experience and know the reality as it is in itself. Intuitional knowledge alone can attain the absolute and this very knowledge is also absolute knowledge. It is knowledge of a thing from within. It is a non-intellectual cognition by which we place ourselves within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Bergson's view of intuition and its appropriateness as a philosophical means of knowledge is closely connected with his theory of reality. Both of these must, therefore, be considered together in order to understand Bergson's position. This, as we have already insisted, is also the position of Śāṅkara. According to Bergson the ultimate reality is a living, flowing, moving reality. It is an absolute, unchecked flow, a completely unimpeded movement. Reality is change itself. There is no thing which changes. Change is the only thing. It is the *elan vital*, the inwardly grasped "real duration", the absolute reality. This is the essence of what we call our "self", its innermost being. This self is a continuous flux and the real nature of it is open to intuition only. Its reality we can seize from within only, by intuition and not by analysis or discursive understanding. It is our own personality in its flowing through time revealed to us directly in intuition. The psychologist, by having recourse to the method of analysis and abstraction, is able to give us only a special aspect of the personality, a snapshot of the inner life, a diagram of concrete inclination. This method resolves the self into a series of "states", but these states are mere abstractions, the outer crusts of the self. There is, as Bergson says, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux one has ever seen. This is the real Self. Its nature is one of pure duration, excluding all ideas of juxtaposition, reciprocal externality and extension. This flowing reality, this *elan vital*, at times slows down and reverses its course, and then there is "genesis of matter". Matter, therefore, is a negation of the free flow of reality, an inversion of the free activity of the creative process. Reality, according to Bergson, presents itself in two ways, as a flow and as rigid matter. As the theory of knowledge must always be dependent upon metaphysics,

consciousness also assumes a double form like the reality at the base of the universe. "The double form of consciousness is due to the double form of the real."¹ This double form, namely Intuition and Intelligence, are turned in opposed directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life. "Consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life."²

Śaṅkara proposes Anubhava as the means to a true knowledge of the real (tattvajñāna). In Anubhava we do not move round the object but we enter into it; we do not adopt any special point of view, but seek an immediate rapport with the object by becoming one with it. In Anubhava we view the thing from inside; in any other knowledge we view it from the outside. In Anubhava the standpoint we adopt is the standpoint of the reality itself; it is the absolute standpoint and the knowledge it gives is absolute knowledge. The standpoint of Anubhava is the standpoint of intuition as Bergson conceives it. The intuitional knowledge which this standpoint gives is the knowledge of Brahman, which is, in the words of Śaṅkara, "sarvopādhivivarjitam". Brahman is the ultimate reality and everything is the manifestation of that Brahman. The manifested universe, being an effect of Brahman, is not something other than it; it is Brahman in its essence always and eternally. In ignorance we see it and its contents as something other than Brahman and independent of it. When there is something other, Brahman is perceived as limited by it and standing to it in different relations. This is the view of "Brahman as qualified by the limiting conditions consisting in the multiformity of evolved names and forms", the "nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭa rūpam" of Brahman, as Śaṅkara puts it.³ This is the view of reality which we get when, instead of placing ourselves within it, we look at it from the outside, setting ourselves up against the reality while, in truth, we form part and parcel of the

1 Bergson : *Creative Evolution*, P. 188.

2 *ibid.*

3 S.B., I. 1. 12.

universal living process. As a matter of fact, we have not to "place ourselves" within the reality; we are within it; nay, we are that real which is the ultimate fact behind which philosophy cannot go. We have to become conscious of this truth, and the awareness of the real from this standpoint is what Bergson calls intuition and Śāṅkara Anubhava. Both of them believe that the absolute can only be given in intuition. According to both of them, "it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us".¹ It enables us to see reality as it is; in the words of Spinoza, to know God as God knows Himself; in the words of Śāṅkara, to know Brahman as devoid of any limiting adjuncts.

Because intuition enables us to enter into the very heart of reality and thus attain the absolute by becoming one with it, intuition according to Bergson, "implies the knowledge of matter". This matter is for him the *élan vital* itself, the current of life which flows on in its unimpeded movement and, in its flowing, creates its own forms of development. Knowledge of this "matter" is real knowledge. This "matter" is, for Śāṅkara, Brahman itself; knowledge of Brahman is the real knowledge (*tattvajñāna*); Anubhava "implies the knowledge of (this) matter". According to Śāṅkara, knowledge of reality which is obtained by recourse to a method other than that of intuition and in which reality presents itself as something alien to the knowing mind, is but external. This knowledge is relative to the special point of view at which we place ourselves. It is, as Bergson says, the viewing of a thing in terms of another thing, approaching the real through an endless series of symbols. It is the translation of the vital in terms of the mechanical; according to Śāṅkara, seeing Brahman through the "limiting adjuncts", *upādhis* which are but its effects and which consist in "name and form". Śāṅkara calls this knowledge *upādhiviśiṣṭa* knowledge of Brahman. But this knowledge does not take one to the very heart of reality; it leaves a man outside it. According to Śāṅkara the knowledge which is given by discursive intellect, as Bergson conceives it, is the knowledge of Brahman as *nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam*. Accord-

1. Bergson; *Creative Evolution*, P. 186.

ing to Śaṅkara, this knowledge is infected with ignorance; according to Bergson, intellect presents a distorted view of reality. "It goes all round into life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it", and thus succeeds only in bringing us a translation in terms of inertia, a snapshot, an external and schematic representation.¹ Bergson regards the knowledge which intellect places at our disposal as but a "translation", because in it reality is viewed not as it is in itself but as it is seen when manifesting itself through the moulds of matter. This matter is the "form" through which the real "matter" at the base of the universe, the *elan vital*, the life-force, is perceived by the intellect in its attempt to cognize it. It is for this reason that Bergson says that "intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form."² According to Śaṅkara, the intellectual way of knowing the real is not knowing it as it is, but as it appears when seen through the limiting adjuncts consisting in the diverse names and forms which are its own evolutes. It is the knowledge of the real as *nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam*.³

Enough has been said to show that there is a remarkable similarity between Śaṅkara and Bergson. But in spite of this remarkable similarity between the "intuition" of Bergson and the "Anubhava" of Śaṅkara, there are points of difference which are no less noteworthy. The Anubhava of Śaṅkara is a value-charged consciousness, a consciousness which, in its very essence, is oriented towards the good. The intuitional consciousness of Bergson is a value-free consciousness, and this is but a corollary of his view of the metaphysical reality, which is conceived by him as a pure flow, a perpetual becoming, a constant and continuous flux, having no goal and devoid of all determination. The real is 'change' itself; it is ever in the making and cannot be supposed in any way to be fixed. But a flow which is merely a flow, a process which is merely a process, cannot be said to possess any intrinsic value. In every change, in every process, there is always

1 *ibid.*, P. 186.

2 *ibid.*, P. 156.

3 S. B., I. 1. 12.

implied a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal and a tendency on the part of the actual to move towards the ideal. This is the inner meaning of the cosmological situation. This tendency on the part of the actual to move towards the ideal constitutes the element of the *nisus* or direction which is vital for the very existence of the process itself, in the absence of which it will cease to be what it is. This is the element of value which is foundational to the process itself. According to Bergson, time or duration is the only reality; it is change or evolution itself, and this evolution is essentially creative. But, as Urban has pointed out, it is the weakness of the whole group of philosophies which make evolution itself creative that they falsely assume that time, process, tendency themselves carry meaning and value. As has been pointed out above, the meaning Bergson appears to find in becoming does not belong to the becoming itself. Bergson's *élan vital* has no trace of that intrinsic value which, according to Śāṅkara, constitutes the very essence of Brahman. It is mere fact just as other facts are. Only it is a pure dynamism. This very duration is also the essence of our self. The result is that the intuitional consciousness which, according to Bergson, has been evolved "because of the need it had.....to follow the stream of life" and which is the only means which "leads" to the very "inwardness of life" appears to be in no way different from introspection or inner observation.

According to Bergson self-knowledge is perhaps the best case for intuition. This intuition is the immediate sense of our being, of our own personality in its flowing through time, of our self which endures. Intuition reveals to us that the self is of pure duration. The inner life is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it; no one of them begins or ends but all extend into each other. It is variety of qualities, continuity of progress and unity of direction. Bergson's only complaint against the competency of psychological introspection as a means to give insight into the real nature of duration or *élan vital* is that it is analytic and resolves the self into a series of elements.

Saṅkara's Anubhava is not the intuition whose only function is to reveal the inner self in its flowing through time. It is the consciousness which is charged with meaning and value and which is oriented towards the good. For such a consciousness the question whether the self is pure dynamism or has a rock-like fixity and possesses the immobility of the mountain is of little or no importance. The question which is significant is the question whether it is intrinsically valuable. Anubhava is the consciousness of the supreme reality of the intrinsic values of life, the values of existence, of consciousness, and of bliss. The Self is the supreme value. It is Sat. It is Cit. It is Ānanda. Anubhava is the means to it. The Self is Brahman itself and Anubhava of Brahman is the same as anubhava of the Ātman. Brahmanubhava and Ātmānubhava signify one and the same fact of the intuitional awareness of the absolute reality which is not merely the highest existence but also the most supreme value. "Anubhava or intuition of the self consists in the realization that my Self is pure consciousness, free from all pain. For him who is in the enjoyment of this intuitional awareness of the Self, there is nothing else that remains to be done."¹ Attainment of this intuition is the attainment of the highest good, of the most supreme bliss, of the greatest beatitude. Saṅkara repeatedly insists that "a palpable result, cessation of grief and delusion, is brought about by the intuitional awareness of the Brahman"², Brahman which is eternal Liberation itself³, the great, the unborn Self, undecaying, immortal and fearless.⁴ There can be, he says, no doubt regarding the capacity of the intuitional awareness of Self which is no other than Brahman to produce certain and palpable fruits. He says, "There should be no fear that true knowledge may be destitute of its result, because that result is the object of immediate intuition"⁵. In the case of such results of action as the heavenly world and the like which are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a doubt; but there can be none about the fruit of true knowledge which is present to intuition.

1 S. B., IV. 1. 2.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

3 S. B., I. 1. 4; III. 4. 52.

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 25.

5 S. B., III. 3. 32. प्रत्यक्षानुभवाच्च ज्ञानस्य ।

CHAPTER VII

ŚRUTI PRAMĀṆA

KNOWLEDGE AS VASTUTĀNTRAM AND ŚRUTI PRAMĀṆA

Anubhava when recorded through the medium of language and handed down traditionally comes to be known as Śruti, that which is heard or revealed. Śruti pramāṇa is really anubhava pramāṇa. Its authority is the authority of an experience which is an embodiment of an intimately personal and, as Plato would say, ineffable realization of the meaning of existence. Its certainty is the certainty of a direct perception. This is why Śaṅkara says that Śruti is Pratyakṣa, i.e. intuitional perception.¹ Like all perception it has a self-certifying character, does not depend on any other authority, and embodies knowledge which is directly experienced. Anubhava is personal acquisition and is confined to the individual who has it. Śaṅkara recognizes that "its result is unique—it is subjective",² and is certain that "it requires no other witness than the testimony of one's own experience".³ But this kind of experience, unless made part of the social heritage by being expressed and communicated through the instrumentality of language, would have little or no significance as a "means of knowledge" or pramāṇa. When expressed in language, it is dragged out of its subjective seclusion and made part of the common culture of the people. It then becomes, to use the words of Ruskin, "his writing, his inscription or scripture to which all who want to know and learn can turn. Left to itself Anubhava can be of no use to others. Others can profit by it only when it is recorded in language. So long as it is confined to the seer, this Anubhava or experience is "pramā" or knowledge merely; when reduced to "words" and made available for use by others, it becomes "pramāṇa" or means of knowledge. The "words" carry authority with them and become "Śabda pramāṇa"—

1 S. B., I, 3. 28; III. 2-24.

2 Brhad. S.B., IV. 4. 29.

3 Ibid.

the authority of the word. What is a purely personal experience acquires an objective worth.

The reality and substantiality of the supreme values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss is a matter of direct Anubhava. Reasoning can only point to their actuality but can give us no insight into their real nature. Intuition alone can do it. This is why Śaṅkara regards Anubhava as the highest pramāṇa and as having final authority in matters of religion. And as Śruti is but an embodiment of the experience in connection with these supreme spiritual values, for Śaṅkara Śruti and Anubhava are really identical. In his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkara calls Anubhava the final pramāṇa.¹ In his commentary on the Gītā Ātma-svarūpādhigama, i.e. self-realization, which is but another word for Anubhava, is said to be the final pramāṇa.² In the same work he declares the Śāstra to be the final authority.³ It is the underlying oneness and inseparability of Śruti and Anubhava which makes Śaṅkara say at once that Self-realization is the means of obtaining insight into that fourth state of the soul which marks the oneness of Brahman and the individual, and that the true nature of Brahman is inconceivable without the aid of the Scripture.⁴ The truth is that for Śaṅkara Śruti is the visible garment of the experiences of the awakened soul. To miss this truth is to miss all that is of significance in Śaṅkara's utterances regarding the value of Śruti for the man who is treading the path of self-realization and for the philosopher who is aiming at the construction of a system of religious metaphysics.

The authoritativeness of Śruti with regard to matters stated by it is independent of everything else, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour.⁵ Those who conclude from these words of

1 S.B., II. 1.14, अपि चान्यमिदं प्रमाणमार्थकत्वाय प्रतिपादकम् ।

2 Gita. S.B., II. 69.

3 Ibid., II. 18, ज्ञात्वा तु अन्तरं प्रमाणम् ।

4 Bhad. S.B. 1.4.7. आत्मप्रत्ययः सारं प्रमाणं यस्य तुरीयस्याधिगमं । S.B., II. 1.27, किमुताचित्तस्य स्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्दं न निरूप्यते । तस्मान्मध्यममूल एव ।

5 S. B., II. 1.1, वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यं शब्देन रूपविषये ।

Śaṅkara that he is appealing to an extra-philosophical standard, and who regard his attempts to bring the truths of Śruti into conformity with the demands of reason as mere rationalization of the dogma fail to understand the inner spirit of Śaṅkara's undertaking. In order to understand the true meaning of his statement that the authority of the Veda is independent and direct we must go back to his theory of knowledge according to which jñāna is vastutantram. Śruti is an embodiment of truths directly realized in intuition. That is why Śaṅkara calls it Pratyakṣa also. Pratyakṣa is direct awareness of a thing and is not relative to any other knowledge or avenue thereof as inference is. Spiritual perception is the only authority in matters concerning the nature and reality of the supreme values of life which are the same as Brahman, just as sensuous perception is, concerning sensible things. Brahman, which is the Self of everyone, can be known only through intuitional perception. The Veda contains knowledge of Brahman, which is an "existent reality". Therefore Vedic knowledge is also vastutantram, and, being vastutantram, is samyagjñāna or perfect knowledge and is independent of time, place and circumstances, just as is the case with all other knowledge, knowledge that fire is hot and ether is formless.¹ This is why the authority of the Veda is independent. Its authority is supreme because it is an embodiment of true knowledge about the Ātman, which is a bhūtavastu, and which, being a bhūtavastu, is open to intuitional perception only. The authority which the Śruti sways is the authority of the jñāna which it embodies, and which is dependent upon and controlled by the "existing reality", which is Brahman in this case.

It is one of the cardinal contentions of Śaṅkara against the Mīmāṃsakas, that the Vedas deal with existent realities also. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that a sentence of the Veda is authoritative when it is devoted to an action, when it says that a certain thing is to be done through such and such means in a particular way. Hence according to them "such terms as the Supreme Self and God have not the support of Vedic testimony in the form of sentences."² But Śaṅkara, in sharp disagreement with the Mīmāṃsakas, contends that the

1 Brhad. S.B., IV. 5. 15.

2 Ibid. I. 3. 1.

Vedas deal with actually "existent realities", Brahman being such an existent reality. "To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things is a mere bold assertion."¹ Śāṅkara is never tired of repeating that Śruti passages are authoritative because they are an embodiment of "certain and fruitful knowledge".² In view of the statements of Śāṅkara to this effect the charge that Śāṅkara merely rationalizes the dogma refutes itself. Śāṅkara writes that "the test of the authority or otherwise of a passage (of the Śruti) is.....its capacity to generate certain and fruitful knowledge. A passage that has this is authoritative, and one that lacks it, is not. Is or is not certain and fruitful knowledge generated by passages setting forth the nature of the Self, and if so, how can they lose their authority? Do you not see the result of knowledge in the removal of the evils which are the root of transmigration, such as ignorance, grief, delusion and fear?"³ Ultimately, then, the authority of the Śruti is made to rest on its capacity to produce certain and fruitful knowledge, which is a matter of direct intuition. If any one regards this Śruti as being without authority, Śāṅkara says, "what trust can one repose in passages dealing with the new and full moon sacrifices", for instance?⁴

The attitude of Śāṅkara towards the authority of the Śruti is very well expressed in the following passage from Professor Whitehead : "What is important is that the scheme of interpretation here adopted can claim for each of its main positions the express authority of one, or the other, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant. But ultimately nothing rests on authority, the final court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness."⁵ Śāṅkara can very well say that the scheme of metaphysics outlined in his works can claim for its main position the express authority of some text or other of the Holy Scripture; but ultimately everything rests on its intrinsic reasonableness; nothing rests on authority. In the vein of Professor Whitehead he

1 S. B., I. 1. 4.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

3 *ibid.*

4 *ibid.*

5 P. R., P. 53.

says, at one place that, "the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedānta texts, not either by inference or by other means of right knowledge", and at another that "the true knowledge of an existent reality depends on the thing itself; and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends on the thing itself i. e., Brahman, it being an existent reality." According to Śaṅkara finally it is "jñāna" which constitutes the means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman can be had;¹ and intuition is the final result of the knowledge of Brahman.² We can clearly see the intrinsic oneness of Śaṅkara's statement at one place that Brahman is "to be known only from the Upaniṣads and through no other means of knowledge" and his assertion at another that "it is to be apprehended by the serene light of knowledge only".³

Though Śaṅkara's statement, at one place, to the effect "that in the inquiry into Brahman scriptural texts, on the one hand, and intuition, on the other, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion"⁴, is liable to be so interpreted as to lend support to the view that Śruti and Anubhava are two independent pramāṇas, having a coordinate rank, yet on deeper reflection in the light of Śaṅkara's own explanation of what the term "Upaniṣad", which is his "Scripture" or "Book", connotes, the plausibility of this view will disappear. The Upaniṣads constitute for Śaṅkara the Śruti which owns the highest authority in matters concerning the eternal verities; and, with the modesty of a maiden, he says in places that the purpose of the Brahma Sūtra and his own commentary thereon is nothing more than "a disquisition on the Vedānta-texts".⁵

The Vedānta is constituted by the Upaniṣads. But what are the Upaniṣads? According to Śaṅkara the word "Upani-

1 S. B., I. 1. 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad S. B., III. 1. 26. यः औपनिषदः पुरुषोऽज्ञानादिवर्जितः उपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञेयो नान्यः प्रमाणगम्यः । S. B., II. 3. 29. परस्यैवात्मनः ज्ञानप्रसादगम्यत्वेन च प्रकृत्वात् ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 2.

5 Ibid.

sad" primarily indicates the "knowledge which shatters or destroys the seed of saṃsāra, such as ignorance and the rest, in those seekers after emancipation who, devoid of all desires for objects seen and heard of, acquire that knowledge."¹ It is only secondarily that it signifies the book containing this knowledge. "The word 'Upaniṣad' is formed by adding the 'Kvip' suffix and the prefixes 'upa' and 'ni' to the root 'sad' meaning (i) to shatter or kill; (ii) to attain; (iii) to loosen. By the word Upaniṣad is denoted the knowledge of the knowable entity inculcated by the work to be commented upon (i. e. Kathopanīṣad)." The primary meaning of "Upaniṣad" is "knowledge", "because the meaning of the root 'sad' i. e. the killing of the cause of saṃsāra, etc., cannot attach to mere book, but attaches to knowledge only";² Śaṅkara does not object to the word "Upaniṣad" being applied to the book containing this knowledge; "even the mere work may also be denoted by that word, because it is meant for the self-same purpose as when it is said 'ghee verily is life'. The word Upaniṣad, therefore, is used in its primary sense when it is used to denote knowledge; but it is used by courtesy i. e. in a secondary sense, to denote the book".³ It is this "knowledge" which is recommended as the "means" to the comprehension of Brahman.⁴ It is this knowledge which is said to be "perfect and complete".⁵ The culmination of this knowledge is an intuitional awareness of Brahman.⁶ Śruti and Anubhava are, in their essence, one. Śaṅkara brings out the same truth when he says in another place that by Parāvidyā, which is a means to the comprehension of Brahman, "is meant primarily that knowledge of the Immutable which could be known through the Upaniṣads and not the mere assemblage of words in them".⁷ It is the "meaning" which is important and not its dress. "Knowledge of the meaning of the Upaniṣad

1 Katha. S. B., Introduction.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., तस्माद्विद्यायां मुख्या वृत्तोपनिषच्छब्दो वर्तते शब्दे तु भक्त्येति ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 1.

5 Ibid. II. 1. 11, सिद्धमर्थोपनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम् ।

6 S. B., I. 1. 2.

7 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 5. उपनिषद्वेदाक्षरविषयं हि विज्ञानमिह पराविच्छेति प्राधान्येन विवक्षितं नोपनिषच्छब्दराशिः ।

is the primary thing about it."¹ But meaning is a mere abstraction apart from its being known or felt or experienced. The authority of the Upaniṣad is the authority of the experienced truth, anubhava. But meaning cannot be abstracted from the medium through which it is expressed. The authority of Anubhava thus comes to be the authority of the word which conveys that Anubhava. Thus it is that for Śaṅkara "both Intuition and Scripture constitute, so far as possible, the means of knowledge in connection with the inquiry into Brahman."²

Śaṅkara says that in matters concerning the knowledge of supersensible realities scripture alone is authoritative.³ What he means to emphasize is that the supreme values of Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss are a matter of direct experience. Only intuition can have access to them. Reason can only point to the indispensability of these values for life and thought, but can give us no insight into their exact nature. Only an actual experience of these values can do that. Logic will only tell us that knowledge is impossible without the acknowledgement of these values, which are presupposed in any attempt on our part to distinguish between the real and the unreal, the true and the false, the fleeting and the permanent, in short, in any attempt to think. But there can be no acknowledgement without knowledge in some sense of the object about which that acknowledgement takes place. Ultimately, then, we have to appeal to Intuition for an insight into the nature of these values, which, for Śaṅkara, are the same as Brahman. Śruti is the recorded intuition. This is why Brahman "is to be known solely from the Scripture"⁴ Sensuous perception is of no avail. Only a "differentiated" object possessing name and form is open to sensuous perception.⁵ There is nothing else which can be perceived by means of the senses.⁶ Likewise Inference cannot be of much help. "Inference is not valid when it contradicts

1 Taitt. S. B., I. 2. 1, अयं ज्ञानप्रधानत्वादुपनिषदः ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 2.

3 Ibid., II. 3. 1.

4 S. B., II. 1. 6.

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 26.

6 Ibid., I. 4. 7.

perception; for it depends upon the latter."¹ We shall discuss later on the relation in which reason stands to intuition in Śaṅkara's system. At present it is enough to bear in mind that the work of Inference cannot begin unless "Perception", either sensuous or spiritual, has taken place. The underlying basis of Śruti pramāṇa, then, is that knowledge is vastutantram, Brahman a "bhutavastu", and Scripture a repository of this knowledge of Brahman.

II

ŚRUTI AS A GUIDE AND A VEHICLE OF CULTURE

Śaṅkara's attitude towards the Śruti or Scripture is not only a reflection of his epistemological attitude; it also summarises his experience of the need for a guide to the soul who is treading the path that leadeth unto God. Very few souls are responsive to the influence exerted by the "invisible helpers" who undertake to guide the aspirant. Very few can feel the touch of the unseen hand and hear the voice of the silence which assures us, "I am with thee". For the majority some more tangible help is needed. It is the word of the Master, which will console, illumine, and elevate. It is what Śaṅkara calls "upadeśa".² Scripture is the repository of this "upadeśa". No one, unaided by instruction, is able to find out by mere reasoning what specific thing has what particular potences helped by an assignable set of auxiliaries and what particular spheres of action, and lead to what particular actions. So also is it impossible to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought. This is the reason for Śaṅkara's unbounded reverence for the Scripture and the seer whose vision the Scripture embodies. Scripture is also the repository of the knowledge that has been handed down to us by the ṛṣis. We ought to be grateful to them

Śaṅkara's reverence for the Śruti is also an expression of the cultural debt which we owe to the seers. This is the ruling idea behind the insistence that we must know the ṛṣi,

1 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

2 S. B., II. 1. 27.

the chanda, etc., of the mantras of the Vedas.¹ "He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he does not know the *īśi*, the metre, the divinity, and the Brāhmaṇa runs against a post, falls into a pit, etc.; therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra."² It is the sense of the cultural debt we owe to the makers of the Vedic civilization which has led Śaṅkara to attach so much importance to the Vedas and the Vedic tradition. "Those alone who tread the path shown by the Śrutis and the spiritual teachers, transcend ignorance. They alone will succeed in crossing this unfathomable ocean of delusion."³ Śaṅkara attaches so much importance to the traditional way of looking at the meaning of the Vedas that he even goes to the extent of saying that "he who is not acquainted with the traditional interpretation is to be neglected as an ignorant man, though learned in all the Śāstras."⁴ Such a man, ignorant in himself, "confounds others devoid as he is of the traditional key to the teaching of the śāstras."⁵ The world-spirit itself is represented by Śaṅkara as being eagerly concerned with the preservation of tradition and traditional ways of thought and life. "A two-fold *nīṣṭhā* or path of devotion was taught by me, the omniscient Lord, when at first at the beginning of creation, I created people and revived the tradition of the Vedic doctrine to teach them the means of attaining worldly prosperity and bliss."⁶ Truth, Śaṅkara honestly and firmly believes, is "inaccessible to persons of shallow understanding, and those who are devoid of the grace of the scriptures and the teacher"; and "they are the scum of the Brahman and other castes who hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition"⁷. Śaṅkara's eagerness to claim and quote some statement of the Scripture in support of his main positions is not a reversion to scholasticism; it is, on the other hand, the expression of the spirit

1 S. R., I. 3. 30.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 16.

4 Gitā. S. B., III. 2.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*, III. 3.

7 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

which is deeply conscious of the debt which it owes to the seers, and is willing to acknowledge the indebtedness.

But, for Śaṅkara, "tradition in philosophy is no literal repetition of dead concepts". "Tradition", he is fully aware, "is life and movement and perpetual reinterpretation". That which constitutes the very life-blood of tradition is the spirit which unfolds itself in the historical movement of thought where alone it can be caught. This spirit remains constant in a flux of forms. It is this spirit which supplies, by its never-ending presence, that "abiding sense of direction" which alone is permanent in tradition. There is a long line of ṛṣis who have seized this tradition, have lived themselves into it and continued it creatively. Śaṅkara associates himself with this tradition. Vāmadeva and the rest are the preceptors who constitute this line and whose traditional teachings have enlightened those desirous of emancipation and wishing to attain sarvātmabhāva.¹ Śaṅkara wants to stick to this tradition and has stuck to it without laying himself open to the charge of arresting it "under the pretext of being faithful to it". This will be visible even to the most casual eye which surveys the development of Vedāntic thought from the time of the Upaniṣads to the age of Śaṅkara. That which is vital to the Vedic tradition is the sense of the reality of the eternal value. Brahman or Mokṣa is Śaṅkara's word for it. The Veda deals with the nature of this supreme value which is also the supreme reality, and the way in which it stands related to existence. The preservation of this element, which is the permanent feature of the Vedic tradition, is the task of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and, in one sense, by stating his belief that the train of thought in his works is Vedic, he is doing no more than endeavouring to exhibit the reality of an Eternal Good which is the origin of the whole creation and towards which all of it moves.

In view of the observation we have made above that tradition, as understood by Śaṅkara, is life and movement and far removed from immobility of thought, Thibaut's statement that Śaṅkara was not free in his speculations "but strictly

1 Allareya. S.B., II. 1. ब्रह्मदेवादिवाच्यं परम्परया श्रुत्या ।

bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not be changed or added to but merely systematized and commented upon" loses its force.¹ Thibaut misses Śaṅkara's attitude towards what he calls the "traditional body of texts" when he says that "they cannot be changed or added to but merely systematized and commented upon". He is labouring under the erroneous impression that it is the "words" which are of significance to Śaṅkara. That which commands Śaṅkara's homage is "that knowledge of the Immortal which could be known through the Upaniṣads and not the mere assemblage of words in them".² It is this knowledge of that eternally real good which is central to the Vedānta texts and is the common presupposition of all of them. Śaṅkara has this in mind when he thinks of the possibility of laying the foundations of a philosophy of Advaita on the basis of the scriptural texts. The essence of his Advaitism is the oneness of value and reality; and the success of his genius lies in the way in which he gives an explanation of "existence" without surrendering this standpoint. It would be doing less than justice to Śaṅkara to look upon his philosophic attempts merely as an endeavour "to force the interpretations of divergent philosophers into a vague agreement."

III

ARE ŚRUTI AND PRATYAKṢA INCOMPATIBLE

Śaṅkara's philosophy, we have shown above, does not seek to spin reality out of a priori truths and to construct a conceptual system independently of experience. It is based upon solid human experience, upon immediate intuition, upon aparokṣānubhūti. From this point of view he is an empiricist to the core. Śruti, for him, is an embodiment of the experiences of a long line of seers and divines. It is not only in this sense that Śruti, and Śaṅkara's system based thereon, are in harmony with experience. They are in harmony with it even in its more limited sense, meaning perceptual experience only. Śaṅkara's system does not falsify the

1 Thibaut, P. civ.

2 Mund. S.B., I. 1.5.

world of experience; it simply seeks its meaning. His anxiety about philosophy being faithful to experience, even ordinary everyday human experience, is amply reflected in his attitude towards the Śruti or Śāstra. Śruti is jñāpaka merely and not kāraṇa¹. "The Śruti is merely informative. The scriptures seek not to alter things but to supply information about things unknown as they are."² "The scriptural statement cannot impart any power to a thing. It is an accepted principle that the Scriptures are only informative and not creative."³ Śāṅkara says that whenever Scripture seeks to tell us about something which is unknown, it does so by examples and illustrations from actual life. This would not be possible, if the intuitional experiences with which the scripture deals were fundamentally opposed to ordinary perceptual ones. "By citing them as examples the Scriptures seek to tell us about some other thing which does not contradict them. They would not cite an example from life, if they wanted to convey an idea of something contradictory to it. Even if they did, it would be different from the thing to be explained. You cannot prove that fire is cold, or that the sun does not give heat even by citing a hundred examples, for the facts would be known to be otherwise through another source of knowledge."⁴ It is experience which tells us that there are many "distinct kinds of genus, sentient and insentient", and the Upaniṣads cite many diverse examples indicating varieties of genus.⁵ Śāṅkara entertains no doubt on the point that philosophy cannot claim immunity from appeal to experience. He says "if you deny an observed fact, saying it is impossible, you will be contradicting experience, a thing which nobody will allow. Nor is there any question of impossibility with regard to an observed fact."⁶ Not infrequently he has recourse to experience in elucidating metaphysical truths. Thus he writes, "there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes."⁷

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 4. 10.

2 Ibid., I. 4. 20.

3 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

4 Ibid., II. 1. 20.

5 Ibid., II. 4. 9.

6 Ibid., I. 4. 10.

7 Ibid., IV. 3. 30.

If there is no inherent conflict between Śruti and experience, if the Scriptures, by citing the characteristics which things in the world are known to possess, simply seek to tell us about some other thing which does not contradict them, then there can be no opposition between Śruti pramāṇa and other means of knowledge. The contrary theory which has long been associated with the name of Śaṅkara and which has been used as the principal key to the understanding of the relation in which the different pramāṇas stand to each other in his philosophy has a fairly long history behind it. The darkness which history has allowed to gather has but served to create a false impression in the minds of readers about the true meaning and force of Śaṅkara's teachings on this matter.

As far back as the eleventh century, Śaṅkara was misunderstood and misrepresented by Rāmānuja on this point. Rāmānuja represents Śaṅkara as holding the view that Scripture and Perception as "means of knowledge" are mutually contradictory; and when there is conflict between Scripture and Perception, the former is of stronger authority and is capable of stultifying the latter. Rāmānuja says that according to Śaṅkara there are scriptural passages which deal with the one absolute Brahman and others which deal with the one phenomenal world of variety and distinctions; and that the former passages are of stronger authority than the latter. Not only this, Rāmānuja thinks that it is even possible, according to Śaṅkara, for some portions of the Scripture to stultify other portions thereof. The conclusion to which this view of the relation between these pramāṇas is interpreted to lead is that the cessation of that bondage which is of the form of varied superimpositions resulting from direct perception which apprehends the world of distinctions does take place by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the Self with Brahman and this knowledge can be had from Scripture alone. This view of the relation between Scripture and Perception does naturally pave the way to the conclusion that the world is an unmeaning illusion and life a tragic joke.

This view, which so grossly misrepresents Śaṅkara's position, has been revived in modern times by Deussen; and

the reputation which the latter enjoys as a scholar and the eminence in which he is held as an indologist have only conspired to perpetuate this error. Deussen simply pours the old wine into new bottles. According to Deussen the fundamental dogma of the Vedānta is that "only unity exists, plurality does not exist". But he says, "this statement abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception, etc., but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition"²; it "contradicts experience, which shows us not that unity, but a plurality, an extension of names and forms (i. e., impressions of ear and eye, sense impressions), and as a part of them our own Self in the form of our created and perishable body"³. Deussen is one with Rāmānuja in attributing to Śaṅkara the view that Scripture is in contradiction not only with Perception but with the canon of Vedic ritual also.

Both Rāmānuja and Deussen have failed to gather Śaṅkara's views on the relation and interrelation in which the different pramāṇas stand to each other. This ignorance is partly a consequence of the failure to recognize that the philosophy of Śaṅkara is a philosophy of value and the standpoint which he adopts is the valuational standpoint, and partly it has itself contributed to this failure. Nothing is farther removed from Śaṅkara's mind than that "the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory, and the Upaniṣadic statement about the unity and oneness of Brahman abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition". Śaṅkara most carefully warns his reader that "one source of knowledge does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by any other means"⁴. "The several means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres."⁵ It is only the self-styled wise men, "the logicians, those first-rate heretics and liars", and the scum of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes who "think that the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory, and also level against us the objec-

1 D. S. V., P. 270.

2 Ibid., P. 270.

3 Ibid., P. 453.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

5 Ibid., स्वविवक्षुराणि हि प्रमाणानि श्रोत्रादिवत् ।

tion that if Brahman be the only reality, such Upaniṣadic texts contradict Perception "¹. Śaṅkara says, these are the persons who are "devoid of the grace of the Scriptures and the teacher", and "hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition". "To those who say that sound, etc., perceived through the ear and so forth contradict the unity of Brahman we put this question: Does the variety of sound and the rest contradict the oneness of the ether? If it does not, then there is no contradiction in our position with Perception."² There is no contradiction because the two statements have reference to two entirely different standpoints. From the existential point of view, the function of Perception is only to give us knowledge of differentiated objects. The perceptual consciousness is a factual consciousness; its deliverance is that there is a plurality, an extension of names and forms. For it "there is a *rerum natura*" and "all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world" have a real subsistence. There is no doubt that Perception is a perfectly valid means of knowledge according to Śaṅkara. But it must be noted that Śaṅkara is not content to take the universe "simply as a fact or set of interrelated facts". Śaṅkara holds that if the philosophical impulse is to be satisfied we must be able to attach the predicate of value to the universe of which the perceptual consciousness makes us aware. Śruti or Scripture, which is an embodiment of the valuational consciousness, can never come in conflict with the former, which is but an ascertainment of the fact of which Śruti constitutes the meaning. There can, accordingly, arise no question of Śruti stultifying Perception.

IV

ARE THE UPANIṢADS AND THE RITUALISTIC PORTION OF THE VEDAS CONTRADICTORY ?

Far from holding the doctrine of the mutual incompatibility of Śruti and Perception as means of knowledge, Śaṅkara emphatically dissociates himself from those who are inclined

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

to it and repudiales it vehemently. The view that "the fundamental dogma of the Vedānta is equally in contradiction with the canon of the Vedic ritual"¹ receives the same treatment. "The Vedānta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic Scriptures. Nor are the latter thereby deprived of their scope. Neither do the ritualistic Scriptures, which uphold differences such as the factors of an action, take away the authority of the Upanisads as regards the unity of Brahman. For the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres."² In view of this unequivocal statement of Śaṅkara on the point, it is really strange that Rāmānuja and Deussen, the latter of whom merely repeats the former's voice, should insist upon making us believe that according to Śaṅkara the statement regarding the unity of Brahman "abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception, etc., but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition"³. This view which is attributed by Rāmānuja and Deussen to Śaṅkara is really the *prima facie* view of the opponent stated by him in order to refute it and expose its hollowness. It is the *pūrvapakṣa* and not the *siddhantapakṣa*. Rāmānuja and Deussen wrongly take it to be the *siddhānta*. This *prima facie* view is stated by Śaṅkara in the following words. "The Upanisads that establish the existence of Brahman alone not only contradict their obvious import and the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, but they also run counter to such means of knowledge as Perception, which definitely establish differences in the world."⁴ After the statement follows Śaṅkara's refutation of this view which we have quoted above. "One source of knowledge does not contradict another".

A careful perusal of the following disquisition about the relation in which the Vedānta texts stand to the ritualistic portion of the Vedas will throw much fresh light on this much misunderstood problem, and will serve to remove many false notions about the metaphysical

1 D. S. V., P. 453.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 22.

3 D. S. V., P. 270.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20

position of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara which this erroneous view has engendered and perpetuated. The disquisition runs as follows, and is self-explanatory: "You have said that passages of the Upaniṣads clash with the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas. This is not correct, because they have a different meaning. The Upaniṣads establish the unity of Brahman, they do not negate instruction regarding the means to the attainment of some desired object or prevent persons from undertaking it. Nor do ritualistic passages fail to lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. If a passage produces valid knowledge regarding its own special meaning, how can it clash with other passages?..... The Śruti says nothing either for or against the truth of the diversity of actions, their factors and their results, which people have already taken for granted. It only prescribes means for the attainment of desired ends and the avoidance of untoward results. To be explicit: As the Śruti that deals with rites having material ends takes the desires as they are — although they are the result of erroneous notions — and prescribes means for attaining them, and it does not cease to do this on the ground that desires are an evil, being the result of erroneous notion, similarly the Śruti dealing with the regular rites such as the Agni-hotra takes the diversity of actions and their factors as they are — although they proceed from error — and enjoins rites such as the Agnihotra, seeing some utility in them... People have innumerable desires and various defects such as attachment. Therefore they are lured by the attachment, etc., to external objects, and the scriptures are powerless to hold them back; nor can they persuade those who are naturally averse to external objects to go after them. But the Scriptures do this much that they point out what leads to good and what to evil, thereby indicating the particular relations that subsist between the end and the means. The Scriptures neither hinder nor direct a person by force as if he were a slave. We see how people disobey even the scriptures because of an excess of attachment, etc..... In this matter people themselves adopt particular means according to their tastes, and the scriptures simply remain neutral, like the sun, for instance, or a lamp."

1 *ibid.*

(§ IV) UPANISADS AND RITUALIS NOT CONTRADICTORY

According to Śaṅkara a means of knowledge is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge, and he has no doubt that ritualistic passages lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. "The means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres. Therefore the Vedānta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic Scriptures."

The view, therefore, that the different means of knowledge are contradictory, and that if Brahman is the only reality, the Upanisadic texts contradict Perception and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, is the result of a confusion of standpoints. When Śaṅkara reminds us that "the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres, like the ear, etc.", he means to direct our attention to the diversity of standpoints from which things have to be looked at. The distinction between the existential and the valuational standpoint is foundational to every utterance of Śaṅkara, and nothing but error can result from a confusion of them. The standpoint of Perception is the existential standpoint, the standpoint of the Upaniṣad is the standpoint of value, the Infinite standpoint. The latter standpoint is the fulfilment of the former. This is the truth which Śaṅkara means to bring out when he repeatedly says that the passages of the Upaniṣads and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas "have a different meaning". The real conflict, according to Śaṅkara, is not between the Upaniṣads that establish the unity of Brahman and the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, as Rāmaṇuja and Deussen think, but between "the knowledge of the unity of Brahman" and "one's competency to perform rites".² The knowledge of the unity of Brahman "only destroys one's natural idea of difference. It does not nullify other injunctions".³

Rites such as the Agnihotra which are connected with the wife and fire, can be performed only if there are agencies for whom they are meant, and this entails an idea

1 Ibid.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20. ब्रह्मैकत्वं विद्यायाः कर्माधिकारविरोधस्योक्तत्वात् ।

3 Ibid., न हि विध्यन्तरविरोधकमात्मज्ञानम् । स्वाभाविकभेदबुद्धिमात्रं निरुणद्धि ।

of difference. They cannot be performed unless there are the gods—Fire, etc.—for whose sake they are undertaken, and this last depends on the sacrificer's regarding the gods as different from himself. Our natural consciousness of difference regarding action, its factors and its results is, previous to the awakening of Self-knowledge, an incentive to the performance of rites. But when this notion of difference regarding the deities to be honoured and the means to it is destroyed in the state of enlightenment, by knowledge, this "knowledge of the unity of Brahman militates against one's competency to perform rites".¹ It is these two which cannot go hand in hand. This is also Śāṅkara's "answer to the charge that if Brahman be the only reality there will be no scope left for instruction, and hence it can neither be received nor produce any result".² When ignorance and the consequent consciousness of difference are removed, the Vedic injunctions are not nullified, only the tendency to perform rites is destroyed. This is "analogous to the cessation of our tendency to perform rites having material ends when desire itself has been removed".³ The Vedānta texts that teach the oneness of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic scriptures.⁴ Shall we say, then, that Rāmānuja and Deussen are among those "self-styled wise men" of whom Śāṅkara speaks, and who "following their own caprices, think that the different means of knowledge are mutually contradictory and level against us the objection that if Brahman be the only reality, such Upaniṣadic texts contradict Perception"⁵?

V

AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF RESOLVING THE
CONFLICT

Śāṅkara's resolution of the apparent discrepancy between Śruti and Perception as pramāṇas, the one teaching

1 *ibid.*

2 *ibid.*

3 *ibid.*

4 *ibid.*, तस्मान्न ब्रह्मकत्वं ज्ञापयिष्यन्मो वेदान्ता विधिगात्रस्य बाधकाः ।

5 *ibid.*, तत्र पंडितं मन्याः किंचित्स्वचित्तवशात् सर्वं प्रमाणमितरेतरविहृतं मन्यन्ते ।
तथा प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधमपि चोदयन्ति ब्रह्मकत्वं ।

the unity of Brahman, the other insisting upon a fundamental plurality of things, has nothing in common with the many attempts made in the history of the Vedānta philosophy itself and associated by philosophers belonging to a rival camp with Śaṅkara's name also. Rāmānuja attributed to the Vedāntin, the view that Perception "apprehends pure and unqualified existence. Perception (also) cognizes Brahman, which is devoid of attributes and is pure existence", and consequently there is no conflict of the Śruti which teaches the oneness of Brahman with Perception.¹ Thus Perception also is made to confirm the deliverances of the intuitional consciousness. In the light of what we have said about the relation in which Śruti and Perception as means of knowledge stand to each other in Śaṅkara's philosophy, there will appear to be a certain meagreness and externality in the above attempt to bring the two into line with each other. This is the impression left on the reader's mind by Maṇḍana's *Brama-siddhi*. Maṇḍana, who, according to Dr. Dasgupta, "must have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara", undertakes to prove in the *Tarka—Kāṇḍa* chapter of his *Brama Siddhi* "that we cannot perceive 'difference' through perception, and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upaniṣad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference".²

The problem arises as follows. The perceptual mode of consciousness reveals difference. The Śruti, on the other hand, teaches that Brahman is one, and all that we see and hear and feel is nothing but Brahman. Does not Perception contradict the deliverances of the intuitional consciousness and therefore the Śruti also which embodies these deliverances? Both Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana recognize that here is a genuine problem to be solved, but their solutions differ fundamentally. Maṇḍana undertakes to prove that "difference", whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception.³ The verdict of the Upaniṣads that reality is one and that no

1 R.B., I. 1.1.

2 History, Vol. II, P. 88.

3 *ibid.*, P. 92.

diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. The line of argument which Śāṅkara adopts is related to the standpoint of value which he consistently maintains throughout his works. Perceptual consciousness reveals facts merely; the intuitional consciousness is concerned with the meaning of facts. As the variety of sound does not contradict the oneness of ether, similarly the differentiated names and forms do not contradict the oneness of Brahman. It is from this valuational point of view that Śāṅkara says that the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of Brahman as the only reality do not contradict Perception.

The attempt of some of the later Vedāntins, referred to by Appaya Dikṣita in his *Sidhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, to resolve the seeming inconsistency between Perception and Śruti resembles very much that of Maṇḍana. It is pointed out therein that the author of *Tattvaśuddhi* holds that in Perception the sense-organs grasp "bare existence" unqualified by name and form, and thus there is no conflict between Perception and Śruti. There would be a conflict, if Perception grasped differentiated name and form: but this it does not do. It cognizes bare existence (*sanmatram*). The *Nyāyasūdhā* outlines a similar view. In all probability the view which Śāṅkara criticizes in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is the same as is subscribed to by Maṇḍana, and Śāṅkara's criticisms have in mind Maṇḍana's resolution of the conflict between the perceptual and the intuitional modes of knowing things. According to Śāṅkara, Maṇḍana's way of resolving the conflict between the two is not in keeping with the spirit of the Vedas, and is "divorced from tradition". In Śāṅkara's attempt there is genius, in Maṇḍana's there is trick. For it is nothing but trick to invent argument to show that the sense-organs reveal what they are never meant to reveal. Sense-organs are concerned with the revelation of a reality which is differentiated. "Objects such as sound and the rest which are perceived by the ear and so forth, are observed to be different from one another." But Maṇḍana wishes us to believe that in Perception only a differenceless reality is cognized. Śāṅkara never subscribes to this view, and to think that on this point Śāṅkara and Maṇḍana are in substan-

tial agreement is to shut one's eyes to the fundamental contrast in their positions.

A discussion of the nature of the pramāṇa of Perception would not be of any great value for understanding Śāṅkara's philosophical position. The only justification for not neglecting it and for treating it at some length is that a wrong view has been held by some of the Vedāntins who profess to follow Śāṅkara about the nature of this pramāṇa, and this wrong view has been supposed to supply part of the foundation of the Advaita philosophy. The misconception which has been used as an argument in support of the Vedāntic Absolutism consists in holding that Perception reveals nothing except a differenceless reality (sanmatram). The great merit of Śāṅkara's analysis of the nature of Perception for the purposes of epistemological inquiry is that he clearly recognizes that knowledge (and perception is a way of knowing things) presents to us a situation in which the knower has to deal with a reality other than himself; and thus steers clear of the difficulty in which the idealists of the Buddhist type have landed themselves.

Sense-perception has the power to deal only with "differentiated realities" or "particularized things". "Only a differentiated object which is within the range of the organs can be perceived."¹ Perception can make us cognizant of things which are limited and finite; it can never give us knowledge of the whole, the totality, the complete. It is true that whatever is perceived is perceived as a whole, as a totality; the perceptual process has a unifying character. But the wholes are perceived as particular wholes, distinguishable and distinguished from other such wholes and standing in definite relations to them. Perceptual consciousness has for its object the *saṁta* and not the *ananta*, the ending and not the endless. Whatever can be an object of knowledge is comprised within "name and form", according to Śāṅkara,² and the term "the known" means the entire differentiated universe.³ It is the sense-organs which help the individual

1 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 26.

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 24. नामरूपयोरेवान्तर्भावान् विदमभेदम् ।

3 Kena. S. B., I. 3.

to particular experiences, and "when they are absent, there is no particular experience, for the latter is the product of the organs, etc."¹ Śaṅkara's meaning is that "degree of discriminative sensibility corresponds broadly to the complexity and differentiation of the organs of sense".

Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, in believing that Śaṅkara holds that Perception can grasp mere Existence or Absolute non-difference and not individualized existence, have not only been unfair to Śaṅkara but have positively served to perpetuate this erroneous notion about his philosophy. "Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished reality, cannot be the object of Perception and the other means of knowledge".² Brahman is not a "thing" among other things, though it is the source of all the reality and being of every thing; and a mode of consciousness which nature has evolved to give us knowledge of things among other things can never be adequate to the comprehension of Brahman, which is everything and which, at the same time, transcends every particular real thing.

Certain physiological conditions are indispensable in their initiating a series of changes which result in awareness or knowledge. Śaṅkara very well recognizes that "there can be no knowledge in the absence of the body and the organs. When there is no body there can be no organs, for they will have no support.....If knowledge could arise even in the absence of the body and the organs there would be no necessity for any one to possess them."³ In order that perception may result, the sense-organs must be stimulated by some object. "Sound, which is the object of hearing, stimulates the ear, its organ."⁴ The sense-organs can be stimulated by their specific stimuli only. "We cannot suppose that eyes can perceive also taste."⁵ The nature of the resulting sensation will depend on the particular sense-organ stimulated. There is an inner affinity between the sense-

1 Brhadj S. B., IV 3. 23.

2 S. B., I. 1. 4.

3 Brhad. S. B., III. 9. 23, 7.

4 Ibid., IV. 3. 5,

5 Ibid., III. 3. 1,

organ and its adequate stimulus, and normally these organs do not respond to modes of stimulation other than those to which they are especially attuned. Thus Śāṅkara considers "the organs to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as light, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours".¹

Perception, in itself, is a perfectly valid means of knowledge. Objects of perception are as definite as any knowledge had through the scriptures. Facts of Perception cannot be doubted. "When a thing is directly recognized as identical, it is improper to infer that it is something else, for when an Inference contradicts Perception, the ground of such Inference becomes fallacious."² Perceptions may sometimes be wrong. "Whenever a wrong Perception arises, it does so on account of a certain similarity of something to another thing without ascertaining the particular nature of that thing, as when mother-of-pearl is mistaken for a piece of silver."³ So far as men are concerned, "there are five distinctions of buddhi, having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, and on their account there are five organs of knowledge"⁴. The sense-organs are merely instruments at the disposal of the self, to be used by it; and it is only when they are inspired by the energy of the self that they "receive their powers of vision and so forth". By themselves, divested of the light of the Ātman that is Pure Intelligence, they are like wood or clods of earth.⁵ The Self is different from one's body and organs, and illumines them like external lights, such as the sun, but is not itself illumined by any of them.

1 *ibid.*, II. 4. 11.

2 *ibid.*, IV. 3. 7.

3 *ibid.*, I. 4. 10.

4 S. B., II. 4. 6.

5 Brhad. S. B. IV. 4. 18.

CHAPTER VIII

VALUE CATEGORIES AND ŚAṆKARA'S SEARCH FOR A SYSTEM

SAMYAGJÑĀNA AND THE VALUE OF REASONING

That Anubhava or intuitional experience, which, when recorded in language, gets the name of Śruti is the only gateway to a knowledge of Brahman or the Absolute has been the occasion for a number of attacks from diverse quarters by critics who see in this a-logism of Śaṅkara nothing but an appeal to an essentially extra-philosophical standpoint. "Inference" or "reasoning" is one of the valid means of knowledge recognized by Śaṅkara. He calls it "tarka" or "anumāna". It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or līṅga which is associated with it. From a knowledge of the līṅga or sign we get a knowledge of the object possessing it. This līṅga or sign is the ground of inference.¹ The validity of the inference depends on the presence of the līṅga or hetu in the pakṣa. Thus when we perceive smoke rising from a hill, we infer that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire on yonder hill. What is important to recognize is that Śaṅkara, like Vātsyāyana, holds that "no Inference can take place in the absence of Perception, for the former depends upon the latter".² For this very reason "Inference cannot stand against Perception", and it cannot be valid when it contradicts it".³ Śaṅkara warns us against challenging the validity of an Inference of the kind based on general observation.⁴ If we did so, he tells us, "all our activities, including eating and drinking, would be impossible. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance,

1 Bhṛad. S.B., IV. 3. 2. निगम्य त्वमभिचारित्वं प्रदर्शनाय ।

2 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 1. 20.

4 Ibid., I. 2. 1.

5 Ibid., IV. 3. 7.

are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt these means expecting similar results. As a matter of fact, however, people who have experience of eating and drinking infer on the ground of similarity that their hunger and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, and proceed to act accordingly."¹

The question which has to be answered is: Can *tarka* or reasoning be relied upon for a knowledge of Brahman or Absolute? Śaṅkara's answer is both "yes" and "no". To the question whether the truth in the Advaita philosophy can be comprehended only by means of Scripture, or reasoning also can prove it, Śaṅkara's unequivocal answer is: "It can be comprehended by means of reasoning also".² But at another place we find him stressing the point that though Brahman is an actually existing and accomplished reality, it is gratuitous to suppose that it can be known through some other means of knowledge. "Brahman, because it is devoid of form, etc., cannot be an object of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*); nor can it be known by means of Inference or reasoning (*Anumāna*), because of the absence of the known inferential marks."³ According to Śaṅkara, "reasoning" can as well as not help us in getting an insight into the nature of Reality, which he calls Brahman. Śaṅkara here attaches an importance to this means of knowledge which cannot belong to what he calls *pratyakṣa* or sensuous perception. Whenever Śaṅkara has occasion to speak about the means to the realization of Brahman or the Highest Good, he takes special care to point out to us the part which reasoning will play in taking us nearer the goal of life. "When both scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity of self, they can show it as clearly as a bael fruit on the palm of one's hand."⁴ A thing, he says, that is ascertained by the Scriptures and reasoning, deserves credence on account of its proving universally true.⁵

1 Ibid., IV. 3.6.

2 Mand. S. B. III. 1. अद्वैतं किमप्यनमाद्येण प्रतिपत्त्यमहोस्वित्तर्कैर्नापि.....
शक्यते तर्कैर्नानिश्चातुम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.6.

4 Brahd. S.B., II. 5. 1.

5 Ibid. IV. 5.1.

One of the customary ways of acquiring knowledge, as observed in the system of logic which Śaṅkara himself approves is the association with adepts in that sphere and discussion with them.¹ The portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad relating to Yājñavalkya, which deals with the same subject as the preceding one, namely the nature of the Self, is mainly argumentative. The pathway to reality is marked by the triple stages of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana. "Brahman should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon. It should be heard of from the spiritual teacher and the scriptures, and reflected on through reasoning. The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition, 'All this is but the Self'.² Brahman is to be known not only from the Scripture or through Intuition. Śaṅkara, agreeing with the scripture, says, "we have to know Brahman by inquiry also".³ Brahman is "mīmāṃsyam" also, worthy of inquiry.⁴ The same Upaniṣad speaks of the disciple who discussed within himself the meaning of the Āgama as pointed out by his preceptor, arrived at a conclusion by his reasoning, realized it in himself, approached the preceptor and exclaimed "I think I now know Brahman."⁵

But how are we to resolve the inevitable conflict into which Śaṅkara forces his reader by his contradictory statements that reasoning is an indispensable aid to the man who is treading the path that leadeth to Brahman, and that it is not possible to assign any stability to reasoning, because what one logician puts forward as true is upset by another and what this other one establishes is controverted by another still.⁶ The contradiction is only an apparent one, and Śaṅkara himself shows us the way out of it. His resolution of the seeming contradiction consists in laying down the principle that reasoning should be conducted in accordance with the

1 *ibid.*, III 2. 1.

2 *Brhad. S.B.*, II. 5.1.

3 *Kena. S.B.*, II. 1.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

6 *S.B.*, II. 1.11.

teachings of the Scripture.¹ "It thus stands established that in conformity with the Scripture and in conformity with the reasoning consistent with the Scripture, it is the intelligent Brahman that is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world."² This is one of the classical attempts in the history of philosophy to bring intuition and reasoning together by assigning them what is their proper due and asking them to contribute what they severally can towards the construction of a systematic philosophy. The reason why reasoning should be subordinated to and made consistent with Śruti lies in the nature of reasoning itself. Anumāna or Inference cannot wholly transcend, and has to be rooted in, Perception. Śruti is called Pratyakṣa by Śaṅkara, because it is an embodiment of the truths directly experienced by the seers.³ Any reasoning or Inference with regard to the nature of Brahman should be in conformity with the experienced truths about Brahman, because Inference depends upon Perception.⁴ Anubhava or intuition should be the regulative principle to which reasoning should submit itself.

Śaṅkara in his insistence on the principle that reasoning should be in conformity with the Scripture, far from rationalizing the dogmas, is laying down a fundamental epistemological as well as methodological principle. Logic or reasoning cannot by itself determine the nature of being. It can be known only by means of the proper pramāṇa consistent with the nature of the reality to be known. Brahman is the object of Śaṅkara's inquiry. It is an appeal to Intuition which will decide the nature of Brahman; logic or reasoning cannot do this. Śruti or Anubhava alone can give us the content or material or a philosophy of religion. The function of tarka should be confined to bringing out the implication of the Anubhava of which Śruti is the record. Reasoning is not a substitute for actual Anubhava; it is but a supplement.

1 S. B., I. 1. 2, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

2 S. B., C. 1. 11, आगमवशेन आगमानुसारितकवशेन च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्च ।

3 S. B. III. 2. 24. श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां प्रत्यक्षानुमानाम्याम् ।

4 Brhad. S.B., I. 2. 1, प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वादनुमानस्य । S. B., I. 3. 28. प्रत्यक्षं हि श्रुतिः प्रामाण्यं प्रति अनपेक्षत्वात् । अनुमानं स्मृतिः प्रामाण्यं प्रति सापेक्षत्वात् ।

Borrowing a term from Kant with some modification, we can say that according to Śāṅkara "spiritual sensibility" alone can supply the content or material of knowledge; reason without it will be empty. This is the real meaning of his repeated insistence that *tarka* should be in conformity with the Śruti; this also is the real explanation of his seemingly dogmatic assertion that Brahman is cognizable only from the Scripture.¹

II

LIMITATIONS OF REASONING OR
INFERENTIAL THOUGHT

The ordinary causal argument which proceeds from effect to cause cannot be of much help to us, according to Śāṅkara, in ascertaining the nature of the reality in which this universe is rooted, if we exclude from consideration the deliverances of the religious consciousness, i. e. of Intuition. Śāṅkara's complaint against the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy is that while they profess to base themselves upon the Śruti and claim to be in line with the Vedic tradition, they draw their inspiration from an entirely alien source and commit themselves to views which are divorced from the teachings of the scripture. These systems forget, according to Śāṅkara, the elementary principle of reasoning that Inference depends upon Perception and cannot stand against it; and in all our reasoning concerning God we must constantly appeal to relevant experiences of sages and seers who say they have seen Him. The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are victims to the twin illusions that reason, without the intervention of sensibility, can supply the content of knowledge also and that a philosophical doctrine of God can satisfactorily be based upon "a contemplation of the works of nature merely...that is to say, of the order and adjustment of the material system to the exclusion of human nature and human experience in any other than its sense-perceptive aspect." Śāṅkara says that an appeal to

1. S. B., II. 1. 6, आगममात्रं तत्त्वमिति न त्वत्त्वमिति ।

(§ II) LIMITATIONS OF REASONING OR INFERENTIAL THOUGHT

the religious experience itself, the highest of which guarantees that the soul is pure consciousness, free from all pain and pure bliss, can alone supply us with the hint of a concrete and tolerable solution. If we rely on the sense-perceptive aspect of experience alone and try to infer truths about the nature of metaphysical verities, paying no heed to the deliverances of Intuition, we shall be led to paralogisms and nullify all chances of attaining beatitude. "If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect. But we only perceive the effect, so that it cannot be decided whether the world is connected with Brahman as its cause or with something else."¹

The systems named above, proceeding upon the principle that insight into the nature of Brahman, which is an already existent reality, is possible through a means of knowledge other than Śruti or Anubhava, arrive at mutually conflicting conclusions without even a remote chance of reconciliation. The Sāṅkhya, says Sāṅkara, basing its speculation upon the strength of reasoning alone, holds that the cause of the world has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connection of the *pradhāna* with the souls.² The followers of Kanāda, being guided by the self-same principle, are led to infer that God is the efficient cause of the world, while the atoms are its material; and the Naiyāyikas join hands with them in viewing the real as the regulative principle merely, which is solely concerned with the organization of the material at its disposal. All these theories, because they refuse to profit by the experiences relevant to the subject in hand, end by accepting conclusions which outrage some of the deepest conviction of the religious consciousness. Their chief sin, in a language which philosophy spoke in India twelve centuries back, is that they are "*vedabāhya*".³ If we make use of a more modern idiom, we can say that their besetting sin is that they want to spin a system out of pure reason, without appeal to experience,

1 S. E., I. 1. 2.

2 S. B., I. 1. 5.

3 S. B., II. 2. 11.

while hoping that the system will be true to facts and be a mirror in which one will see the face of the universe as it is.

Śankara is aware of the difficulty which many who have attained to perfection of power and vision experience with regard to the true nature of the cause of the world. That is why he teaches us to limit our rationalism by a proper empiricism; and unless this is done, so that the rationalist also becomes an empiricist, "a knowledge of the true nature of reality, which is perfectly unfathomable and on which depends man's final emancipation, cannot even be guessed except with the help of the Scripture".¹ The argument from effect to cause, by itself, can only point to the necessity of some reality in which the universe which we experience must be grounded. It can at best show that the value of Existence is an independent and absolute value. The reasoning process can merely give us the knowledge that Brahman is Sat. But no amount of inference can ever succeed in showing that reality is consciousness or unconsciousness, is bliss or devoid of bliss. It is only a first-hand, direct, intuitive experience of the values of consciousness and bliss that can assure us of their reality. This is the reason why Śankara says that intuition is the final result of the inquiry into Brahman.² This is the reason why he exhibits the deceptive nature of mere ratiocination in his works³, and stands up for the subordination of it to experience or Śruti.

But at the same time Śankara has not omitted to discuss the question whether and in what way "it is possible to establish by reasoning also the causality of Brahman, but not of the Pradhāna and similar principles."⁴ But the peculiarity of his attempt is that he, along with the other Brahma-vādins, "defines the nature of the cause, etc., on the strength of the Scriptures".⁵ This, he believes, is also the strength of his system. The refusal to subordinate tarka to Śruti by the Naiyāyikas, etc., and their over-confidence in the power of

1 S. B., II. 2. 11.

2 S. B., I. 1. 2, अनुभावसानत्वात् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 6, केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति ।

4 S. B., I. 1. 5.

5 S. B., II. 2. 38.

reason, have, according to Śaṅkara, vitiated their attempt to found a philosophical theory of God on tarka merely. The fault from which those theories which regard God as the "efficient" cause only suffer are all traceable, in Śaṅkara's view, to their neglect to profit by experiences concerning God, which experiences are in the very centre and foreground of the picture which Śaṅkara draws of the universe. The Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, etc., while professing to accept the pramāṇa of Śruti, are, in practice, systems of avowed rationalism and "expound the nature of the cause on the strength of mere analogy".¹ They forget that the nature of the cause, the constitutive stuff of the world, cannot be discovered in a place other than our inner nature. To interrogate our inner nature is to appeal to experience. Appeal to experience is appeal to Śruti.

III

REASONING AND SEARCH FOR A SYSTEM

But appeal to Śruti is not enough. Religion is realization, anubhava or sāksātkāra. Philosophy is mīmāṃsa or reflection. It is an inquiry or investigation into the nature of the truth in the light of the deliverances of religious consciousness. In other words, philosophy is an intellectual interpretation of intuitional awareness of reality, and as such it is concerned with the establishment of certain views which are consistent with that intuition (pratipādana) and the refutation of others which are opposed to it.² Logical analysis and dialectic are indispensable in philosophy. Tarka also establishes the Advaita standpoint³, and whenever Śaṅkara has to say anything against it, it is against tarka which ignores what Intuition vouchsafes and attempts to override it. Śaṅkara assigns a primary position to Intuition as a means of knowledge because it alone can supply the content of knowledge. But if tarka without Anubhava is empty, Anubhava without tarka is chaotic. Knowledge is neither empty nor chaotic. It is content organized in relations. Reasoning or reflection alone

1 idid., दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयन्ती ।

2 S. B., I. 4. 28, प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता ।

3 Mand. S. B., III. 1.

can be entrusted with the work of organization, because it is the faculty of logical analysis and dialectic and these latter are forms of relational consciousness, which in its turn, is bound up with the perception of multiplicity or manyness. Reflection or *tarka* has to view things as differentiated as well as integrated. Thus it has to introduce order and unity into the phenomena, to systematize them, and to make a whole of them by discovering the ground underlying them.

If *tarka* or reasoning is not resorted to in order to systematize that experience, we shall have Intuition without a philosophy of intuition. Śāṅkara therefore insists that Śruti and *tarka* are the true bases upon which a philosophical system can be reared. Anubhava or Śruti cannot do the work which Śāṅkara assigns to *tarka*, whether it be the theoretical aspect of knowledge or the practical side of it that is under consideration. The theoretical aspect of knowledge consists in the formulation of a reasoned and consistent view of the universe. Both Anubhava and *tarka* contribute to it; the former by supplying the material and the latter by organizing that material in accordance with certain principles of order. The practical side of knowledge aims at the actual realization of the truth by having recourse to the threefold discipline of "hearing" the scriptural text, "reflecting" on it through reasoning, and finally "meditating" on it. The practical aspect of knowledge closely corresponds to the theoretical; only the latter has one stage less, namely that of Anubhava. Philosophy or *mīmāṃsā* needs Śruti and *tarka*; religion or realization needs both these; and, in addition, actual Anubhava of the truth. Philosophy or reasoned knowledge of Brahman is an indispensable stage that finally culminates in Brahmanubhava. When Śāṅkara has in mind the construction of a systematic philosophy which will do justice to the religious experience of mankind, he insists upon our having recourse to Śruti and *tarka*, the former supplying the matter and the latter the form. He believes, though he does not explicitly undertake to show, as Kant did later on, that knowledge is neither empty nor chaotic, but content organized in relations. When he has in view the actual *sādhana* aiming at the realization of beatitude, the

summum bonum of life, he speaks of all the three, hearing, reflection and meditation. When he is discussing the theoretical aspect of knowledge he is content with remarking that "In conformity with the Scripture and in conformity with reasoning consistent with the Scripture, Brahman is the efficient and the constituent cause of this world".¹ But this intellectual conviction is only a stage on the road to realization; and when this is the point under consideration, Śāṅkara hastens to add that *nididhyāsana* should follow *śravaṇa* and *manana*, finally ripening into *anubhava*.

IV

SĀṆKARA'S INTUITIONISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF HEGEL

It is said that there is a contrast between the intuitional or mystical method of Śāṅkara and the dialectical method of Hegel. According to Śāṅkara, the Absolute is revealed in an immediate experience. Hegel, on the other hand, insists on the mediating activity of thought. No experience in its immediacy can reveal the real. The Hegelian method of knowing the Absolute is thus different from the Vedāntic method of knowledge. This way of putting the matter, however, serves to conceal many important points of affinity between Śāṅkara and Hegel regarding the method as well as the conclusions. From the simple fact that Hegel has criticized immediate or intuitive knowledge as the organ of philosophy, people have passed to the conclusion that Hegel's criticisms are applicable to Śāṅkara's position also because Śāṅkara also holds that Brahman can be known only in an intuition of it. But Jacobi's theory of intuitive knowledge, which is what Hegel repudiates, is entirely different from that of Śāṅkara: and the reasons for which Jacobi is understood to reject "thought" as an organ of philosophy are not acceptable to Śāṅkara.

The line of argument advanced for the thesis that the knowledge of God and of truth must be immediate or intuitive,

1 S.B., II, 1.11.

which is what Hegel understands by the "Intuition theory", is that thought is a mere "faculty of finitisation".¹ Thought, in its operation, has to make use of categories. But these categories, as arrested by the understanding, are limited vehicles of thought, forms of the conditioned. A thought limited to these modes has no sense of the Infinite and the True. "Consequently, if the object in question be the True, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, we change it by our notions into a finite and conditioned; whereby instead of apprehending the truth by thought, we have perverted it into untruth."² As Hegel says in another place, "the absolute on this view is not to be grasped in conceptual form but felt, intuited; it is not its conception, but the feeling of it and the intuition of it that are to have the say and find expression".³ According to Hegel, "truth finds the medium of its existence in notions or conceptions". According to the opposite view, "it is rather the opposite of the notional or conceptual form which would be required for systematic philosophical exposition".⁴

Jacobi's reason for rejecting thought is that it is a faculty of finitisation; it can deal with the conditioned only. Śaṅkara rejects tarka or reasoning because it is not competent to grasp the ultimate values, Sat, Cit and Ānanda which in their unity constitute what he means by Brahman. But it is an error to think that Śaṅkara approves of Anubhava as an organ of philosophy; for systematic philosophical exposition recourse to conceptual thought is indispensable. Intuition will give us religion merely. But the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is not merely religion; it is a philosophy also, though a philosophy as a formulation of this religion. Śaṅkara says that tarka also proves the truth of his system of Advaita. This tarka operates only by making use of conceptual thought. Reasoning in Śaṅkara's system, which is bound up with the conceptual mode of thought, proceeds by developing and systematizing the results of intuition experience. This is why Śaṅkara gives us at the end not merely aparokṣānubhūti, but a Śārīra-ka Mīmāṃsā.

1 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 122.

2 *Ibid*, PP. 121, 122.

3 Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind, P. 71.

4 *Ibid*.

Hegel's criticism of the Intuitionist theory of Jacobi and the Romantics is not at all applicable to Śaṅkara. On the other hand, Hegel and Śaṅkara are at one at many points. Hegel quarrels with the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge because "it sets itself up against philosophy". He makes it plain that "the difference between philosophy and the asseverations of immediate knowledge rather centres in the exclusive attitude which immediate knowledge adopts when it sets itself up against philosophy". Philosophy, for Hegel, is the thinking study of things. It aims at the "systematic development of truth in scientific form". This alone is the true shape in which truth exists. In other words, according to Hegel "truth finds the medium of its existence in notions or conceptions alone".¹ Hegel does not "seek to controvert the maxims of immediate knowledge"; "it is the last thing philosophers would think of".² For example, he points out that "immediate knowledge consists in knowing that the Infinite, the Eternal, the God which is in our idea, really is; or, it asserts that in our consciousness there is immediately and inseparably bound up with this idea the certainty of its actual being". It would be strange, he says, if any one could suppose that these principles were opposed to Philosophy. But "this immediate consciousness of God goes no further than to tell us that He is". Philosophy is reflective knowledge; it should tell us not only that he is but also what He is. To know merely that He is would be knowing what Hegel calls a "vague and indeterminate Divinity", "that very natvete of emptiness of knowledge". The ideal of philosophy will be satisfied when we also know what He is; but this would be an act of cognition, involving meditation. To know God fully would be to know him as a spirit, as "at once the beginning and the end, as well as the mean". This knowledge of God implies mediation. Without this mediation "God as an object of religion is expressly narrowed down to the indeterminate supersensible".³ The ideal of philosophy is the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge.⁴ The

1 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 127.

2 Hegel : Phenomenology of Mind, P. 71.

3 The Logic of Hegel, Translated by Wallace, P. 126.

4 The Logic of Hegel, P. 136.

5 Hegel: Phenomenology, P. 79.

truth is the whole. "But just as little is the attainment of a general notion of a whole the whole itself."¹ Philosophy, as a thinking consideration of things, wants, as Hegel says, to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches, and its mass of foliage. It cannot be satisfied by being shown an acorn instead. It is the endeavour of philosophy to grasp and express the nature of the Absolute in conceptual form.

Śaṅkara knows that language fails to describe the Absolute Experience adequately; it is ineffable. It is to be lived only.² But at the same time he is not unaware of the fact that philosophy is a matter of intelligible expression, and that language and reality are inseparable; that language is the only medium through which the nature of the real has to be expressed and communicated.³ For Śaṅkara also philosophy or *mīmāṃsā* of the nature of Brahman is a matter of mediated knowledge; though *Brahmānubhava*, which alone, according to him, constitutes religion, is an immediate experience. Philosophy is a systematic formulation of this religion or experience. We miss the close resemblance between the thoughts of Śaṅkara and Hegel on this point, because we fail to see that Hegel has in mind the linguistic expression of the absolute experience, while Śaṅkara is thinking all the time of that experience as actually lived. It is no doubt true that certain remarks of Hegel himself about what he calls the "Hindoo" view of immediate experience are responsible for this misconception about the relation between their views. But the truth is that Hegel has missed the true import of the Vedāntic view of immediate experience and its proper place in the philosophical scheme put forward by Śaṅkara. There is nothing to support Hegel's indictment that it is because the Hindoo believes "the immediacy of consciousness to be the criterion of truth" that he finds God in the cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama.⁴ If we consider carefully some of the philosophical tenets of Śaṅkara's Advaitism, it

1 *Ibid.*, P. 75.

2 *Mand. S.B.*, I. 9.

3 *Ibid.*, I. 1, परंच ब्रह्माभिधानाभिधेयोपायपूर्वकमेव गम्यते ।

4 *The Logic of Hegel*, P. 136.

will appear to us that they constitute not immediate but mediated knowledge, because, as Hegel rightly points out, "whatever is more than a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a form of mediation, contains a process towards another state from which we must return once more".¹ The statements of Śaṅkara that the Conscious Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, that it is the Self of everything and the goal of the entire world process, which, along with several others, constitute his Brahmanavāda, are forms of mediation; and only in this form can they be put forward as doctrines of a philosophical system. But these truths can be directly experienced also. This explains why Śaṅkara's Advaitism is not only a religion but a philosophy also, a philosophy as the formulation of this religion, involving in its turn meditation also. In understanding the attitudes of Hegel and Śaṅkara towards what is called "immediate experience", we must not forget that Hegel's "reason" is not the same as what Śaṅkara calls "tarka", and what the latter says against tarka does not indiscriminately hold true of "reason" as the former conceives it. Tarka is reflective activity. But Hegel's "reason" does not mean simply reflective activity; it is both reflective activity and intuitive activity, and both at once in an indivisible act. It is, therefore, "mediate and "immediate" in its operation.

V

THE VALUE CATEGORIES OF ŚAṅKARA

Reflection involves the use of categories of thought, and Śaṅkara uses certain categories in order to systematize and express the experience in which the Absolute reveals itself. A careful study of these will most clearly show to us that in Śaṅkara's system thought is not alien to intuition but an indispensable ally of it; and reason, far from misrepresenting the nature of the Absolute, provides one of the bases for the composition of that dialectic hymn of absolute knowledge which Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra so singularly typifies. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the general nature of reality will be found to contain the essence of the categories

¹ Hegel: *Phenomenology*, P. 82.

used by him in exhibiting the details of his Advaitism, and also the solution of the problem presented by them. The chief of these are (i) Substance and Quality, (ii) Cause and Effect, (iii) Universal and Particular. The categories in terms of which the nature of the universe and human experience of it are to be determined and communicated share, in common with them, not only the inseparability of value and existence but also their characteristic duality. This is the case with the category of Substance and Quality and with that of Cause and Effect. This is, likewise, the key to the understanding of his view of the Universal and its relation to the Particular. These categories of philosophical explanation, as used by Śāṅkara, share this nature because philosophy or reflective activity regarding the meaning of reality is bound up with the world of finite experience, which is marked by the characteristics noted above. Even if the Mukta, the freed soul, who has overcome the opposition between value and fact, chooses to describe his experience of the Absolute which is nothing other than Mokṣa itself, he will have to make use of an idiom which belongs to the realm of duality. This, however, does not mean that philosophy is nonsense. It only means that description of the absolute experience falls short of the experience itself.

The principle, then, which we have to bear in mind in understanding the nature of the categories is that, in the first place, Brahman as the highest value and reality is the Ātman of the entire universe, which is a revelation of its nature; and, in the second, this revelation, while one with Brahman, is at the same time not wholly Brahman, and, while something other than it, is not wholly other.

VI

THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE

The category of substance as used by Śāṅkara is a value category. It is concerned with the value of "Reality", "Being" or 'Satto' and is a development of that. Consistent with the value standpoint which Śāṅkara adopts, his inquiry into the nature of substance is an inquiry into the value of

it. What we call things are regarded by us as possessing qualities or characteristics. Therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion, a spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone.¹ Śāṅkara admits "that we cannot say that things have no natural properties at all", and it is also clear, he says, that "a thing can never divest itself of its natural property at all."²

The question arises, what are we to understand by the "it" to which these numerous attributes are ascribed, and how does it possess them? In other words, what is the substance to which the several qualities belong or in which they inhere? According to the Vaiśeṣika system substance is the substratum or support of qualities, the āśraya on which qualities depend. It is something over and above the qualities and is their basis. Quality abides in substance and has itself no quality. According to Locke the idea of substance is the idea of "the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine resubstante*, without some thing to support them"; this support we call substantia "which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding."³ Both these systems try to know the substance as "something besides" the qualities that characterize it; and, as Pringle-Pattison points out, "all the difficulties in regard to the obscurity of the idea, our inability to give it any determinate content, and our consequent ignorance..... of the real essence of any substance" are traceable to this inconsistent demand. "Nothing can be at all without being in some determinate way, and this 'being in some determinate way' is precisely what we mean by the qualities of a thing." We cannot divorce the being of a thing from the essence of it; the that of a thing is inseparable from its what. Existence cannot be dissociated from its reality or value. Accordingly, Śāṅkara points out that

1 Locke: *Essay* abridged and edited by Pringle-Pattison, p. 156.

2 Brahm. S. B., IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 6.

3 Locke: *Essay*, p. 156.

"the quality must be held to constitute the very essence of the substance". True to his standpoint of Advaita, the non-duality or oneness of value and reality and the inseparability of essence and existence, Śaṅkara does not regard the quality as something which supervenes on or is derived from the substance, or the substance as something which can exist without and apart from the latter. "Heat of fire lasts as long as fire."¹ "Fire can never part with its natural light or heat."² The latter is the essence of the former, its very self, the Ātman. "If a thing cannot exist apart from something else, the latter is the essence of that thing". "The heat or light of fire surely is not a consequence of the activity of fire; it is a contradiction in terms to say that they are, and yet that they are the natural properties of fire"³. The thing is not first there and then in a magical way clothed with qualities afterwards. A thing is nothing apart from its inherent nature, and the inherent nature of a thing, according to Śaṅkara, is eternal. The quality is simply a special way of the thing's being there. Śaṅkara is whole-heartedly of Lotze's view that all attempts to lay down a theory of the way in which the what of things flows from a mere that are attempts to answer the absurd question "how Being is made". Thus Śaṅkara is led to the view "that between the cause and the effect, as between the substance and its quality, we should assume an identity of essence, as there is no distinction between them such as there is between a horse and a buffalo".⁴ It is an imperfect way to view the quality as something which is different from the substance and which is owned by the latter.

Rāmānuja has failed to grasp the true position of Śaṅkara on this point, and his criticism of the category of substance and quality betrays a misunderstanding of its nature as discussed by Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja takes pains to make the

1 S. B., II. 2. 17. तस्माद् द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य ।

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 1. 23.

3 Ibid., IV. 3. 7.

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 7. यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणाग्रहणं यस्य तस्य तदात्म्यमेव लोके दृष्टम् ।

5 S. B., II. 1. 18. कार्यकारणयो द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाद्यमपह्निषद्वन्द्वुदय-
भावात्तादात्म्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

point that all the accepted criteria of truth prove only such things as are qualified by attributes. There can be no reality which is nirguna. That which is said to be known on any ground must have some character by which it is known. Substance is what possesses qualities. The basis is the substance and what depends on it is the quality. The relation between the two is one of inherence wherein distinction subsists between the substance and the attributes as well between the attributes themselves. The distinction between the object and its qualifications cannot be done away with. That Brahman is Saṁgu and not Nirguna is but another way of expressing this epistemological view entertained by Rāmānuja. From what has been said above it is not difficult to see that Ramanuja misrepresents Śāṅkara's position when he attributes to him the view that there are things which do not possess any quality, and he exposes himself to the charge of ignoratio elenchi when he points out that what is to be known on any ground must have some character by which it is known. Śāṅkara has pointed out in unmistakable words that it cannot be said that things have no-natural properties at all.¹ He boldly asserts that what is natural to a thing can never be eliminated, as the heat and light of the sun., and has the courage to lay it down as a maxim that "nothing but the inherent nature of a thing can be regarded as eternal".² Rāmānuja and Śāṅkara are at one on this point, though Rāmānuja fails to see this. The difference between the two consists in the fact that Rāmānuja is content to treat the category of substance and quality as a merely descriptive category while Śāṅkara uses it as an ontological category. That there are things and these things are viewed by the mind as possessing certain qualities is the deliverance of commonsense. Rāmānuja accepts it as a fact and Śāṅkara does not see any reason to overthrow it. Rāmānuja stops here. Śāṅkara presses his inquiry deeper and attempts to determine the philosophic significance of this tool of thought; and, as the result of his inquiry, tells us that quality must be

1 Brhad. S. Br., IV. 4. 6. न च स्वाभाविको घट इव नास्ति पदार्थानामिति दास्यं वक्तुम् ।

2 Ibid., IV. 4.6.

held to be the very essence of the substance. There is an identity of essence between them, because existence is inseparable from essence.

But if substance and attribute are identical in essence, whence the necessity of coining two different words, one to designate the "dravya" and the other the "guna"? Govindānanda anticipates this objection.¹ Śāṅkara says that the universe in which these distinctions are experienced and to which they have relevance exhibits not only the inseparability and oneness of essence and existence, but also their duality. It is *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*. Śāṅkara says that just as in our ordinary experience of the world objects like a hare, kuśa-grass, a palasa tree, being absolutely distinct from each other, are never found to be dependent upon each other, similarly if quality and substance are absolutely distinct from each other, quality cannot possibly be dependent upon substance.² But again, as Govindānanda points out, if complete difference is destructive of any such relation, so is complete identity also.³ Śāṅkara points out that the level of ordinary human experience involves the distinction between essence and existence, and that is why one and the same substance appears under these varied attributes or qualities, as when we speak of "a white blanket", "a ruddy cow", or "a blue lotus".⁴ But here also Śāṅkara is careful to note that "there never exists in the case of the substance and its qualities a knowledge of their distinctness, as it does in the case of the fire and the smoke".⁵ Hence the quality constitutes the very essence of substance.⁶ Hence also "the assumption of the relation of Inherence is purposeless, because substance and quality are actually perceived as identical-in-essence".⁷

1 Ratnaprabha on S.B., II. 2.17. अभेद द्रव्यगुण इति शब्दप्रत्ययभेदः कथम् ।

2 S.B., II. 2.17.

3 Ibid., अत्यन्तभेदवदत्यन्ताभेदेऽपि धर्मधर्मित्वायोगादिति मन्तव्यम् ।

4 S.B., II. 2.17.

5 S.B., II. 2.17. तेन तेन विशेषणं प्रतीयमानत्वान्नैव द्रव्यगुणयोरभिध्मयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति ।

6 S.B., Ibid.

7 S.B., II. 1.18. तादात्म्यप्रतीतिरेव द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकृतानानर्थक्यम् ।

VII

THE UNIVERSAL AND ITS RELATION TO THE PARTICULAR

Another category which plays an important part in Śaṅkara's metaphysics is the category of the universal and the particular. The central problem of philosophy from time immemorial has been the relationship of the One to the many or of the universal to the particular. This was the problem which occupied the attention of Plato, whose doctrine of Ideas is the answer to it. This very problem "which had already been recognized as fundamental by Socrates, stands in the centre of the Aristotelian logic", whose Categories formulated it. It at once produced the Platonic doctrine of Ideas and gave rise to the Aristotelian logic. The problem was hotly debated in the Middle ages, and, as Windelband points out, it is significant that this occurred independently in the Orient and in the Occident. The zeal which enlivened Plato's discussion of the problem and turned his philosophy into the science of Ideas, the enthusiasm with which Aristotle carried on his war against that doctrine of ideas, while himself always remaining a Platonist, the tenacity with which the science of the Middle Ages held fast to the elaboration of this problem in endless discussions, unerringly prove that "in this question a very real and very difficult problem lies before us".

Śaṅkara's discussion of the problem has a uniqueness about it, though we are disappointed to miss in it that many-sided approach to the question which a man of his genius alone could effect with courage, confidence, and insight. Anyhow, his discussion of the problem does not degenerate into a mere game with the abstractions of formal logic. In order to understand the nature of the universal and its relation to the particular we must carefully note that the basic

1 S. B., II. 2. 17.

2 S. B., II. 2. 17. तेन तेन विशेषणं प्रतीयमानत्वात्तेन द्रव्यगुणयोरग्निसूक्ष्मयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति ।

3 S. B., *ibid.*

4 S. B., II. 1. 18. तादात्म्यप्रतीतिश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानयंबन्धम् ।

conception of Śaṅkara's axiological ontology and epistemology is that of the Ātman. Time and space cannot render intelligible to us the real nature of the Ātman, the essence of a thing, and the relation in which the one can stand to the other. The universal, according to Śaṅkara, is the essence of the particular, its very Ātman, that in the absence of which the particular cannot be what it is. The relation between the two is one of identity-in-essence; the particular is nothing other than the universal. The question about the relation between the particular and the universal would not have presented a problem before us, had it not been for the fact that the level of experience at which we find ourselves is infected with a duality between reality and existence wherein the two, while inseparable, are not completely reconciled to each other. In the case of a thing and its essence, we cannot even say that the one depends upon the other or the one supports the other. If the real nature of the particular is that it has its essence in the universal, if it is the universal which reveals itself as the particular this or that, if the universal is the Ātman of the particular, it is futile, according to Śaṅkara, to think that there can be any relation of dependence or inherence between them. When one is the other, we cannot speak of the one as supporting the other or the other as supported by the one. According to Śaṅkara, this view of the *ananyatva* of the particular from the universal not only blurs but abolishes the sharp distinction between what is universal and what is particular. If the universal is the essence of the particular, they cannot be treated as "antithetical terms". Accordingly, it is a concession to the exigencies of language when Śaṅkara speaks of the particular as included in the universal and as participating in its essence, and of the latter as giving reality to the former. "*Svarūpaprādāna*" is the word used by Śaṅkara. The universal communicates its own life to, or better in, the particular. It sets itself up as the particular and the particular is but the appearance or form of the universal. The universal is not first there and then, at some later moment, commences pouring its life into the particular, which perhaps may be thought to have an independent life of its own alongside the universal. It is the one life of the universal which

reveals itself as the particular. Śaṅkara's doctrine is neither that of "the universal in things", nor of "the universal before things", but of the universal as the Ātman of the thing. All the relational forms turn out to be inadequate when it is a question of expressing the nature of the relation between a thing and its essence. The thing is made of its essence. When Śaṅkara speaks of the universal as "sustaining" or "supporting" the particulars, it is only to bring out the truth that the universal is their Brahman, their Self, because they have no reality apart from it, for if a thing cannot exist apart from something, the latter is the essence, the self of that thing.¹

Śaṅkara reduces the relation of the universal and the particular to that of cause and effect, where the latter is but the differentiation of the former. The particulars are included in the general and are not separate from it, just as an effect is not separate from its cause. The general, the universal, is the "uktha", the source of the particulars. It is their "sāman" (common feature), for it is common to all the particulars. It is their "Brahman", their Self, for it sustains them. That which is derived from another is not other than it, as a jar, for instance, is not other than clay. The particulars being derived from the universal are not other than it. Śaṅkara illustrates this point.² "Speech, that is, sound in general, is the "uktha", the cause or material, of the particular names, as the salt rock is of the particles of salt. All names, differentiations, such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta, spring from it, this generality of names, as do particles of salt from the salt rock. Sound in general is their sāman, that is, common feature. It is common to all names which are its own particular forms". The particular names are derived from speech, because speech is their Brahman, Self; for they have no reality apart from sound. "Sound in general sustains or supports all names or particular sounds by giving them reality."³ "Thus on account of their relation as cause and effect, and as general and particular, and the one giving the other reality, particular names are proved to be just sound"⁴. The particular is thus

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 6.

2 ibid., I. 6. 1.

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 6. 1.

4 ibid., एव कार्यकारणत्वोपपत्तेः सामान्यविशेषोपपत्तेरात्मप्रदानोपपत्तेश्च नामविशेषाणां शब्दमात्रता सिद्धा ।

identical in essence with the universal and non-different from it. The universal being the essence of the particular, Śaṅkara speaks of it as the cause of the latter. But he warns us against thinking that the particular is made of an alien essence. The relation between the particular and the universal is one of *tadatmya*, identity of essence.

The various words which are employed by Śaṅkara to bring out this identity of essence, in spite of their seeming separateness, are to be understood in the light of the principle of the identity of value and reality which, as we have said above, is the bedrock upon which his system is founded. His statements to the effect that the particulars "arise"¹ "are born"² and "are differentiated"³ from the universal and are included in it,⁴ and the universal "sustains and supports"⁵ the particulars and "lends them its own life"⁶ are but to bring out the truth and strengthen the idea that the particular is nothing other than the universal. If the particular shares the life of the universal, it is one in essence with it. If it is one in essence with it, it cannot exist in isolation from it at any instant. This mode of conceiving the nature of the particular and the universal precludes any relation of "inherence" between them.

In the Middle ages the schoolmen gave to the doctrine of the real existence of universals the name of "realism". In this sense of the word, Śaṅkara's philosophy can most fittingly be described as realism, which stands in sharp contrast with conceptualism. According to conceptualism the only existent realities are individuals. No common natures exist, and so individuals cannot share a common nature. The universals are mental constructs formed by a process of abstraction from the contemplation of individual entities. They are created

1 उत्तिष्ठन्ति ।

2 उत्पद्यते ।

3 प्रविभज्यते ।

4 सामान्येऽन्तर्भावात् ।

5 विभ्रति, धारयति ।

6 स्वरूपप्रदानेन आत्मप्रदानेन

by the mind in order, through their instrumentality, to acquire knowledge about real things. These concepts somehow correspond with each of a number of individuals. This doctrine of "universalia post rem" does not find favour with Śāṅkara, who holds that common natures do exist. The universal is called *sāman* "because of sameness, that is, common feature".¹ In this way there are "varieties of universal".² Śāṅkara and Plato are at one in thinking that the name remains insignificant unless there really is a "common nature" which justifies the common name. Neither of them is prepared to believe that the universals are just 'thoughts in our minds' and exist in intellectu merely; to think that they are merely "labour-saving devices", "conceptual shorthands" is to ignore the truth about them. Plato's rejoinder in the "Parmenides" has a unique parallel in Śāṅkara's statement in his commentary on *Bhādaranyaka* quoted above. The Platonic realism has been summed up in the formula "universalia ante rem". It would be instructive to bring out a comparison between the Platonic realism and the Vedāntic realism of Śāṅkara.

VIII

PLATO AND ŚĀṆKARA ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL

According to Plato, the "universals", "ideas", or "forms" are the substantial realities. They exist in and for themselves. They are the incorporeal, eternal, self-identical entities, the original transcendent archetypes of things existing prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The particulars are the imperfect copies or reflections of these eternal patterns. They may come and go; but the idea or form goes on for ever. The idea is the rational essence of things, it is that which each group of things is in itself. It is the universal as in or beside the particular, the common element in or beside the point of difference. On this view

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I. 6. 1. समत्वात् साम सामान्यमित्यर्थः

2 *Idid.*, II. 4. 9. सामान्यबहुत्व व्यापनार्थः ।

any intelligible connection between the universal and the particular was ex-hypothesi excluded. The world of incorporeal ideas was regarded as the higher, the more valuable, the more primitive world; the world of sensible objects was said to possess a merely borrowed existence, being but an image, an imitation, an imperfect copy of the former. Critics have, accordingly, not failed to point out that on account of this absence of relation between general and particular, between ideas and phenomena, between conception and perception, this "tearing apart" of essence and existence, being and becoming "all philosophy of nature is cut off by the hypothesis of Ideas"¹. It has been emphasized that Plato, in spite of all his efforts, had not been able to overcome this absence of relation even in the later phases of his teaching, which viewed the idea as the final cause of phenomena, as the end for the sake of which occurrence takes place "Even as the final cause of occurrence the ideas remained a world by themselves beside the phenomena."²

If the general idea is the substance of the particulars or the essence of the things, how can it exist apart from that of which it is the substance or the essence? The general cannot exist outside of and alongside the particular. This "tearing apart" of the world of "essence" and the world of "existence" by Plato became the chief target of attack by his successor Aristotle, who constantly urges that the universal cannot exist out of the particular, and whose entire effort is directed towards bridging this gulf which his predecessor had created by allotting to the ideas a transcendent region in which they reposed in their self-identical purity. In so far as the ideas are put outside of the particulars, they can explain neither the existence of the particulars nor our knowledge of them. The universal is the constitutive nature of a group, and the constitutive marks of a class are only found in the concrete particulars. According to Aristotle, then, forms or universals exist only as characteristics or features of individual things. They are real, but real only as the essence of concrete individual entities. The universals exist "in" the various

1 Aristotle : *Metaphysics* A. 992 b. 8.

2 Windelband : *History of Philosophy*. P. 133.

instances, so that there would be no "squareness" unless there were squares, nor "manness" unless there were men. On the Aristotelian view, though there are no universals *ante res*, there are universals *in rebus*, and this doctrine is historically known as the doctrine of "universalia in re". The controversy between Plato and Aristotle regarding the relation between the universal and the particular, whether the former exists prior to things and apart from them and independent of them or is inherent and immanent in the thing, loses much of its significance for Śāṅkara on account of the special point of view from which he looks at the problem, namely, the axiological. Śāṅkara says that if the universal is the essence of the particular, if it is its very Self (Ātman), it is idle to raise the issue whether the "idea" exists "in" the particulars or "outside" them, whether the one is "along with" the many or "in" and "among" the many.

The problem with which Śāṅkara's doctrine of the "sāman", the universal, is concerned is, as is the case with the Platonic theory of ideas, the explanation of the world of generation, the world of phenomena. But explanation, in the hands of Śāṅkara, assumes the form of determining the significance, the value of the phenomena. The category of causality as used by him bears an axiological stamp. Śāṅkara does not separate the one from the many and then attempt the impossible task of deducing the many from the one. His is the awareness of a non-temporal unchanging realm of absolute existence, of a "grand universal" which subsumes all other universals, and of a changing cycle of merely relative being; and the problem before him is only that of finding out how the world of generation is necessarily implicated in the world of absolute being. In his own way he endeavours to show that the world of generation is a revelation of the life of the Absolute, the Great Universal, the Mahasāmānya.

It cannot be said of Śāṅkara that by his doctrine of sāman, "all philosophy of nature is cut off"; nature is the manifesting life of the universal.¹ Plato's doctrine of universalia *ante rem* marks a deviation from that valuational standpoint which is his greatest contribution to philosophy. If the universal is

1 S. E., I. 4. 14.

the essence of the particular it cannot be outside the particular. Using the plain man's language, we can say that it must be in the particular; and Śaṅkara would have nothing to say against Aristotle's doctrine of universalia in re. But it would be truer to say, according to Śaṅkara, that the particular is in the universal, if we cannot afford to give up the plain man's language. The universal cannot be sought in the particular; it is the latter which is to be sought in the former. In this sense the Aristotelian view of universalia in re tells only a half truth. The universal transcends the particulars and is not exhausted by them. In this sense the Platonic Realism embodies a great measure of truth. But neither the Platonic nor the Aristotelian view contains the full measure of it; for half a wave can only tell half a truth. For Śaṅkara the particular is undivided from the universal; it is avibhakta, as he says, from the universal.

Though from the standpoint of the highest reality, the particular is non-different from the universal, yet when we have recourse to language which commonsense speaks we can say that the particular is in the universal and the universal in the particular. As containing the particular and being the source of it, the universal is transcendent; and as being present in the particular, it is immanent. The highest universal is both transcendent and immanent. Brahman is in everything and everything is in Brahman. But Śaṅkara is careful to draw our attention to the fact that this mode of expression is a concession to the weakness of language, though it is nearest the truth, because it does away with the onesidedness of the Platonic and the Aristotelian way of characterizing the nature of the universal. Śaṅkara, in this matter, does not hesitate to speak with the vulgar while thinking with the learned. He knows "it is impossible even in the most rigid philosophic reasonings so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies".

While holding tenaciously to the truth that the particular is nothing other than the universal, in which case a relational mode of thought and expression will be out of place, he yet has recourse to a mode of speech which use had made inevi-

table, and speaks of the relation between the two with the help of the concept of "participation". The individual thing but partakes in the universal essence of the Idea, the *sāman*; it is included in the universal.¹ This act of participation connotes to Śaṅkara identity of essence and not incongruity of nature between the Idea and the particular. Śaṅkara prefers to designate the relation as one of participation and not imitation, "because imitation suggests a separate independent reality of the universal, and participation means that the plan is not copied but modified to suit the special circumstances of time and space"².

The universal and particular are of one and the same stuff. The universals do not belong to a transcendent world from which, as it were, they descend upon their particulars and infrom them with their spirit. From the standpoint of commonsense the universals can be regarded as the more primitive, the producing and determining substances, and the particulars as dependent upon them. This determination or dependence is conceived by Śaṅkara as a causal process in which the universal takes on form and unfolds itself as the particular. More correctly speaking, the universal is neither in the particular nor outside of the particular; it is the *Ātman* of the particular, and in the *Ātman* there is neither "in" nor "out". In this view of the nature of the universal and the particular the difficulty regarding the status of the finite individual which divides the Absolutists from the Personalists loses much of its sting.

The pressing problem before Śaṅkara is not whether the individual possesses adjectival or substantive reality. His view is far removed from that "contrary opinion" of which Professor Whitehead says that "it led to the collapse of Descartes's many substances into Spinoza's one substance; to Leibniz's windowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the sceptical reduction of Hume's Philosophy".³ Though Śaṅkara, like the medieval thinkers in the West, changes the

1 Brhad. S. B., I, 6. 1, अन्तर्भाव ।

2 Alexander: Space, Time and Deity, P. 221.

3 P. R., P. 66.

logical subordination of the particular into a production and inclusion of it by the general, and reiterates "that the particular forms of existence are produced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that which is general is produced from particulars"¹, yet he also holds that a mere particular does not exist. "All specific forms have their origin in mistaken cognitions."² "But the particulars are false only in their character of specific forms; in their character of pure being these too are true".³ The superior reality of the universal does not swallow up the particular, according to Śāṅkara. That would be but a wooden way of expressing the identity of essence which the individual enjoys with the universal.

Like Plato, Śāṅkara also teaches that there are varieties of universal. There are numberless such forms or ideas, nothing being too lowly or insignificant to have its idea. "There are many distinct kinds of universals and particulars; sentient and insentient"⁴. Professor Alexander expresses a similar truth when he says that "the universals are spatio-temporal, physical, biological, mental, according to the level of existence to which their individuals belong. The universals of physical things are physical and the universal man, though it is not a man, is man or human. A physical universal is a physical subsistent and a mental one a mental subsistent"⁵. The universal, according to both Śāṅkara and Alexander, belongs to the same order as the particulars. These ideas or universals, though numberless, are not disordered like chaos. They constitute a well-ordered world. This order forms an inter-related organic unity, the universals being arranged in logical order, and subsumed under the highest universals, the Mahāsāmānya, which, according to Śāṅkara, is nothing but Brahman itself, the source of all the rest. According to Śāṅkara, there is a gradation of universals, the lower of which are joined together by means of other universals of a higher

1 S. B., II, 3. 9. सामान्याद्वि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

2 Chand. S. B., VIII. 3. 4.

3 Ibid., तान्यपि आकारविशेषोऽनृतं स्वतः सामान्यरूपतया सत्यम् ।

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 9. अनेके हि विसृजणाश्चेतनाचेतनरूपा सामान्यविशेषाः ।

5 Space, Time and Delfy, P. 223.

order; the latter, in turn, are embraced under others, still more exalted, and so on; the universals increase in generality and force until we reach the top, the last, the highest universal or the Brahman which comprehends, contains or summarizes the entire system. This Brahman is the highest reality and the greatest value, and thus conceived, it is also the cosmic purpose. "The distinct kinds of the general and particulars are, through a series of intermediate steps, included in a supreme genus, Pure Intelligence."¹

Śaṅkara does not tell us anything more about the systematic connection and order existing in the realm of universals. Though he believed in the possibility of a coordination and subordination among the universals, the thought of a "logically arranged pyramid" of universals which must culminate in the universal that is most general seems not to have been carried out. It is present only in a seed form in his writings, but it is the key to the understanding of his system. What Windelband said of Plato characterizes Śaṅkara's position on this point; and it is as true of Śaṅkara, as of Plato, that the subordination of the other universals to the highest universal is not the logical subordination of a particular under the general but the teleological subordination of the means to the end. The world is governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the Good, and is a rational spiritual whole.² All change and occurrence exists for the sake of the Idea, the Universal, the Brahman. The Mahāsāmānya is the final cause of phenomena. "Just as a drum, a conch and a viṇā have distinct general and particular notes of their own, which are included in sound in general, so during the continuance of the universe we may know all things to be unified in Brahman, because the varieties of genus and particulars are not different from it".³

Plato speaks of "the heaven which is above the heavens", of which "no earthly poet ever did or will sing worthily", as

1 Brhad. S. B., II. 4.9., तेषां पारम्पर्यगत्या यथैकस्मिन्महासामान्येऽन्तर्भावः प्रज्ञानघने ।

2 S. B., I. 4.14.

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 4.9, एवं स्थितिराद्ये तावत्सामान्यविशेषादतिरेकाद्द्रष्टृकत्वं शक्यमवगन्तुम् ।

the abode of the idea. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; "the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul."¹ But this heaven is not the physical heaven, part of the mundane universe. What Plato really means is that the home of the Idea is Idea as such; the Idea has no place outside of itself. In the same vein Śaṅkara speaks of the *Brahmapuram* as the abode of the Brahman, the *Mahāsāmānya*, the Great Universal. But this *Brahmapuram* is nothing other than Brahman itself. "The true city of Brahman is Brahman itself."² Brahman is the city and also the citizen. Thus it is clear that Śaṅkara's conception of the universal and the particular is but the consequence of the valuational standpoint which he adopts throughout. This also enables us to see that standpoint in a truer light and a more proper perspective. This consideration of the nature of the universal and its relation to the particular which Śaṅkara has "transformed into a causal process by means of which the universal takes on form and unfolds itself in the particular" has prepared us for understanding the nature of the creative aspect of the Vedāntic Absolute, which, for a fairly long time, has been represented as a lion's den into which every foot was seen entering but none coming out, or as "the night in which all cows are black".

IX

ŚAṅKARA'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

It has been the misfortune of philosophy that it has always been called upon to express and expound the complex nature of reality in words while that reality has always been found to be too deep for words. There does not seem to be an end to that difficulty. The difficulty arises owing to something which is inherent in the nature of reality itself and the medium through which it is to be expressed. The difficulty, as Deussen has pointed out, is that "all metaphysics has to battle with the great difficulty, unique in the whole province of science, that it must think in conceptions and

1 Plato. *Phaedrus*, 247.

2 Chand. S B., VIII. 1.7.

express in words what is properly contrary to their nature, since all words and conceptions at last spring from that very base of empiric reality which metaphysics undertakes to transcend, in order to lay hold on the 'Self' of the world or the thing-in-itself which finds its expression and manifestation in all empiric reality".¹ This difficulty attracted the notice of Kant, who coined entirely new words and redesigned the language to make it suitable for philosophy and, as Urban says, "in pouring new wine into the old bottles of Scholastic terminology produced a 'barbarous language'." Bergson and Whitehead, in our own times, have pressed upon us this problem of the relation between language and the reality to be expressed by it. Bergson complains that natural language was made to handle the static and cannot grasp the dynamic; "it is not moulded on reality". He concludes that we should not try to express reality in linguistic symbols, but use language only poetically, only to bring us to the point where we may intuit directly the "duration" which escapes language. As reality is not static, nouns and adjectives, which symbolize states and can represent only the static, misrepresent reality. Bergson says that the statement "the child becomes a man" does not express the truth, because "the reality which is the transition" from childhood to manhood has slipped between our fingers. We have only the imaginary stops, "child" and "man", and we are very near to saying that one of the stops is the other.² The truth is, he continues, that if language were moulded on reality, we should not say "The child becomes the man", but "There is becoming from the child to the man." But the first manner of expression is alone conformable to our habits of language.³

Whitehead, influenced by Bergson and the New Logic which replaces natural language with non-linguistic symbols, has brought about a "linguistic revolution" by creating a language of pure dynamism. Natural language, according to him, is unable to express reality. But the tool

1 D.S.V., P. 97.

2 Creative Evolution: P. 330.

3 *ibid.*, P. 330.

required for philosophy is language. According to Whitehead, then, philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned.¹ The language of literature, he says, breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities.....the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express. This very dissatisfaction has led him to create an entirely new language and design an entirely new idiom. He has undertaken a drastic revision of the basal categories which rendered metaphysical speculation possible during the course of the centuries preceding his age. This revision is in the direction of the displacement of static categories by dynamic ones, because reality is dynamic, is fluent energy. Whitehead thus asks us to speak, and himself attempts to speak, a language wholly of verbs. All modern philosophy, he says, hinges about the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. But this manner of speech does violence to the truth which is dynamism. For the category of "substance" we have, in him, the category of the "actual occasion", which is not a thing but a 'process'. These "processes" are the ultimate entities of the temporal world. For the category of "inherence" we have the category of 'ingression'; for the category of "thinghood" that of "concrecence". Bergson taught the lesson that philosophy must redesign language. He did not himself practise what he preached. Whitehead profited by that lesson and, in redesigning the natural language, produced a work which, according to a contemporary writer, "has proved to be the most unintelligible essay in philosophy ever written".

Śāṅkara's philosophy of language consists of some very simple truths about the deficiency of human language, through which alone the inexpressible has to be expressed, and of certain propositions which have to be borne in mind in any attempt to characterize the absolutely Real. Śāṅkara does not make any attempt to redesign the language which his predecessors wrote and his contemporaries spoke on the

1 P. R., P. 14.

ground that it is not moulded on reality. The real, according to Śaṅkara, is above all change and rest, and neither a language of pure dynamism nor one which derives its metaphor from the unmoving rock can be adequate to its essence. Śaṅkara's complaint is not with reference to any particular type of language but to language itself; but, at the same time, he does not fail to see that language is the only tool which one can use in philosophizing.

The real nature of Brahman, which is above all division and differentiation, cannot be adequately expressed through the use of words. Language presupposes distinctions and differentiations, distinctions between different kinds of being, between being and non-being, between reality and unreality and different orders of reality. It is relational in essence and "naturally makes use of relations of like with like, of content to container, of cause to effect, which are implied in every phrase in which there is a subject, an attribute and a verb, expressed or understood".¹ "A presentation", says Śaṅkara, "by some one has for its object something to be presented, and this is possible only where there is difference", difference not only between the man who undertakes the presentation and the thing which is to be presented but also between "that" which is presented and "what" is presented of it. When reality is everything, and there is nothing other than it, "what is there that can be specified and through what"? Śaṅkara is at one with Bradley in thinking that "thought essentially consists in the separation of the "what" from the "that", and however much it may endeavour to restore this breach there still remains a difference unremoved, between the subject and the predicate, a difference which, while it persists, shows a failure in thought but which, if removed, would wholly destroy the special essence of thinking".³ Liberation, which is Śaṅkara's Brahman, is the consciousness that I am all this, in which there is no want and no striving. For such a consciousness there is present neither the distinction between the self and the not-self nor the distinction between one thing and another.

1 Bergson : *Creative Evolution*, P. 156.

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 3. 8.

3 *Appearance and Reality*, P. 319.

In the absence of the former distinction there is an utter annihilation of any tendency to carry on any reflective activity. This is the reason why "Brahman is unknowable. One is known by another, but it is one, hence unknowable".¹ In the absence of any distinction predication itself would not be possible, for predication presupposes the distinction between the subject and the predicate.

According to Śaṅkara, every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing as associated with a certain genus, or a certain act, or a certain quality, or a certain mode of relation.² For example, "cow" and "horse" imply genera, "cooking" and "reading" imply acts, "white" and "black" imply qualities, 'wealthy' and "cattle-owner" imply relations. But Brahman belongs to no genus, as it is the highest genus, the Mahāsāmānya. "It cannot have anything like a generic property like the cow, etc., because it is devoid of all upādhis or limiting adjuncts; it has neither generic nor specific characteristics because it is one, without a second."³ The varieties of genera and species are not other than it, being but differentiations of it, and consequently cannot be set up as against it and limiting it. Brahman cannot be treated as a class among other classes, and thus cannot be said to possess any generic property. It is only well defined classes remaining distinct from each other that can do so. Being devoid of qualities it cannot be denoted by a word implying a quality. The distinction between substance and quality is non-existent in Brahman because in it existence is inseparable from essence. Being actionless it cannot be denoted by a word implying act. It is not related to anything else, for it is one and non-dual and there is nothing other than it. "It is one, without a second. It is no object (of self). It is the very essence."⁴ As a matter of fact, the inability of language to express the nature of the Absolute is ultimately

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 20., प्रतिपादयितुः प्रतिपादनस्य प्रतिपाद्यविषयत्वात् । भेदे हितद्वयवति ।

2 Gita. S. ., XIII. 12.

3 Mond. S., I. 9.

4 Gita. S.B., XIII. 12, न च सम्बन्धि एकत्वात् अद्वयत्वात् अविषयत्वात् आत्मत्वात् ।

grounded in Śaṅkara's basal assumption that reality is advaitam, non-dual, in which essence and existence are inseparable, and the distinction between subject and predicate is non-existent.

As Brahman is the absolute existence, Śaṅkara says that "when we wish to describe its true nature, free from all difference due to limiting adjuncts, then this is an utter impossibility. Then there is only one way left to describe it as 'Not This', 'Not This' by eliminating all specific determinations of it that one may know of".¹ "Because it is above all duality, it is described as 'Not This, not this.'"² Brahman transcends and is wholly other than every particular real thing. None of the particular predicates we affirm of it therefore can be adequate to the all-inclusive and infinite nature of it. We cannot attempt to know the Absolute Brahman as we can know, for example, "a cow"³ Because it is not a thing among other things and is the very essence of them, their very self, "all the characteristics of a substance are denied of it; in other words, the Immutable is not a substance; it is not gross, nor minute, nor short nor long."⁴ Every particular predicate we affirm of it properly belongs to some one of its effects in contradistinction from others, and can therefore be applied to it only analogically and with the warning that the mode of characterization is bound up with the consciousness that there are things other than the Absolute. It is the finite or imperfect consciousness, according to Śaṅkara, which creates something other than Brahman, sets up a region of not-self, and then superimposes this not-self, this something other, upon it. It is by way of this superimposition that the work of predication proceeds and Brahman is viewed as "this" or "that". But when the predicate is seen to be the manifesting life of the subject and the subject to be the very self of the predicate, when this consciousness of non-duality dawns, "what is there that can be specified and through what?"⁵ Śaṅkara here is wholly of Bradley's mind when the

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 3.6.

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad. S.B., III. 4.2.

4 Brhad. S.B., II. 8.8. एतैश्चनुमिः परिमाणप्रतिषेधैः द्रव्यमप्रतिषिद्धो भवति ।

5 Brhad. S.B., III.8. 8, एकमेव द्वितीयं तत्केन किं विशिष्यते ।

latter says that "used of the whole each predicates would be the result of an indefensible division and each would be a fragment isolated and by itself without consistent meaning"¹, and that such predicates belong to and have a meaning only in the world of appearance".² The real nature of the Absolute cannot be expressed through words which were devised to handle one or other of its effects. It can be done only by denying all specific attributes. "It can be said to be neither 'sat' nor 'asat'."³ Therefore in all the Upaniṣads Brahman is described in a "negative way" or "by way of remotion" as "not this", "not this".⁴

This negative way of speaking about Brahman incorporates within it a profound mysticism, and in order to grasp Śaṅkara's real meaning it should be read as part and parcel of his metaphysical views. In the highest state of realization, when everything becomes the Self what should one see and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, and what should one think and through what, what should one know and through what? "Not this, Not this"—this means that "there is nothing other than or separate from Brahman. These words do not mean that Brahman itself does not exist"⁵ The particle "neti, neti" also points to the absoluteness of the eternal value by denying the self-subsistence of the relative values which are ultimately grounded in and derive their being from the former, i. e. it is a value-charged idiom. It is but a means of pointing out to us that there is nothing in the world of space and time which can give us an insight into the absolute nature of them. This "negative way" tells only half the truth, of which there is a positive side which we have already discussed while explaining the nature of Brahman as Saccidānanda. "Neti, neti" is not the established dogma of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara; it is, as he puts it, but a "pratipādanaprakriyā", "pratipādanaprakāra", "way or manner of establishing the

1 Appearance and Reality, P. 432.

2 Ibid. P, 318.

3 Gita. S.B., XIII. 12.

4 Brhad. S.B., II.3.6. प्रतिपद्यद्द्वारेण नेति नेति इति निर्देशः ।

5 S. B., III 2. 22.

truth". The manner of exhibiting the nature of Brahman by having recourse to the denial of particular attributes is the same everywhere.¹ "The passage 'from whence all speech along with the mind turns away unable to reach it' embodies but a mode of establishing Brahman."² It tells us, as Śaṅkara says, about the nature of Brahman by denying the reality of forms fictitiously attributed to it.

Is, then, intelligible discourse about Brahman an impossibility? If we divorce philosophy from language we cannot talk intelligibly about anything. If the philosopher wants to speak about Brahman, about Ātman, about Liberation or even about things temporal, he must use language. Even if he wishes to talk about that state of perfection from which words return back without being able to reach it, he must perforce use language unless he chooses to be content with "living" that. Language is the very condition of there being any significant reality about which we can talk intelligibly.

According to Śaṅkara, if we want to talk about the Absolute and think of its nature, we can talk and think only by predicating of it its other which we have abstracted from its undivided life by an act of indefensible division which, for this very reason, is avidyātmaka. "Brahman is described by means of name, form and action superimposed on it."³ Even if a perfected consciousness were to choose to write down a philosophical exposition of the absolute consciousness it would be compelled to have recourse to what Bradley calls an act of "indefensible division" and Śaṅkara "adhyāropa". An ignorant man does it under an erroneous conception, taking it for solid truth. The wise man does it under a necessity which belongs to the very nature of thought, which is relational in essence. "Ignorant people have false notions, whereas thinking people have notions that relate to an apparent basis for conventional intercourse. For instance, even thinking people sometimes say that the sky is dark or

1 S. B., III. 3. 33. समानो हि सर्वत्र विशेषनिराकरणरूपो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकारः ।

2 S. B., III. 2. 22, प्रतिपादनप्रक्रिया त्वेषा 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह' ।

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 3. 6. अध्वारोपितनामरूपकमंडारेण ब्रह्म निदिश्यते ।

red, where the darkness or redness of the sky has just the above apparent reality."¹

Though the Absolute cannot be subjected to any relative treatment such as thinking or talking about it, the philosopher drags it out of its absolute seclusion and makes it the object of "conventional intercourse" through the limiting adjuncts of name and form. Only thus is reflection on the Absolute possible². "Brahman with the two limitations of name and form becomes the subject of discourse as the knower, the knowable, knowledge and all other wards."³ Brahman is thus described as "Knowledge, Bliss, Existence", as "Pure Intelligence", as "Atman". It is only in this way that it is thought of as the source and the ground of everything, as sustaining and supporting everything. Reflecting upon Brahman is subjecting it to relative conditions, and these relative conditions in Brahman are only possible through the limiting adjuncts of name and form. Even when we speak of Brahman as the Ātman of all, we are creating a distinction in thought between Brahman and other things and viewing Brahman as the "Self" with reference to them.

1 *ibid.*, II. 1. 20, अविवेकिनां मिथ्याबुद्धित्वात् विवेकिनां च संव्यवहारमात्रालम्बनार्थत्वात् ।

2 *Mand. S. B.*, IV. 100. अव्यवहार्यमपि व्यवहारगोचरमापद्य ।

3 *Taitt. S. B.*, II. 6. 1. ताभ्यां चोपाधिभ्यां ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानशब्दार्थादि संव्यवहारभागवत् ।

CHAPTER IX

VALUE AND EXISTENCE

EXISTENCE GROUNDED IN VALUE

For Śaṅkara existence is grounded in value and is inexplicable apart from it. The world of existence is an expression of the world of value. It also represents the duality of value and existence, a discrepancy between the ideal and actual. But, at the same time, it symbolizes their oneness and inseparability also. Śaṅkara expresses this dialectical antinomy which is embedded in the heart of reality—the duality as well as the oneness and inseparability of value and fact—in one word by calling the world of existence *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*.

The interpreters of Śaṅkara have allowed themselves to forget that according to Śaṅkara philosophy has to deal with the value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from value. "Fact or existence" does not contain its own value; it derives its value from something other than itself; and existence, being, becoming, perishing of the world process becomes intelligible and gets rid of the arbitrariness which otherwise would cling to it, only when it comes to be viewed in terms of value. It is from this valuational standpoint that Śaṅkara declares that the universe conceived as a mere flow, as a mere kaleidoscopic transformation, is without essence. Śaṅkara knows as well as Bergson and Heraclitus that the universe resembles "a flowing river or a burning lamp"¹, but considered in itself "it is transient, impure, flimsy and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, a dream, and so on, though it appears to those who have identified themselves with it to be eternal, undecaying and full of substance."² It is merely "a scheme of mathematical phenomena shifting lawfully through endless space and time." But no value attaches to these "infinite shiftings of cosmic dust." Śaṅkara

1 *Brhad. S. B.*, I. 5. 2.

2 *ibid.*

believes with Plato and Aristotle that the source of all intelligibility is value. Viewed in terms of value, the universe points to a source other than and independent of itself, of which it is a manifestation at the spatio-temporal level. That source is Brahman which is at once Divine Life, Divine Light and Divine Bliss.

Both Rāmānuja and Bhāskara attribute to Śaṅkara the view that the world of name and form is unreal and illusory. Rāmānuja thinks that according to Śaṅkara the world is an unreal play, carried on by implements unreal and known by the jīva to be unreal¹, and takes pains to point out that this view militates against Śaṅkara's own conception of Causality, which regards the effect as non-different from the cause.² Bhāskara gives the same interpretation. The world, according to Śaṅkara, is an illusory phenomenon. External objects, like fire, earth, water and mountain, have no existence, are mere phases of consciousness, and are momentary and without essence. Śaṅkara is one who does not believe in the externality of objects of perception.³ Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara share these views held by Rāmānuja and Bhāskara. In Dasgupta's view Śaṅkara holds that world-creation is illusory and but a fanciful appearance. Though he admits that "there was some amount of realism in Śaṅkara," he is never able to persuade himself to believe that this realism is a feature of Śaṅkara's philosophy. He says that Śaṅkara "was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations" but that this can hardly be taken to be "the meaning and force of Śaṅkara's philosophy".⁴ Thibaut attributes the same view to Śaṅkara. "Neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes unreality. The whole world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the belated traveller."⁵

1 R.B., II. 1.15

2 Ibid.

अवाद्यायंवादिन्

4 History, Vol. II. P.42

5 Thibaut, P.CXIX,

II

THE WORLD AS AN EXISTENTIAL ORDER

These views grossly misrepresent Śaṅkara's true meaning. Śaṅkara not only did not hold that the world as a fact is illusory but vehemently criticised those who shared this view. Śaṅkara's criticism of the Buddhistic idealists and nihilists leaves no room for doubt regarding his true meaning. So far as the "fact" of the world is concerned Śaṅkara is a realist to the core. The "world differentiated by name and form contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of action, these fruits having their definite times, places and causes"¹ and "is the object of perception"². It comprises "the sun, moon, planets, constellations and stars", all obeying a fixed law.³ Things do not happen spontaneously; "all things spring from definite causes".⁴ There is constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, and no mere chance play. "A son has the same form as, or resembles, his parents. A quadruped is not born of bipeds, nor vice versa."⁵ "The bird and the serpent are seen to be born from bird and serpent; hence a bird is the origin of another bird and a serpent of another serpent."⁶ "The seed, if lifeless, will not develop, which means that the vital force (*prāṇa*) begins to function earlier than the eye and other organs. ... The vital force goes on fostering the embryo from the moment of conception, and it is only after it (the vital force) has begun to function that the eye and other organs begin their work."⁷ Things in the world have certain fixed characteristics such as grossness or fineness. "You cannot prove that fire is cold or that the sun does not give heat."⁸ It is only a blind prejudice, that will assert that things are devoid of inherent qualities.⁹ We have

1 S. B., I. 1. 2.

2 Chānd. S. B., III. 14. 1.

3 Kāthā. S. B., II. 3. 2.

4 Bṛhad S. B., I. 4. 10.

5 *ibid.*, II. 5. 19.

6 Chānd. S. B., VI. 3. 1.

7 Bṛhad S. B., VI. 1. 1.

8 *ibid.*, II. 1. 20.

9 *ibid.*, IV. 4. 8.

but to open our eyes to see the surprising wealth of detail which the universe presents to us.¹ It comprises different worlds, Bhū, etc., different beings, god, birds and man, &c, different castes and orders of life.² It has a three-fold division according to the body (adhyātma), the elements (adhibhūta) and the gods (adhidaiva); it includes the animate kingdom and the inanimate one—stationary objects such as hills.³

Some of these objects which make up the entire universe are "external".⁴ As examples of these Śaṅkara cites the following in his works: earth, ākāśa, atoms⁵; "houses, couches, palaces, pleasure-grounds and the like things, which according to circumstances are conducive to the attainment of the pleasure or the avoidance of pain"⁶; "jars, pots and urns; bracelets, armlets and earrings, needles, arrows and swords."⁷ Some of these objects are the handiwork of God; some are the product of human agency. But in any case they are external. The external objects enable the soul to enjoy the fruits of its various actions.⁸ This world is the "abode where all creatures are born and experience the results of their past work".⁹

There are other objects in the universe like the living organism.¹⁰ These bodies are of various classes and consist of a "definite organization of the different parts".¹¹ It is in and through the instrumentality of the body that one experiences the fruits of one's actions.¹² According to Śaṅkara the body has not the same status as the other objects of the universe. There is a peculiar feeling of subjectivity which

1 S.B., I. 3. 33, जगद्विचित्र्यम् ; II. 1. 30, विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्चः ।

2 S. B., I. 3. 3C.

3 Brhad. S.B., I. 5.2.

4 S. B., II. 2. 1; III. 2. 21; Mand. S. B., II. 38.

5 ibid; S. B., II. 3. 7.

6 S. B., II. 2. 1.

7 S. B., II. 3. 7.

8 S. B., II. 2. 1.

9 Brhad. S. B., VI. 2. 10.

10 Mand. S. B., II. 38; S. B., II. 2. 21; II. 2. 1.

11 S. B., II. 2. 1. प्रतिनियतावयव विन्यासम् ।

12 ibid. कर्मफलानुभवाधिष्ठानम् ।

characterizes the possession of a body. Though this is the result of an adhyāsa according to Śaṅkara, it is the indispensable basis of all practical dealing.¹ The jīva's body is not only a complex of presentations like every other physical thing. It forms a part of the jīva, the striving purposive individual. It is a thing which the jīva feels as a whole in common or organic sensations. The physical body possessed by a living being is different from that of which we have perception in dreams or which is result of magical illusion.²

Thus the conclusion to which these considerations lead us is that for the perceptual consciousness the world is a fact. Śaṅkara does not deny that there are imaginary objects. But such objects have no externality. "They last only so long as the act of imagination lasts."³ Śaṅkara, therefore, calls such objects "cittakāla", "cittapariśeṣa".⁴ The "external" objects are entirely different in their nature; they are not "cittakāla". They, according to Śaṅkara, exist not only during the time when they are experienced, as is the case with the imagined objects; they are also perceived as persisting and co-existing with other objects. We at any time perceive an ordered co-existence of the different parts of the external universe. Because they co-exist, they also limit each other and thus exclude each other. Externality, according to Śaṅkara, thus implies ordered co-existence and mutual exclusion.⁵ An imagined object does not co-exist with any other imagined object, nor does it exclude it. External objects, on the other hand, exist, persist, change and interact with each other independently of any experience of the individual who cognizes them. The time which marks the existence of an external object is not only the time of the occurrence of any mental state in relation to it, but also the time which records its distinction and exclusion from other connected physical things. Therefore Śaṅkara

1 S. B., II. 1. 1. Introduction.

2 Mand. S. B., III. 10.

3 Mand. S. B., II. 14. कलनाकाल एवोपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः ।

4 ibid

5 ibid., परस्परपरिच्छेद परिच्छेदकत्वं बाह्यानां भेदानां ।

says that external objects are "double-timed".¹ Imagined objects are only "single-timed", because their existence is marked by the time when the act of imagination takes place.

Though the spatio-temporal order is a fact, its existence does not constitute its reality, which is a value notion in Śaṅkara. "True, the truth of the modifications has been mentioned in other Śruti passages, but this declaration is without reference to the highest truth; it is only with reference to the consideration of the fact of certain objects being amenable to the senses and others not being so amenable."² Earth, &c., are real and permanent, though their reality and permanence is relative.³ "But here we speak of 'truth' (satyam) from a practical point of view, and therefore relatively; compared with the falsity of a mirage, water is said to be true. 'Satyam', therefore, means true relatively, for there is but one absolute truth and that is Brahman."⁴ But it is strange that his medieval critics should attribute to him the view that external objects like fire and water have no existence and are mere phases of consciousness. It is all the more strange when we see that many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, who claim to take a more dispassionate view of the matter, hold the same view. The concept of "existence" is not identical with that of "value". To say that external objects like fire, earth and water exist is not to say anything about their value. Śaṅkara knows this full well. "What is admittedly an unreal entity can be said to be neither eternal nor non-eternal."⁵

It was never a problem for Śaṅkara to prove that there is not a "world" with "souls" in it; there could thus be no possible occasion for "indulging in realistic interpretations" and then, by having recourse to "linguistic trickery", "getting out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions... were merely an estimate of things from the commonsense

1 Ibid., ब्राह्मण द्वयकाला ।

2 Chand. S. B., VII 17. 1.

3 Katha. S. B., I. 3. 15 आपेक्षिकं नित्यम्

4 Telit. S. B., II 6. I, व्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं सत्यम् ।

5 S. B., II. 2.24, न हि अवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा संभवति ।

point of view".¹ Just as to admit a fact is to say nothing about its value, similarly to deny a fact can never amount to a judgment of value about it. Dr. Dasgupta does not realize the implications of his own words—"estimate of things from the commonsense point of view". "Estimate" implies evaluation, and the latter implies a measure of value. A "fact" cannot be its own measure of value, unless it be shown that fact has a right to independent existence, in which case we shall have a concept which symbolizes a reality where value and existence fuse into one. The world of "common-sense" does not contain its own value. In the words of Śaṅkara, it possesses only a degree of reality. To ignore that all "estimate" is in terms of value and "estimate of things" is a value idiom is to open the door to serious misunderstandings.

III

FACTUAL ORDER AND THE VALUE CONSCIOUSNESS A KEY PASSAGE FROM ŚAṅKARA

Before we proceed to demonstrate that his problem is not to discuss the existence or non-existence of the world but to ascertain its value, it is necessary to bring out the distinction between the terms "pratipādayati" and "anuvadati" which Śaṅkara maintains with meticulous care throughout his works. Śaṅkara whole-heartedly accepts the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation, and carefully draws a distinction between (i) that which constitutes the main topic dealt with in a particular work and (ii) that which is mentioned only by the way and is subsidiary. The former, according to Śaṅkara, is the "pratipādyaviṣaya"; the latter is merely "anuvāda". "Pratipādana" is demonstrating, proving, establishing. "Anuvāda" is merely repeating after some one by way of corroboration, echoing, resounding. Śaṅkara, following the Mīmāṃsakas, calls it "arthavāda" also.² Śaṅkara in expounding his views, and in interpreting the texts of the Vedānta closely observes this distinction.³ What is the

1 Dasgupta: History, Vol. II, P. 2.

2 Aitareya. S. B., II. 1. 1.

3 S. B., I. 4. 14; I. 3. 19; III. 2. 30; IV. 2. 30; IV 3. 14; II. 1. 27; II. 1. 33; Mānd
S. B., III. 14, 5.

"pratipādyā viśaya" is primary and essential (mukhyam); what is merely "anuvāda" is secondary.¹ The "pratipādyaviśaya" is concerned with "value" or "significance"; what is mere "anuvāda" is concerned with the reporting of facts.

Equally necessary is it to understand the sense in which the term "sṛṣṭi" and its equivalents are used. The word "sṛṣṭi" is used by Śaṅkara to mean creation, production, or making²; and this, in its turn, implies differentiation, multiplicity, diversity, manyness. Sṛṣṭi, then, means any and all of these things. In his commentary on the Māṇḍūya Kārikā he uses the word sṛṣṭi in the sense of "multiplicity" or "diversity".³ The word "vikāra" is also used in the same sense; the production of effects (vikaroti) means giving rise to multiplicity.⁴ In his commentary on the Brahman Sūtra whenever there is occasion to use the word "sṛṣṭi" or "vikāra", he uses it in the sense of "phenomenal diversity".⁵ Nor are his commentaries on the Upaniṣads an exception to this.⁶

Śaṅkara's problem is the determination of the value of the factual order. He gives unequivocal expression to it.⁷ "The manifoldness of creation" is not what Scripture wishes to establish. For we neither ourselves observe nor learn from Scripture that any good is connected with (the knowledge of) it. Nor can we assume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the manifoldness of creation have a consistency in meaning⁸ with the passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages speaking of the manifoldness of creation and so on serve the purpose of giving us knowledge of Brahman, Scripture itself declares. Compare Chāndogya,

1 S. B., III. 2. 29. अमदमेव हि प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन निर्दिशति, भेदं तु पूर्वप्रसिद्धमेवानुवदति ।
Mand. S. B., III. 14. भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

2 Mand. S. B., III. 14. 15. उत्पत्त्यादि ।

3 Ibid. III, 15.

4 Ibid., III. 13. विकरोति नाना करोति ।

5 S. B., I. 4. 14; II. 1. 28; II. 1. 30; II. 1. 22.

6 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20. नोत्पन्न्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनपरम् । Ibid., I. 4. 7.

7 S. B., I. 4. 14.

8 सूत्र्यादिप्रपञ्चः ।

9 एकवाक्यता ।

VI. 8. 4: 'In the same manner, my dear, from food as an offshoot infer water as its root; from water as an offshoot, infer fire as its root; and from fire as an offshoot, infer the Being (sat) as its root. We, moreover, understand that by means of comparison such as that of the clay, &c., the manifoldness of creation is described solely for the purpose of bringing home to us the non-difference of the effect from the cause. Accordingly it is said by those who know the sacred tradition that the statement of the fact of creation by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things is only a means for bringing home to us the truth that (ultimately) there is no diversity. On the other hand Scripture expressly declares fruit to be connected with the comprehension of Brahman. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest'; 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief'; 'A man who knows him conquers death'. This fruit is, moreover, a matter of direct intuition. For as soon as a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, by means of the text 'That art Thou', its transmigrating nature vanishes for him."

This is one of the many classic statements of Śaṅkara which embody his conviction that philosophy deals with the meaning and value of existence rather than with existence abstracted from meaning and value; and which go to show that Śaṅkara, with his eye on the Good, adopts a valuational, not an existential view of the universe. "The manifoldness of creation is not what Scripture wishes to establish." One may know the whole history of the evolutionary advance and yet have no philosophy. All this is mere description of facts. Nor can a mere recognition of the factual multiplicity of the spatio-temporal order yielded by the perceptual consciousness be in any way conducive to the attainment of what is the highest good for man. This is the recorded experience of those who have realized this beatitude.

Though, according to Śaṅkara, the essence of the universe is not constituted by the "infinite shiftings of the cosmic dust" and so conceived the universe is a "senseless spectacle", a mere "vicious circle of existence", yet there is another side to the universe. The universe is also "an almost untouched reservoir of significance and value", and living a

rational life is, for him, "reaching out to the reality of things as a region in which the discovery of value need never end."¹ But this picture of the universe can be taken to be faithfully drawn only when we regard the universe as an expression of a divine purpose and meaning. This is what Śaṅkara wants to emphasise when he says that "the passages about the manifoldness of creation have a consistency in meaning with the passages treating of Brahman"² When it is pointed out by the Upaniṣads (and consequently by Śaṅkara) that it is Brahman (which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda) which has manifested itself in the variety of diverse names and forms, the truth that is brought out is that the entire multiplicity, because it has no other source than Brahman, because it subsists in Brahman during its continuance, and finally dissolves in Brahman, is nothing other than Brahman. Knowledge of the bare multiplicity of the world and its creation is of no value. "Fruit" attaches only to the realization of the universe as an expression of Brahman, of Divine Existence, Divine Wisdom, and Divine Bliss.³

Any attempt to interpret the words of Śaṅkara* to mean that he denies the fact of creation and of phenomenal diversity proceeding from Brahman is to misunderstand him and misinterpret him. Śaṅkara is solely concerned with the defending of the truth that this diversity is rooted in Brahman, and is an expression of Brahman's nature. According to Śaṅkara "those whose preoccupation is the reflection on values have no respect for creation".⁴ The refusal to be interested in "creation and its manifoldness" is connected with an axiological bias and a pragmatic consideration, and not with any mere ontological prejudice. Those who have dedicated their lives to the pursuit of the Good do not feel inclined to devote themselves to "the observable processes of nature, life, society, and history", to "stars and systems wheeling past", to the "groaning and travailing of creation"

1 Hocking: *Types of Philosophy*, P. 428.

2 S.B., I. 4.10.

3 S.B., I. 4. 14. ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिबद्धं तु फलं श्रूयते ।

4 नह्यं सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चः प्रतिपिपादयिषितः ।

5 Mand. S.B., I. 7. ननुपरमार्थचिन्तकानां सृष्ट्यावादेरः ।

and "the dread strife of poor humanity's afflicted will", for their own sake. If they ever do so, they do it in order to discover "the One Spirit's plastic stress" which

Sweeps through.....

Torturing the unwilling dross that checks its flight.
To its own likeness as each mass may bear.¹

The passage quoted above from his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*², only one among many of the same import, is the key to the interpretation of Śaṅkara's philosophy. An analysis of this passage will reveal to us that Śaṅkara is endeavouring to show two things, one of them negative and the other positive. It would be truer to say that these are not two truths, separate and independent, but two aspects of one and the same truth. (a) In the first place Śaṅkara wants to show that philosophy is not concerned with the bare facts of the natural order. No fruit or value attaches to the bare recognition of the multiplicity or manifoldness of creation. The following passage from Pringle-Pattison most truly represents Śaṅkara's meaning: "The kaleidoscopic transformations of external nature possess in themselves no trace of that intrinsic value which must belong to what Kant calls an end-in-itself. They are all summed up in Spencer's phrase, 'the redistribution of matter and motion'. The human mind is not content to take the universe as a fact or set of inter-related facts. It is not intellectual coherence alone which the philosopher seeks.....The most perfect realization of unity in variety is as naught, if there is nowhere anything to which we can attach this predicate of value."³ The first sentence of this quotation reads as if it were a literal translation of the opening lines of the passage quoted above.⁴ (b) In the second place Śaṅkara wants to give expression to his conviction that the world of multiplicity, of name and form, is a manifestation of Brahman, which is Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss and so ultimately divine in its nature and in

1 Quoted in Urban: *Intelligible World*, P. 328.

2 I. 4. 14.

3 *The Idea of God*: P. 30.

4 P. 272.

its essence. "Fruit" attaches to this knowledge alone.¹ Pringle-Pattison expresses exactly the same idea when he says, "If the philosophical impulse is to be satisfied, we must be able to repeat the verdict of the divine Labourer upon his world, we must be able to say that the world is 'good' in the sense of possessing intrinsic worth or value".² The universe is an expression of divine life and divine bliss—this is the last word of Śaṅkara's philosophy. Realising this, one attains the highest, is able to overcome grief and conquer death and become immortal.

As I pointed out above, this is not the only passage in which Śaṅkara embodies his conviction of the centrality of the problem of "value" in the Vedānta philosophy. This is the constant theme to which he frequently recurs. Lest I should be considered guilty of reading my own thoughts into Śaṅkara's statements by torturing the texts, I will quote at length, even at the risk of repetition, the different statements which show that Śaṅkara's philosophy is concerned not with existence but with the value of these existences. There is a striking unanimity in the import of these statements dispersed throughout his works. Śaṅkara seems to have taken meticulous care in emphasizing both the negative and the positive moments of the truth which constitutes the central theme of his philosophy, the value-character of the universe. The following will amply repay careful study and patient reflection:

I. (a) "While the realization that Brahman is the one Self (of every being) is the means to the attainment of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent fruit is connected with the realization of the truth that Brahman has modified itself into the form of this world." (b) "Whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own, as for instance, the statements which speak of Brahman's modifying itself into the form of this world—is merely to be used as a means for the realization of Brahman. Whatever has no fruit of its own but is mentioned in connection with something else which has such a fruit is auxiliary to it."³

1 S. B., I. 4. 14.

2 The Idea of God: P 30.

3 S. B., II. 1. 14.

II. (a) "Nor have the Scriptural passages which speak of (Brahman's undergoing) modifications the purpose of establishing the fact of a change¹; for realization of this is not attended with any fruit." (b) "They rather aim at establishing that Brahman is the Self (Ātman) of all—Brahman which is raised above this phenomenal world, for we learn that fruit is attached to the realization of this"².

III. (a) "The scriptural texts speaking of creation (i. e. phenomenal diversity) do not refer to the highest good (Paramārtha); they refer only to the phenomenal world of name and form which are the figments of Avidyā". (b) "Nor is it to be forgotten that the aim of these texts is to establish that Brahman is the Self of every one".³

IV. (a) "There is no 'good' (phalam) to be attained by the knowledge of the narrative of the creation." (b) "It is well-established in all the Upaniṣads that immortality can result only from the realization of the oneness of the Self."⁴

V. (a) "The examples of gold, iron, sparks of fire are not meant to establish the multiplicity caused by the creation, etc., of the universe."⁵ (b) They are only meant to strengthen one's idea of the oneness of the individual self and Brahman."⁶

VI. (a) "Since duality has been repudiated, the passages delineating the manifestation, etc., of the universe can have the sole aim of helping the realization of the unity of the Self."⁷

VII. (a) "The realization of the manifoldness due to creation has been censured."⁸ (b) "The realization of the

1 न परिणामप्रतिपादनाय ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 27.

3 S. B., II. 1. 33.

4 Ritareya. S. B., II. 1. 20.

5 नोत्पत्त्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनं परम् ।

6 Brhad S. B., II. 1. 20.

7 Ibid., I. 4. 7.

8 Mand. S. B., III. 24. निन्दितत्वाच्च। सृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः ।

oneness of the Self, because it carries fruit with it, is the settled meaning of the Scripture."¹

VIII. (a) "Those whose ideal is the attainment of the highest good² do not entertain any respect for creation (i. e. manifoldness, diversity), because it can lead to no purpose." (b) "The noble ones who desire to win immortality concern themselves with the meditation of that 'fourth' and the highest good."³

IX. (a) "The difference between the individual and Brahman, which has been announced by means of the Upaniṣadic texts, is not the highest truth. It is only secondary (gaṇam). Ultimate diversity can never be the final meaning of the passages speaking of difference. They only intimate the attitude of the ignorant, which is marked by difference and diversity.....This, however, is not the primary truth."⁴ (b) "In the upaniṣads what is intended to be established by means of the statements regarding origin, dissolution, etc., is the oneness of the individual Self and Brahman."⁵

X. (a) "The Scriptural texts which speak of origin and creation have another significance." (b) "The creation and its different modes which have been described by having recourse to the examples of clay, iron, sparks of fire, etc., are but the means and ways for bringing home to our minds the truth of the oneness of the individual and the universal self."⁶

IV

THE SYMBOLISM OF CREATION: ITS POINTER VALUE.

We thus come to the conclusion that "creation" in Śaṅkara's philosophy has only a symbolic value, inasmuch as

1 *ibid.*, फलवत्त्वात्सैकत्वदर्शनमेव श्रुतिनिश्चितोऽर्थः ।

2 *Mand. S. B.*, I. 7, परमार्थचिन्तकानां मुमुक्षुणाम् ।

3 *ibid.*, I. 7.

4 *ibid.*, III. 14, भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

5 *ibid.*, III. 14.

6 *ibid.*, III. 15.

It points to those timeless values of which it is revelation in time. It establishes the "self-hood" of Brahman. There is no other meaning of "sṛṣṭisruti". The question naturally arises, "How does Śaṅkara show this?" Śaṅkara is quite clear on the point that the argument which he has advanced in order to substantiate his main thesis that "Brahman is everything and so the Ātman of everyone" is the causal argument. "The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition 'All this is but the Self', viz., that the universe has sprung from the Self, has the Self alone for its genus and dissolves only into the Self."¹ "Because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued.....with it during continuance, for it cannot be perceived apart from the Self, therefore everything is the Self."² The various illustrations given to show the oneness of the universe with Brahman and its non-difference from it, are those of clay, gold, iron, and sparks of fire. "By means of comparisons such as that of the clay, etc., the manifoldness of creation is described solely for the purpose of bringing home to us the non-difference of the effect from the cause"³ "The examples of gold, iron, and sparks of fire are only meant to strengthen one's idea of the oneness of the individual self and Brahman, and not to establish the multiplicity caused by the origin, etc., of the universe. When one is told that the self has been separated from the Supreme Brahman like a spark, one is firmly convinced that one is Brahman. We know that a spark is one with fire before it is separated."⁴

Śaṅkara gives, in one of his works, an admirable summary of what we have tried to state at length. An objection is raised against his doctrine that the aim of the scriptures (which also represents Śaṅkara's own view) is to teach multiplicity or diversity. Śaṅkara does not associate himself with this view but openly repudiates it. "Not so, for the

1 Chend S. B., VII. 25. 2.

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 4. 6.

4 S. B., I. 4. 14.

5 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

passages are meant to convey the idea of oneness. We notice in life that sparks may be considered identical with fire. Similarly a part may be considered to be one in nature with the whole. Such being the case, words signifying a modification or part¹ of the Supreme Self, as applied to the individual Self, are meant to convey its identity with It. That this is so appears also from the introduction and conclusion. In all the Upaniṣads, first identity is broached, then by means of illustrations and reasons² the universe is shown to be a modification or part or the like of the Supreme Self³, and the conclusion again brings out the identity.⁴ Here, for instance, the text begins with, 'This all is the Self', then through arguments and examples⁵ about the origin, continuity, and dissolution of the universe it adduces reasons for considering its identity with Brahman, such as the relation of cause and effect, and it concludes with 'Without interior or exterior', and 'This Self is Brahman'. From that introduction and conclusion it is clear that the passage setting forth the origin, continuity, and dissolution of the universe are intended to strengthen the idea of the identity of the individual Self with the Supreme Self. Otherwise there would be a break in the topic. All believers in the Upaniṣads are unanimous on the point that all of these enjoin on us to think of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self. If it is possible to construe the passages setting forth the origin, etc., of the universe so as to keep up the continuity of that injunction, to interpret them so as to introduce a new topic would be unwarrantable. A different result would have to be provided for. Therefore we conclude that the Śruti passages setting forth the origin, etc., of the universe must be intended to establish the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self."⁷

1 विकारांशत्वाच्चा शब्दाः ।

2 दृष्टान्तः हेतुभिरपि ।

3 विकारांशत्वं जगतः प्रतिपाद्यम् ।

4 पुनरेकत्वंमुपसहरति ।

5 Brhad. II. 4. 6.

6 हेतुदृष्टान्तः ।

7 Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.

THE VIEW-POINT AND ITS INTERPRETATIONAL VALUE

From what we have shown above it is clear that statements that "the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of pralaya than during the period of its subsistence"¹ and that "neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority..... ..to the highest spiritual principle constitutes unreality in the sense in which the *Māyā* of Śaṅkara is unreal"² are far from representing faithfully Śaṅkara's view. This misrepresentation is the result of the failure to distinguish between "existential" and "axiological" concepts. Likewise Professor Dasgupta strikes a false note when he says that Śaṅkara makes use of "linguistic trickery" in order to prove that the world is a magical illusion.³ Critics fail to realize the value-character of Śaṅkara's philosophy when they insist upon seeing an incongruity between Śaṅkara's statement, in certain places, that the world-creation forms the very nature of Brahman and his assertion, in others, that the world is "unreal".⁴ Their interpretation is not a new one; it is a mere revival of views preached much earlier by the medieval critics of Śaṅkara, namely Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Vijñāna-bhikṣu. Professor Dasgupta believes that the creative aspect of Brahman is irreconcilable with the ascription of unreality to the world and that Śaṅkara flatly contradicts himself when he wants to hold to the first and at the same time stick to the other. We select Professor Dasgupta's exposition for comment and criticism, while at the same time desiring to make it clear that what we shall say about him holds equally true of all other expositors and critics who think that Śaṅkara adopts the existential point of view and are not alive to the fact that the driving force of his thought is primarily axiological and not merely ontological.

Professor Dasgupta is discussing Śaṅkara's answer to the question: "Why should Brahman create this world

1 Tilbaut, P. XCIV.

2 *ibid.*, P. CXIX.

3 *History*, Vol. II. P. 2.

4 *ibid.*, P. 42.

when He has nothing to gain by it?" Śaṅkara's answer to the question is contained in his commentary on B. S. II. 1. 33. Commenting upon this Professor Dasgupta writes as follows: "The reply (i. e. of Śaṅkara) is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by his *līlā* or play. Śaṅkara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the *māyā* theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sūtras which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the sūtra as attributing the world creation to God's playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience, and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the Self and Brahman."¹

There is nothing in Śaṅkara's commentary on the above sūtra which can be taken to lend plausibility to the view that Śaṅkara is singing his old song of the *māyā* theory. Professor Dasgupta is led to believe that Śaṅkara is endeavouring to establish the falsity of creation, because he fails to understand the true import of Śaṅkara's words. The passage under consideration is the following:²

न चेयं परमाद्यविषया मृष्टिश्रुतिः अविद्याकल्पित नामरूपव्यवहार गौचरत्वात्
ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चैतदपि नैव विस्मयतव्यम् ।

Professor Dasgupta interprets the words 'न चेयं परमाद्यविषया मृष्टिश्रुतिः', to mean that "all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance." This is not the meaning Śaṅkara intends to convey by these words. What Śaṅkara wants to express is that realization of diversity or multiplicity, which no doubt is a fact for the perceptual consciousness, is not at all conducive to the attainment of the highest good, nor is it something whose very being is its validity. The right translation of the passage would be: "The scriptural texts speaking of creation (i. e., phenomenal diversity) do not refer to the highest good." This is one of the cardinal tenets

¹ *Ibid.*, P. 42.

² B. S. II. 1. 33.

of Śaṅkara's philosophy, which is a philosophy of value; the "kaleidoscopic transformations of external nature possess in themselves no trace of intrinsic value." There are many statements which corroborate this view.¹

It is really strange that the above words should convey to Professor Dasgupta the meaning that the principal truth which Śaṅkara wants to bring out here is that the world-creation is a fanciful appearance, when there is overwhelming evidence, scattered all over Śaṅkara's works, to show that he is concerned with the determination of the value of the world and not with its affirmation or denial as a fact for perceptual consciousness, and when in the same passage which is under consideration² Śaṅkara makes it abundantly clear that it is not possible to deny "creation" (implying phenomenal diversity), because there are specific texts to this effect. He says, "It cannot be said that He either does not act or acts like a senseless person: for Scripture affirms the fact of creation, on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other."³ Creation is a fact; that there are scriptural texts to this effect is also a fact. But that there is ultimate diversity and multiplicity, that the universe is its own value—this is not the meaning either of the eternal process of creation or of the scriptural texts which embody this truth. The meaning of the eternal process of creation is that the universe, which is a manifestation of Brahman's

- 1 (i) न ह्यमृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चः प्रतिविपादयितः न हि तत्प्रतिबद्धः कश्चित्पुरुषार्थो दृश्यते श्रूयते वा, (S. B., I. 4. 14.)
- (ii) न च जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कर्मचित्फलमायामिष्यते । (S. B., II. 1. 14.)
- (iii) न चेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था तत्प्रतिपत्तीकलानवगमात् । (S. B., II. 1. 27.)
- (iv) न हि मृष्ट्याद्यायिकादिपरिणामात्किञ्चित्फलमिष्यते । (Āltareya. S. B., II.)
- (v) भुवर्णमणिसोहानि त्रिकुनिगदृष्टान्तानोत्पत्त्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनपरा । (Brhad. S. B., II. 1. 20.)
- (vi) निन्दितत्वाच्च मृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः । कलवच्चात्मकत्वदर्शनमेव श्रुति निन्दितोऽयं, (Mand. S. B., III. 24.)

2 S. B., II. 1. 33.

3 Ibid. नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तवृत्तिर्वा, मृष्टिश्रूतेः सर्वजश्रूतेश्च ।

nature, is nothing other than Brahman; it is divine in its nature. Professor Dasgupta fails to realize the inner significance of Śaṅkara's statement that "scriptural texts relating to creation" aim at "establishing"¹ "the selfhood of Brahman".²

In the passage under discussion what Śaṅkara is establishing is not that "the ultimate reality is the identity of the Self and Brahman", as Professor Dasgupta erroneously thinks, but that "the nature or causality or Brahman's creativity proves the Selfhood of Brahman." Śaṅkara is not concerned with pointing out the "fact" of the identity of Self and Brahman in the above passage; he is concerned with showing the "mode" in which the "fact" of their identity can be proved to be in conformity with the demands of reason. "The reasoning has been set forth in the passage furnishing arguments in support of the proposition, "All this is but the Self", viz., the universe has sprung only from the Self, has the Self alone for its genus and dissolves only into the self."³ The compound word "sīṣṭi-śruti" sums up the entire reasoning which Śaṅkara has to offer in support of the proposition that everything is the Self.

Professor Dasgupta fails to realize this, because somehow or other he has missed the import of the word "pratipādanaparavāca". Śaṅkara has not used this word as a loose writer might. He needs it; "no other words would or could serve the turn, and no more could be added", and any one who would go to the author to get at his meaning and not to find his own, should pause and ponder over the word and what it implies. It carries with it a reminder that "sīṣṭi-śruti" is a mere means to prove the conclusion that Brahman is the Self of everything. The statement of Śaṅkara⁴, namely "सृष्टिभूतेः ब्रह्मात्मभाव प्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च:", is really an enthymeme of the first order; and when fully expressed in logical form will stand as follows:

1 Ibid. प्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च ।

2 Ibid. ब्रह्मात्मभाव ।

3 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 1.

4 S. B., II. 1. 33.

(§ V) THE VIEW POINT AND ITS INTERPRETATIONAL VALUE

1. Whatever springs from a thing, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance has that thing as its Self and is nothing other than it.¹
2. Everything springs from Brahman, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance.²
3. Therefore everything has Brahman as its Self and is nothing other than that Self.³

The principle of causality, as understood by Śaṅkara, constitutes the major premise of the syllogism, the fact of creation supplies the minor, and the Brahmanhood of the world and the Selfhood of Brahman is the conclusion to which the premises lead.

One is apt to think the two statements of Śaṅkara in his commentary on B. S. II. 1. 33, namely, (i) "that the scriptural texts about creation refer only to the phenomenal world of name and form, which are the figments of avidyā" and (ii) "that the aim of scriptural texts is to establish that Brahman is the Self of everything", are mutually irreconcilable. This is the impression left on Professor Dasgupta's mind also. But on reflecting deeper we shall see that there is no such irreconcilable opposition. (a) We have already pointed out that "sṛṣṭi" for Śaṅkara both means and implies "phenomenal diversity".⁴ But this phenomenal diversity, according to Śaṅkara, is not pārmāthika, that is, it does not represent the essential nature of Brahman, though it constitutes an irreducible moment in the life of that Brahman. It is, as he says, māyika.⁵ We shall show later on the necessity of this māyika sṛṣṭi and its metaphysical significance as explained by Śaṅkara. Here we are interested in reminding the readers of Śaṅkara that to regard the diversity and multiplicity as ultimate and final is ignorance, and so long as this consciousness does not disappear, the achievement of the Highest Good will remain unrealized.

1 Brhad. S.B., II. 4. 6. कार्यकारणानन्यत्व ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 33. सृष्टिश्रुतेः ।

3 Ibid., ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादन ।

4 Mand S. B., III. 24.

5 Ibid., III. 1; III. 9. माययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः ।

But there is another side of this *śiṣṭi*, and another implication of the *śiṣṭi-śruti*. *Śiṣṭi* not only means phenomenal diversity; it also implies (i) dependence upon Brahman and (ii) non-otherness from it.¹ So far as the aspect of diversity is concerned, it is not ultimate and no fruit has been assigned to a knowledge of it by those who have actually attained the summum bonum of life. Śāṅkara, therefore, says that this "bheda-dṛṣṭi", this consciousness of diversity, and the scriptural texts which embody this "bheda-dṛṣṭi", are not primary but secondary.² In this sense *śiṣṭi* is "gaṇi", secondary and subordinate. But it is not "gaṇi", secondary, when used in the sense of "dependence upon Brahman" and "non-otherness from it". The one ideal of philosophy, according to Śāṅkara, is the attainment of the knowledge of that synthetic principle knowing which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known. This, says Śāṅkara, is possible when the entire universe is non-different from Brahman, which is the knowable. Non-difference again of the universe from Brahman is possible only when the former originates from the latter. The following quotations from Śāṅkara will amply justify my contention and bring to light a cardinal principle of his philosophy which has not up till now received the attention which it deserves.

"The scriptural texts about the origin of the *prāṇa* cannot be taken in a secondary sense, because therefrom would result the abandonment of the original promise. For after the text has held out the promise that by knowing the one every other thing is known, it goes on to say, in order to prove that statement, that 'From it is born *prāṇa*', etc. This statement is made good only if the whole world, including the *prāṇa*, is an effect of Brahman, because there is no effect independent of the material cause. If, on the other hand, the statement as to the origin of the *prāṇas* were taken in a secondary sense, the promissory statement would thereby

1 S. B., II. 1. 20, कृत्स्नस्य जगती ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदन्यत्वं न ।

2 Mond. S. B., III 14, न हि भेदाक्त्यानां कदाचिदपि मुख्यभेदादित्यम् । भेददृष्ट्यनुवादो गौण एव ।

be stultified.”¹ And again: “In all the Vedānta texts we meet with promissory utterances of the following nature: ‘That by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, the unknown becomes known’;² ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this becomes known’;³ ‘Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?’ These promissory utterances are not abandoned, that is, not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, which is the knowable; for if it were something other than Brahman, the promise that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known would not be fulfilled. This non-difference again is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman.⁴ And we understand from the words of the Vedas that the fulfilment of the promise is possible only through the theory of the non-difference of the effect from its cause. For the affirmation contained in the clause, ‘That by which the unheard becomes heard,’ etc., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, etc., which all aim at showing the non-difference of the effect from the cause. In order to establish this⁵ the subsequent clauses also, ‘In the beginning my dear, this was pure Being, one, without a second; it thought; it created fire’⁶, at first state that the entire aggregate of effects originates from Brahman, and then declare its non-difference from it, viz. in the passage, ‘In it all that exists has its Self.’.....In all the Vedānta texts there occur passages which, by means of various instances, make the self-same assertion, ‘All this is that Self.’⁸” Śaṅkara sums up this long argument in the following words: “The promissory utterance of the scripture, viz. ‘That by

1 S. B., II. 4. 2, गौणं तु प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्च नो प्रतिज्ञेयं हीयेत ।

2 Chand. S. B., VI. 1. 3.

3 Brhad. S. B., IV. 5. 6.

4 S. B., II. 1. 20, स चाव्यतिरेक एवमुपपद्यते यदि कृत्स्नं वस्तुजातमेकस्माद्ब्रह्मणः उत्पद्येत ।

5 Ibid., तत्साधनाय च ।

6 Chand., VI. 2, 1.

7 Ibid., VI. 8. 7.

8 Brhad., II 4. 6.

which the unheard becomes heard', &c, is established, because the entire universe is an effect of Brahman and is non-different from it."¹

1 S. B., II. 1.20. कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदनन्वत्वाच्च मिदं ता श्रोती प्रतिज्ञा
'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति' ।

CHAPTER X
EXISTENCE AS ROOTED IN REALITY
THE PROBLEM OF CREATION

THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Śaṅkara says that the world of value is Brahman itself; the world of existence is the world of Avidyā. This may give rise to the suspicion that the two are ultimately irreconcilable and their dualism is the last word of Śaṅkara's constructive metaphysics. This would be a grave mistake. Value and existence, though they are not identical for the ordinary human consciousness, whose nature it is to be always endeavouring to bring the ideal and the actual together, are not complete strangers to each other. The world of existence lives on a spark of Brahman. "The manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the reality of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour."¹ The world of value and the world of existence do not stand facing each other idiotically. Śaṅkara shows that, in its essence, the world of existence is an expression of the world of value, the actual of the ideal, the not-self of the Self. This, however, cannot be made clear unless we are told "why these appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds"²; unless we "know why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one"³; in short, unless we get an insight into the meaning and mystery of the process of creation.

The problem of creation in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara has been the subject of constant misunderstanding and this

1 S. B., I. 4. 22.

2 Bradley : *Appearance and Reality*, P. 467.

3 *ibid.*

misunderstanding is bound up with ignorance of the standpoint which is central to Śāṅkara's metaphysics, namely the valuational standpoint, and his philosophy of language. The question whether Brahman is essentially a creative reality cannot be answered satisfactorily if we ignore the very condition under which this question presses itself and under which the operation of language is possible. The word "creation" recurs so constantly in philosophical and theological discussions of the nature of God and his relation to the world that it is desirable to submit the idea to a somewhat more searching examination before we can take it as expressing or pointing to a philosophical truth. Such terms as creation, means and end may retain little of the ordinary meaning attaching to them when they are used to describe the ultimate conditions of the universe. But, with this reserve, they still remain useful and intelligible modes of expressing the truth about the real. They are, when so used, to be regarded as axiological concepts.

The question whether Brahman is essentially creative is an intelligible question, because it aims at finding out the essence of the universe which is a fact before us. For Śāṅkara the question whether Brahman is the cause of the universe is really the question whether essence is irrelevant to existence and existence intelligible without essence. It is the question how duality is implicated in non-duality and the *dvaita* is the differentiation of the *advaita*. This question arises in the world of *Māyā* where existence is other than essence but not wholly other. It is relevant to the universe which, in the words of Śāṅkara, is *tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya*. For both the raising and the answering of the question the duality of value and existence is an indispensable condition. Neither the question nor the answer has any significance for the stage where fact and value are identical. The language in which the answer to the above question is expressed bears an unmistakable and at the same time unavoidable stamp of the duality of fact and value.

The recognition of Brahman as a creative reality means the acceptance of the truth that essence explains existence;

and the assertion that the revelation of name and form (which is what Śaṅkara means by creation), which are neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman, takes place from Īśvara, has reference to exigencies of language.¹ The modern interpreters, instead of using Śaṅkara's philosophy of language as giving the clue to the understanding of his metaphysical position, especially as regards the creative aspect of it, have fallen back upon the device of drawing a distinction between the Śuddha and the Māyāśabala Brahman, or Brahman and Īśvara, and relegating the work of creation to the latter. Śaṅkara's description of Brahman as "nett nett", as Nirguṇa and Nirviśeṣa, is perfectly consistent with his ascription of causality to it. The distinction between Brahman and Īśvara when they are viewed as metaphysical principles is non-existent in Śaṅkara. The distinction which has significance and upon which is based his whole philosophy of sādhanā, with its recognition of Jñeya and Upāśya Brahman or Niguṇa and Saṅguṇa Brahman, is the distinction between Brahman realized as our very Ātman and Brahman realized as different from us and controlling and governing our destiny.²

Every term of our mortal speech retains the association of time. The only language which philosophy can intelligibly speak is a language of time, and it is through this language that the nature of the timeless has to be expressed. The only way then in which the nature of Brahman as the most supreme reality and value, as the timelessly real, can be expressed is by calling it the Source, the Origin, the Cause, the Absolute Ground, the Adhiṣṭhāna of the world. The perceptual consciousness makes us aware of the world-fact; the valuational consciousness finds that it is not self-subsistent, that its being is not its validity, that it is not a self-justifying end. In its search for the reality which sustains the world-fact and the world-process, and its discovery of the value which invests it with meaning and significance, the

1 S. B., II, I. 14.

2 Chand. S. B., I. 11.1, आत्मा इति च आत्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य आदित्यादि ब्रह्मणः उपास्यत्वं निवर्तयति । अमर्देन आत्मा एव ब्रह्म ब्रह्मवात्मा ।; Tatit. S. B., II. 8. 5. वेदां पुनर्गोश्वरोज्यो आत्मनः कार्यं चाग्न्यत्तेषां भयानिबृत्तिः भयस्यान्यनिर्मितत्वात् ।

valuational consciousness is led to recognize Brahman as the Self of the universe, and its innermost essence, and as the goal towards which the world-process can be said to be moving. Brahman is the final explanation of the world-fact. Apart from Brahman the world is an unintelligible fact. At the level of our experience, which is characterized by the duality of Self and not-self, or value and fact, the essential metaphysical truth for which Śaṅkara's Advaitism stands, namely the absoluteness of Brahman and the inseparability in it of value and existence, cannot be expressed in a better, more intelligible, and more exquisite way than by calling it the Ātman or the absolute ground. Śaṅkara's notion of the Ātman is that of the cause, the cause not as a temporally antecedent event but as the essence, which explains the fact and in which the fact is rooted and has its being and apart from which it is unintelligible. All this is Brahman—this is the key-note of Śaṅkara's philosophy. How even what appears to be other than Brahman is really Brahman, or what is really Brahman appears to be other than Brahman—this is the key-problem of Śaṅkara's doctrine of creation.

To him, believing as he does that there is an essence to everything and that this essence is neither a matter of doubt nor disbelief and denial the question whether Brahman, which is the Ātman, the Self or essence of the universe and can be separated from it neither by time nor by space, is the source or ground and cause of that universe, does not present any serious philosophical difficulties. We never find Śaṅkara struggling with the problem how Brahman can be the cause of the universe. The difficulty which some of the followers of Śaṅkara and many of his modern interpreters experience in accounting for the origin of the universe out of Brahman is of their own making; and the hypothesis of a "saṁgha Brahman or changing Brahman" is a gratuitous one. Śaṅkara never doubted that Brahman is the cause of the universe. At the very outset, in his commentary on the First Sūtra, Śaṅkara shows that Brahman cannot be denied, because it is the very Self of the universe and of every one of us. In the commentary on the Second Sūtra he elaborates his view as to how Brahman can be regarded as the Self of

the universe. *Prahman* is the *Ātman* or Self, because it is the cause or source of the universe.

The entire misunderstanding about the problem of creation in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara has its genesis in the thought that the *Saguṇa Brahman* is an ontological principle and the Second Sūtra undertakes to define the nature of this *Saguṇa Brahman*. Deficiency of language has been erroneously made identical with deficiency of realization. The Second Sūtra undertakes to express the perfect truth that Brahman is the essence of the universe in language which, after all, is an imperfect medium of expression, being relational, by calling it the origin, etc., of the entire aggregate of phenomena. The ontological truth that Brahman is the essence of the universe can be expressed only by having recourse to the value category of cause, and the Second Sūtra, in its own way, expresses how the spatio-temporal order of the universe has its being in Brahman, the highest reality and value.

II

THE VALUE CATEGORY OF CAUSE

The concept of cause, according to Śaṅkara, is an axiological concept. It is the concept of the Self or *Ātman* or essence. The cause is the essence of the effect, and, as the existence of a thing is inseparable from its essence in time as well as in space, the causal relation, according to Śaṅkara, is not a relation of temporal sequence. "If a thing cannot subsist apart from something else, the latter is the essence of that thing."¹ To find out the cause of a thing is to ascertain the "essence" of that thing. Brahman as the cause of the universe cannot be reached at the farther end of any chain of phenomenal antecedents and consequents. It is cause only in the sense of ground, essence, that is to say, the Being whose nature is expressed in the universe as a whole. In other words, Brahman is cause only when cause=ratio; for the reason or ultimate explanation of anything is only to be found in the whole nature of the system or in the supreme values

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, II. 4.7.

which are foundational to that system. All questions of temporal beginning and of historical emergence are, from this point of view, secondary. But the existing interpretations of Śaṅkara's written words, in their confusion of existential and axiological categories, view the causal or creative nature of Brahman in a false light and raise difficulties which are in no way connected with the central concepts of Śaṅkara's metaphysics. The problem of creation is treated by Śaṅkara as part and parcel of the problem of value. For him the important question is: What is the meaning of creation? And in consonance with the standpoint of value which he adopts, the process of creation assumes in his philosophy the character of a means or intermediary towards an end—that end being the revelation in and to finite spirits of the infinite riches of the divine life and the affirmation of the absoluteness of it. The idea of creation tends to pass into that of self-revelation or self-realization, and creation becomes the very *svabhāva* of Brahman, "an act grounded in the divine nature, and therefore, if we are to use the language of time, coeval with the divine existence". It belongs to the very being of Brahman, to his very essence to be creator; and creation is the revelation of Brahman's nature.¹

As existence and essence are inseparable, and cause is the essence of effect, it is not a problem for Śaṅkara how the universe becomes separated from Brahman in time. There is no point of time when we can conceive of a gulf between Brahman and the universe. Being the Self of the universe, Brahman gives it the reality which it possesses. Nothing can be independent of its essence or *Ātman*. Accordingly, Śaṅkara does not attempt to solve the problem of the relation between Brahman and the universe, which is but a variation of the more general problem of the relation between cause and effect, by having recourse to the concept of time. The solution assumes the form of determining the value of the universe with its distinctions and diversities and the treatment of the concept of time becomes in Śaṅkara part and parcel of the general and more vital problem of the relation between value and existence. To understand the purpose

¹ S. B., I. 4. 14.

of the gulf which appears to divide Brahman from the universe and the universe from Brahman, is to understand the meaning and also the mystery of the process of creation. The problem of creation is: Why is existence made to appear separate from essence when they are one and inseparable? Creation is the visible gulf between the ideal and the actual. Time and space are the media through which the actual is made to appear as other than and separated from Brahman. Time and space, therefore, are appearances according to Śaṅkara. They are vikāras. Śaṅkara's doctrine of creation is intended to show that the universe, even when time does its best to bring about a gulf between it and the Brahman, cannot be separated from Brahman and continues to have its essence in it in all the instants of time and points of space. In other words, the truth of the universe is constituted by the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. The concepts of time and creation are utilized by Śaṅkara in the service of his Axiological Monism; and his Creative Monism is to be read as part and parcel of his Axiological Monism.

At the very outset of his Commentary, Śaṅkara makes it clear that Brahman is that from which the origin of the universe. The Second Sūtra of the First Adhyāya undertakes to give a definition of Brahman whose cognition the First Sūtra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedānta, that Brahman, whose cognition is the only road to final release, that Brahman, in fact, which Śaṅkara calls the highest. It is unfortunate that history should have allowed clouds to gather round this point and led generations of interpreters to be busy with the discussion whether Brahman or Īśvara is the explanation of the universe and whether the second sūtra is a definition of the former or the latter. There is nothing in Śaṅkara's commentary on the first two Sūtras even to suggest that there is any such problem. In his comments on the First Sūtra Śaṅkara lays down the problem of his philosophy. It is an inquiry into the nature of Brahman whose comprehension constitutes the highest beatitude. This Brahman is declared to be the very essence of the universe and of every conscious being in it and is said to give reality to the whole of it and to

every part of it.¹ In the Second Sūtra he shows the manner in which Brahman can be viewed as the Ātman or the essence of the universe. Brahman is the Ātman, because nothing can be perceived apart from Brahman. "Nothing can be perceived apart from the Self, because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in it and remains imbued with it during continuance. Therefore everything is the Self."² Thus on account of the relation of cause and effect, of general and particular, of the one giving the other reality, Brahman is the self or essence or Ātman of the universe. Therefore is Brahman defined as that from which the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the universe proceed. The universe has being by participation in this Brahman. It is only because Brahman is the source or ground of the universe, the latter being its self-revelation and Brahman being the self-communicating life, that an intuition into the essence of the universe is possible.³

There is nothing in Śaṅkara's commentary on these sūtras to support Thibaut's contention that the Second Sūtra can be accepted by Śaṅkara only as a definition of Īśvara, who is an inferior principle, and not of Brahman.⁴ It is an error to think that according to Śaṅkara "Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates", and then to bring against him the charge that "it is improbable that the sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit".⁵ There are not two metaphysical principles in Śaṅkara, one to account for the existence of the universe and the other to insure the attainment of the summum bonum of life. One and the same reality is the productive source of the universe as well as the highest good in the realization of which consists the perfection of human achievement. Brahman is this reality as well as this good. It is the source of the universe and is also the highest beatitude. "One should know the highest Brahman to be one's Ātman and the Ātman of

1 S.B., I. 1.1.

2 Brhad. S.B., II, 4.6.

3 S.B., I. 1.2.

4 Thibaut, P. XC.

5 Ibid.

all living things, now treated of and to be particularly described in the sequel as the cause of the creation, support, and destruction of the universe, for the cessation of all the miseries of saṁsāra."¹ "The settled meaning of all the Upaniṣads is that the highest consummation results from a knowledge of Brahman which is the cause of the universe."² Brahman from which the origin of the universe proceeds is the subject-matter of Paravidya, the discipline the one purpose of which is to give us an insight into the nature of the supreme Good. "That entity known as Puruṣa from which the universe derives its essence, from which, as its source, it proceeds and into which it is again absorbed is true;.....It is the subject of Brahnavidyā."³ "It is the omniscient, not subject to saṁsāra; both high and low, high as being the cause and low as being the effect; when it is seen directly as 'I am that', one attains emancipation, the cause of saṁsāra being uprooted"⁴

Professor Radhakrishnan draws our attention to the fact that "at the centre of Śaṅkara's system is the eternal mystery of creation, a mystery in which every movement of life and every atom of the world is implicated". Śaṅkara no doubt admits that there is "mystery" in creation, but this mystery is very different from what it is ordinarily understood to be. Ordinarily the following two ideas are looked upon as constituting the meaning and mystery of creation according to Śaṅkara: (i) creation is illusory; (ii) it is not due to Nirguṇa Brahman, but to the Saguṇa or Māyāśabala or changing Brahman. Īśvara is this changing Brahman. According to both these views Īśvara is an inferior principle and "has less of reality than absolute being".⁵ The first view does not amount to any serious attempt to explain the problem. It merely explains it away. According to the second view there are certain genuine difficulties inherent in the nature of the problem itself, but the whole discussion centres round

1 Altareya. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Praṇa. S. B., VI. 1. जगत्तच्च यन्मूलं तत्परिज्ञानात् परंश्रेय इति निश्चितोऽयं ।

3 Mund. S B., II. 1. 1.

4 Ibid, II. 2. 6., परं च कारणात्मनावरं च कार्यात्मना तस्मिन्परावरे साक्षादह-
मस्मीति चष्टे संसारकारणोच्छेदान्मुच्यत इत्यर्थः ।

5 Radhakrishnan: I. P. Vol. II, P. 572.

certain issues which were never present to the mind of Śāṅkara and which consequently cloud the discussion instead of shedding light on it.

According to Professor Dasgupta Śāṅkara believes that "in reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory."¹ But in the sense in which the world exists and we all exist as separate individuals we can affirm the existence of Īśvara as engaged in creating and maintaining the world.² This Īśvara, according to Professor Dasgupta, has "little importance" in the Vedānta system, "for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer and much more powerful than we, but he is as much phenomenal as any of us."³ Professor Dasgupta's conviction that creation according to Śāṅkara is illusory does not lead him to make further inquiries into the "how", the "why" and the meaning and purpose of creation. From what he says in the second volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy*, namely that "Padmapada's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakāśātman, has been taken in the first and second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedānta"⁴, it would appear that he also attributes to Śāṅkara the view that Brahman and Īśvara are different, and it is the latter and not the former who is the productive source of the world and its multiplicity. It would also seem that, according to Professor Dasgupta, Śāṅkara distinguishes, like the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, between the Śuddha and the Kāraṇa Brahman, and attributes the act of creation to the latter. But we are led to doubt his faithfulness to the *Vivaraṇa* School, when we read that "Brahman, the Self, is at once the material cause (upa dāna kāraṇa) as well as the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the world"⁵, for the very point which Prakāśātman wants to make is that it is the Māyāśabala Brahman and not the Śuddha which is the cause of the universe. The reader also finds it difficult to reconcile this statement with another statement of his on a different page that "the highest truth is the

1 *History*, Vol. I, P. 438.

2 *ibid.*, P. 438

3 *ibid.*, P. 477.

4 P. 104.

5 Dasgupta: *History*, Vol. I, P. 438.

Self, the reality, the Brahman, and both *jīva* and *Īśvara* are but illusory impositions on it"¹. According to Professor Dasgupta Śaṅkara's attempt to resolve the mystery of creation may be summed up by saying that all creation is illusory but that accepting it as illusion it may be conceived that God created the world as a mere sport.² Professor Dasgupta's interpretation of Śaṅkara does not help us much in obtaining insight into Śaṅkara's resolution of what Professor Radhakrishnan has called "the eternal mystery of creation". Nor does it explain to us, as other interpretations seek to do, how *Īśvara*, who is different from Brahman, is metaphysically a more competent principle.

The view that *Īśvara* and not Brahman is the creative principle responsible for the evolution of the universe is the result of the recognition, on the part of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, that Brahman is metaphysically a deficient explanatory principle. While, on the one hand, it is thought that "*Īśvara* has less of reality than absolute being", it is virtually conceded on the other that it possesses greater reality because Brahman is unable to explain the world of becoming and the only way to account for it is "through the recognition of a *saguṇa* Brahman or changing Brahman, an *Īśvara*" in whom "we have besides the absolute Brahman the element of objectivity or *prakṛti*, self-expression or *Māyā*".³ This vein of thought is wholly foreign to Śaṅkara and has its root in the failure, on the part of these interpreters, to make sufficient use of the axiom of the inseparability of value and reality upon which Śaṅkara's system of Advaitism rests. These interpreters are not fully alive to the significance of Śaṅkara's thought when they speak of an *Īśvara*, a God who is on a lower level of reality than Brahman and who produces, sustains and dissolves the universe eternally and as part of his nature.

The root of the whole difficulty is that all of them are haunted by the feeling that Brahman is, after all, a "value" or an *essentia* and needs some intermediate link to connect it

1 *Ibid.*, P. 477.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 438.

3 Radhakrishnan: I. P., Vol. II, P. 555.

with what is existent or real. They fail to see that Brahman is not only the highest value but also the highest reality, and the two are one and inseparable. If existence is inseparable from essence and essence includes existence, the doubt how existence can arise out of essence or how essence can produce existence loses its relevance. The only meaningful question which should suggest itself to the inquiring mind is, if essence and existence are in their very nature inseparable, how is it that they appear to be separated and what is the significance of this apparent gulf between the two? As I have said above, according to Śaṅkara this is the implication of creation. Creation is the bringing about of an apparent distance between the ideal and the actual. The purpose of this apparent distance between the two is to reaffirm that the two are in essence one and inseparable, that Brahman is the Ātman, the essence of everything.¹ An intermediary in the form of an Īśvara or Māyāśābala Brahman has been felt necessary to bring Brahman, which is Being, Knowledge and Bliss, and the Universe together, because these interpreters do not remain true to the standpoint of value according to which Brahman is the essence, the self, the Ātman of the universe. According to Śaṅkara, the affirmation of Brahman's causality is but an alternative way of reassuring our faith in the absoluteness of the value of Existence.² To say that Brahman is Absolute Existence is to say that it is the Original Cause. Without acknowledging an absolute value of Existence, which is to acknowledge a First Cause, our thought will be moving in a vicious circle.³

The recognition that Śaṅkara uses the category of cause as a category of interpretation and not scientific description or explanation, will resolve many of the tangles in which Śaṅkara's Absolutism finds itself with regard to its creative aspect. As effect is inseparable from cause in time as well in space, to have recourse to spatial and temporal ways of

1 S. B., I. 4. 14.

2 Tai. S. B., II. 1. 1. अतः कारणत्वं प्राप्तं ब्रह्मणः । कारणस्य च कारकत्वं वस्तुत्वात् ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9. सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव न नो ब्रह्मेत्यविरोधः मूलप्रकृत्यभ्युपगमेऽनवस्था । प्रसंगात् ।

explaining the relation between the two is to misunderstand Śāṅkara's treatment of the category of cause. Neither time nor space can affect this inseparability of essence and existence. To understand the relation between essence and existence is to understand the relation between cause and effect or between Brahman and the universe. Śāṅkara does not, like Bergson, deify "time" and transform it into a mysterious entity endowing it with something of divine Providence. Time does not render intelligible the nature of reality. It is reality itself which explains time and renders it significant and meaningful. But it is only when the real is conceived as value that Śāṅkara regards it as explanatory of time and becoming. In other words, it is the conception of Brahman as the Ātman or the Self which gives time the intelligibility it seems to have. The reality of a thing cannot be abstracted from its value; in fact it is constituted by its value. What we call "being" or "fact" is a form of value. Essence is what Śāṅkara calls Ātman. The very nature of essence forbids a complete abstraction of existence from essence as irrational. Time, whose essence consists in the apparent gulf between essence and existence or the ideal and the actual, is not, therefore, as real as the essence or the ideal itself, which is the standard with reference to which any idea of a gulf or discrepancy is formed. Time, therefore, does not explain the Ātman, but is itself explained by the Ātman.

III

THE CAUSE AS THE ĀTMAN OR SELF

SATKĀRANAVĀDA

If the filaments which unite the effect to its originating cause are never severed by time and space, the effect has always its being in and through the cause, and it can never set itself up in opposition to the cause nor can it transgress the limits set up by the cause.¹ The effect is the cause itself having assumed another form. The effect is always with the cause. The pot cannot exist if it chooses to renounce the

1 Chand. S. B., VIII. 4. 1. कारणं हि आत्मा । न शक्यं हि कारणातिक्रमणं कर्तुं कार्येण । Gita. S. B., VIII. 28. कार्यं हि कारणस्यान्तर्बन्धि भवति ।

earth as its Self and live in abstraction from it. If it succeeds in renouncing it it will reduce itself to a non-entity. The tie which unites the effect to the cause is too close to be severed by time or space.¹ Śaṅkara points out that we are not wholly correct in speaking of a tie or bond between cause and effect which time itself is not able to destroy. But for the duality between value and existence there would be little justification for employing language in which cause and effect were treated as related. A thing can only be related to another; and it is only in the case of realities which are different from each other that we can speak of the one as producing or attaining another or transgressing it. A thing can in no way be said to produce or attain itself or transgress itself. The pot neither "attains the earth nor transgresses it".²

So viewed the category of cause turns out to be an axiological and not an existential category. Its purpose is not to describe the facts, but to penetrate beneath the facts and discover their value. The category of cause, regarded as an existential category, points to and presupposes difference and discrepancy, but used as an axiological category, as is the case with Śaṅkara, it establishes the Advaita position according to which essence and existence, Brahman and the world, are one and inseparable. When it is used as an existential category Śaṅkara says that "men of wisdom should not think of the true nature of Brahman in terms of whole and part, unit and fraction, or cause and effect; for the essential meaning of the Upaniṣads is to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman".³ But Śaṅkara realizes quite well that we can talk about Brahman only by having recourse to categoric modes of thought and expression. Therefore, when compelled to do so, we must view these categories as axiological categories, that is, as intended to bring out the

1 S.B., IV. 3.14. विकारेणैव विकारिणो नित्यप्राप्तत्वात् । न हि घटो मृदात्मना पण्डित्यज्जातमिच्छते परित्यागे वाग्भाव प्राप्तेः ।

2 Chand. S.B., VIII. 4.1. अत्रेव हि अन्यस्य प्राप्तिरनिकम्प्यं वा विद्यते । न तु तेनैव तस्य । न हि घटेन मृदाप्यतेऽनिकम्प्यते वा ।

3 Brhad. S.B., II. 1. 20. अतो न पदितं : सत्स्यैव रूपप्रतिपत्तिविषयं ब्रह्मणोऽशब्दवैकल्येनैव विकारविकारित्य कल्पना कार्या ।

value of the facts. "Such being the case, words signifying a modification or part of the supreme Self, as applied to the individual self, are meant to convey its identity with it. The Śruti, through arguments and examples about the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe, adduces reasons for considering its identity with Brahman, such as the relation of cause and effect."¹

The effect cannot be viewed as something other than the cause. The language of time fails to give any insight into the true nature of the relation which unites the effect to its cause or existence to its essence. The scientist's definition of cause as an immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedent of a phenomenon is, according to Śaṅkara, content with an external and superficial view of the concept and fails to penetrate beneath the surface. If the relation of cause and effect be understood to carry the implication that existence can ever be abstracted from value or essence, Śaṅkara is prepared to go to the length of asserting that neither logic nor reasoning can establish such a view and philosophy can very well do without it.² The doctrine of the identity and inseparability of value and reality forbids any conception of causality in which the cause and the effect are treated as "different from each other or as even standing in the relation of the dependent and the support. The effect is only a special state which the cause assumes and in which it exists".³

The distinction between cause and effect is a distinction which has been created by language, but for which we could not speak of one thing as the effect and the other as the cause. Language in a very real sense creates reality. All modifications or effects are "names" only and exist through or originate from speech only; in reality the effect has no existence apart from the cause, because it is in all

1 Ibid. उत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयहेतुदृष्टान्तैः विकारविकारित्वाद्येकत्वं प्रत्ययहेतु-
पाद्यान्तरमवाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्युपसंहरिष्यति ।

2 Mand. S.B., IV. 40. अतो विवेकिनामसिद्ध एव कार्यकारणभावः ।

3 S.B., II. 2. 17, न हि कार्यकारणयोर्भेद आश्रिताश्रयभावो वा वेदान्तवादिभिरभ्यु-
पगम्यते । कारणस्यैवमस्यानमात्रं कार्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् ।

times rooted in the cause. The only reality is the cause. The effect is only a variation of this reality. The clay is the reality and all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails all of which agree in having clay for their self or essence, are forms of clay. In themselves they are not realities, for existence in abstraction from essence or value is inconceivable and what is inconceivable can never be. The effect or change is a passing state of the real and every change is temporary. It is the permanent essence behind the change which renders it possible and intelligible. When Śāṅkara says that the words "production" and "creation" are words used by the ignorant what he intends to bring out is the inseparability of existence from essence and, consequently, of effect from cause, in time as well as in space. His Ajātavāda stands for the repudiation of a view of causality in which the concept of time, unrelated to meaning and value, is utilized to explain the relation between the effect and the cause. In other words, it is a denial of the position that time can ever bring about a cleavage, whether passing or permanent, between essence and existence or between the self and the thing. Ajātavāda, as Śāṅkara understands it, is inconsistent not with creation and the reality of a creative force, but with that conception of creation in which time is allowed to play the part which should properly belong to value and that conception of reality which in revealing itself exhausts itself and loses its essence. The picture of creation which Ajātavāda is made to offer represents at once the duality of value and existence, the discrepancy between "is" and "ought", the distance between the ideal and the actual and their oneness and inseparability. This is the *anirvacanīyata* or *Māya* as Śāṅkara puts it. Creation is not pure essence; nor is it mere existence. It is not the complete oneness of value and existence, nor is it a total and wholesale denudation of value. It is the distance between the two. The inner meaning of this creative process is the exhibition of the truth, which is the reality also, that existence itself is a form of value and lives in and through it. Ajātavāda, in short, means that time, while it appears to bring about a gulf between the cause and the effect, is not able to create, at any point of time or space, a divorce between the two, so that the effect is always with the

cause, because it is nothing other than the cause. Ajātavāda in Śāṅkara is explicable only as a value concept. It is an organ of his Brahmapada or Brahmakāranavāda.

It is not true to say that causality is only the bond which binds all the phenomena of the world together, and does not bind the phenomenal world with that which manifests itself through it. Deussen, in holding this view, forgets that the concept of cause is a value concept and is but a development of the absolute value of Existence. "The cause, therefore, must exist before the effect is produced."¹ "If existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be perceived as enveloped in non-being. But as a matter of fact, they are all observed to be positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor does any one think that pots and the like which have their essence in clay are the effects of threads and the like. Everyone knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only."

Hence as we see, on the one hand, that nothing originates from non-being, such as the horn of a hare, and, on the other hand, that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the doctrine of something coming out of nothing cannot be accepted.² If the cause did not exist before the effect is produced, we should be able to perform impossible feats and achieve undreamt-of results. Rice would grow for the husbandman, even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves, even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver, too lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving.

The acknowledgement of the reality of the cause is an acknowledgement without which reason cannot work. Human mind with all its cunning cannot banish the values out of existence and think of the universe as being without them. For a logic which knows its business and does not love to indulge in sophistry the assumption of the reality of the cause is a necessary assumption. "We observe that a positive

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1, अतः निदः प्राक्कार्योत्पत्तेः कारणसद्भावः ।

2 S. B., II. 2. 26.

effect which is produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause."¹ We must, therefore, admit the reality of the cause before creation.² This argument, it should be noted, is not merely an inferential argument. The logic which leads to it is a logic which is ruled by the presupposition of the foundational nature of values. Śāṅkara's view of causality may be said to be Satkāraṇavāda.³ It affirms that value or essence or Ātman cannot be denied.

IV

THE VALUE NOTION OF POTENTIALITY

SATKĀRYAVĀDA

But Satkāraṇavāda embodies and emphasizes only one aspect of Śāṅkara's conception of causality. There is another side to it which is expressed by the term Satkāryavāda.⁴ It is not true to say, as Professor Belvalkar does, that Śāṅkara's real view is not "Satkāryavāda" but "Satkāraṇavāda"; and it is missing the proper balance to think with Dr. Dasgupta that Śāṅkara's doctrine is "more properly" called Satkāraṇavāda.⁵ Likewise, Rāmaṇuja and Bhāskara are far from the truth when they represent Śāṅkara as establishing the non-difference of cause and effect on the theory of the effect's non-reality, both of them neglecting the maxim, which Śāṅkara holds as foundational to his system, that being abstracted from value is inconceivable. Śāṅkara's doctrine is both Satkāraṇavāda and Satkāryavāda. They are but complementary ways of expressing the truth that the ultimate object of our thought is not abstract being unrelated to value, but value itself, of which being is a form; in other words, of expressing the truth that value and reality are ultimately one and inseparable. The doctrine of Satkāryavāda emphasizes the existential aspect of reality, the

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Ibid., अनुमीयते च प्राक्कार्योत्पत्तेः कार्यकारणयोरस्तित्वम् ।

3 Ibid., कारणमङ्गुलः ।

4 Ibid., तस्मात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि यदेव कार्यम् ।

5 History. Vol. II, P. 468.

doctrine of Satkāraṇavāda, the value aspect of it. An adequate explanation can ignore neither the value aspect of things nor their existential aspect and a comprehensive view of causality must recognize that just as the cause or the essence exists before the effect is produced, the effect too exists before it is produced.¹ The concept of potentiality, of which the doctrine of Satkāryavāda is an embodiment, is a value concept and maintains that in any derivation the meaning and value of the thing which is derived is retained and conserved, and the objects which are derived have meaning and value as part of their very nature or reality. Inasmuch as the concept of potentiality means that there is nothing of lasting value in the end that was not present in kind in the beginning, it is only a reaffirmation, in different words, of the doctrine that existence without essence, or reality without value, is unintelligible and that both in the end are one.

It is as true to say that the cause exists before the effect is produced as to say that the effect too exists before it is produced. But as the effect is nothing other than the cause, and can at no point of time maintain its existence in isolation from the cause, it is equally true to say that the relation of cause and effect, implying the antecedence in time of the cause, cannot be established by logic. When both are together the one cannot be said to precede or follow the other. They cannot be really separated from each other. But as they appear to be so separated, the only legitimate and philosophically significant question concerning the problem of causation is: "Why do the cause and the effect appear to be so separated? What is the inner meaning of this separation?" The causal relation involves a dialectical antinomy. The effect is nothing other than the cause, but it is not wholly one with the cause. It is neither "tat" nor something other than "tat". It is anirvacanīya, inexpressible in terms of pure value or mere existence. The axiom of the oneness of value and reality at once affirms and denies the reality of the causal relation, brings out its inexpressibility, and transforms it into a relation of identity. Śaṅkara, by emphasizing the different

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

aspects, brings out the many-sidedness of the category of causality.¹

The doctrine of Satkāryavāda that there is nothing evolved which was not originally involved is a natural corollary of the axiom of the oneness and inseparability of value and existence. Śaṅkara says that "the very manifestation of the effect points out its pre-existence".² Manifestation, according to him, means coming within the range of perception. Only a thing which acquires the character of an existent can be said to come within the range of perception. But an existent apart from its value or essence is a nonentity; it is the value or essence which embodies itself in an individual form that is characterized by existence in space and subsistence in time. It follows that what is not grounded in the essence or is foreign to it can never be brought into being. Being cannot be abstracted from value; existence cannot be alienated from essence.³ "That which is posterior in time, that is, the effect, has, previous to its actual beginning, its being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely."⁴ The jar can be had from the clay only and cloth from the thread alone. Oil cannot be squeezed out of sand nor curd from water, because they do not have their self or essence either in sand or in water. On account of the specificity which characterizes the capacity of the cause, the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause cannot be accepted and the logic of the thing points to its having potential being in its cause. "The effect must be viewed as existing through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does exist independently, apart from the self of the cause. The inseparability of the

1 Mand. S. B., IV. 40. असिद्ध एव कार्यकारणभावः ।; Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1, अतः अनुमीयते च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यकारणयोरस्ति तद्वत् S. B., II. 1. 15, कारणदन्यत्वं कार्यस्य ।

2 S. B., I. 2. 1, कार्यस्य चाभिव्यक्तिर्लिङ्गत्वात् कार्यस्य च सद्भावः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सिद्धम् ।

3 S. B., II. 1. 18, कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एवानात्मभूतस्यानारभ्यत्वादित्यभाणि । S. B., II. 1. 16, यच्च यदात्मा न वर्तते न तत्तत् उत्पद्यते ।

4 Ibid., कारणान्मनैव सत्त्वम् ।

effect from the cause is the same before its origination (as after it). The effect with all its qualities of sound, etc., does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning of it. It cannot, therefore, be said that the effect is non-existent before its manifestation."¹

Potential existence, implying as it does "the absence of spatio-temporal determination"², is liable to be mistaken for unqualified non-existence; and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought, in its confusion of existential and axiological categories, has actually fallen a prey to this error. For Śāṅkara who always insists that the ultimate truths cannot intelligibly and adequately be expressed in the relations of space and time, the concept of potentiality is essentially a value concept, and the potential reality of things cannot be identified with existence in space and time. If existence is equated with position in space and time, Śāṅkara would prefer to speak of potential reality rather than potential existence. The objection to Śāṅkara's doctrine of the potential reality of the effect that "it must be perceived, because it is not non-existent" derives its plausibility from the fact that it views the concept of potentiality as an existential concept and the objector wants to perceive an intelligible reality by making use of sense-organs as one would perceive a cow or a castle. The effect, the jar for instance, although existent is not perceived before its manifestation, because its essence or self or Ātman, in and through which it lives and from which it can never be abstracted, has not embodied itself in that particular form which we call a jar. This is the obstruction in the way of the jar being visible during its potential existence. "Before its manifestation from the clay the obstruction consists in the particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump. Therefore the effect, the jar, although existent, is not perceived before its manifestation as it is hidden."³ Every effect, says Śāṅkara, has two kinds of obstruction. When it has become manifest and acquired the character of a spatio-temporal existence like other differentiated objects, the obstr-

1 S. B., II. 1. 7.

2 Mand. S. B., I. 2. अस्माकृतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात् ।

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

uctions which can veil the effect are of a physical nature like "darkness and the wall, etc." The obstructions are such as are consistent with the nature of an existent. The obstruction which prevents the perception of the potential reality of the effect is of a different nature. It consists in the essence not having realized itself in an individual form or, as Śaṅkara puts it, "in the particles of clay remaining as some other effect such as a lump". The terms and the concepts, "destroyed" "produced", "existence" and "non-existence" depend on this two-fold character of "manifestation and disappearance" according to Śaṅkara.¹

Śaṅkara's doctrine of Satkāryavāda should not be identified with the Sāṅkhya view bearing the same name. In spite of the similarity in the statements of the doctrine there is an essential difference which reveals itself in the philosophical consequence which the doctrine is made to yield. Śaṅkara's conception of Satkāryavāda is essentially an axiological conception. The Sāṅkhya conception of it is an existential one. Both the systems recognize that without accepting a First Cause, a Mūlaprakṛti, our thought will be moving in a vicious circle. Śaṅkara says that the Original Cause is what he means by Brahman.² But here the similarity between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta of Śaṅkara ends. Śaṅkara's thought moves along a value-scale and leads him to a reality which is the most supreme value also, to a supreme Genus, Pure Intelligence, in which "through a series of intermediate steps" all things are "included" and "unified". It finds the last basis of being in the Ātman which is the measure of all reality and of all value.³ The Sāṅkhya view, in its search after a Final Cause which is more and more comprehensive and inclusive, uninspired by the idea of a scale of values is ultimately led to a reality in which there is no trace of that intrinsic value of which Śaṅkara's Brahman is an embodiment. The Brahman of Śaṅkara is value itself, a value which is at the same time creativity also; the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is an essentially value-free reality. It is

1 Ibid.

2 S. B., II. 3. 9. या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 15. आत्मनोऽस्त्वितिः प्रलयश्चाद्भुतः ।

mere existence, unbounded and unlimited. Śāṅkara appreciates the truth which the Sāṅkhya system has caught hold of, the truth, namely, that the less can be derived from the more, never the more from the less, a truth which is vitally connected with the notion of value and a scale of values, and that this movement along a value-scale ultimately takes us to an Absolute Existence.¹ But he does not see his way to accepting the Sāṅkhya view in toto as a philosophical creed, because the system, as it moves along, fails to realize that the conception of "potentiality" is not an existential but a value concept, and ends by equating the Prakṛti, the Original Stuff, with mere existence, which is wholly devoid of value. Had the Sāṅkhya started with the recognition that intelligible causation means axiological interpretation, that is, in other words, the placing of things in an order of meaning and value, its logic would neither have stopped with the Prakṛti nor ended in a dualism of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti, but would have led to a conception of Puruṣa which was the fulfilment of the Prakṛti and its own meaning and justification. The dualism which the Sāṅkhya system has perpetuated by recognizing a Puruṣa coordinate in rank with the Prakṛti is the historical monument of an unsuccessful attempt to bring value and reality together in a system. The Sāṅkhya was not able to fulfil this task. The value which it gives us in the end is barren and the reality which is the fons et origo of all is blind. A barren value and a blind reality—this is the last word of Sāṅkhya constructive metaphysics. It was left to the Vedānta of Śāṅkara to bring reality and value together in a whole and declare that both in the end are ultimately one and inseparable, thus laying the foundations of an axiological epistemology and a metaphysics of value.

It is only from the standpoint of value that Śāṅkara makes the statement that the effect too, like the cause, exists before it is produced though it exists potentially and not actually. The complaint of the Asatkāryavādin that the effect, though said to be existent, is not visible, and therefore it cannot be viewed as real, ignores the very condition under

¹ S. P., III. 2. 17.

which the statement can be regarded as intelligible. The proposition of the Sāṅkaryavādin is a statement of value and not of fact. There is a certain sense in which, according to Śāṅkara, the effect may be said to be non-existent. The statement of the Asāṅkaryavādin regarding the non-existence of the effect before its actual production is true from the existential standpoint, but this standpoint possesses little or no value for philosophy, whose task is interpretation and not description. "If, however," writes Śāṅkara, "you say that before its manifestation the jar is non-existent, meaning thereby that it does not exist exactly as the potter, for instance, exists while he is at work on production (that is, as a ready-made jar), then there is no dispute between us It should be borne in mind that the present existence of the lump or the two halves is not the same as that of the jar. Nor is the future existence of the jar the same as theirs. Therefore you do not contradict us when you say that the jar is non-existent before its manifestation while the activity of the potter, for instance, is going on. You would be doing this if you denied to the jar its own future form as an effect. But you do not deny that. Hence the previous non-existence of a jar does not mean that it does not at all exist as an entity before it comes into being. If the jar before its manifestation be an absolute non-entity like the proverbial horns of a hare, it cannot be connected either with its cause or with existence."¹ The effect, therefore, before its production is existent.²

Śāṅkara draws and develops the consequences of the doctrine that the effect, too, like the cause, exists before it is produced. If the effect is potentially existent, it must exist in and through the cause which is the very self or essence of the effect. The jar cannot deny the earth and enjoy an existence. To deny the earth would be to destroy its own existence.³ The effect, therefore, is not separated from its cause, which is its essence, either in time or in space. The

1 S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 S. B., II. 1. 19. युक्तं च प्रागुक्तं: कार्यस्य यत्त्वम् ।

3 S. B., IV. 3. 14. न हि घटो मृदात्मना परित्यज्याज्वनिष्ठो परित्यागे वाऽभावप्राप्तेः ।

cause or the essence is eternally present to the effect.¹ We must, then, revise our language and say that the effect not only exists before it is made actual but is non-different from the cause both before and after its production, because it is but another form of the cause.² To say that both cause and effect exist before creation or manifestation is the same as to say that the effect is "ananya" from the cause³. Relational modes of expression cannot bring out this inseparability of essence and existence. We cannot even say that the one depends upon the other or supports the other. We can only say that the one is the other. The effect is the potentiality of the cause rendered actual. This potentiality is, to use the plain man's language, a certain power possessed by the cause.⁴ It is the very essence of the cause and "is thus identical with the self of the cause".⁵ The effect, again, is identical with the Self of that power. It can, therefore, be regarded neither as non-existent nor as something other than the cause, as the power can be said to be neither non-existent nor different from it. "As the ideas of cause and effect, on the one hand, and of substance and quality on the other, are not separate ones as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its quality must be admitted."⁶ The effect is thus non-different from the cause, because it is only when the cause exists that the effect is observed to exist and not when it does not exist. It is only when the clay exists that the jar is observed to exist and the cloth only when the threads exist. That the effect appears to have a different form should not be used as an argument for proving the independence and the otherness of it from the cause. "A substance does not become a different substance by appearing under a different aspect. Milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curd and so on. It is impossible, even in hund-

1 Ibid., विकारिणां विकारिणो नित्यमाप्तत्वात्

2 संस्थानमात्रम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.5. 4 S.B., II. 1. 18. शक्तिश्च कारणस्य ।

5 Ibid., तस्मात्कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः

6 Ibid., शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम् । अग्निराकार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषवद्देवदूयनावातादात्म्यमश्नुष्यन्नव्यम् ।

reds of years, to prove that the effect is something other than the cause."¹ "We thus see that something which is derived from another thing is not different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from clay."² The cause, when it assumes a special aspect, receives the name of "effect".³

In spite of the non-difference of cause and effect, the effect has its self in the cause, and not the cause in the effect.⁴ There is a certain superiority in the cause, because in the last recourse it is value which explains existence and not existence value. Being does not explain essence. It is Essence which renders being intelligible. The idea of intelligible causation, according to Śaṅkara, is bound up with the giving of a "privileged position" to something; and this implies the recognition that the less can be derived from the more, never the more from the less. "The relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause, as for instance in the case of the clay and the jar; and without such superiority the relation is simply impossible."⁵

Śaṅkara believes that the idea of privileged position is inherent in the notion of value as such, and his complaint against the Pāñcarātra system is that it does not give a privileged position to something and place things in an order of meaning and value. But the whole idea of intelligible causation, of speculative deduction or evolution, involves as organic to it the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality and of value. The followers of Pāñcarātra, according to Śaṅkara, do not recognize any super-eminence of any one of the four vyūhas-Vāsudeva, Śaṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, and do not acknowledge any difference founded on the

1 Ibid.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 6.1.

3 S.B., II. 3.7. तदेव तु द्रव्यं विशेषवदवस्थानमावृत्तमानं कार्यं नामभगव्यते ।

4 S.B., II. 1.9. अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं ।

5 S.B., II. 2.44. भवितव्यं हि कार्यकारणयोरतिशयं न मूढद्वयोः न हि अत्यतिशयं कार्यं कारणमित्यवकाशेति । S.B., II. 1.25. अत्यन्तं सात्त्विकं च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रतीयते ।...न ह्यमत्यतिशये प्रकृति विकार इति भवति ।

superiority of knowledge, power, etc., between Vāsudeva and the other lords. They simply say that they are all forms of Vāsudeva without any special distinctions, though they are successively derived from each other. It is because speculative deduction or derivation is a movement along a value-scale, the opposite process of dissolution also is determined by the same notion of order and value. It is the effect which returns into the cause and not the cause into the effect. Things which are made of clay, on being destroyed, pass back into clay, and things which have originated from water again dissolve into water. "In this way each particular effect passes back into its immediately antecedent cause, each cause being of a subtler nature than its effect, until in the end the last cause is dissolved into Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It is not reasonable to assume that an effect, passing over its immediate cause, should at once dissolve itself into the cause of the cause."¹ As the cause explains the effect and the effect presupposes the cause it is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause as long as an effect subsists, since on its dissolution the effect also cannot exist. The cause continues to exist even although the effect be destroyed.² It should be noted that the passing back of the effect into the cause is not a complete destruction of it, for just as the cause exists before the effect is produced, the effect too exists before it is produced. The passing of the effect into the cause is the returning of existence into its essence, and both becoming one. This is the cessation of the process of creation. The effect thus always exists in and through the cause and never transgresses it.³

The causal relation implies the permanence and continuity of the causal substance which manifests itself as the effect. It is the permanent and the stable which explains the changing and fleeting. The cause does not lose itself in expressing itself as the effect; it continues to live in the effect. The clay abides in the jar and the gold in the earring and the bracelet. "And even in those cases where the continued

1 S.B., I. 3. 14.

2 Ibid.

3 Ghs. S.B., VIII. 22. कार्यं हि कारणस्यान्तर्यंति भवति ।

existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' only means that the causal substance, the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility."¹ Therefore even in such cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, "we must acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition)".² The doctrine "that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence, is false"³.

V

BRAHMAN AS THE CREATIVE SOURCE

The creative nature of Brahman as it is conceived by Śaṅkara is but a consistent and rigorous application of the doctrine of causality which we have outlined above. "The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether, and so on", "the world which is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by mind". "The cause is the highest Brahman." Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, that is, has no existence apart from the cause.⁴ Brahman is the Self of the universe, its very essence, the supreme value in which it is grounded and without which even its existence is inconceivable. "We observe that a posi-

1 S. B., II. 1. 18.

2 S. B., II. 2. 27.

3 Ibid.

4 S. B., II. 1. 14. कार्यमात्मनादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत् कारणं परं ब्रह्म तस्मात्कारणात्परमाप्तोऽनन्त्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेण भावः कार्यस्यावगम्यते ।

tive effect which is produced takes place only when there is a cause and does not take place when there is no cause. Similarly the cause of the universe must have existed before creation, as is the case with the cause of a jar, for instance".¹ The effect, too, exists before it is produced. "Similarly this universe too, we can understand, existed before its manifestation".² As the cause, Brahman, does not deviate from existence in all time, similarly the effect, the universe, does not deviate from existence in all time.³ "The cause which covered and the effect which was covered were both existent before the origin of the universe."⁴ As something which is derived from another is not different from it, similarly the universe, both before and after its production, is non-different from Brahman. As existence is inseparable from essence and is nothing other than essence, and Brahman is the essence of the universe, the universe at the time of its origin, as also prior to it, is nothing but Brahman. As before the separation of sparks, smoke, embers and flames, all these are nothing but fire, and therefore there is but one substance, fire, so this universe differentiated into names and forms, is, before its origin, nothing but Pure Intelligence.⁵ It is not only at the time of its origin and continuance that the universe, on account of its non-existence apart from Pure Intelligence, is Brahman, but it is so at the time of dissolution also. Just as bubbles, foam, etc., are non-existent apart from water, so name, form and action, which are the effects of Pure Intelligence and dissolve in it, are non-existent apart from it.

If the real is, in its essence, advaitam and there is no difference either within it or without it, it being alike throughout its structure, as space and time which are the principles of differentiation lose their relevance where we have to deal with value and its relation to reality, the duality which meets us everywhere, the discrepancy between value and existence

1 Brhad. S. B., I. 2. 1.

2 Ibid.,

3 S. B., II. 1. 16, यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यमपि जगत्त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति ।

4 Brhad, S. B., I 2. 1.

5 Ibid., II. 4. 10.

which stares us in the face everywhere, the gulf between essence and existence which constitutes the very life-blood of finite existence, must all be rooted in non-duality; the duality must be the differentiation of non-duality; the dvaitam of the advaitam. The multiplicity, the diversity, the rich variety must be the effect, the kârya, of what in its essence is above this division and discrepancy.¹

According to Śaṅkara the dvaita is the self-revelation of the Advaita. The universe is the self-differentiation of the Absolute Universal. This at once introduces the note of interpretation and sets up the problem of creation. How does Brahman become many? How is the unity of value and existence replaced by the duality of the two? How does the inseparability of essence and existence make room for their discrepancy? Creation, according to Śaṅkara, means the one beoming many, the unity giving rise to multiplicity, homogeneity developing into, or better still, developing heterogeneity. In more strict philosophical language we may say that creation, for Śaṅkara, is the bringing about of a gulf between value and existence, of a discrepancy between essence and existence, of an unreconciled but not irreconcilable opposition between the ideal and the actual. That reconciliation, which is the fundamental metaphysical truth about the constitution of the universe, can again be brought about in the personal life of the individual affirms the reality of religion and emphasizes the need of the religious life. The problem of creation, as formulated above, has in mind only one aspect of it, namely that aspect which aims at giving what, in the words of Padmapāda, may be said to be the upalakṣaṇa, and in the words of Prakāśātman, the taṭastha lakṣaṇa of creation only. It gives us an existential picture of creation. To know the svarūpa lakṣaṇa of creation we shall have to ascertain the purpose or the meaning which is being gradually realized through the creative process, which, according to Śaṅkara, is eternally complete and eternally being fulfilled, which is at once in time and out of time. First we shall take up the question of the way or mode in

1 Mand. S.B., III. 18, अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि यस्माद द्वैतं नानात्वं तस्याद्वैतस्य भेदस्त-
द्भेदः तस्य कार्यमित्यर्थः : 1...अनस्तद्भेदोच्यते द्वैतम् ।

which the One gives rise to the many; and then we shall endeavour to ascertain the ideal which inspires the creative movement and the purpose which guides it throughout.

VI

THE MODE OF BRAHMAN'S CREATIVITY AND THE ROLE OF AVIDYĀ

What is meant by saying that Brahman becomes many? And what is the way in which it becomes so? The real always maintains its nature.¹ Brahman is the reality. But multiplicity means break or division or, as Śaṅkara puts it, "bheda". "Śiṣṭi", "Dvaita", "Utpatti": "Bheda" "Vikāra" are synonymous terms in Śaṅkara. Creation or production means bringing forth multiplicity, the Advaita becoming dvaita.² The word "dvaita" is a synonym for the created universe in the writings of Śaṅkara.³ It denotes not only "duality" but multiplicity, for duality means "otherness" and the otherness of Brahman which is One Infinite Mass of Consciousness can be nothing other than multiplicity, diversity, variety⁴. The word dvaita is much more significant in another respect. It implies and sums up the nature of the universe, which is marked by the duality of value and existence. If the Advaita gives rise to dvaita, if the oneness makes room for manyness, then the dvaita or multiplicity cannot be as real as the one or the Advaita. It cannot be as meaningful as the other and cannot possess as much intrinsic reasonableness as belongs to the Advaita. The eternal inexhaustible truth can become many not by destroying its essence, which would mean destroying its own Self, but by having recourse to a mode of expression in which unity, without giving up its nature, gives rise to multiplicity. According to Śaṅkara, there is nothing else in the universe except Consciousness, which has the gift of maintaining its own unity and at the same time

1 Mand. S.B., III. 19. अनिष्टं स्वभाववैपरीत्यगमनं सर्वत्र माणविरोधात् ।

2 Mand. S.B., II. 13. विकरोति नानाकरोति । *ibid.* III. 24. सृष्ट्यादिभेददृष्टेः ।
ibid. III. 15. उत्पत्त्यादिकृतो भेदः । उत्पत्ति भेदादि ।

3 Mand., S.B., II. 31. विश्वमिदं द्वैतम् ।

4 *ibid.*, III. 18 द्वैतं नानात्वं तस्यद्वैतस्य भेदः ।

giving rise to multiplicity, of producing differences and at the same time not allowing those differences to tamper with its unity. Śāṅkara expresses this truth by saying that the Absolute Consciousness gives rise to multiplicity only through *Mâyā*.¹ And this multiplicity, this variety and manifoldness, can have meaning and significance only in and through the unity of which it is an expression.

In order to create the Absolute Brahman must divide itself into centres, and, while so divided, it must still remain one and at rest with itself. This division into centres, which must of necessity be centres of consciousness, as Brahman is nothing else but a mass of Blissful Consciousness, cannot be a division in which the created centres are, in any way, removed or cut off from the Supreme Centre by time or space. Time and space themselves are rendered intelligible and significant only with reference to the Ideal. They are distances between the Ideal and the actual; and the actual itself has meaning only as a form of the Ideal. Being in abstraction from value is non-entity. Time, therefore, cannot bring about this division or separation. The Absolute Brahman is Infinite Consciousness, in which there is an utter absence of the consciousness of an other. The infinite Consciousness is, in other words, a consciousness of "identity with all" (*sarvātmabhāva*). This "state of identity with all is another name for Liberation", according to Śāṅkara which is Brahman itself.² The division of Infinite Consciousness into multiple centres is possible only by having recourse to a mode of reproduction in which the divided centres are cut off and made to exist as conscious individuals limited by an external environment which is consciously treated by them as their "other". The idea of manyness can be said to have significance only for a conscious personality which is finite and limited and at the same time lives as such an individual.³ Its finitude exists in and through its behaviour, which

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, अजमव्यवसायमसत्त्वं नाययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः तस्मान्न परमार्थमद् ईदम् ।

2 S. B., I. 1. 4. अतस्तत् (i.e. मोक्ष) ब्रह्म यस्येयं विज्ञानाया प्रभुता ।; Ibid., III. 4. S2. ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्तयस्य ।

3 परिच्छिन्नसत्त्वभाव ।

reveals itself in its limited thinking, feeling, and willing. The first essential of the creative process, then, is to produce limiting adjuncts with which the divided centres should identify themselves. The production of the limiting adjuncts and the identification with them are not two different acts which are cut off from each other by intervals of time, as two pieces of land are separated by water or musical notes by intervals of silence. Consciousness itself cannot be chopped up into bits, as a piece of cloth can be divided into pieces. The one Universal Consciousness, therefore, reproduces itself into multiple centres only by identifying itself with the different limiting adjuncts. The idea of the "limiting adjuncts" itself is a product of limited consciousness. In the last resort, then, the idea of creation as a fact and as abstracted from its significance or value or the purpose guiding its movement, is identified by Śaṅkara with the idea of a limited consciousness or, as he puts it, with that of Avidyā.¹ Creation in the sense of differentiation or multiplication will be a word without meaning unless this rich variety, which the creative power of Brahman brings forward, is actually felt or appreciated or enjoyed by conscious spirits. For the rose and the lily, the hyssop and the hawthorn, there is neither creation nor the creative joy born of creation; there is neither division nor differentiation, neither unity nor multiplicity. For them there is neither the presence nor the absence of creation.

For a creative reality, the essence of which is constituted by Consciousness, the process of creation lives in and through an act of conscious enjoyment of the riches of that creative life.² The creative process, then, which means revelation of a plurality or multiplicity, which exists as such for a conscious individual, implies the setting up (i) of conscious subjects, (ii) of external objects for such subjects and (iii) of a medium or instrument through which the conscious subjects may take note of and deal with the external environment. It is in this way that particularized consciousness can be brought into being; and the bringing into existence of such

1 S. B., I. 4. 3.

2 Gītā. S. B., IX, 10, दृष्टिकर्मत्वापत्तिनिमित्ता हि जगतः सर्वा प्रवृत्तिः । इत्याद्यापत्तिनिष्ठा अवगत्यवसानं च ।

particularized consciousnesses is the meaning of creation.¹ The process of particularization or individuation is rendered possible, according to Śaṅkara, through the limiting adjuncts or upādhis which help the creation of multiplicity of subjects and objects. "Name and Form are the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, of which, when they are differentiated, it is impossible to tell whether they are identical with or different from It, as is the case with the foam of water. It is name and form in all their stages that constitute relative existence."² Māyā or the Divine Creative Power is but the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. In this antecedent condition names and forms lie unevolved.³ Name and Form constitute the "otherness" of Brahman; but they are not quite "other", for apart and in abstraction from Brahman they are non-existent and non-entities. Without "otherness" there cannot be said to be any variety or multiplicity. There is variety or multiplicity when there is something other than the Self. It is ignorance which brings forward something other than the Self. Consciousness of something other than the Self is the particular consciousness or the consciousness of the particular. "Variety is thus the cause of particular consciousness."⁴ "Only when the Self is under limitations do the organs stand as something different to help it to particular experiences. Those things that cause the particular experiences (of the waking and the dream states) viz. the mind (with the Self behind it), the eyes, and forms, are all presented by ignorance as something different from the Self."⁵ When the organs and objects do not stand as different entities, as in the state of profound sleep (suṣupti), there is no particular experience.⁶ The universal consciousness is Brahman consciousness. It is the consciousness of identity with all.⁷ The particular consciousness is the consciousness of identity with some and not with

1 विशेषसंज्ञा, विशेषात्मभाव ।

2 Brhad S. B., II. 4. 10.

3 S. B., I. 4. 9, सर्वं दैवीशक्तिरूप्याकृतनामरूपा नामरूपयोप्रागवस्था ।

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 21, नानात्वं विशेषविज्ञानहेतुरित्युक्तं भवति ।

5 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 29.

6 ibid.

7 सर्वात्मभाव ।

others.¹ Creation begins with the rise of individual conscious centres, which are embodied consciousnesses. But Consciousness can embody itself only when there is a body which is viewed as different from that self or consciousness. It is ignorance alone which creates the consciousness of "something other" than the Self.² The idea of "limiting adjuncts" has meaning only in and through an act of consciousness. The creative act thus implies the production of appropriate material for the fashioning of the universe, which are in the end reducible to names and forms, and the birth of a limited consciousness. Both rise and fall together. The *Māyā* of Brahman is not only the creative Power; it is also *Avidyā*. Much of the misunderstanding about the Vedānta of Śaṅkara would disappear if, instead of speaking of *Avidyā* as the cause of the world, we spoke of the Divine Power of Brahman as its creative source and of the projection of *Avidyā* as the means through which the creative act is accomplished.³

It stands to the credit of Śaṅkara that he has fully realized the importance of the concept of *Avidyā* for any philosophical doctrine of creation which asserts that creation means differentiation or revelation of variety and multiplicity. It is *Avidyā* which "represents that which is infinite as finite, presents things other than the Self, which are non-existent, and makes the Self appear as limited".⁴ As creation has no meaning apart from such consciousness on the part of an experiencer, name and form, in the revelation of which consists the creative act, are said to have their essence or self in *Avidyā*.⁵ The individual self is cut off as a separate entity from the Absolute Brahman, which is the Supreme Self, by ignorance, through its connection with the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, and thus becomes mortal, subject to birth and death hunger and thirst, and other such relative attributes,

1 परिच्छिन्नात्मभाव, विशेषात्मभाव ।

2 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 32. अविद्यया हि द्वितीयः प्रविभज्यते ।

3 S. B. I. 4. 9. पारमेष्ठिन्याः कृतेः समस्तजगद्विजायिन्या ।

4 Brhad. S. B., IV. 3. 20.

5 S. B. I. 4. 3. अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजवृत्तिः.....अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः संततो वर्तते ।

and is identified with name, form and action. When this separate existence enters its cause, the great reality, the supreme Self; and is merged in it, in other words, when the differences created by ignorance are gone, the universe becomes one without a second. The separate existence of the individual self, in which it is born or dead, happy or miserable, possessed of the ideas of "I" and "mine", and so on, is not the result of Brahman modifying itself. The individual is not the effect or vikāra of Brahman. It is the unmodified Brahman itself limited by the upādhis. Its division from the Absolute is figurative and not actual, due to the limiting adjuncts of name and form.¹ There are the elements transformed into the body, organs and sense-objects, consisting of name and form. They are like the foam and bubbles on the limpid water of the supreme Self. From these elements, that is, with their aid the self comes out. As from water reflections of the sun, moon and so on arise, or from the proximity of such limiting adjuncts as red cottonpads a transparent crystal turns red, and so forth, so from the limiting adjuncts of the elements, transformed into the body and organs, the self comes out clearly as an individualized entity. These elements are the cause of its individualization.² It is here that it is true to say that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul".³ According to Śāṅkara the difference between Brahman and the individual self is due to the limiting adjuncts. Intrinsically there is neither difference nor identity between them, for they are by nature Pure Intelligence, homogeneous like a lump of salt. "The unconditioned Self, being beyond speech and mind, undifferentiated and one, is designated as 'Not this, not this'; when It has the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, which are characterized by ignorance, desire and work, It is called the transmigrating individual Self; and when the Self has the limiting adjunct of the power of Māyā manifesting

1 S. B., II. 1. 13. भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणा विकारः.....अद्विष्टरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वप्रवणत्वात्, तत्रापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभागः ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 12. एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुदायः ।

3 Genesis, 2. 7.

through eternal and unlimited knowledge. It is called the internal Ruler and *Īśvara*. The same Self as by nature transcendent, absolute and pure, is called the immutable and supreme Self. Similarly, having the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and organs of *Hiranyagarbha*, the Undifferentiated, the gods, the species, the individual, men, animals, spirits, etc., the Self assumes those particular names and forms."¹

Creation, then, means becoming many. Brahman's becoming many means manifesting "names" and "forms" and "entering into" them.² When names and forms are manifested or unfolded they do not abandon their own Self, which is Brahman or become divided from Brahman either in space or in time. The production of name and form is not like the begetting of a son according to Śāṅkara, much less like the manufacture of an article. The creation of the universe is not comparable to the "manufacture of an article which remains throughout separate from its maker and which is dismissed, when finished, to do the specific work for which it is meant". Nor can the creative act of God be fitly represented by the addition of a child to a family. Śāṅkara raises the question: How is the phenomenon separated from Brahman? and answers "Not as the son from the father."³ The filaments which unite the created universe to the Creative Spirit are never severed. The Creative Spirit is not really the sustainer of the dependent universe; it is its essence. The universe, too, is Brahman in essence. The more appropriate way of expressing the nature of creation is to say that "Brahman created itself".⁴ "Therefore is Brahman said to be self-made. That Brahman is self-created is well-known to the world, because it is the source of all; or Brahman, the cause, is called *Sukṛta* on account of its virtue, because it created everything, being everything."⁵ Brahman becomes many by differentiating names and forms and developing these distinctions.

1 *Bṛhad. S. B.*, II. B. 12.

2 *Taitt. S. B.*, II. G. 1. तन्नामदा व्याकरणं ब्रह्मणो बहुभवनम् । *Bṛhad. S. B.*, I.

4. 7. तस्या एव प्रवेद्य व्याकरणकृतं त्वय्युतः ।

3 *Taitt. S. B.*, II. 7. 1. किं ततः प्रविभक्तं कार्यमिति पितुरिव पुत्रः नेष्टवाह ।

4 *Ibid.*, स्वयमेवास्मानमेवाकुरुत कृतवत् ।

5 *Ibid.*

What is the distinction between the differentiated and the undifferentiated Brahman? Prior to the creation the real could be cognized as Pure Being merely. Though at the present time also this is Pure Being it is differentiated into names and forms, the object of the notion of "this". "Before creation no object could be cognized as 'this', as differentiated into name and form, just as it is not so cognized during deep sleep. Just as on waking from deep sleep one recognizes mere Being—that during deep sleep the only object was Pure Being—so also prior to creation. Just as, in the world, in the morning, one sees the potter gathering clay for the making of the jar, and then having gone away to some other place, and returning in the evening, he finds in the same place various such articles as the jar, the cup and the like, and then the idea in his mind is that all this was clay in the morning, in the same manner we have the present assertion, 'In the beginning, this was Pure Being.'¹ The universe, diversified with the distinctions of name, form and action, was the one Ātman alone. "Though even now it is surely the one entity still there is a distinction. The distinction is that before the creation, the universe, with no manifested difference of name and form and one with Ātman, was denoted by the word Ātman alone; but now, owing to the manifestation of the difference of name and form it is denoted by many words and also by the one word Ātman. Just as foam, which, before the separate manifestation of its name and form from that of water, was capable of being denoted only by the word 'water'; but when it becomes manifested by its difference of form and name from that of water, the same substance, water, is denoted by more than one word, 'water' and 'foam', and foam is denoted by the one word 'foam'.²

VII

THE FUTILITY OF ANY AUXILIARY
PRINCIPLE

The Idealistic Monism of Śaṅkara according to which the Absolute transcends the distinction, often treated as

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 1.

2 Āitareya. S. B. I. 1. 1.

absolute, between value and existence, does not recognize any other auxiliary principle as explanatory of the creative process of the world. Śaṅkara tells us in unmistakable words that "there is, other than the Ātman, nothing which is divided from it, either in space or in time, which is subtle, distant, different, which was past, which is, or which is to be".¹ In his system of Advaitavāda there is no room for any other auxiliary principle like the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya, independent and material, or like the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas; and the Vivaraṇa school does not seem to be faithful to Śaṅkara when it emphasizes the need of accepting another principle in addition to Brahman.² Besides Brahman and its own effects there is nothing else. Brahman is Advaitya, non-dual, according to Śaṅkara. It is One. He compares it to clay.³ But here the comparison ends. "Whenever two things are compared they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison."⁴ Though in the case of the clay and the jar we feel the necessity of certain other cooperating agencies in the shape of the potter who is the efficient cause, and so forth, so far as Brahman is concerned, Śaṅkara excludes all such extraneous agencies. Apart from the Self, which is the Absolute Being, no other object exists. The recognition of another principle would come in clash with the monism of the Good, which is the very starting point of Śaṅkara.⁵ Neither the Māyā of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, which is the "Divine creative power", and "which

1 Talih. S.B., II. 6.1.

2 Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, p.681. ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वाज्जगद्रूपेण विकरिष्यमाणं वस्त्वन्तरं किंचिदङ्गीकार्यम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1. 14. एव ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ताग्नायः Mand. S.B. III. 15. मूलो ह विस्फुलिगादि दृष्टान्तापन्यासः सृष्टिर्वा बोधिता ।

4 S.B., III. 2.21; II. 3.40. तस्य दृष्टान्तदर्शनावतांशेन द्रष्टव्यः ।

5 Chand. S.B., VI. 2.1. सदव्यतिरेकेण सतः सहकारिणं द्वितीयं वस्त्वन्तरं प्राप्तं प्रतिपिद्यतेऽद्वितीयमिति । नास्य द्वितीयं वस्त्वन्तरं विद्यत इत्यद्वितीयम् । Talih., S.B., II. 6.1. न हि आत्मनोऽन्यदनात्मभूतं तत्प्रविभक्तदेशकालसूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टं भूतभवद्भविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ।

exists in Brahman as warp and woof, as the potentiality of a fig tree in a fig seed"¹, nor the Name and Form, the concrete manifestations of *Māyā*, which is their unmodified state, can be viewed as something other than or external to Brahman. They are not the Not-Self, an *anātmavastu* like the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* or the Atoms of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. It is the exigencies of language which compel us to speak of *Māyā* as the divine power of Brahman. In truth there is no difference between the reality and its essence, between the *śaktimat* and the *śakti*. *Māyā* as the *śakti* of Brahman is nothing other than Brahman. The *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* system has not been integrated into a whole with its *Purusa*, and the atoms of the *Vaiśeṣikas* stand in an external and accidental relation to their God. They are in the words of *Śaṅkara*, *anātmabhūta*, *anātmavastu*, *vasīvantara*.²

It is, therefore, indifferent whether we say that Brahman or Name and Form constitute the material cause of the universe. "Name and form, one with the unmanifested *Ātman*, and denoted by the same word *Ātman*, can very well be regarded as the material cause of the universe, as water and foam in their unmanifested state being water alone become the causes of the manifested foam. Therefore the Omniscient created the universe with name and form, one with himself, as the material cause"³. As Brahman is the creator and also the material for creation we can very well say that it creates without any material (*nirupādānaḥ*). The analogy of the juggler bringing forth magical creations brings out this independence of the creative principle and the identity of the material and the efficient cause, so far as the final explanatory principle of the universe is concerned. It is a misconception of the analogy to interpret it in such a way as to concentrate on the indifference of Brahman about the creative process or the utter meaninglessness of it. To interpret it so would mean paying no heed to *Śaṅkara's* warning that "when-

1 *Kaṭha. S.B., I. 3. 11.*

2 *Altareya. S.B., I. 1. 1.* यथासंख्यानान्नात्मपञ्चपाति स्वतन्त्रं प्रधानं यदा च काण्डानामण्यो न तद्विद्वान्नात्मनः किञ्चिदपि वस्तु विद्यते । : *Taṇi. S.B., II. 6.1: Chand. S.B., VI. 2. 1.*

3 *Altareya. S.B., I. 1. 1.*

ever two things are compared they are compared only with reference to some particular point they have in common, and the entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated".¹ Therefore Śaṅkara says that "the omniscient and the omnipotent Ātman, the great conjurer, creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe, just as the intelligent juggler, without any other material, creates himself in another form as travelling in the air"². The views which regard the illusoriness of the world and the falsity of the creation as the essence of Śaṅkara's Monism do little or no justice to the value side of the universe as conceived by Śaṅkara, and to his repeated insistence that the effect is real in the same sense and to the same extent as the cause and that the two are identical. The Creative Monism of Śaṅkara is inconsistent with "all the theories which maintain the unreality of the cause or the effect or both"; they are all "untenable and easily refuted".³ The interpretations of Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Dasgupta and Belvalkar, all of whom think that Śaṅkara proves the monism of the Brahman by denying the reality of the effected universe, and that his view is more properly called Satkāraṇavāda, miss the essential truth of the creative aspect of his Vedāntism. Brahman, which is the essence of the universe, its Self or Ātman, "creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe".

To start with, there is the Ātman only; there is nothing other than the Self, nothing which could be viewed as Not-Self. Creation means that the Ātman presents itself as "other" than itself in the form of the universe. In the absence of this discrepancy, the causal relation itself would disappear.⁴ Where essence and existence are one, and come together, there is neither any event nor any process. But, according to Śaṅkara, it is essence which explains existence and being

1 S. B., III. 2. 20.

2 Aitareya. S. B., I. 1. 1. यथा विज्ञान्वात्मायात्री निरूपादान आत्मानमेव आत्मान्तरत्वेन आकाशेन गच्छन्तमिव निमिमीते तथा सर्वज्ञो देवः सर्वशक्तिः महामाय आत्मानमेवात्मान्तरत्वेन जगद्वेण निमिमीत इति युक्ततरम् ।

3 Taitt. S. B., II. 6. 1. एवं च सति कार्यकारणोभयासद्वाद्यादिपक्षाश्च न प्रसज्यन्ते मुनिराकृताश्च भवन्ति ।

4 S. B., II. 1. 6, अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत ।

itself is a form of value. There is a certain superiority in the cause; the effect has its self in the cause and not the cause in the effect. Name and Form, therefore, which in their manifested state constitute the created universe, have their essence in Brahman. They exist in and through this Brahman. But they are not the essence of Brahman. Name and form are said to be Brahman, because when we deny Brahman they are not.¹ Name and Form are the limiting adjuncts of the Absolute, and with these two limitations Brahman becomes the subject of talk as the knower, the knowable. The created universe is neither one with Brahman nor wholly other than it. Its oneness would destroy the process itself; its complete otherness would prevent any process from coming into being. The cosmological situation involves and represents a dialectical antinomy, the resolution of which does not present any serious difficulty to Śāṅkara, as he believes that the two worlds of value and existence are identical in essence, that the world of fact is a necessary expression of the world of value, the Not-Self of the world of Self. There is no brute fact existing in its own right. There is nothing which is mere Not-Self, unenlivened by the life of the Self and the light of Brahman. Just as the foam is neither wholly one with water nor totally different from it, similarly the names and forms are neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman. Water is pure and limpid; the foam is impure and dirty. But the latter has no being apart from the former.

Śāṅkara, following the Upaniṣads, brings out the inseparability of the universe from Brahman by emphasizing the entrance of Brahman in the universe after the manifestation of name and form. "He entered the very universe which he created."² But Śāṅkara is careful to point out that the Self, which is without parts and which is all-pervading can never be supposed to enter in the sense of leaving a certain quarter, place or time and being joined to new ones.³ "The cause

1 Talit. S. B., II. 6. 1. अतो नामरूपे सवविस्थं ब्रह्मणोवात्मवती न बह्य तदात्म-
कम् । ते तत्प्रत्याख्यानं न स्तः एवेति । तदात्मके उच्यन्ते ।; S. B., II. 1. 6. कार्यस्य
कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं ।

2 Talit. S. B., II. 6. 1.

3 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

itself is transformed into the effect; therefore it is not reasonable that the cause should enter the effect after the effect is produced, as if it had not entered before."¹ The clay has no entrance into the pot apart from the clay becoming the pot. The Ātman is one, has no parts, and since there is no place where it is not to speak of its entrance is unsound. The entrance of the Self into the universe is but a metaphorical way of stating that the universe exists in and through the Self, "which is perceived in the midst of the former".² The Self is differentiated by the activities of living, etc., into name and form, such as the vital force or the eye. "That the cause of ākāśa, etc., after creating the world, is obtained within the internal cavity, with such distinctions as seer, hearer, thinker, knower, is what constitutes the entrance of the Self."³

Much of the difficulty which the readers of Śaṅkara experience in understanding the creative aspect of his Absolute will disappear if, instead of speaking of "creation", we prefer to talk of "revelation". "It is true", says Śaṅkara, "that from one entity no other entity is born. The truth is that Being alone subsists in another form."⁴ Creation, viewed as a process of revelation, brings out the continuity of the causal substance and emphasizes the need of recognizing what Professor Whitehead calls "an underlying activity, a substantial activity expressing itself in individual embodiments and evolving in achievements of organisms".⁵ Brahman presents itself in another form, just as the serpent coils itself into a ring or the clay-dust subsists in the form of the jar. "It is Being itself which subsists in the form of that which is denoted by the word 'this', just as it is the clay which is denoted by the words 'jar', etc."⁶ Though the various effects, lump, jar, etc., differ among themselves, yet they are the same with regard to the clay. Though the jar differs from the lump and the lump from

1 Taïtt. S. B., II. 6. 1.

2 Brhad. S. B., I. 4. 7.

3 Taïtt. S. B., II. 6. 1.

4 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2. सत्यमेव न सतः सदन्तरमुत्पद्यते कितर्हि । सदेवा संस्थाना न्तरेणावतिष्ठते ।

5 Science and the Modern World, P. 135.

6 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 2.

the jar, yet neither the lump nor the jar differs from the clay; hence both the lump and the jar are pure clay, only different forms of it. In the same manner all "this" is only a form of Being.¹

VIII

CREATION AS MĀYIKA DIFFERENTIATION

The question, "how can an indivisible and incorporeal Being be modified into different forms?" does not present any insuperable difficulty to Śaṅkara, who believes that the creation of multiplicity and diversity has meaning only for a consciousness which enjoys it as such. Apart from its being cognized, known, appreciated and accepted as such, it is difficult to see in what possible sense we can speak of variety as a fact to be taken note of. Before the clay can be viewed as having become many in the shape of the jar, etc., or the rope regarded as having grown forth into the form of the serpent, our mind must be affected accordingly. "The Lord is perceived as manifold, although He is ever the same Pure Intelligence, on account of Māyā."² Māyā is explained by Śaṅkara as "(diverse) knowledge or false identifications created by name, from and the elements"³ The creative act implies not only the projection of differentiations but also recognition of them as such. The latter aspect has greater significance according to Śaṅkara, for creation is an intelligible concept and possesses meaning only on the intellectual plane to which we rise from the level of bare existence. "The Lord with the help of his Māyā projects the differentiations within himself, like the snake in the rope, and knows them as such."⁴ The possibility of an indivisible and incorporeal reality differentiating itself into parts which are separated from each other in space and time is excluded by the

1 *ibid.*, मूदादिसंस्थानमात्रं घटादयः एवं सत्संस्थानमात्रमिदं सर्वमिति युक्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेः सदेवेति ।

2 *Bṛhad.* II. 5. 19.

3 *ibid.*, इन्द्रो मायाभिः प्रजाभिः नामरूपकृतमित्याभिमानीर्वा न तु परमार्थतः ।

4 *Mand. S.B.*, II. 12, देव आत्मन्येव वक्ष्यमाणं भेदाकारं कल्पयति रज्ज्वादाविव सर्पादीन् स्वयमेव च तान् बुद्धयते भेदास्तद्वदेव ।

very nature of it. As it is "false knowledge" or *Avidyā* which lends intelligibility to the concept of "differentiation" and consequently to that of "creation", the dissolution also with which Śaṅkara's philosophy especially deals is not the dissolution which is "natural" according to the Paurāṇikas and in which effects dissolve into their causes, but one "which is consciously effected by the knowers of Brahman through their knowledge of Brahman and which happens through the cessation of ignorance":¹ Śaṅkara calls this extreme dissolution or *ātyantikapralaya*. He has this "prajñā" or "diverse knowledge" aspect of the creative power of *Māyā* in mind when he says that "just as the parts of the serpents are assumed from the parts of the rope, similarly it would be possible for the forms of modifications to proceed from the assumed parts of the Being, all modifications being names merely".² Śaṅkara's intention is not to preach any variety of subjective idealism or to lay the foundations of mentalism. Far from even lapsing into any such vein of thought, he takes pains to dissociate himself from such views. Critics unable to perceive the true force of Śaṅkara's analogy come forward with the objection that if Brahman becomes many, like the rope growing forth into a serpent, then "in that case all that is seen to be is a non-entity, because the rope as a serpent is a non-entity".³ They level against him the charge that he makes a confusion between the *Parināma* and *Vivarta* illustrations, and the examples he adduces to illustrate the creative act do not fit in with the context.

The example of the rope and the snake, it is made clear by Śaṅkara, is not intended by him to prove the illusoriness or utter non-existence, of "all that is seen".⁴ According to Śaṅkara "there is no non-existence of anything anywhere".⁵ It is Being itself which is mistaken for dualities and diversities. There is nothing which is other than Brahman. "It is Being alone which names, and is named as other things; just as the

1 *Bṛhad. S.B.*, II. 4. 12.

2 *Chand. S.B.*, VI. 2.2.

3 *Ibid.*, II. 6.3.

4 *Ibid.* सर्वं यद्गृह्यते ।

5 *Ibid.* न असत्त्वं कस्मिन् कस्मिदिति ब्रूमः ।

rope that is named serpent by the notion of a serpent; or again just as the lump, the jar, being mistaken for something other than the clay, are named 'lump', 'jar'. For those that know the rope to be the truth, there is an end to the consciousness of the snake; and for those who know the clay to be the reality; there disappear the ideas of the lump, the jar, etc. In the same manner for those that have a discriminative knowledge of Being, there no more operates the consciousness of the modifications being something other than that Being.¹ All names and all things which are named as other than Brahman are forms of Brahman and have their essence in it. It is not the thing which is false; it is the consciousness of an alien reality, of a foreign substance, of otherness, which is believed to constitute the essence of things, that is false and is to be given up. We are wrong not in taking note of the facts, we make a mistake in understanding their meaning. Philosophy ascertains the value of the existential order of phenomena. And when philosophy becomes conscious of this mission, as it has done in Śaṅkara, it finds that "all that one sees or hears or touches is nothing but the Lord Vasudeva".²

The process of creation, then, according to Śaṅkara, consists in Brahman's differentiating names and forms and entering them and thus "obtaining specific or individualized consciousness" in connection with these names and forms.³ Brahman "in the process of manifesting name and form transformed himself in accordance with each form, or (to put it differently) assumed the likeness of each form".⁴ The manifested universe in its real form is Brahman. In this form it is complete and self-sufficient. The process of creation is also eternally complete but is also being eternally fulfilled. It is at once eternal and temporal; in time as well as out of time. In its essential aspect it is eternal and eternally complete; in its temporal aspect it is a process and a passage craving for completion. Sub specie aeternitatis it is perfect and infi-

1 Chand. S. B., VI. 2. 3. मद्धिवेकदशिवामन्यविकारमद्वयद्वि निवर्तते ।

2 Gita. S. B., XIII. 18.

3 Chand. S. B., VI. 3. 2. तस्य विशेषविज्ञानम् ।

4 Brhad. S. B., II. 5. 19.

nite; *sub specie temporis* it is infected with imperfection and finitude. The universe is a manifestation of the Absolute Reality which is Brahman. As the Absolute in revealing itself does not lose itself and its infinite Existence, infinite Consciousness and infinite Bliss are eternally conserved to it, and as existence is one with and inseparable from essence through all instants of time and points of space according to Śāṅkara, Brahman and the Universe both are equally infinite. "That (Brahman) is infinite, and this (universe) is infinite. The finite proceeds from the infinite. (Then) taking the infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone."¹ The universe appears to be separated from and other than Brahman—this constitutes the fact of creation. The universe is rooted in and one with Brahman—this is the meaning of creation. Time is what is meant by the gulf between Brahman and the universe or essence and existence. But time is not able to create an absolute divorce between essence and existence. Time itself becomes intelligible with reference to the essence and as the distance between the essence and the existence which is a projected form of the essence. This means that neither time nor the universe viewed as a process and a passage is absolutely real and intelligible. It therefore cannot be said to possess an intrinsic value and an absolute significance. Brahman is the meaning of the universe. It constitutes the absolute value and absolute existence. Time and the universe are meaningful only in so far as they point to the absolute values which are foundational to time and to the temporal world.

"The Supreme Brahman is complete, all-pervading like the ether, without a break, and unconditioned. So also is this conditioned Brahman, manifesting through name and form and coming within the scope of relativity, infinite or all-pervading, indeed in its real form as the Supreme Self, not in its differentiated form circumscribed by the limiting adjuncts. This differentiated Brahman proceeds or emanates from the infinite or Brahman as cause. Although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up its nature, infinitude, the state of the Supreme Self—it emanates as but the infinite. Taking

1 Brhad., V. 1. 1.

the infinitude of the infinite, or Brahman, as effect, that is, attaining perfect unity with its own nature by removing through knowledge its apparent otherness that is created by ignorance through the contact of limiting adjuncts, the elements, it remains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman, alone, without interior or exterior, the homogeneous Pure Intelligence."¹ The Infinite is Brahman. That again is this infinite universe — Brahman manifested as effect, connected with the limiting adjuncts of name and form, projected by ignorance, appearing as different from its real nature.

IX

FROM CREATIVE MONISM TO AXIOLOGICAL MONISM

From what has been said above it would seem that the causal argument is one of the pivots on which the Advaitism of Śaṅkara rests. Far from being riddled with contradictions, as Professor Radhakrishnan supposes to be the case, "the concept of causality" is an essential part of the foundation on which the superstructure of Śaṅkara's monism is reared. But it is only when we view it a value category that it can perform the task which Śaṅkara assigns to it. The causal argument sums up the "reasoning" through which can be established the Brahman-hood of the universe. The universe is divine in character because it originates from Divinity. The Creator and Creation are one. "Virāja, after projecting this whole world, knew, 'I indeed am the creation, that is, the projected world. The world I have projected not being different from me, I myself am that; it is not something over and above myself. For I projected all this, the whole world.'"² It is only when we treat the concept of causality as an existential concept that Śaṅkara "shows the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature" of it and not otherwise. It is hardly true to say that according to Śaṅkara "to postulate a first cause is arbitrary, since it would be to assume a beginning for the causal series, a beginning for time".³ Professor Radhakrishnan

1 *ibid.*

2 *Bṛhad. S.B., I. 4.5, अहं वाच सृष्टिरस्मि अहं हीदं सर्वममृशीति ततः सृष्टिरभवत् ।*

3 Radhakrishnan. I. P., Vol. I. P.530.

misses the truth that the category of cause as employed by Śaṅkara is a value category, a category of interpretation and not of description in terms of before and after. It is not "time" but "value" which supplies the clue to the understanding of the inner meaning of the concept of cause and of the importance of such a concept for metaphysics, which concerns itself not with being abstracted from value, but with value itself, of which being is a form. It is hardly true to say of Śaṅkara's treatment of the category of cause that "when it is formulated truly it is useless; when it is useful, it is not true".¹ To postulate a First Cause is the fundamental demand of the logic and the intellect oriented towards value, according to Śaṅkara. It is the starting-point of philosophy. To assume a First Cause is to acknowledge an absolute value of Existence. Not to acknowledge it is to open the door to contradictions and confusions. "Without acknowledging an Original Cause our thought will be moving in a vicious circle."² The demand for a "First Cause" is the fundamental demand of a rational life and a rational logic.

We find it difficult to agree with Professor Radhakrishnan in his assertion that Śaṅkara, like Kant, shows the futility of the "cosmological" and "physico-theological" proofs for the existence of God.³ We find Śaṅkara religiously insisting, whenever there is an occasion to do so, that Brahman is the eternal and supreme cause and the cause is the Supreme Brahman.⁴ Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction is not with the causal argument, but with a particular formulation of the causal argument, namely the formulation which seeks to prove the existence of God, not as the constitutive stuff and the living content of the universe, but as its directive power only. The view which Śaṅkara controverts is the view that Īśvara is merely the operative or the efficient cause of the world. Śaṅkara himself is committed to the view that Brahman is both

1 *ibid.*, P. 532.

2 S.B., II. 3.9. मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ।

3 *ibid.*, P. 542.

4 S. B., II 2. 15, नित्यं परं कारणं ब्रह्म ।; *ibid.*, II. 1. 14, कारणं परं ब्रह्म । S. B., I. 1. 10. आत्मनः कारणत्वं दर्शयन्ति सर्वे वेदान्ता ।; S. B., I. 1. 16, सर्वविकारसृष्टिश्च न परस्मादात्मनोज्यत्रोपपद्यते ।

the material Cause and the ruler of the world.¹ The view which does not find favour with him is the view "which maintains that *Īśvara* is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i. e. the operative cause of the world", and it is this doctrine which is inconsistent with the Vedāntic tenet of the monism of the Good.² Śāṅkara's own view is *Brahmavāda*. It is Value Philosophy; he himself is a *Brahmavādin*, a Value-Philosopher. Brahman is identical with the Absolute Good in his system. His view is, therefore, the Monism of the Good. But his Brahman is the creative principle also, and his *Brahmavāda* is identified by him with *Brahmakāraṇavāda*. His Monism of the Good thus turns out to be essentially a Creative Monism. The difficulties which Śāṅkara has pointed out in the way of the causal argument do not vitiate his own statement of it, because it is identical in essence with what has been called in previous pages the "axiological" argument. The ordinary causal argument which proceeds from effect to cause, or from the empirically verified existence of the world to God as the cause which explains that existence, is based explicitly on what Hume called "a contemplation of the works of nature", "the frame of nature", and thus tries to rest a philosophical doctrine of God on a fragment of the evidence actually before us. If we take into account the whole evidence before us, "the works of nature" as well as man's awareness of the values which are organic both to man's life and to nature, we shall, according to Śāṅkara, be led to the view that Brahman is the Creator and also the Creation, the Musician and also the Music, the Song as well as the Singer. Śāṅkara demolishes not "*Īśvarakāraṇavāda*" but "*Kevalādhisthāṇīśvarakāraṇavāda*", that is "*Īśvarakāraṇavāda*" as accepted by the Nyāya system.³ It is the contingency of the finite, the relative, the conditioned, the *sopādhika* which is the whole nerve of the reasoning contained in the causal argument as employed by Śāṅkara. The conditioned Brahman is rooted

1 S. B., II. 2. 37. प्रकृतिभावेनाधिष्ठातृभावेन त्र्यम्बकस्यैव तत्त्वस्य स्वयमेवाचार्येण प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात् ।

2 Ibid., तस्मादप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाना केवल निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इत्येवमर्थो वेदान्त-विहितं ब्रह्मैक्यं प्रतिपक्षत्वात्कलं प्रतिपिद्वपते ।

3 Ibid., II. 2. 41. सत्यं गन्तव्यं कर्तव्यं हि तं ईश्वरकारणवादः ।

in the Unconditioned. "The argument is not so much 'Because the contingent is therefore the necessary being is'; it is rather 'Because the contingent is not therefore the necessary being is'".¹ The effect is unable to stand alone, because it is infected with relativity. It has nothing stable in it, or permanently satisfactory. Human thought is thus compelled to pass beyond it to a reality which is abiding and permanent. The finite exists only in and through the Infinite. "Whatever is an effect, limited and gross, is pervaded by that which is the cause, unlimited and subtle, as earth is pervaded by water. Similarly (in the series from the earth to the ether) each preceding element must be pervaded by the succeeding one — till we come to the Self that is within all."² The implicit logic of religion leads us through a series of intermediate genera, to a Supreme Genus, Pure Intelligence, in which all the varieties of that genus are included and unified during all states.³

We have seen how the Absolute divides itself into centres and the way in which, so divided, it still remains one. The universe, according to Śaṅkara, is a place of soul-making and in the making of souls we have the typical business or the central interest of the universe. The fact of individuation, which is what Śaṅkara understands by differentiation or creation, constitutes the very essence and open secret of the Absolute life. "Brahman in the process of manifesting name and form transformed itself in accordance with each form", or, to put it differently, assumed the likeness of each form.⁴ Brahman, which is Truth, Knowledge and Infinity, having created akāśa, etc., ending with things made of food, "enters into them and appears as individualized".⁵ But "why these appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds"? "Why the fact of appearance and of the diversity of its particular spheres"? "Why does the Absolute divide itself into centres"? Śaṅkara's

1 S. B. II. 14. ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यमात्मन्यभावाच्च इति गम्यते ।

2 Brhad. S. B., III. 6. 1.

3 Ibid., II. 4. 2.

4 Ibid., II. 5. 19.

5 Tatit. S. B., III. 1. 1. तदेवानुप्रविष्टं विशेषवद्विवेकप्रमाणम् ।

6 Bradley : Appearance and Reality, P. 453.

7 Ibid., P. 457.

answer is not, as Bradley's is, "We do not know".¹ He does not say "these are questions not to be answered".² The answer to the question: "Why did He come in so many forms?" can be given only in a language of time which is relevant to the sphere of the duality of value and existence, as both the raising of the question and the answering of it belong to this. If this limitation is borne in mind, the essential truth contained in Śāṅkara's statement of the answer to the question and intended to be communicated to his reader cannot be darkened. Śāṅkara's answer to the question is formulated by him in two slightly different ways, which do not ultimately diverge, according as the answer is given from the side of the Absolute or from the side of the individuated self. There is difference in the formulation of the answer, because the Unconditioned Brahman and the individual self cannot speak the same language even when they undertake to express the same truth. The Supreme Unconditioned Brahman speaks a language the verb of which is in the present tense, but this "present" is a "timeless present". The individuated self is used to a language which cannot transgress the distinction between the past, the present and the future in its attempt to give intelligible description of things. The idiom of communication which the Unconditioned Brahman would employ would be an idiom which would negate the mutual externality of successive moments in time. The answers given from the two sides would not ultimately diverge because the Unconditioned and the individuated self are ultimately one.

From the side of the Absolute the answer which Śāṅkara gives is that the universe is the self-realization of Brahman, that Brahman is infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. This realization involves the positing, by projection, of individuated selves and seeing in them nothing but its own life, its own consciousness and its own bliss. "Brahman, having created all this universe beginning with ākāśa in due order, without the aid of any other entity than itself, entered, for its own realization, all the bodies having life. And, having so entered, it realized its own real

1 *ibid.*, P. 467

2 *ibid.*, P. 443.

Self directly thus: 'I, Brahman, am all this'. Therefore, it alone is the one Ātman in all bodies and there is none else."¹ From the side of the individuated self the answer suggested as giving the clue to the purpose guiding the process of creation is that man ought to know that "he is one with that Bliss which is Brahman and which is invisible and unlike everything else".² At another place the same truth is worded differently.³ Brahman manifested itself in different forms "for the sake of making itself known. Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature of this Self as Pure Intelligence would not be known. When, however, name and form are manifested as the body and organs, it is possible to know its nature."⁴ The truth underlying both these slightly different formulations is one and the same, namely that the process of creation is an expression and, therefore an affirmation, of the truth that Brahman is Infinite Consciousness and Infinite Bliss. Brahman is not first there and then undertakes the creative act and becomes the creator with a view to realizing any end or purpose. Brahman exists as creatively realizing itself in the world. This act of creative realization is an act of conscious enjoyment. But for the fact that Brahman is Consciousness which is the same throughout its structure, the creative act would not be possible. But as Brahman is Infinite and Eternal Consciousness, it is eternally aware of its infinite nature which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, and the creative act is being eternally fulfilled. Brahman is infinite, which means unlimited. A thing can be limited only by something other than itself. Brahman is Consciousness also and therefore it is Infinite Consciousness. An Infinite

1. Altoreya. S. B., II. 1. 1. सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वमिदं जगत् स्वतो ज्येष्ठस्त्वन्तरामनुपादायैव आकाशादिकमेव सृष्ट्वा स्वात्मप्रबोधनार्थं सर्वाणि च प्राणादिमण्डलीराणि स्वयं प्रविशेत् । प्रविश्य च स्वयमात्मानं यथाभूतमिदं ब्रह्मास्मीति साक्षात् प्रत्यवदधत् ।
2. Taitt. S. B., III. 1. 1. सर्वकार्यविलक्षणमदृश्यादिधर्मकमेवानन्दं तद्वद्वाहमिति विजानीयादनुप्रवेशस्य तदर्थत्वात् ।
3. Brhad S. B., II. 5. 19.
4. Ibid. तदस्यात्मनो रूपं प्रतिवक्ष्यामि प्रतिव्यापनाय । यदि हि नामरूपे न आक्रमेते तदास्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिव्यापेत् ।

Consciousness must eternally be aware of its infinitude. The eternal awareness of its infinitude means that it is always conscious that it is not limited by anything and there is nothing other than itself. This creative thought is at once the positing of an "other" and realizing that this other is not wholly "other" and is one with itself. Brahman "creates itself as other than itself in the form of the universe" and "realizes its own real Self directly thus: I, Brahman, am all this".¹ This awareness that there is nothing other than myself is an eternal awareness. Therefore the act of creation is eternally being fulfilled and eternally complete. Creation, for Śaṅkara, is not a special act or an event in time. It is the eternal fashion of the cosmic life and is grounded in the divine nature. It is coeval with divine existence. It belongs to the very being of Brahman, to its very essence, to realize itself thus.

As the creation of the universe is an expression of the truth that Brahman is everything and there is nothing other than Brahman, similarly the realization that I am one with Brahman and with everything is also the end involved in the process of creation. Brahman is the origin and also the goal of the universe. Thus it is Brahman which as name and form—as the body and organs—is inside and outside everything. As it is Brahman which, after revealing name and form, has entered them, there is no other witness but this, no other hearer but this. It is Brahman which as the inner self sees, hears, thinks, understands and knows. Thus the projection of the universe and the entrance of the Self into it serve as an aid to the realization of the unity of the Self. Brahman is the inner Self of all and also the objective world of name and form. The individuated self, when it realizes this inner meaning of the creative process, "identifies itself with all as its limiting adjuncts, becomes the Self of all and become all. Again, it is without any limiting adjuncts, without name, devoid of interior or exterior", because everything, being its own expression, is non-different from it. Thus while, on the one hand, creation is the way in which Brahman exists, regarded as an act of differentiation and viewed in its conditioned

1. Atareya. S.B., I. 1.1; II. 1.1.

aspect, it has an instrumental or mediating function. Thus conceived Spirit is the terminus ad quem of creation. The names and forms were manifested, so that the transcendent nature of the Self as Pure Intelligence might be known. The meaning and the mode of creation harmonize with each other.

Is there, then, any recondite purpose in the making of the universe? Is there any ultimate motive by which the Absolute is moved to create? If by this we mean that the purpose is something "foreign and external" to Brahman, something which is far removed from its nature, something after which it has to strive and to which it has to adjust itself, then Śāṅkara repudiates all such ideas of finality. Brahman is Self-fulfilled and its self-fulfilment through time cannot be anything other than the expression of its perfection. That is why, for Śāṅkara, Brahman is infinite and this universe also is infinite; from the infinite comes out the infinite. Brahman can have no "purpose" in the above sense, in the making of the universe, because Brahman's life, which is a life of infinite consciousness and infinite bliss, is essentially a process of self-communication. Brahman exists as creatively realizing itself in the universe. To those who insist that philosophy should point to some definite purpose which determined the process of creation Śāṅkara's answer is that "it is irrelevant to ask or to answer the question".¹ To attempt an answer to such a question is to regard creation as an event which took place at some assignable date in the past, as in Biblical Chronology which fixed the date at 4004 B.C.

For Śāṅkara the question of historical emergence of the universe has no philosophical importance and there is something wrong with this whole method of attacking the problem of creation. Philosophy cannot undertake to account for what are but local incidents of the distribution of cosmic forces. It looks at the universe as part of a value-scheme; and this point of view cannot sanction any explanation in which the universe is made to stand somehow independently outside Brahman, whose relation to the subsequent unfolding of the

1 Gita, S.B., IX, 10, किं निमित्ता इयं सृष्टिः इति अत्र प्रश्नप्रतिबन्धने अनुपपन्ने ।

cosmic drama is at most that of an interested spectator. "Of what purpose is this creation by the One, the Divine, the pure, all-witnessing Spirit or Consciousness, who has really no concern with any enjoyment whatever?"¹ To answer this question will be to answer the question, "How Being is made," which, as Lotze said, is an absurd question. If we do not abstract Being from its Essence but admit that Essence is a matter of acknowledgment, which is the only legitimate procedure, there will be no difficulty in seeing that creation is the eternal fashion of the cosmic life. It is the eternal realization on the part of the Absolute that it is everything. This view is essentially one with the Hegelian view that the Absolute is not a substance but a Subject or Spirit, that this "Absolute Spirit takes upon itself and makes its own the stupendous labour of the world's history; that in so doing it infuses the component parts with spiritual significance, embodies itself in human form, and, in the process, at once eternal and in time, reconciles the world to itself and itself to the world". The universe being eternal, the process is eternally being fulfilled and eternally complete.

For Śaṅkara the idea of evolution which is philosophically satisfactory cannot be temporal. Like Bradley, he believes that a conflict with the sciences upon any question of development or order could not properly arise. As for the solution of the philosophical problem of evolution, the fact of time, i. e., succession, is in the main irrelevant and the conflict between Divine Evolutionism and Naturalistic Evolutionism has never assumed the formidable shape of a problem for Śaṅkara. Whether a particular order of reality appeared sooner or later in a particular time-series does not affect the philosophical view that God is the First and the Final cause of the universe. Philosophy is interested, according to Śaṅkara, in knowing that one reality from which everything springs and knowing which all else is known. But Śaṅkara is careful to warn us that "the general assertion of everything springing from Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately proceed from that which is, not that they should be its immediate effects".² Accordingly, Śaṅkara sees no conflict

1 *Ibid.*

2 S. B., II. 3. 10, प्रतिज्ञासि सद्ब्रह्ममात्रमपेक्षते नाव्यवहितजन्यत्वमित्यविरोधः ।

between the scriptural texts which speak of "creation without specifying the order of succession" and the texts "which specify the order of creation". The statement that "fire springs from air" is as true as the statement that "fire springs from Brahman". "The supposition that after the creation of ether and air the air-form of Brahman gave rise to fire would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman; for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curd comes from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow."¹ This reconciliation which Śaṅkara effects between the "akram-avatsṛṣṭivādīnya" śrūtis and the "kramavatsṛṣṭivādīnya" śrūtis is really the reconciliation between Divine Evolutionism and Naturalistic Evolutionism, between the philosophical conception of evolution and the scientific conception of evolution. "The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants, such as kuśa-grass, kāśa-grass, palasa trees, or in various living beings, such as cattle, deer, men", has taken place, according to Śaṅkara, through the evolution and manifestation of "different species and individuals".² The question of the "origin of species" and the factors that contribute to it constitute the subject-matter of science, which is concerned with determining "how one effect proceeds from another".³ Philosophy is concerned with understanding the nature of that Supreme Genus which unifies the varieties of genera and species with the special natures of which sciences undertake to deal.

X

ŚAṅKARA'S VALUE-SCHEME AND THE DOCTRINE ON MĀYĀ

The forgoing discussion of the creative aspect of Śaṅkara's Absolutism has prepared us to understand the real significance of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā, which, by some enthusiastic commentators, has been raised to the rank of a

1 S. B. II. 3. 10.

2 S. B., II. 4. 20, प्रत्याकृति प्रतिव्यक्ति बानेकप्रकाशः ।

3 S. B., II. 3. 9, विकारभ्यां विकारान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् ।

vāda and by certain caustic critics reviled as the Vedāntic version of Buddhistic Nihilism and Idealism. The doctrine has proved a stumbling block to his readers, and has been regarded as a cloak which merely covers the inner flaws of his system. It has been said that when arguments are wanting, Śaṅkara falls back upon this doctrine, and manoeuvres an easy escape. It would seem, according to such critics, that instead of following the customary practice of abusing the adversary when arguments fail, he practices an abuse of logic by "throwing it overboard" and appealing to Śruti, or by choosing "to sing his old song of Māyā theory". The incorporation of the doctrine of Māyā in the body of the Vedānta system has been said to be an illustrious example of a halting logic, of faithlessness to facts, of blinking evidence and of a device to explain away instead of facing squarely the difficulties of the situation. All the writers on Śaṅkara hold that his real objective was to establish Vivartavāda or Māyāvāda as against Pariṇāmavāda; but many of them, like Dr. Dasgupta, are disposed to think that Śaṅkara was never concerned "to explain the definite relation of māyā to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. He did not think it worthwhile to explain anything definite regarding the nature of avidyā and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe."¹

Much of the misunderstanding which prevails about the true force of what Śaṅkara has said about Māyā is due to failure to realize that Śaṅkara's philosophy is a philosophy of value, and that his Brahman is essentially a truly creative reality. His Monism is a Monism of the Good, and his Monism of the Good is a truly Creative Monism. The doctrine of Māyā is not a substitute for the Brahmanavāda of Śaṅkara but a phase of and incidental to Śaṅkara's philosophy of value, Brahman, or Mokṣa. Māyāvāda is not the whole of Brahmanavāda or Mokṣavāda, the foundations of which have been laid and made secure by Śaṅkara in his commentaries. The doctrine is concerned with merely pointing out the mode or manner in which Brahman creates and re-creates itself in nature, in

1 History, Vol. II, P. II.

history and in human affairs. It summarizes Śaṅkara's judgment not about the fact or otherwise of Brahman's causality but about the way in which Brahman's causality operates and attains completion. Māyāvāda is not a denial of Brahmanakāraṇavāda but an aspect of it. It presupposes that Brahman is also the creative reality and not merely a value, and simply draws the consequence of this presupposition, which, while being a statement about the mode of creation, is at the same time an assertion about the character of the created world in its relation to the creative source.

That Brahman is creative is a fundamental truth about the nature of the ultimate reality which is in no way derived from any other truth. Only Consciousness can be said to be the creative reality. There is yet another side to the truth about the nature of the real. It is the truth about the conservative aspect of reality. The real is so constituted that it cannot give up its nature and be something other than what it is. Śaṅkara's conception of causality is an embodiment of the creative as well as the conservative aspect of reality. Brahman, which is the most supremely real, reveals itself into multiplicity, but in so doing it does not give up its nature of being alike throughout its structure and of having no difference either within it or without it. This is the essence of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyavāda or Vivartavāda. The principle of "creativity" combined with the principle of "conservation" leads inevitably to the doctrine of Māyā, the essence of which is that Brahman, which is the Self-communicating life, does not lose itself in revealing itself in diversified names and forms and realizing that all this is its own Self. The doctrine of Māyā is not a theory or a hypothesis. It is a statement of fact about the nature of reality. According to Śaṅkara, "there is no reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the Brahman, which in its nature is one and non-dual, without destroying its character of unity".¹ This, it should be realized, is the essence of Māyāvāda, and we have the authority of Vacaspathiśra to support this view.²

1 S.B., II. 1. 28, एकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वयंपात्प्रमर्देनैवानेकारामृष्टिर्भविष्यति ।

2 Bhamati on S.B., II. 1. 28. अनेन स्फुटितो मायावादः ।

Our dream-life supplies us with an example wherein the dreaming person carries on and accomplishes the work of creation without any extraneous aid and without permitting its own unity of nature to be destroyed. Consciousness is the only reality of which we are aware as giving rise to multiplicity without destroying its own unity. "There are no chariots in the dream-state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads". Human experience in its higher as well as its lower ranges is full of examples of creative activity wherein the creator does not lose itself in creating itself. "The gods, manes, ṛṣis and other beings of great power are seen to create many and various objects without availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere resolve—a fact which is vouchsafed by mantra, arthavāda, itihāsa, and purāṇas."¹ In ordinary life the magician creates himself in another form, as travelling in the air, and produces multifarious objects like elephants, horses and the like, without giving up his nature. The doctrine of Māyā is not concerned with the denial of creation but with the revival of that view of creation according to which it is the eternal that explains the changing, the immovable which renders movement intelligible.

The Absolute can be said to create itself as diversified into multiplicity only in so far as this act does not tamper with the integral unity of Brahman. Māyā is the word chosen by Śaṅkara to express this truth. Brahman creates itself into many only through Māyā. The division of the Absolute into the relative many is not an absolute division. Neither the nature of the real permits such a division nor is such a division required for the fulfilment of the purpose which determines the origin and guides the course of the evolutionary process. The process is but incidental to the realization of the truth by the Absolute that it is everything and there is nothing other than and different from it. To say that a reality which is one and alike throughout its structure becomes many "really", that is, in the sense that multiplicity and diversity possess equal value and significance, is to admit that fire is at once hot and cold.

1 S.B., II. 1. 25.

(§ XI.) THE VALUE CONCEPT OF ANIRVACANĪYATĀ

The statement of Śaṅkara that multiplicity is not the paramārtha sat but māyā has presented serious obstacles to readers, because they have attempted to understand it while adopting the standpoint of existence. The statement is one made from the standpoint of value, and carries an axiological significance. That multiplicity is not paramārtha means really that this fact does not possess intrinsic value, that it does not carry its own meaning, that it is not self-explanatory unless understood as an expression of value. The significance of the creative process consists in the realization that the whole of creation is nothing other than Brahman. The creation of multiplicity is subservient to the realization that it is the Ātman ultimately. Brahman created the universe and then realized, "I, Brahman, am all this". Unity is in the beginning; it is in the end. It is the beginning and also the end. Multiplicity is in the middle only. It is māyika therefore. The highest truth is the oneness of value and existence. The Advaita appears as dvaita only through Māyā.¹ It is the identity of value and existence which renders significant their duality and discrepancy. The dvaita is the fact; the advaita is the value of this fact. The former possesses relative being and deficient value. The latter possesses absolute reality and infinite value.

XI

THE VALUE CONCEPT OF ANIRVACANĪYATĀ

The doctrine of Māyā not only emphasizes the origin of the world from Brahman and the latter's subsistence in its eternal purity and absolute integrity; it also summarizes the peculiarly baffling nature of the world of name and form. Śaṅkara characterizes the universe as anirvacanīya. Nāma and rūpa are everywhere said to be tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya, neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman. Brahman is the absolute value. The universe is neither absolute value nor absolute non-value. It is not absolute

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, अजमव्ययमात्मतत्त्वं माययैव भिद्यते न परमार्थतः ।.....

द्वैतमद्वैतभेद इत्यवते द्वैतमप्यद्वैतवत्परमार्थसदिति स्यात् कस्यचिदाशङ्क्यत आह—
यत्परमार्थसदद्वैतं मायया भिद्यते ।

value, because it is characterized by the discrepancy between value and existence, while in Brahman these two become one and inseparable. The absolute value is *advaita*; in it there is no trace of that conflict, that unreconciled opposition, between essence and existence, between the ideal and the actual, which describes the universe of which we have experience as finite individuals. It is a perfect and ideal embodiment of Infinite Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. Existence is the same as Consciousness. Consciousness in its turn is the same as perfect Bliss. The universe is not absolute value; neither is it absolute non-value. The universe lives on a spark of Brahman. If Brahman were to withdraw from the universe its reality, its consciousness and its bliss, the universe would lose all claim to be regarded even as something; it would be a non-entity like the flower of the sky or the son of a barren woman. The universe has a relative being. The consciousness which is an item of the universe is constantly circumscribed by something foreign to it; the Self is always confronted by a not-self which it can neither wholly reconcile to itself nor treat as absolutely alien to it. The bliss we meet with in the universe is conditioned bliss which today is and tomorrow is not. It is infected by the duality of subject and object, and is but a fraction, a particle, of the supreme Bliss in which all differences cease. The universe is not "Abraham". It is Brahman, but it is Brahman limited by name and form which constitute relative existence. The limitation of Brahman by name and form means, in other words, the duality of value and existence. The universe, embodying as it does, in the very heart of it a dialectical antinomy, can be described neither as absolute value nor as absolute non-value. It is characterized neither by oneness of value and existence nor by absolute antagonism between the two. It represents at once oneness and duality of value and existence, their inseparability as well as their discrepancy. This renders the universe, a passage, a flow, of which Absolute Value is the origin as well as the goal.

This way of characterizing the universe is the result of Śaṅkara's intellectual maturity, and reflects the genius of the

man. From the absolute point of view, when we rise from the sphere of logic to that of religion, the universe is seen to be nothing other than Brahman. But when we attempt to describe its nature from the standpoint of the logical understanding, for which the duality of value and existence is an indispensable condition, there is no better and logically more adequate and philosophically more comprehensive way of doing this than to say that the universe is neither Brahman nor something other than Brahman, that it is neither absolute value nor absolute non-value. The sphere of religion is the sphere of realization and when we have attained this, anirvacanīyatva ripens into ananyatva and the duality of essence and existence is replaced by their oneness and identity. The dvaita culminates in advaita. Tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya — this is a value judgment made by Śaṅkara, and only thus can its secret and the greatness of that secret be revealed to us. Shallow critics, unmindful of the value standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara, have missed the true import of it and identified it with the judgment "sadasadbhyāmanirvacanīya" and ridiculed Śaṅkara. Some modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, not being able to shake off the prejudice inherited from Prakāśātman, that of adopting the existential point of view, fail to rise to the height from which Śaṅkara views the universe. It should be borne in mind that Śaṅkara nowhere uses the term "sadasadbhyāmanirvacanīya" in connection with Māyā or the universe of Māyā. He has taken meticulous care to use the word "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya" in all his writings.¹ This use cannot be explained by calling it a secondarily automatic action. There is a set purpose in it, and the purpose is to draw attention to the fact that it is only in terms of Value that philosophy can undertake to understand the nature of ultimate truths. All ultimate judgments are, in the last resort, judgments of value. In the above judgment Śaṅkara uses the word "tattva" and not "tat". It is true that, according to Śaṅkara, the world "tat" also signifies Brahman. But the word "tat" expresses the nature of Brahman in terms of the value of "Reality" only and not as Absolute Value. For Śaṅkara the interest of philosophy is centred not in Being merely but in Absolute Value,

¹ S. B., I. 3. 19; I. 4. 5; II. 1. 27; II. 1. 14; II. 1. 5; Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 10.

and it is as the most supreme Value that Brahman is the most supremely Real. It is value which constitutes reality. It is Brahman as the Supreme Essence which is the most Real. Śaṅkara's philosophy of Value prefers to call Brahman not "tat" but "tattva". Brahman is no doubt "tat", that.¹ But the truth of Brahman is constituted by its essence, which consists in the oneness of the values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda. The true Reality is the Essence; the true "tat" is the "tadbhāvaḥ" which is the "tattvam". The true Brahman is the "Brahma-bhāvaḥ". Brahman is the "tattva", the Absolute Value. The universe is not "tattva" or absolute value or Brahman. But neither is it wholly "anyatva" or absolute non-value. It represents the oneness as well as the duality of Value and Existence. Its nature cannot be described in terms of pure Value or bare Existence. It is "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya".

This way of characterizing the universe is much more significant than calling it "śadasadbhyāmanirvacaniya". The former judgment measures the universe not only in terms of the value of Existence but also in terms of the values of Consciousness and Bliss. The latter views the universe with reference to the value of Existence merely, with the result that interpreters who have failed to note the subtle distinction between the two divergent characterizations have invariably lapsed into the existential view. The term "tattva" signifies all the three values of Sat, Cit and Ānanda; the term "Sat" is confined to one dimension of value, namely the dimension of Existence. The result of the lapse into the existential view has been that the interpreters have asked a wrong question and got a wrong answer. They have raised a false issue and have been satisfied with a false resolution of that issue. They have asked the questions: "Is the universe real or unreal? Is it existent or non-existent?" and have been content to learn that it is neither real nor unreal, neither existent nor non-existent. For them reality or existence has meant mere "being is space and time" in abstraction from all value and meaning. If they adopted the standpoint of value which is

1 Gita. S.B., II. 16. तदिति सर्वनाम सर्वं च ब्रह्म तस्य नाम तत् तद्भावः तस्य ब्रह्मणो यायात्म्यं ।

the standpoint of Śaṅkara, instead of being concerned with determining the existence or non-existence of the world they would try to ascertain the significance or value which the universe possesses. They would be led to recognize the instrumental or mediating function of the world and measure it in terms of value and not subsistence in time and existence in space. Even those interpreters who have followed Śaṅkara strictly in characterizing the universe as "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya" have failed to grasp the real significance of this characterization. Deussen, while faithful to Śaṅkara in this respect, inasmuch as he translates the above epithet as "neither Brahman nor something different from him"¹, fails to realize that Brahman for Śaṅkara is not mere Reality but also Value and that primarily. He equates Brahman with Being merely, and in consistence with this standpoint of existence wrongly understands Śaṅkara to mean that the whole empirical reality with its names and forms can be defined as "neither Being nor nothing"², as "neither Being nor non-being"³, and is comparable to an hallucination or to a dream.⁴ Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Kokilleshwar Sastri and Thibaut—none of them is able to give up the standpoint of existence. They invariably fail to distinguish between "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniya" and "śadasadbhyāmanirvacaniya", and without exception translate the former as "neither is nor is not", "neither being nor non-being", "neither existing nor non-existing", "neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal".⁵ The modern interpreters, even when they equate Brahman with Being or Existence and identify "tattva" with it, do not treat Being or Existence as a Value concept. Being or Existence is always understood by them in terms of space and time. Thus Māyā, according to Dr. Dasgupta, "is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of Excluded Middle. Māyā

1 D. S. V., P. 467.

2 *Ibid.*, P. 277.

3 *Ibid.*, P. 136.

4 *Ibid.*, P. 303.

5 Dasgupta : *History*, Vol. I, PP. 442, 447; *History*, Vol. II, P. 13; Radhakrishnan : *I. P.* Vol. II, PP. 564, 579; Kokilleshwar Sastri : *Advaita Philosophy* P. 137; Thibaut, P. XXV.

can neither be said to be 'is' nor 'is not'.¹ This unconscious bias for the existential standpoint leads Dr. Dasgupta to endow time with something of divine providence and make it a mysterious reality designed to replace the old idea of Deity. The falsehood of the world-appearance, according to his interpretation of Śaṅkara, is involved in the category of the Indefinite which is neither sat ("is") nor asat ("is not"). He thinks that the opposition of "is" and "is not" is solved by the category of time. Since the world-appearance exists for a time, it is sat (is); but since it does not exist for all time, it is asat (is not).² Śaṅkara, however, does not measure the reality of the universe by time. To do so would be to hold that time is not only real but the only reality, that not only has it value, but it is intrinsic and absolute value. According to Śaṅkara the reality which belongs to time and the value which it possesses is derived from Brahman, which is the Absolute Reality and Value and the source of all other realities and values. This Brahman is the measure of all reality and the measure of all value. It sets up the standard with reference to which the spatio-temporal order of existence is to be judged as to its reality and value. Time does not explain the spatio-temporal world, it itself needs an explanation. Time does not solve the opposition of "is" and "is not"; it creates the opposition. Time does not provide the resolution of the discrepancy between "is" and "is not"; it constitutes the riddle itself. The answer to this riddle of the world in space and time lies outside space and time, that is, in Brahman. "Time limits everything that is born.....occupies a lower position without being able to limit It."³ When judged with reference to Brahman, we find that the world-appearance is neither Brahman wholly nor something entirely other than Brahman. It possesses a deficient value and a deficient reality, which is as much as to say that it has an instrumental value. In other words, it has a mediating function and its purpose is the revelation of Brahman's nature.

The medieval critics of Śaṅkara betray colossal misunderstanding of the position adopted by him on this point.

1 History, Vol. I. P. 442.

2 History, Vol. I. P. 443.

3 Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 15.

Rāmānuja thinks that the *Māyā* of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is comparable to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like. It combines contradictory ideas in one and the same concept. Competent critics have established beyond doubt that the seven charges brought by Rāmānuja against Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* are irrelevant and do not touch his position. One is shocked to read Bhāskara's criticism of the *anirvacanīyutā* of *Māyā* and the *Mayika* world. It is an insult to human intelligence to have thought of propagating and perpetuating these ideas by writing a "book", which, as Ruskin said, is man's "inscription" or "scripture", his rock on which he engraves his ideas. Bhāskara says, if *Maya* is indescribable, how will the teacher impart instruction to the disciple, and if it remains incomprehensible how can we carry on our dealings with the help of that concept? If the names and forms are indescribable, how is it that we can clearly utter the words "cow", "horse", etc., and these are names of objects?¹ One wishes that Śaṅkara knew of this criticism and enjoyed the fun. There is evidence of extreme carelessness on the part of Bhāskara even in transcribing words and phrases from Śaṅkara, to say nothing of rightly understanding them. Thus he speaks of *Māyā* as² *sattvasattvābhyāmanirvacanīyā*, as *satyāsati*³, and at the same time as *tattvatattvabhyāmanirvacanīyā*⁴.

XII

THE VALUE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAṆKARA AND THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PARIṆĀMAVĀDA AND VIVARTAVĀDA

What can be said regarding Śaṅkara's attitude towards the present controversy between *Pariṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*? Śaṅkara does not seem to be familiar with these names, and there is no evidence that he had begun thinking out and formulating the answers to the problem of philosophy in terms of either of these "vādas". The issue which

1 B. B., II. 1. 14.

2 *ibid.*, II. 1. 14.

3 *ibid.*, IV. 1. 14.

4 *ibid.*, IV. 1. 1.

has philosophical significance for him is the issue between *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and *Pradhanakāraṇavāda*.¹ The issue is whether the universe is intelligible as an expression of value or its nature can be rationally comprehended in terms of mere existence. Śaṅkara's *Brahmakāraṇavāda* stands for the former alternative and repudiates the latter. The rejection of *Pradhanakāraṇavāda* means for him the rejection of all those systems of thought, like the *Vaiśeṣika*, which attempt to deduce the world from a source other than the Absolute Good, which is called Brahman by Śaṅkara. In the *Pradhana* of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Atoms* of the *Vaiśeṣika* there is no trace of that intrinsic value which alone renders intelligible what we call the real. In abstraction from this value the might of the *Prakṛti* and the force native to the atom are as naught. The Good is the most real and the source of all intelligibility and reality possessed by everything. This Good cannot be identified either with the *Pradhana* or with the atom.²

The words "vivarta" and "pariṇāma" are not unknown to Śaṅkara, though he does not label his system as *Vivarta-vāda*. These words are used by him in one and the same sense, namely that of manifestation or expression. The passage where the word *vivarta* occurs is to be found in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* i. 3.39.³ Translated into English it stands thus: "For, in the air, when it manifests itself as 'parjanya', people say that lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves." The word *vivarta*, in the above passage, means "manifestation" merely, and does not imply any idea of "perversion" or "illusion". The word "pariṇāma" is also used by Śaṅkara in the same sense. (i) "The Ātman, though an already accomplished and existent reality, "modifies" itself into special forms of effects as their Self."⁴ (ii) "The sacred texts speak of Brahman and

1. S. B., I. 4. 28.

2. S. B. I. 4. 28. प्रधानकारणावादः सूर्यदेव पुनः पुनरावृत्त्यपि निरकृतः । एतेन प्रधानकारणप्रतिषेधन्यादकलादेन सर्वोत्पत्तिविकारणप्राप्ता अपि प्रतिविद्यमाना व्याख्याता ।

3. वायो हि पर्जन्यभावेन विवर्तमाने विद्युत्स्वनपित्तवृष्ट्यशनयोविवर्तन्ते इत्यादिशते ।

4. पूर्वविद्योऽपि हि न ब्रह्मात्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमद्यमास आत्मानमिति ।

its "modification" into the Self of its effects as coordinates."¹ (iii) "Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able "to modify" itself into manifold effects."² Padmapāda also uses the word "vivarta" in the sense of "manifestation" or "modification" without even suggesting any idea of "illusion".³

Śaṅkara had already emphasized the truth that the real reveals itself as many without destroying or giving up its nature as unity.⁴ This, according to him, is the mode in which alone the Ultimate Reality can be consistently conceived to produce or create itself in the multiplicity of names and forms. Śaṅkara's intention was to bring out the truth that value, which is essentially creative, is conserved in the process of creatively realizing itself. The statement that value is conserved is bound up with and incidental to the assertion that value is creative. Brahmakāraṇavāda, "Brahman as Creativity", is thus the fundamental thesis of Śaṅkara. That Brahman does not lose its Brahman-hood in the act of creation is incidental to its creative nature. Śaṅkara coined a technical term (Brahmakāraṇavāda) to designate his system in its totality, but did not think it necessary to find another to express the mode in which Brahman's creativity operated. Vācaspatimīśra coined the term Māyāvāda, which summed up this mode. Māyāvāda, in its essence, does not stand by itself; it is incidental to Brahmakāraṇavāda and is to be regarded as part and parcel of it. So far as the mode of creation is concerned, Śaṅkara did not think it worth while to distinguish between "vivarta" and "pariṇama" and solidify these ideas after the fashion of the later Vedāntins into two different "vadas", so long as it was kept in mind that "a multiform creation may exist in Brahman, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of

1 Ibid. यत् कारणब्रह्मण एव विकारात्मना परिणामः सामानाधिकरण्यादेनाग्नयते ।

2 S.B. II. 1. 24. तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विविधवित्तयांगालोरादिविद्विन्न परिणाम उपपद्यते ।

3 Panos, adika. P.82. नन्वेवं सति कथं सर्वज्ञता ? तस्यैव ज्ञानशक्तिविवर्ततात्मकत्वात् नामविकल्पप्रपञ्चस्यापि तदाश्रित्य विवर्तनात्तद्व्यवृत्ता । Ibid. P.78. अतो दददददभो विदयो विवर्तते प्रपञ्चः तदेवमूलकारणं ब्रह्मंति सूत्रायः ।

4 S.B. II. 1. 28

unity" of the values of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss.¹ Even in those cases which, according to the later Vedāntins, are to be classed as cases of "pariṇāma" as distinguished from vivarta, and where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, we have to acknowledge, according to Śaṅkara, as the cause of sprouting, etc., only those permanent particles of seed which are not destroyed.² But the permanence which the differentiated objects enjoy is partial, and is nothing as compared to the eternal perdurance of the Absolute. The later Vedāntins reserved the word "pariṇāma" for those cases of operation of causality where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the causal substance is seen to take place, and the word "vivarta" for other cases where the cause reproduces itself without giving up its nature.³ The former view was christened *Pariṇāmavāda* and the latter *Vivartavāda*.⁴ The controversy between *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and *Pradhānakāraṇavāda* was hushed into silence and that between *Vivartavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda* took its place. With the coming into prominence of the question of the *modus operandi* of Brahman's causality, the axiom of the essentially creative nature of value ceased to have the importance which it had for Śaṅkara according to whom the question whether it is Value (Brahman) or mere Existence (*Pradhāna*) which is really creative was a question of life and death for philosophy. The Vedānta philosophy forgot the lesson which was taught by Śaṅkara, that Value is Creativity. But, then, how could the question of the mode in which Brahman creates itself be settled? The question of the fact and that of the nature of Brahman's causality came to be amalgamated and considered as one. *Vivartavāda* or *Māyavāda*, which should have been a statement of the method of creation, came to be regarded as an answer to

1 Ibid., स्वरूपानुपमदेनेव ।

2 Ibid., II. 2.7.

3 Vidyaranya: *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, P.674. किं ब्रह्म पूर्वकं परित्यज्य परिणमते उताऽपरित्यज्य विवर्तते । ; *Prakāśatmaṇa. Pañcapādika Vivaraṇa*, P.206. सत्यतोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामो ।

4 *Pañcapādika Vivaraṇa*, PP. 206.212; *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, PP. 651, 661, 662.

the question about the fact of creation; and "vivarta" was defined as the appearance of the one cause as the unreal many of the phenomena. *Pariṇāma*, on the other hand, was regarded as the development of the cause in its potential state.¹ The centre of gravity of philosophic interest shifted from value to existence. Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Brahma-vāda*, which later on came to be identified, though unjustifiably, with *Māyāvāda* or *Vivartavāda*, laid emphasis on the conservation of value. The *Vivartavāda* of the later *Vedāntins* came to be viewed as synonymous with the denial of the reality of the effects and their treatment as non-existent and false.

The modern interpreters of Śaṅkara work with this conception of *Vivarta* and *Vivartavāda*, and try to affiliate his Vedantic monism to Buddhistic Idealism. Thus it is pointed out that Śaṅkara's *Advaita* is established by refuting not so much *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* as *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*, and his real objective is to establish *Vivartavāda* or *Māyāvāda* as against the *Pariṇāmavāda* of certain commentators.² The doctrine of *Vivartavāda* is identified with the view that the world does not actually "emerge" from Brahman, but is a "phenomenal appearance" of Brahman.³ This conception of *Vivartavāda*, which is far removed from Śaṅkara's view, leads inevitably to the doctrine of what Professor Dasgupta calls "the unreal many of the phenomena",⁴ If, on the other hand, we stick to the axiological significance which Śaṅkara intends to convey by his doctrine of *vivartavāda*, we shall be required to speak not so much of the "unreality" of the many as of their "value" or "significance". The failure to recognize and keep constantly in mind that the concepts used by Śaṅkara are axiological concepts is responsible for much misunderstanding and many a criticism which is wide of the mark. The root of the whole difficulty, according to these interpreters, is (i) that in the first place Śaṅkara is not able to keep distinct

1 Dasgupta; *History*, Vol. I, P. 468.

2 Hiriyanna. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, PP. 339, 340.

3 *ibid.*

4 *History*, Vol. I, P. 468.

the two widely divergent views of causation, the *pariṇāma* view and the *vivarta* view, and constantly confuses the two and (ii) that in the second place he gives examples to illustrate his theory which are "quite out of place".

Thus it is pointed out by Thibaut and Dr. Dasgupta that Śaṅkara's reply to the objection that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman, is not consistent with his conception of causality, according to which effects are "non-existent and false" and have "no substantiality".¹ Śaṅkara gives certain illustrations to show that effects can be largely dissimilar from their causes. Dr. Dasgupta says that Śaṅkara's arguments here are not only weak but uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere *mayā* and magic and has no essence, Śaṅkara, says Dr. Dasgupta, should have rushed straight to his own view of "effects having no substantiality" and not adopted the *pariṇāma* view of "real transformation". Dr. Dasgupta's suggestion is that Śaṅkara should have adopted the simple device of denying that there was any problem to be solved, as the world was an unsubstantial dream, non-existent and false. The objection, says Dr. Dasgupta, could have validity only with those who believed in the real transformation of effects from causes, and not with a philosopher like Śaṅkara who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Śaṅkara, according to the same writer, was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily in the commentary on the *Sūtras* an example of the *vivarta* view of the unreality of effects which could only yield a realistic interpretation. But Śaṅkara, it should be noted, knew quite well that the seeming multiplicity of the world could not be accounted for by simply attempting to write off the appearance of difference as mere illusion due to partial vision. The way out of the difficulty is to make a return to the value standpoint, which is the only standpoint Śaṅkara adopts. The conception of *Vivarta* is a value conception. The critics of Śaṅkara view it as an existential concept and not as an axiological one, and believe that the world is no more in Brahman at the time of *pralaya* than

1 Dasgupta: *History*, Vol. II, PP. 38,39,40.

during the period of its subsistence.¹ The conception of vivarta is not concerned with the affirmation or denial of existence as such, but with the recognition that in any attempt at explanation or deduction of existence values are conserved, and it is value which renders existence intelligible. Likewise this conception does not say anything about the fact of causality but only about the mode in which causality operates. The real issue before Śāṅkara is not whether the world originates from Brahman, but whether Brahman in manifesting the world loses itself, that is, whether the cause occupies a "privileged position" in relation to the effect. Śāṅkara's answer is that Brahman, without destroying itself, reveals itself in the form of the world and realizes in it its own life and its own bliss.

Whether there is conservation of value, and whether it is value which explains existence and ultimately renders it intelligible, and whether the idea of intelligible causation is not bound up with the giving of a "privileged position" to value — this should be the real point at issue between *Parīṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*. But this point has been lost sight of by the interpreters of Śāṅkara, and the controversy between the two schools has been understood and expressed from the existential point of view and in existential terms. Thus *Parīṇāma* is conceived as "real creation of real things"², or "real transformation of causes into effects", e. g., "the production of a pot from clay, or of curd from milk"³. *Vivarta* is regarded as the "merely apparent" or "illusory" "change" or "modification of any substance, as of the rope into the snake"⁴, and *Vivartavāda* is held to be the view about "the unreality of effects" or "effects having no substantiality" or the treatment of effects "as non-existent and false".⁵ This treatment of the concept of vivarta as an existential concept has led these interpreters to take serious objection to Śāṅkara's use of the examples intended to illustrate his theory regarding

1 Thibaut : P. XCIV.

2 Thibaut, *ibid.*

3 Dasgupta : *History*, Vol. II, PP. 38, 39.

4 Chatterjee and Datta: *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, PP. 287, 416

5 Dasgupta, *ibid.*

the creation of the effects as well as their absorption into the originating cause. Thus against Śaṅkara's view that "Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers able to transform itself into manifold effects just as milk is"¹, it is pointed out by Thibaut that this illustration "refers to the real creation of real things" and cannot be used to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. Likewise, Dr. Dasgupta finds fault with Śaṅkara for giving side by side "examples of magical creations" and of "realistic transformations." "If his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his examples of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parināma view of causation is to be adopted, the vivarta view is to be given up."²

As I pointed out before, the real issue which is of vital importance for Śaṅkara's metaphysics has been lost sight of by his interpreters. It is whether value will explain existence or existence value. According to Śaṅkara, it is value which explains existence. Value occupies a privileged position and as the notion of cause is, for Śaṅkara, the notion of value, i. e., of "reality" or the Ātman, the cause always possesses a superiority over the effect, whether the causality is of what the later Vedāntins and the modern interpreters call the "parināma" type or of the "vivarta" type. Even when we have before us a case of what has been said to be a "real transformation of the cause into the effect, i. e. the production of a pot from clay", which is believed to be a case of parināma, the cause and the effect do not occupy the same *status* according to Śaṅkara. The clay possesses a certain superiority over the effect, so that it is the clay in which the pot has its Self and not the pot in which the clay has its Self. The true reality is the clay; its effects are name and form assumed by the causal substance.³ If we constantly keep before our mind that the concept of causa-

1 S. B., II. 1.24.

2 Dasgupta: History, Vol. II. P. 38.

3 S. B., II. 1. 16, न ह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति । S. B., II. 2. 44, भवितव्य हि कार्यकारणयोरतिशयेन यथा मृदुषट्पोः न ह्यसत्यतिशये कार्यकारणमित्यवकल्पते ।

lity is a value concept in the hands of Śāṅkara, that Śāṅkara's notion of cause is the notion of Ātman or Self, which is the notion of the value of 'Reality', and that it is value which explains existence and not vice versa, we shall not be required to distinguish between Parīṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda. The plausibility of this distinction and its value rest upon a confusion between the existential and the axiological notion of reality and cause. Parīṇāma is defined by the modern interpreters of Śāṅkara as "real creation of real things" or "real transformation of causes into effects". This view is borrowed from the later Vedāntins. Appayadikṣhit defines parīṇāma as a transformation or effect which has the same "status" or "order of reality" as the cause, and vivarta as an effect which has a status other than or inferior to that of the cause.¹ Parīṇāma, viewed as "real creation of real things", implies that cause and effect belong to the same order of reality. But here the significant question which suggests itself to our mind is this: what is the notion of "reality" in terms of which this definition of "parīṇāma" has been laid down? It is not difficult to see that in defining "parīṇāma" thus the concepts of "reality" and "order" are used as existential and not value concepts. It is only when cause and effect are regarded as mere existential categories that clay, which is the cause, and pot, which is the effect, can be said to belong to the same "order of reality"; both are empirical entities and possess the same empirical reality, the same vyāvahārika satta, being objects of sense perception. But the notion of cause, according to Śāṅkara, is a value notion implying degrees of reality and value; and placing things in the relation of cause and effect is placing them in an order of value. Thus it is the cause which is the Self of the effect and not the other way round. The cause, representing as it does the value of Reality, possesses a certain superiority over the effect. Thus it is not true to say, as Professor Radhakrishnan does, that "In the case of transformation, the cause and effect belong to the same order of reality"². Viewed as mere "existent

1 Siddhantalessasangraha, I. 2. वस्तुनस्तत्त्वमसत्ताकोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामः तदसमसत्ताको विवर्त इति वा ।

2 I. P., Vol. II, P. 570.

something" the clay and the pot have the same status and belong to the same order of reality. To be aware of them thus is to have factual awareness of them. But to view the clay as the cause of the pot, as the Self of the pot, and as its essence and its ground, is to raise it to a different level of reality and to confer a higher status upon it, the nature of which can be understood only when it is realized that the notions of reality and cause for an ultimate reflection are the notions of value, implying distinctions which are intelligible only as value distinctions. It is not fair to fasten upon Śaṅkara views which he did not hold and then to bring against him the charge that he is not able to keep distinct the two widely divergent views of causation, the pariṇāma view and the vivarta view, and constantly confuses them.

The true function of the "illustrative example", it must be pointed out, has also been forgotten by Thibaut and Dasgupta. "An example", according to Śaṅkara, "is cited with a view to explaining the whole by exhibiting only a part".¹ And whenever two things are compared, they are compared, says Śaṅkara, only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed, if it could be demonstrated, there would be an end of that relation which gives rise to the comparison.² At one place where he gives an example of the carpenter in order to illustrate the "upadhi", he points out definitely that the case of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to a particular extent only.³ The different illustrations given by Śaṅkara are intended to bring out special points in connection with the creative activity of Brahman, and the significance of the illustration is to be understood as being confined to that point alone. The example of the milk transforming itself into curd and of the gods creating without any extraneous means⁴ are intended only to bring out the truth that Brahman, without requiring any extraneous implements, can create the world (by its mere

1 Chaud. S.B., VI. 4.1, उदाहरणं नामैकदेशं प्रसिद्धयाशेषप्रसिद्धयर्थमुदाहृत इति ।

2 S.B., II. 3.20.

3 *ibid.*, II. 3.40.

4 *ibid.*, II.1.24.

resolve). The examples only bring out the truth that auxiliary means and extraneous implements are not indispensable. And so far as this point is concerned, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Dasgupta in thinking that these examples neither "fit in with the context" nor "hold good", and with Thibaut in believing that these "illustrative instances" are "essentially heterogeneous".¹ It is strange that these examples are understood by Thibaut to illustrate the theory which "considers unreality to be the true character of the world", as distinguished from the theory which believes in "the real creation of real things". The example of the magician given by Śaṅkara is everywhere and always intended to bring out the truth that Brahman, in the course of the creative act, does not lose its nature and the multiplicity of the creation does not tamper with the absolute unity and indivisibility of Brahman.² Similarly the "examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold" would appear to be "out of place" only if we forgot that the point which Śaṅkara intends to illustrate is that the nature of the originating cause is not affected by the reabsorption of the effect in to it. The solution of all these difficulties is that we must make a return to the standpoint of value which is organic to Śaṅkara's system.

XIII

THE CONCEPT OF AVIDYĀ

Much of the dissatisfaction with the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is due to the emphasis he lays upon the concept of Avidyā. The caustic critic goes to the length of asserting that Avidyā is the sole explanatory principle in Śaṅkara's metaphysics. We have already shown that the principle of Avidyā is indispensable for any system of metaphysics written by an intelligent author who wants to explain the fact of multiplicity. Multiplicity exists in and through a conscious experience of it, and this experience is bound up with a limited conscious.

1 *ibid.*, II. 1.24. 25. क्षीरवद्धि, देवादिवत् ।

2 S.B., II. 1-9. अस्मिन् चायमपरो दृष्टान्तो यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिद्वयि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते एव परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यते इति यथा च स्वप्नदृग्गकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति । ; *ibid.*, II. 1. 28.

ness. Hence evrey where Śāṅkara's description of Māyā as Avidyā, of the creative power as of the nature of nescience. The existence of the individual soul as such is altogether due to the relation in which it stands to nescience.¹ The world with which philosophy has to deal in respect of its value or significance is an experienced world containing within it conscious subjects and consciously experienced objects. If there is a world out of all relation to consciousness, philosophy can have nothing to do with it. The experienced world is made up of a constant and regular interaction between the subject and the object. This interaction in the form of a conscious enjoyment of the objective world is not possible without some principle of limitation, i.e., of Avidyā, which makes for limited feeling, limited knowing, and limited striving. "How could there be saṃsāra at all without Prakṛti transforming itself as causes and effects, as the body and the senses, as pleasure and pain, and without the conscious Puruṣa experiencing them? When, on the other hand, there is a conjunction—in the form of Avidyā or nescience—of Puruṣa, the experiencer, with Prakṛti, the opposite, the object of experience, in all its transformations as the body and the senses, as pleasure and pain, as causes and effects, then only is saṃsāra possible."² It is Avidyā which brings the subject and the object together. Avidyā exists either as want of knowledge, or doubt, or a wrong notion.³

The problem of the relation between Māyā and Brahman is meaningful only within the world of experience which is marked by the duality of value and existence or essence and fact. Māyā is nothing other than the creative power of Brahman. In truth the distinction between that which owns the power and the power itself has no meaning in the world of reality where essence and existence fuse in one. Making concession to the exigencies of language, we can say that Māyā is the śakti of Brahman, but we have

1 S.B., I. 4.3, अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः संततो वर्तते ।

2 Gita, S.B., XIII, 20.

3 Ibid., XIII. 2, अविद्या विपरीतग्राहकः संशयोपस्थापको वा अग्रहणात्मको वा । ; Brhad. S.B., III. 3.1, यदि ज्ञानाभावो यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीत ज्ञानं बोध्यतेऽज्ञानमिति ।

constantly to bear in mind that śakti is ananya, non-different from the śaktimat, and no question of a relation is possible as a thing cannot be related to its own self. This truth of ananyatva is not to be conceived but to be "lived". It is not logic but life which will resolve the discrepancy which is natural to the former. For the logical understanding Maya is neither one with Brahman nor wholly other than it. It is anirvacaniya, so is the world of effects. It is neither the oneness of value and existence as Brahman is; nor is it the complete divorce between the two. It shares the oneness and inseparability as well as the duality of value and existence. From the logical point of view, i. e., that of reflective consciousness, it cannot be said to be something independent like the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya. It is not anātmavastu, the Not-self. If it were so, Brahman could not be advitiya or advaita. The conception of Āvidyā, of a discrepancy between value and existence involving finiteness and limitedness, is dependent upon and presupposes the oneness and inseparability of the two. The fact of Āvidyā itself gives evidence that in one respect at least the Ātman transcends Āvidyā. "Ignorance is an object witnessed by the Self. He who visualizes the error of ignorance as something distinct from his own Self like a jar, is not himself under that error."¹

The doctrine of Māyā is neither a mere fabrication of the fertile genius of Śaṅkara nor traceable entirely to the influence of the Sūnyavāda of the Buddhists. Śaṅkara only elaborated the ideas that he found in the Upaniṣads and wove them into the contexture of his Advaitic philosophy. We find in the Upaniṣads all the material that may easily have led Śaṅkara to elaborate a theory of Māyā out of it.² The fundamentals of Śaṅkara's Advaitism were not moulded by Buddhistic influences, and the doctrine of Māyā, as it is found in Śaṅkara's works, is an indigenous development of the Upaniṣadic views. It is a natural corollary from his epistemological and ontological position. The doctrine of Māyā in Śaṅkara stands for either of the following two truths: (i)

¹ Brhad. S. B., IV. 4. 6.

² Ranade : A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, P.288.

Brahman gives rise to multiplicity without destroying its unity (i. e. not really); (ii) the world of creation symbolizes the duality of value and existence (*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*). We have already shown that the principle of Creativity combined with the principles of Non-contradiction and Identity leads inevitably to the doctrine of *Māyā*.¹ The second truth that the world represents neither complete oneness of value and existence nor complete discrepancy between the two follows from the same principle and is traceable to the Upaniṣads, which speak of man's awareness of a region where all duality and opposition and strife is overcome, where "a father is no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas"², where everything becomes the Self; and of another sphere where there is duality between value and existence or Self and not-self, and where "one sees something, one smells something, one knows something"³. The world of experience is not "advaita", because it presents an unreconciled opposition between value and fact; but it is not mere "dvaita" either, because it lives on a spark of Brahman and its existence is inseparable from an Absolute Value. It is "*tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*". In other words, the world of experience is the world of *Māyā*.

XIV

THE TERM *MĀYĀVĀDA* AS A LABEL

We shall conclude by saying a word as to how Śaṅkara's system is to be labelled. What is his "vāda"? Is the appellation "*Māyāvāda*", which is so often associated with the philosophy of Śaṅkara, justified? Does it represent the essential feature of Śaṅkara's system? Or is it a misnomer? A careful reading of Śaṅkara's aristocratically executed Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* will reveal to anyone his intense delight in inventing exquisitely exact names to designate his own and the rival systems. In this art he has

1 Mand. S. B., III. 19, परमार्थसद्वैतं मायया भिद्यते ।

2 Brhad. IV. 3. 22.

3 Ibid., IV. 5. 15.

almost reached perfection. He uses the word "vāda" in the sense of "theory" or "doctrine" or "ism"¹ Those who hold a particular vāda are designated by him as "vādins", the word denoting exactly what its English equivalent "its" does.² Thus the Sāṅkhya system is referred to by him as Sāṅkhyavāda³, Pradhānakāraṇavāda⁴ and the upholders of the system are designated as Pradhānavādins⁵. The Vaiśeṣika system is called Aṇuvāda⁶, Aṇvādikāraṇavāda⁷ and their adherents Aṇuvādin⁸. The Nyāya system is designated as Tārikaparigrahitā Īśvarakāraṇavāda⁹ or Kevalādhiṣṭhātri śvarakāraṇavāda.¹⁰ Buddhistic systems are referred to by the names of Sarvāstitvavādin, Vijñānāstitvamātravādin, Sarvā-sūnyatvavādin.

What about Śaṅkara's vāda? I have not come across any statement of Śaṅkara wherein he calls himself a Māyāvādin. The truth is that the words "Māyāvādin" and "Māyāvāda" were first applied to Śaṅkara and his philosophy by his opponents. In all probability it was Bhāskara who for the first time made use of these names to characterize Śaṅkara's philosophy. The terms, as used by Bhāskara, were those of reproach. Bhāskara, it is now settled, was either a contemporary of Śaṅkara or flourished just after his death. He frequently calls Śaṅkara a Māyāvādin, a hidden Buddhist, and dubs his philosophy Māyāvāda and regards it as another version of Vijñānavāda Buddhism.¹¹ Later writers who belonged to the rival schools only multiplied his voice, and the view that Śaṅkara's philosophy was mere Māyāvāda was given currency. Many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara have merely repeated Bhāskara's utterance. Śaṅkara frequently calls himself a Brahmvādin¹²

1 S. B., I. 4. 8; II. 2. 32.

2 S. B., I. 3. 19; II. 2. 18.

3 S. B., I. 4. 9.

4 S. B., I. 1. 10; I. 4. 28; II. 1. 12; II. 2. 17.

5 S. B., II. 1. 29

6 S. B., II. 2. 13.

7 S. B., I. 4. 28.

8 S. B., II. 1. 29; II. 2. 11.

9 S. B., II. 2. 41.

10 S. B., II. 2. 37.

11 B. B., I. 2. 6; I. 2. 12; I. 4. 21; II. 2. 29; I. 4. 25; II. 1. 14.

12 S. B., II. 1. 6; II. 2. 38; II. 1. 29; III. 2. 11; II. 3. 53.

and designates his system as *Brahmavāda*¹ or *Brahmakāraṇavāda*² or *Vedāntavāda*³, implying, of course, that Brahman is the ultimate reality and the eternal source of everything. It is also called "*Īśvara Kāraṇavāda*"⁴ or more fully "*Aviśeṣeṇa-Īśvara Kāraṇavāda*", meaning that *Īśvara* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe. He also calls himself a "*Mokṣavādin*"⁵, i. e., a Value-Philosopher; for according to him *Mokṣa* is the highest good (*param puruṣārtha*) and is identical with Brahman. Brahman is consciousness, and so he calls his philosophy "*Cetanākāraṇavāda*" in opposition to the *Pradhānakāraṇavāda* of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Aṇvādikāraṇavāda* of the *Vaiśeṣika*. He is at one and the same time an Idealist (*Cetanākāraṇavādin*) and a Value Philosopher (*Mokṣavādin*). The term *Māyāvāda* in no way represents the essentials of Śaṅkara's Advaitism, the essence of which consists in the fact that the universe is an expression of Eternal Value; nor do the doctrines associated by Bhāskara with *Māyāvāda* represent Śaṅkara's position faithfully. What Śaṅkara has said about *Māyā* in his exposition of *Brahmavāda* or *Mokṣavāda* should not be raised to the rank of a "doctrine" or "vāda". To permit *Māyā* to set itself up as an independent principle is to take an external and extremely one-sided view of his system.

Though the name *Māyāvāda* was first applied to Śaṅkara's system by his enemies, who were interested in calumniating him, it was later on appropriated by many who professed to follow Śaṅkara and the terms *Māyāvāda* and *Brahmavāda* came to be synonymous. We find Govindānanda (1600 A.D.) using the terms as synonymous in his *Ratnaprabhā*. While Śaṅkara in his text calls himself a *Brahmavādin*, Govindānanda commenting upon the same text designates his system as *Māyāvāda*.⁶ Long before Govindānanda,

1 S. B., I. 3. 41; I. 1. 31; II. 2. 9.

2 S. B., I. 4. 28; II. 1. 13.

3 S. B., I. 4. 1; I. 4. 22.

4 S. B., II. 1.1; II. 2.10.

5 S. B., II. 1.11.

6 S. B., II. 1.29, परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः । Ratnaprabhā on S. B., II. 1. 29, परिहृतस्त्विति । उक्तं हि मायावादे सर्वं मामञ्जस्यम् ।

Vācaspatimiśra (840 A.D.) used the term "Māyāvāda" to designate Śaṅkara's system of the Vedānta. Commenting upon the same Sūtra,¹ Vācaspati calls Śaṅkara a Māyāvādin; for him also, as for Govindānanda, the terms Māyāvāda and Brahmapāda are interchangeable.² It seems Govindānanda borrowed this term from Vācaspatimiśra and had no reason to doubt the suitability of it as it was used by so great an authority. But the term, as used by Vācaspati, had none of the implications understood by Bhāskara. To Bhāskara the Māyāvādin did not believe in the reality of external objects; he was a mere "abāhyārthavādin"; "Āvidyā" was the sole explanatory principle with him—he was an "āvidyāmātravādin"; for him the external objects were merely phases of consciousness; thus the Māyāvādin was merely a hidden Buddhist. But for Vācaspati Māyāvāda is the doctrine that Brahman the ultimate reality creates the entire universe of names and forms, which is characterized by multiplicity, without destroying its real nature. This is what Śaṅkara also holds, though he calls this view Brahmapāda, and not Māyāvāda as Vācaspati does.³ According to Vācaspati the above sūtra and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon contain the essence of Māyāvāda, and the line just quoted sums up this vāda.⁴ So far as Śaṅkara and Vācaspati are concerned there is a difference only in the names used and there is perfect agreement regarding the essentials of the doctrine which the names are meant to signify. The only thing which is striking is that Vācaspati uses the term Māyāvāda while in his text Śaṅkara uses the term Brahmapāda. It seems Vācaspati was led to use the term in his defence of Śaṅkara against the attacks of Bhāskara, who had criticized him as a mere Māyāvādin. Vācaspati appropriated the term, while at the same time removing the misconceptions which had been associated with it by Bhāskara. In the latter act he rendered a signal service to Śaṅkara's Vedānta; but he little realized that in retaining the name which Bhāskara had coined he was taking

1 S.B., II. 1.29.

2 Bhamati on S.B., II. 1.29, न पुनरस्माकं मायावादिनाम् ।

3 S.B., II. 1.28 एकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यति ।

4 Bhamati on II, 1.28, अनेन स्फुटितो मायावाद स्वप्नदृगात्मा हि मनसैव स्वरूपानुपमर्देन रथादीन सृजति ।

a step which, in this world of "name and form", would give rise to misconceptions and allow them to gather round the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. What Vācaspati wanted to emphasize was that Śaṅkara's view of Māyā, which formed an indispensable part of his Brahmanavāda, was not open to the charges levelled by Bhāskara. There is no doubt that the term Brahmanavāda is much more significant than the term Māyāvāda, because Brahman for Śaṅkara is the highest good (Mokṣa) as well as the highest reality (Ātman), and Brahmanavāda is an exposition of this. Śaṅkara's philosophy is not a philosophy of Māyā but a philosophy of Value, and his doctrine of Māyā is but incidental to it.

CHAPTER XI
THE ALLEGED CREATIVITY OF A
PHENOMENAL ĪŚVARA

THE CURRENT VIEW

Thibaut, Deussen, Radhakrishnan, Belvalkar, all attribute to Śaṅkara the view that Brahman cannot be defined as that from which the world proceeds and that the Second Sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ" is a definition not of the Śuddha or Nirguṇa Brahman but of the Māyāśābala or Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman, that is, of Īśvara. They are unanimous in holding that Śaṅkara denies the possibility of the origin of the universe from Brahman, which is the absolute reality, and insists upon the recognition of another reality in the form of a Saṁguṇa Brahman or Īśvara to account for the world of becoming. Thibaut regards Śaṅkara's Brahman as Pure Being, as a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, and raises the question: Whence, then, the appearance of the world? Śaṅkara's answer, according to him, is that Brahman is associated with a certain power called Māyā or Avidyā, to which the appearance of the entire world is due. The non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as it is intelligent, but in so far as it is associated with Māyā, which itself is of a non-intelligent nature. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called Īśvara. This "Īśvara is himself something unreal."¹ Likewise Deussen also holds that, according to Śaṅkara, it is only a Saṁguṇa, Savīṣeṣaṁ, not a Nirguṇa or Nirvīṣeṣaṁ Brahman, who can be a creator. for in order to create Brahman requires a plurality of powers and these stand in contradiction to a Nirvīṣeṣaṁ Brahman.² The Saṁguṇa Brahman is the lower Brahman, and "only a lower not a higher Brahman can be conceived as creator of the world", and it is the Aparāvidyā which "treats the creation

¹ Thibaut : P. XXX.

² D. S. V., P. 107.

Īśvara, "who is different from Brahman", who "has less of reality than absolute being", who is himself "not above time but subject to time", and who belongs to the "empirical world" and is "phenomenal" in character, is capable of performing a feat which the "absolute being" itself is powerless to perform. Eternity alone explains time and the permanent the changing, according to Śaṅkara. The real, without giving up its nature, gives rise to change and explains that change as part and parcel of the meaning of the rational life of the real.¹ This, it should be recalled, is the essence of Śaṅkara's doctrine of vivartavāda or māyāvāda. Śaṅkara clearly says that change cannot explain change. "Even in those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition)."² Only things of permanent nature, which are always recognized as what they are, such as gold, are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments. Śaṅkara, who has severely criticized the Buddhist view "that nothing can become a cause so long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction"³, can hardly be expected to subscribe to the position that "a changing Brahman", for whom "changelessness and inactivity are impossible" and whose "nature undergoes change, contraction and expansion"⁴, is a metaphysical necessity: Śaṅkara's Brahman, like Aristotle's God, is the first mover and itself immovable.

Śaṅkara would have been not only shocked to hear that Īśvara, who was regarded by him as all-pervading, all-knowing, all powerful and the self of everyone, is represented by his

1 S.B., II. 1.28. नैवात्र विवर्तितव्यं कथमेकस्मिन्ब्रह्माणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकाराः सृष्टिः स्यादिति ।

2 S.B., II. 1.27.

3 Ibid., यत्कृतं स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्ति भवितुमर्हति इति ।

4 Radhakrishnan: I. P., Vol II, PP.557, 558.

interpreters as phenomenal, illusory, subject to time, possessing a deficient reality and belonging to the empirical world; he would have regarded it as blasphemy. The world of space and time, according to him, is grounded in a reality which is above space and time, which is the source of space and time themselves, and which itself is not a link in the causal chain of spatial and temporal events. Far from arguing the phenomenal character of Īśvara and establishing his empirical nature, in every line which he has written we see his unfailing insistence on the non-temporal and non-spatial character of Īśvara.¹ His Advaitism, he plainly confesses, is opposed to all attempts at "establishing the phenomenal character or empirical self-hood of Īśvara; it rather is concerned with denying the empirical character of the transmigrating soul and teaching that Īśvara is its real Self".² Īśvara is the source of the universe but is not subject to the changes which affect the universe; it is not a part of the universal flux which is the universe. It is present from the very foundation of the world but is not a part of the process which is the world. The world follows from Him but He does not flow with the world. He is eternally real.³ He is exempt from the attributes of empirical existence.⁴ The realization of him alone can bring about the cessation of the evils and imperfections which are natural to empirical life and existence. The truth is that the words Brahman and Īśvara are used by Śaṅkara to designate one and the same metaphysical reality. There is nothing in Śaṅkara to warrant the conclusion that Brahman is the Absolute Reality in his system of the Vedānta, and that the word Īśvara has been coined by him and reserved for the "Apara" or the lower Brahman. The distinction between the Para and the Apra Brahman, between the Nirguṇa and the Saṅguṇa Brahman, is not a metaphysical distinction in Śaṅkara. It is relevant and has significance within the sphere of practical realization. In the sphere of Upāsanā we are at

1 S.B. IV. 3.10. न देशकालादिविशेषयोगः परमात्मनि कल्पयितुं शक्यते ।

2 S.B., IV. 1.3. न हीश्वरस्य संसायित्वं प्रतिपाद्यते इत्यभ्युपगच्छामः किं तर्हि?
संसारिणः संसारित्वापोहेन ईश्वरात्मतत्त्वं प्रतिपिपादयिष्यतिमिति ।

3 S.B., I. 1.5. नित्यसिद्धेश्वरस्य; Aitareya. S.B., I 1.1. पूर्वसिद्ध ।

4 S.B., IV. 1.12. एष व्यावृत्तसर्वसंसारधर्मकोऽयम्; Aitareya. S.B., I. 1.1. जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयकृदसंसारो सर्वज्ञः ।

liberty to think of Brahman in one way or another in order to comprehend its nature and bring it nearer to us. But when it is our aim to ascertain truth, which means "knowing" a thing as it is, we cannot think of it in alternative ways. The determination of the nature of the metaphysical truth cannot permit the recognition of alternative realities, a Brahman as the Absolutely Real and an *Īśvara* who "has less of reality than Absolute being".¹ The distinction between the Para and the *Āpara* Brahman has reference to the distinction between *Jñāna* and *Upāsana*, or Knowledge and Activity.² If *Āpara* Brahman is the *Upāsya*, the object of worship, "the best image of the truth", "the way in which the everlasting real appears to our human mind", our unwillingness to recognize and postulate it as the first metaphysical principle should not result in the introduction of irrationality into the universe and in leaving the mystery of creation "unexplained".

According to Śaṅkara Para Brahman is the same as the *Kāraṇa* or the *Suddha* Brahman, the same as the *Nirguṇa* or *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman; and the words Brahman and *Īśvara* are used to refer to the same reality. This Para Brahman is the causal explanation of the world in his system, which is at once called by him *Brahmavāda* and *Brahmakāraṇavāda* and is distinguished from other rival systems of thought in its insistence on Brahman being the Efficient as well as the Material Cause of the universe. Śaṅkara calls his *Brahmakāraṇavāda* by another name also, namely, *Aviśeṣeṣeśvara-kāraṇavāda*³, where emphasis is laid on Brahman's being the sole and unconditional causal principle. The view that *Īśvara* and not Brahman, the *Saguṇa* and not *Nirguṇa*, the *Āpara* and not the Para, the *Saviśeṣa* and not the *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, is put forward by Śaṅkara as the causal principle of the universe has taken so deep a root in the minds of his readers that nothing short of an exhaustive, systematic, and synthetic appeal to his *ipsissima verba* will be of any avail in removing from our minds this idea. This appeal to his written words

1 Radhakrishnan: I.P., Vol. II, P.572.

2 *Kaṭha*. S.B., I.3.2. परमार्थज्ञानी सर्वज्ञविदात्मने ।

3 S.B., II. 2.37.

and the spirit in which they were written is rendered all the more necessary on account of the weight of authority which scholars like Deussen, Dasgupta, Thibaut and Radhakrishnan have lent to this view by accepting it as representative of the main tendency of Śaṅkara's cosmological speculation.

III

PARA BRAHMAN OR ĀTMAN DESCRIBED AS THE ROOT CAUSE

Though from Śaṅkara's statements to the effect that Brahman is the cause of universe, the view that the exigencies of thought demand the recognition of a Saguna Brahman, of an Īśvara who is "different" from Brahman and who is an "inferior" principle as Creator, is altogether excluded, yet there are explicit assertions of Śaṅkara where Para Brahman and it alone is described as the originating cause of the universe. "All these beings take their rise from the ether only—this sentence clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedānta-texts agree in declaring that all beings spring from the highest Brahman."¹ This Para Brahman is said to be the Mūlakāraṇa, the Originating Cause. It is the Param Kāraṇa, the Great Cause.² That very Brahman whose comprehension is said to lead to the summum bonum is the cause of the universe. "On the introductory words, 'he who knows Brahman attains the highest', there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman is true Existence, Intelligence and Infinity; after that it is said that from this very Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things, and that entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all."³ Brahman is described as Ākāśa in the Upaniṣad, and this Ākāśa or Ether is said to be the revealer of all names and forms.⁴ This Ākāśa is the Para Brahman according to Śaṅ-

1 S.B., I. 1.22. परस्व हि ब्रह्मणः इदं लिङ्गम् 'सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि आकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते' इति परस्मादि ब्रह्मणो भूतानामुत्पत्तिरिति वेदान्तेषु मर्यादा ।

2 Ibid.

3 S.B., I. 1.15.

4 Chand., VIII 14.1.

kara. "The word 'Ether' can denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing. The complete revelation of name and form cannot be accomplished by anything else except Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self and evolve names and forms'¹ It is on account of the revelation of names and forms that creatorship is the characteristic mark of Brahman."² The Para Brahman alone is the causal principle; and it is only the Kāraṇa Brahman that can be said to be above the manifoldness, the diversity, and the division which affect the Aparā Brahman.³ The Kāraṇa Brahman is One and Non-dual. "In the manifested Brahman we may meet women but not in the Kāraṇa Brahman, (which is) the causal principle; for it is one and indivisible and knows no second, as is evident from the texts, 'Where one sees nothing else' and 'Who shall find whom there?'"⁴ The word Brahman is always used by Śaṅkara to mean Para Brahman, unless otherwise indicated; and when Brahman is described as the source of the universe, it is this Brahman and not any "inferior" or "phenomenal" reality that is meant.⁵ All the Vedānta texts are at one in using the word "Brahman" to mean Brahman which is the cause of the world.⁶ The distinction between Brahman and Īśvara conceived as different metaphysical principles is sanctioned neither by his written words nor by the spirit which informs his writing. There is only one ultimate principle. It is the Self of the universe and of every one of us. It is an interesting problem for the student of Śaṅkara to discover how, in spite of definite statements of Śaṅkara to the effect that Para Brahman is the cause of universe, the view that Aparā and not Para, Savīśeṣa and not Nirvīśeṣa Brahman, is the originat-

1 Ibid., VI. 3.2.

2 S.B., I. 3.41.

3 Mānd. S.E., II. 2.8. परं च कारणात्मनावरं च कार्यात्मना । S.B., III. 2.14.

'आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म' इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वप्रधानानि नार्थान्तरप्रधानानि ।

4 Taitt. S. B., I. 11.1.

5 S.B., I. 13. 14. परस्यैवेदं ब्रह्मणः पुरं सच्छरीरं ब्रह्मपुरमित्युच्यते ब्रह्मशब्दस्य तस्मिन्मुख्यत्वात् ।

6 S. B., II. 1. 1. यत्सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धं ब्रह्मशब्दस्यालम्बनं जगत्कारणम् ।

ing cause came to be accepted as representing the orthodox Vedānta position. We shall take up this question when we discuss the relation between Śaṅkara and the Vivaraṇa School of Prakāśātman. Meanwhile it is necessary to show the hollowness of the view that Īśvara and not Brahman is the creative principle by adducing more statements of Śaṅkara where he speaks of Para Brahman as evolving the universe and guiding its course as its inner controller. "The highest Brahman only is the evolving agent."¹ "And as the worlds and everything else are produced from the highest Brahman, so the prāṇas also.....As ether and so on are understood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prāṇas also are effects of the highest Brahman."² This statement as to the origin of the prāṇa, etc., from Brahman cannot be taken in a secondary sense; for the whole point of Śaṅkara's metaphysics is to show that Brahman, being the only reality, is the cause of everything and that this is why by knowing one thing every other thing is known, nothing being, in essence, other than that one thing. On any other interpretation the promissory utterance about the possibility of knowing everything by knowing the One will have to be abandoned, according to Śaṅkara, which would mean an abandonment of the very truth for which Śaṅkara's system stands, namely that Reality is advaitam or non-dual. Śaṅkara cannot be expected to introduce surreptitiously an "inferior" principle in the form of Īśvara, when he has himself been battling throughout his works against any and every form of dualism and pluralism.

Deussen's view that, according to Śaṅkara, Brahman, in order to create, requires a plurality of powers, and as these stand in contradiction to a nirviśeṣam Brahman, only "a sagunam, saviśeṣam", not "a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam" Brahman, can be a creator does little justice to Śaṅkara. The whole point of Śaṅkara's view of evolution or creation is that it is a process of differentiation in which unity gives rise to multiplicity, homogeneity to heterogeneity, indefiniteness to definiteness. In Śaṅkara's words, it is a process of the sāmā-

1 S. B., II. 4. 20. परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्याकृतं त्वमिहोपदिश्यते ।

2 S. B., II. 1. 1. यथा लोकादयः परस्माद्ब्रह्मणः उत्पद्यन्ते तथा प्राणा अपीत्यर्थः ।

nya, the general or universal, setting itself up as the viśeṣa, the special or particular.¹ Brahman is the Mahāsāmānya according to Śaṅkara, the Great Universal from which all the variety of genera and species and the particulars included in them arise and separate and which includes them all.² These are all unified in Brahman and are not different from it. As the Mahāsāmānya, Brahman is the "Root Cause" of the universe, whose reality cannot be denied.³ This Root or Original Cause, the Mūlaprakṛti which is Śaṅkara's Brahman, is nirviśeṣam, devoid of all specifications and particularizations, though it is the source of all particulars and differentiations. This is why Śaṅkara calls Brahman one "without breath and without mind, pure, higher than the high, imperishable".⁴ "Without breath, without mind, pure"⁵—these according to Śaṅkara, are the characterizations of the Śuddha Brahman, which is to be sharply distinguished from the Saṅga Brahman or the qualified Brahman.⁶ It follows that it is the Śuddha, the Nirgaṇa, and not the Saṅga Brahman, which is the creative principle behind the universe. The Śuddha or the unqualified Brahman is the Root Cause. The conception of the Saṅga Brahman, as we have shown, is the conception of the Upāśya Brahman in Śaṅkara's system. Far from representing a metaphysical truth which explains the existence of names and forms themselves, it is an embodiment of "the imperfect figurative ideas which we form of the Godhead in order to bring it nearer to our understanding and our worship", and presupposes the evolution of names and form, which supply the very basis of these presentation forms. This is not only a matter of inference for us, to be arrived at with the help of statements made at different places. There are explicit statements of Śaṅkara to this effect. "Though devoid of all specifications, it certainly exists, being known

1 S. B. II. 3. 9. समान्याद्वि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

2 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 9.

3 S. B., II. 4. 7. मूलप्रकृत्यनभ्युपगमेऽवस्थाप्रसंगात् । या मूलप्रकृतिरभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म ।

4 S. B., II. 4. 2. मूलप्रकृतेः प्राणादिसमस्तविशेषरहितत्वावधारणात् । Ibid., II 4. 8.

5 Mund. II. 1. 2.

6 S. B., I. 2. 2. 'अप्राणो ह्यमना दृष्टः' इति श्रुतिः शुद्धब्रह्मविषया इयं तु मनोमयः प्राणशरीरः इति सगुणब्रह्म विषयेति विशेषः ।

as the root cause of the universe; for that into which effects are absorbed must undoubtedly exist. The whole system of effects traced back in the ascending series of subtlety leads to the conviction of something as existent (in the last resort)Therefore the cause of the world, the Ātman, must be known as existing."¹ Brahman is the essence of the entire universe of name and form, and being the essence it is the Mūlakāraṇa, the Original Cause, Mūlaprakṛti, the Aboriginal Stuff, the Paramakāraṇa, the Great Cause.²

When it is said that Brahman is "without prāṇa, without mind, and pure", it is not meant that Brahman on account of being immutable is not the cause of the manifested universe. This way of characterizing the Nirguṇa or Nirviśeṣa Brahman is not meant to negative its creativity. It is only a way of emphasizing the truth that prāṇa, etc., do not maintain their nature eternally and always as Brahman maintains its nature. Brahman therefore which is eternal perdurability, cannot be said to be "endowed with prāṇa, etc.," because they are partial moments in the Absolute life of Brahman. "If prāṇa, etc., existed as such in their own forms before their creation, like the Puruṣa, then the Puruṣa might be said to be "with prāṇa" because of their then existence. But they, the prāṇa and the rest, do not, like the puruṣa, exist in their own forms before their creation. So the highest Puruṣa is without prāṇa, etc., just as Devadatta is said to be without a son before one is born to him."³ According to Śaṅkara, the mind and all the sensory organs and their objects are born of this Unqualified Brahman, which is without prāṇa, without mind, and pure.⁴ In the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣada "this very being who is to be known from the Upaniṣads and who has been described as 'Not this, Not this', who projects eight beings and withdraws them into the heart.....who transcends the being identified with the universe with his three states.....body, heart and sūtra, has been described both directly and as the

1 Katha S. B., II. 3. 12, तदाऽपि सर्वविज्ञोऽपि जगतो मूलम्..... तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपपन्नव्यवः ।

2 S. B., II. 2. 9; II. 3. 14.

3 Mund. S. B., II. 1. 2.

4 Ibid., II. 1. 3.

material cause of the universe in the words 'Knowledge, Bliss', etc."¹

Brahman is called the Aksara, the Immutable, by Śaṅkara, and from this Immutable the whole creation is said to take its rise, "just as the spider without requiring any other cause itself creates, that is, sends out threads not distinct from its own body and again absorbs them itself"². At another place this Immutable Aksara is said to be the very essence of the universe, its immortal source, from which it proceeds and into which it is absorbed³. In view of such statements it is difficult to believe that Śaṅkara would have approved of Professor Radhakrishnan's line of argument explaining and justifying the "recognition of a Saṁguṇa Brahman or changing Brahman, an Īśvara" as necessary to account for "the world of becoming", because Brahman, which is Immutable, cannot give rise to change.

The words Ātman, Paramātmān, and Brahman are used in the same sense by Śaṅkara. Ātman is the same as Paramātmān. It is Brahman itself⁴. Paramātmān and Brahman are the same as Ānanda⁵. The same metaphysical reality which is declared to be the supreme source and the First and Final Cause of the universe is indifferently named Brahman, Ātman, and Paramātmān. It is said to be the Ātman of the entire universe precisely because it is its originating cause.⁶ The creation of the entire system of effects cannot possibly belong to any Self other than the highest Self⁷. "Everything springs from the Ātman, is dissolved in it, and remains imbued with it during continuance, for it cannot be perceived apart from the Ātman."⁸ Ātman is the Self-comm-

1 Brhad. S. B., IV. 1. 1, यः ओपनिषदः पुरुषो नन्ति नेतीति व्यपदिष्टः स माक्षा-
चोपादानकारणस्वरूपेण च निदिष्टः 'विज्ञानमानन्द ब्रह्म' इति ।

2 Mund. S. B., I. 1. 7.

3 Ibid., II. 1. 1.

4 S. B., I. 3. 1, आत्मशब्दश्च परमात्मपरिग्रहे सम्यग्बकल्पते ।

5 S. B., I. 1. 12, ब्रह्मण्येवानन्द शब्दो दृष्टः । परस्मिन्नेव ह्यात्मन्यानन्दगदो
बहुकृतोऽभ्यस्यते । आनन्दमयः पर एव आत्मा ।

6 S. B., I. 1. 12, आत्मनः कारणत्वं दर्शयन्ति सर्वे वेदान्ताः

7 S. B., I. 1. 16.

8 Brhad. S. B., II. 4. 6., S. B., I. 4. 6., III. 3. 16; Mund. S. B., II. 1. 10.

unicating life according to Śaṅkara¹. There are not two views traceable in Śaṅkara regarding the creative aspect of Supreme Reality which is sometimes called Brahman, sometimes Ātman and at other times Paramātman. "As the creator is described in any one Vedānta passage as all-knowing, the Lord of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedānta passages also. Brahman is, for instance, described as "Truth, Knowledge, and Infinity."² Here the word "Knowledge" and so likewise the statement made later on that "Brahman desired" intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares that the cause of the world is the Lord by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term "Ātman", and represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with the gross body, whereby it affirms it to be the internal self within all beings. Again, in the passage "May I be many, may I grow forth" — it tells how the Self becomes many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-different from the created effects. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also.³

IV

PARA BRAHMAN DESCRIBED AS PARAM

ĪSVARA

Just as Brahman, Ātman, and Paramātman are declared to be the originating cause of the world and its inner essence by virtue of this causality, similarly Īsvara also is invariably described as the source and the end of the whole creation. The word "Īsvara" is used in Śaṅkara to indicate the same Absolute Reality as is signified by the words Brahman, Ātman and Paramātman, and not any other entity which is "different" from them or on a lower level, or which is a mediating principle between Brahman and the world, or which is,

1 S. B., I. 4. 26. आत्मनः कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च दर्शयति ।

2 Talit., II. I.

3 Chand., VI. 2. 1; S. B., I. 4. 14.

In any sense, illusory or phenomenal or possesses a deficient or borrowed reality. All these views are at variance with the teaching of Śāṅkara, who openly declares that "in any attempt to ascertain the true meaning of the Vedānta texts we meet with no intelligent reality except the omniscient Īśvara, whose essence is eternal freedom".¹ He is described in the following Upaniṣadic texts: "There is no other seer but He, there is no other perceiver but He, there is no other knower but He"²; "There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it"³; "Thou art that"⁴, "I am Brahman"⁵. It is the highest reality. It is eternally existent and eternally perfect.⁶ From Śāṅkara's statement that "there is no permanence anywhere apart from the highest Brahman", and Īśvara is eternally real, it would naturally follow that Īśvara and Brahman are one and the same. But even the bare possibility of doubt is excluded when we find him attributing the work of creation and of the revelation of name and form, in one and the same passage, indifferently to Para Brahman and to Paramaśvara. "For the text says at first 'that divinity, etc., and then goes on in the first person, 'let me evolve', which implies the statement that Para Brahman only is the evolving agent..... That the highest Lord (Paramaśvara) alone evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged by all the Upaniṣads. The evolution of names and forms, therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who is also the author of the tripartite arrangements."⁷ It is no account of oneness of Īśvara and Brahman that the realization of Īśvara as our very Ātman is insisted upon by Śāṅkara for the attainment of the

1 S.B., II. 2. 30. न हि निरवमृताः परमात्मैवादीदृश्यादन्वयेनो वातुः द्वितीया विद्वान्वाचं निरुपनायामुपपन्नम् ।

2 Brhad., III. 7. 23.

3 Chan., VI. 8. 7.

4 Ibid., VI. 1. 6.

5 Brhad., I. 4. 7.

6 S.B., IV. 4. 17. 18. निरवमिदं, पृथगिदं ईश्वरः; S.B., IV. 4. 21. अनादिमिदं न-
द्वयेण ।

7 S.B., IV. 3. 9. न हि परमादुद्भवाणीत्यत्र तत्रचित्प्रत्यया मग्नाः सन्ति ।

8 S.B., II. 4. 20. तथा हि 'देवर्षेभ्यः' इत्यत्र कस्य 'आकाशानि' इत्युक्तमनुस्यप्रयोगेन-
परमैव ब्रह्मणः आकाशमिहोपदिश्यते..... परमेश्वर एव नामरूपयो-
र्आकर्षेति मनीषनिवसिष्ठान्तः ।

summum bonum. For Śaṅkara the choice is not between "the realization of Brahman" or "the realization of Īśvara". It is a choice between two different ways in which Brahman and Īśvara, which are one and the same, are to be realized—whether the realization of Brahman and Īśvara as our very "Ātman", our very "Self", will ensure the attainment of human perfection, or the realization of them as something other than our Self, as our controller or governor. For Śaṅkara the possibility of liberation is bound up with the first alternative. Accordingly he says that "the great Lord is to be realized as our very Self".¹ To the question whether the Paramatman is to be realized as one with us or as other than our Self his uniform answer is: "as our very Self".² The particle "tat" in the sacred formula of the Vedāntin, namely "tattvamaṣi" signifies, according to Śaṅkara, "the thinking Brahman which is the cause of the origin, etc., of the world, and which is known from passages like the following: "Brahman, which is Knowledge and Bliss"; "Brahman is unseen but seeing, unknown but knowing"; "not produced, not subject to old age, not subject to death, not coarse, not fine, not short, not long".³ Param Ātman, Param Brahman, Param Īśvara are words which are used by Śaṅkara invariably to designate one and the same entity which is the highest value and the highest reality and, in the latter capacity, the highest Self and the source of the universe also.⁴ As Brahman and Mokṣa are said to be eternally perfect, so Īśvara also is described as Nityasiddha.⁵ This eternally real and eternally perfect Īśvara is the subject-matter of Paravidyā, and the realization of it results in the attainment of summum bonum. In Śaṅkara's system the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of Paravidyā. If we were to assume that the Indestructible

1 S.B., IV. 1.3. द्वाहयन्ति च आत्मनोर्नवेदस्वर वेदान्तवाक्यानि नित्यमपि ॥१॥

2 Ibid.

3 Brhad., III. 8. 11.

4 Brhad. S. B., I. 1. 12. एक एव तु परमात्मेश्वरः ।

5 Brhad. S. B., III. 8. 8.

6 S. B. III. 4. 2. नृत्पदेन च प्रकृतं नदं ब्रह्मेशित्वं जगत्तो जन्मादिकारणमभिधीयते 'मत्स्य' जलमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तं. २. ६ ६.) 'विज्ञानमनन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३. ८. ११.) ।

7 S.B., IV. 3. 14. नित्यमिदं निःशेषम्; S.B., III. 4. 52. नित्यमिदं त्वभावेन; S.B., IV. 4. 18 पूर्वमिदं ईश्वरः नित्यमिदं ईश्वरः ।

distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Īśvara, the knowledge referring to it would not be Parāvidyā. The distinction of Parā and Aparā Vidyā is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to absolute good, the latter to merely worldly exaltation."¹

Deussen's view that Īśvara and the treatment of creation belong to Aparāvidyā is hardly consistent with the position of Śaṅkara, who takes special care to do away with all such views as seek to establish two or more metaphysical realities. There are no "fluctuations" between the empirical and the metaphysical standpoint in the sphere of cosmology as Deussen supposes to be the case. The root of the whole difficulty is that Deussen starts with the presumption that "the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms", an esoteric and an exoteric, and that these two forms are present and run parallel in all the provinces of the Vedānta teaching. But the truth is that Śaṅkara adopts only one standpoint, namely that of value, and it is from this standpoint that he explains the fact of creation and the meaning of the creative process. Deussen misses the truth that the distinction between the Aparāvidyā and the Parāvidyā is an axiological distinction in Śaṅkara, the former dealing with the relative good (abhyudaya) and the latter with the absolute good (niḥśreyasa); the Aparāvidyā treats of creation as a fact, the parāvidyā seeks to determine the meaning of this fact. It is only when we give up the standpoint of value which is central to Śaṅkara's metaphysics that we are led to imagine that his teaching of the metaphysical identity of Brahman and the world "cannot be brought into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which he himself bestowed on it".² The fluctuations between the empirical and the metaphysical standpoint in the sphere of Cosmology of which Deussen speaks, the false connections in the organism of his system which he discovers, and Śaṅkara's alleged failure to bring together the exoteric doctrines into a whole of exoteric metaphysics, which he considers essential, are all connected with the failure to realise that Śaṅkara's metaphysics is a metaphysics of value.

1 S.B. I. 2. 22.

2 D. S. V., P. 101.

The words Brahman and Īśvara indicate one and the same metaphysical reality, and accordingly Brahman and Īśvara are indifferently described as the cause and the source of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the universe. "That omniscient and omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this world is Brahman."¹ "The origin, etc., of the world possessing the characteristics stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else except the Īśvara possessing the qualities noted above."² The real nature of Brahman or Īśvara is above all particularizations because Brahman is *advaitam*, non-dual, and there is nothing other than it. "The real form of Īśvara is devoid of all particularizations and specifications."³ To the objection that the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self or Brahman does not leave any room for the ascription of creative activity to it Śāṅkara's unequivocal answer is that the fundamental tenet which he has outlined in I. 1. 2, namely that the creation, subsistence and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, is not contradicted here. "That tenet is maintained and we do not teach anything contrary to it."⁴

Brahman is described by Śāṅkara as the reality "from which are born all the living things from *Brahmā* to a worm, by which, being born, these living things are sustained, into which these beings enter at the time of their destruction and with which they become one, from which these things do not swerve either at birth or death or during their existence". This is the description of Brahman, and we are asked to realize this Brahman with a view to attaining immortality.⁵ "Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth' show in the first place that the Ātman is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by its reflection; and in the second place that it is the material cause also, since the words 'may I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying

1 S. B., I. 1. 2; I. 1. 5; I. 1. 11; I. 1. 20.

2 S. B., I. 1. 2.

3 S. B., I. 1. 20. निरस्तसर्वविशेषं पारमेश्वरं रूपम् ।

4 S. B., II. 1. 14. सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव न तद्विग्रहोऽयं पुनरिहोच्यते ।

5 Taitt. S. B., III. 1. 1.

itself has the inner Ātman for its object.”¹ The scripture, by saying that “the Self made itself”, intends to bring out the agency as well as the objectivity of the Self.²

It must be remembered that it is a concession to the ordinary modes of speech that Brahman is spoken of as the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. In Brahman itself there is no such distinction. The distinction is relevant to human ways of speaking the truth, and language always falls short of Brahman. Śaṅkara's dissatisfaction with the thinkers who view God as the efficient cause only is due to the fact that these introduce into the nature of God a dualism, and therefore an imperfection, which, on their own assumption, is quite foreign to his nature. All of them profess to be Advaitavādins but they are not able to remain consistent with the Advaita creed. It is only a radical revision of the tables of stone on which their tenets are engraved that can bring about the much needed harmony between their silent assumption and their explicit faith, want of which is the bane of their systems.

V

THE UNITY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL AND THE COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

“The Ātman is the ‘operative’ cause because there is no other ruling principle, and the ‘material’ cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.”³ In Śaṅkara's works we do not even find a trace of the distinction between the Nirguṇa and the Māyāśabala Brahman of which Prakāśātman and the modern interpreters make so much. The very problem for which the later Vedānta had to create a metaphysical principle in the form of a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is non-existent in Śaṅkara. Brahman is always declared to be the origin and the source of the universe,

1 S. B., I. 4. 24.

2 S. B., I. 4. 26.

3 S. B., I. 4. 23, अविष्टान्तराभावादात्मनः कर्तृत्वमुपादानाभावाच्च प्रकृतित्वम् ।

and the word *Īśvara* is uniformly used as synonymous with Brahman. This Brahman or *Īśvara* is the principle in the realization of which consists the summum bonum of life. Śāṅkara has summarized his discussions, extending over several pages in certain places, in his Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, and these summaries unmistakably point to Brahman as the First Cause and as the highest end of human life. Śāṅkara sums up his long discussion carried on in the commentary on the first four *Sūtras* in the following words: "So far it has been declared that the *Vedānta* passages whose purport is to intimate to us the truth of Brahman being the *Ātman* of every one of us, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to action. And it has been further shown that Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world."¹ A little further on we find him re-emphasising the same point. "All the *Vedānta* texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman.....They declare the *Ātman* to be the cause.....The all-knowing Brahman is therefore to be viewed as the cause of the world, on account of the uniformity of view of the *Vedānta* texts."² In the beginning of the Second *Pāda* of the First *Adhyāya* Śāṅkara summarizes the contents of his comments on the *sūtras* of the first *pāda* in the following words: "In the First *Pāda* Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain characteristics have (implicitly) been declared—all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on." A little further on, summarizing his discussions, he says again the same thing: "After having set forth inquiry into Brahman as the main topic, we have first defined Brahman as that from which the origin, etc. We have, thereupon, refuted the objection that this definition holds good of the *Pradhāna* also by showing that there is no scriptural authority for this."³ We have shown in detail that the common purport of all the *Vedānta* texts is

1 S. B., I. 1. 5.

2 S. B., I. 1. 11.

3 S. B., I. 1. 5.

to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not Pradhāna, is the cause of the world."¹ The whole of the First Adhyāya is summarized at the end, and the discussion is shown to have developed the view that Brahman is the First or Originating Cause, and, as such, the very Self of every one of us, and it is the one aim of all the Vedānta texts to establish the selfhood of Brahman.² "It has been shown in the First Adhyāya that the omniscient Īśvara is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his controlling the created world, he is the cause of the subsistence of the world, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical display; and that lastly he is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has been further proved that Īśvara is the Self of every one of us."³ There is no alternative left to us except recognizing that there is only one ultimate Reality in Śaṅkara. We may call it Brahman, Ātman or Īśvara. It is the source of the entire multiplicity of the universe, and its destiny also. In the realization of this Brahman as our very Self lies the perfection of human achievement, and with it the cessation of transmigratory existence and its attendant evils and imperfections.

VI

THE THEORY OF MĀYĀŚĀBALA BRAHMAN

The theory that it is the Māyāśābala Brahman and not the Śuddha which is the creative principle behind the universe with its richness and variety is as old as Prakāśātman (1200 A. D.) and has been revived in modern times with much force of argument and added strength of conviction. It was Prakāśātman who, for the first time in the history of the Advaita Vedānta, impressed upon us the necessity of recognizing a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman in order to explain the becoming of the universe on the ground that the Śuddha Brahman, by its nature, was not an efficient metaphysical principle.

1 S. B., I. 4. 1.

2 S. B., I. 1. 1.

3 S. B., II. 1. 1.

With the recognition of the distinction between the Śuddha and the Mâyāviśiṣṭa Brahman, he also distinguished between the "taṭastha" and the "svarūpa" lakṣana of Brahman, and creatorship was declared to be the taṭastha lakṣana of Brahman. According to Prakāśātman the world of becoming cannot be due to Brahman, which is the object of the inquiry undertaken by the Brahma Śūtra. Creation presupposes a multiplicity of powers adapted to a variety of actions and the power to generate it is foreign to and inconsistent with the nature of the Viśuddha Brahman. The creative power is thus merely upalakṣana of Brahman. It is not its essential nature but merely an accidental feature of it.¹ Deussen repeated the same thing about seven hundred years after Prakāśātman, when he wrote that, in order to create, Brahman requires a plurality of powers, but as these stand in contradiction to a Nirviśeṣa Brahman, only a Saṁguṇa, Saviśeṣam, not a Nirguṇam, Nirviśeṣam Brahman can be creator. Prakāśātman's logic leads him to recognize another principle which, in conjunction with Brahman, would be able to produce the world of name and form with its multiplicity of agents and enjoyers and objects of enjoyment. This second principle is that of Mâyā. Brahman qualified by Mâyā is the causal explanation of the universe.² Vidyāraṇya, one of the most notable representatives of the Vivaraṇa school of Śaṅkara Vedānta, in commenting upon Prakāśātman's Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, distinguishes between the Śuddha and the Kāraṇa Brahman, and attributes the work of creation to the latter. Though, according to him, the Śuddha Brahman cannot be said to have anything to do with creation and the creative process, the Mâyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is vitally connected with it and alone deserves to be viewed as the explanatory principle. The Second Śūtra is a definition, not of the Śuddha, but of the Kāraṇa Brahman.³ Vidyāraṇya's reasons for the inability

1 Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa, P. 205. न हि नानाविधकार्यक्रियावेशात्मकत्वं तत्प्रसव-
शक्त्यात्मकत्वं वा त्रिजास्य विशुद्धब्रह्मान्तर्गतं भवितुमर्हति तस्माज्जगज्जन्मादि
कारणत्वमेवोपलक्षणमिति ।

2 Ibid. तस्मादनिर्वचनीयमायाविशिष्टं कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्राप्तम् तत्राह 'यदवष्टम्भो
विद्वो विवर्तते' इति ।

3 Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, P. 643, शुद्धब्रह्मसम्बन्धाभावेऽपि मायाविशिष्ट-
कारणब्रह्मसम्बन्धित्वात् । यत इत्यनेन हि सूत्रपदेन कारणमेव निदिश्यते न तु
शुद्धम् ।

of Brahman to explain the origin of the universe are the same as those given by Prakāśātman. He also feels the necessity of recognizing another principle in addition to Brahman which in cooperation with it would be able to produce the universe and sustain it. The conception of Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman is the conception of such a principle, which combines within itself both being and becoming. Brahman is changeless. In order to explain change, either it must be joined to a principle of change or the principle of change must be added to it. Māyā is this principle of creativity. Both Brahman and Māyā should be brought together, and as the result of this arithmetical process we get a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman other than the Śuddha Brahman, who is invested with creative power and the force of conservation.¹

VII

PADMAPĀDA AND THE VALUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN UPA AND VIŚEṢA LAKṢAṆA

Padmapāda distinguishes between the "upa lakṣaṇa" and the "viśeṣa lakṣaṇa" of Brahman. "That from which the origin, etc." is the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, according to Padmapāda, and not the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, because it does not tell us that about Brahman knowing and realizing which we can attain the highest beatitude. It only tells us that we must acknowledge an All-sustaining Reality which is the origin of the universe and in which the universe rests. It does not tell us what the essence of this reality is. The realization of the summum bonum of life is not to be attained by simply recognizing that Brahman is the "general cause" of the universe. This knowledge has no special fruit attached to it. One must realize that Brahman is the Self of every one, and that this Brahman is "all-knowing, all powerful and supreme bliss". Realization of this "svarūpa" of Brahman brings about the

1 *ibid.*, P. 684, निर्विकारत्वाज्जगद्रूपेण विकरिष्यमाणं वस्त्वन्तरं किञ्चिदङ्गीकार्यम्...
माया ब्रह्ममिलित्वैकमेवोपादानमिति वाच्यम् ।

emancipation of the soul.¹ The Second Sūtra gives us a characteristic which no doubt belongs to Brahman, but it does not take us to the very heart of Brahman. It does not tell us what its essence is, because merely by realizing this we cannot become what Brahman itself is. For Padmapāda the causal argument which the Second Sūtra sums up can only point to the indispensability of Brahman to a rational explanation of the universe. It points to the necessity of acknowledging an absolute reality which is the source of the universe and in which the universe is grounded. But more than this it does not claim to tell us. In the words of Padmapāda, the Second Sūtra gives us an idea of Brahman as the "general cause" only.² The Upaniṣadic text "that from which these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death", embodies the necessity of acknowledging this absolute cause. But it does not contain the final conclusion of the Upaniṣad regarding the nature of this cause. The text, by affirming the reality of this cause, only urges inquiry into its true essence. It asks us to "to try to know that".³ Śaṅkara makes it clear that this text is not the last word about the true nature of Brahman. "The proposition which finally determines the sense of the above passage runs as follows: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death'."⁴ It is this which gives us an insight into the true essence of Brahman, and consequently this is the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman. As the view which regards Brahman as the general cause merely is not conducive to the true realization of Brahman, being only a half-truth about its nature. Padmapāda speaks of it as the view about "the indifferent causal principle of the universe,"⁵ a view in which there is no trace of the intrinsic values of consciousness and bliss which in their indivisible unity constitute Brahman.⁶ Creatorship, therefore, is

1 Pancapadika; P. 89. इदं तु कूटस्थनित्यं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रकान्तम यत्स्वरूपा-
वगमो मोक्षोऽभिप्रेयते ।

2 ibid.. P. 93. कारणमामन्यसिद्धे ।

3 तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म ।

4 S.B., I 1.2.

5 Pancapadika, P. 84, तदस्यमेव जगत्कारणं प्रतिपाद्य ।

6 ibid P. 81, ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शाभावात् ।

the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, and does not point to anything "special" about it.¹

In order to get a complete insight into the true nature of Brahman, Padmapāda asks us to read Śaṅkara's comments on the Second and the Fourth Sūtras together. The Second Sūtra purports to establish the nature of Brahman as the highest reality. But as this reality is one with and inseparable from the highest value, to view the real in abstraction from all value would be to take an existential view of it and reduce it to the status of a mere existent. As the Second Sūtra is content to view Brahman as the absolute reality only, according to Padmapāda, taken by itself it gives us only an existential account of Brahman and thus embodies merely its upa lakṣaṇa. But to be content with the existential view of reality is to be content with a onesided, incomplete and therefore erroneous view of it. The existential view should therefore be brought in harmony with the valuational view. The creative nature of Brahman should be read as part and parcel of its value character. The creative Monism of Śaṅkara would then be identical with his Monism of the Good. In his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra Śaṅkara has mainly shown that Brahman is the highest value and is the Self of every one of us; and true to the standpoint of value, which he adopts in full agreement with his master Śaṅkara, Padmapāda insists upon the ontological problem being conceived as part and parcel of the general axiological problem. His repeated assertion that in order to have real knowledge of Brahman after we are convinced that it is the general cause of everything, we must read together the texts, 'that from which all these beings are born', and 'thou art that' is an invitation to shift the centre of gravity of philosophical thought from mere being to value. He finds it intolerable to permit the Second and the Fourth Sūtras and Śaṅkara's comments thereon to stand in isolation from each other, because, according to him, reality and value are ultimately one and inseparable,

1 *ibid.*, P. 81 तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरे वाक्ये जन्मादिधर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वात् । P. 76.

किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मत्यत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः जन्माद्यस्य इति ।; P. 77,
तत्रेदं लक्षणं प्रपञ्चधर्मत्वात् पृथग्भूतमेव कारणमुपलक्षयति न विशेषणत्वेन अतः
पृथक् स्वलक्षणं कथनम् ।

and he finds reality, which the second sūtra undertakes to discuss, intolerable without raising it to the sphere of value, and deems it equally difficult to think of value, which is the content of the Fourth Sūtra, without implying some form of being.¹

Padmapāda imagines an objection to the effect that all that was to be said about the nature of Brahman and all the texts which served to elucidate it have already been mentioned by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Second Sūtra and there is little justification for further quotations in order to throw more light on Brahman's nature under the Fourth Sūtra.² In answer to this supposed objection, Padmapāda points out that in his commentary on the Second Sūtra, Śaṅkara has brought out only one aspect of Brahman's nature, namely its nature as the Absolute Reality. Brahman's nature as the most supreme Value also possesses much greater significance for a philosophy like that of Śaṅkara, the driving force of which is not merely ontological but rather axiological, and which is committed to the thesis that all problems of metaphysics ultimately resolve into questions of value. The Second Sūtra does not deal with Brahman as the Supreme Good and consequently is limited to the exposition of an aspect of reality which, taken by itself, cannot lead us to the very heart of it and the realization of which cannot ensure that eternal beatitude which is Brahman itself. Such a Brahman is a "taṭastha Brahman" for Padmapāda, and the texts quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ" are illustrative of this "taṭastha Brahman".³ The commentary on the Fourth Sūtra is especially devoted to the exposition of the truth that Brahman is the most supreme value and also the Self of everyone and that in the realization of this consists the perfection of life. To bring out this aspect of Brahman is to bring out the value side of reality, that aspect which really matters for metaphysics. The commentary on the Fourth Sūtra is not content to view Brah-

1 Ibid., P. 93. दृष्टान्तानि च वेदान्तशङ्करानि कारणसामान्यमिदं तद्विशेषावगमाय

समन्वितानि 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादीनि 'तत्त्वमस्यीत्यादीनि च' ।

2 B. S., I. 1. 4. तत्त्वमन्वयात् ।

3 Pancapodika, P. 84, अस्त्यत्रान्निप्रायो भाष्यकारस्य । तत्र ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं वक्तव्यमिति तदवश्यमेव ब्रह्मणो निरूपकाणि धान्यानि उदाहृतानि ।

man as the "indifferent causal principle", but endeavours to establish it as constituting the very essence of human life, being Infinite Reality, Infinite Consciousness and Infinite Bliss. The texts quoted under this sūtra are illustrative of the Selfhood of Brahman and the oneness of the individual with the universal Self, the latter being represented as the embodiment in one indivisible Absolute Experience of the values of Sat, Cit, and Ānanda. The comments on this sūtra give what Padmapāda calls the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman and what, in the history of later Vedānta, came to be known as the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.¹

The distinction between *upa lakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* thus turns out to be a value distinction in the philosophy of Padmapāda. It may be said to be a distinction between the "existential" definition of Brahman and the "axiological" definition of it. The *upa lakṣaṇa* may be said to be the "existential" definition of Brahman, because it merely points to the bare existence of Brahman as a substance; it is *upa lakṣaṇa*, because it merely takes us near Brahman but does not let us in. Knowledge of the bare existence of Brahman as substance is not knowledge of the essence of Brahman. Knowledge of the essence or value which is indistinguishable from Brahman the real would be knowledge of the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. The *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* may thus be said to be the "axiological" definition of Brahman. Brahman is the essence of the universe, and unless we view Brahman as such our characterization of it as "that from which the origin, etc., of this universe" will be devoid of the very truth which Brahman in itself is.²

VIII

INSPIRATION FROM ŚAṆKARA, THE MASTER

Padmapāda, in indicating the distinction between the *upa lakṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, has drawn

1 *ibid.*, P. 84, इह तु तत्त्वमसीति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मतावगति पर्यन्तानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि न तटस्थमेव जगत्कारण प्रतिपाद्य पर्यवस्यन्तीत्यतस्तथाभूताण्येव वाक्यानि उदाहृतानि 'सदेव सोभ्यंदमग्रासीदित्येवमादीनि' ।

2 *ibid.*, P. 84, तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरेवाक्ये जन्मादिवर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वात् ब्रह्मसंस्पर्श-भावात् ।

his inspiration from his master Śaṅkara, in whose writings the distinction is perfectly clear, though the technical terms "upa lakṣaṇa" and "viśeṣa lakṣaṇa" are not to be met with there. Śaṅkara supplied the material and Padmapāda gave an official "form" to it. The instrumental or mediating function of the spatio-temporal universe is the larger idealistic truth which Śaṅkara always emphasized and endeavoured to make clear. The truth of the creative process is constituted by the values of which the process itself is a revelation. Śaṅkara would whole-heartedly approve of Padmapāda's statement that no trace of the essence of Brahmanhood is discoverable in the bare assertion "that everything has sprung from Brahman". This is an assertion about the mere "that", and says nothing about the "what". To give the "what" would be to give the essence. The essence would be the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa. The second Sūtra tells us about the "that", and Śaṅkara in his commentary merely throws out a hint about the "what" leaving the full exposition of the nature of the "what" for his commentary on the Fourth Sūtra. The process of creation, as understood and treated by Śaṅkara, points to Brahman, but is not the essence of Brahman. It is existence and presupposes essence. What the nature of essence is has to be ascertained, and emancipation is connected only with the realization of the essence. Among several statements of Śaṅkara from which Padmapāda may be said to have derived his distinction between the upa lakṣaṇa and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, the following may be given as an instance: "While the cognition of the oneness of Brahman is a means to final release, there is nothing to show that any independent fruit is connected with the view that Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passes over into the form of this world. The Scripture expressly declares that fruit attaches only to the knowledge that the Immutable Brahman is the Self of everyone ... Hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own, as for instance the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world, is to be understood as but a means for the comprehension of Brahman. Whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connection with something which has such a result, is sub-

ordinate to the latter.¹ This statement when read in conjunction with Śaṅkara's assertion in the concluding portion of his commentary on the Second Sūtra that the "what" of the "that" from which the origin, etc., of the world takes place, is constituted by Ānanda leaves no room for doubting that the distinction between the "substantial" and "essential" definitions of Brahman as drawn by Padmapāda was clearly present to Śaṅkara's mind. The statement that "from Bliss these beings are born; by Bliss, when born, they live; into Bliss they enter at their death" is one which "finally determines the sense" of the passage which has been summed up in the sūtra "Janmādyasya Yataḥ". This utterance is the "nirṇayavākyaṃ" according to Śaṅkara, which Padmapāda, using more technical language, calls the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa of Brahman.

Padmapāda is careful to point out that Śaṅkara's commentary on the Second Sūtra does not omit the mention the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, or as the later Vedāntins called it, the svarūpa lakṣaṇa, of Brahman. It also gives the svarūpa lakṣaṇa, the essential nature, of Brahman, which is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfect bliss, by supplying the desired attributes which qualify the "tat", that Brahman "from which the origin, etc., of this universe" and which the sūtra itself omits to mention.² Padmapāda says that but for this addition, which was sorely needed in the interest of clarification and comprehension of the essential nature of Brahman, the sense of the sūtra would be incomplete. This addition serves to give the essential nature of Brahman also, that is, its svarūpa lakṣaṇa.³ Śaṅkara, true to his Monism of the Good, carefully points out in his commentary referred to above that Brahman is not only the most real but also the highest value, and by mention-

- 1 S. B., II. 1. 14, न च यथा आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनमेव जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित्कलायाभिप्रेयते कृतस्य ब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम् । यत्तन्नाफलं श्रूयते ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादितद्ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव विनियुज्यते फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गमितिवत् ।
- 2 S. B., I. 1. 2, जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्नव्ययतः कारणाद्भवति तद्ब्रह्मंति वाक्यशेषः । अन्यथाप्येव जातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यसुदृढमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयायादाहर्तव्यानि ।
- 3 Pancapaika, P. 77, 'जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः तद्ब्रह्मंति वाक्यशेषः इति-साकाङ्क्षस्य सूत्रवाक्यस्याकाङ्क्षितपदपूरणमुपलक्षितं ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणं च दर्शयति ।

ing both together intends to convey his conviction that a complete comprehension of Brahman's nature is not possible by taking into account only the one or the other of the two lakṣaṇas. Śaṅkara, no doubt, emphasises the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, but that is because he believes that value or essence explains existence or being, and "being" itself is a form of value. But Śaṅkara never holds that the upa lakṣaṇa gives an "accidental" definition of Brahman, as some of the later Vedāntins believed and many of the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara believe even now. Padmapāda, true to the master and his value standpoint, believes that value and reality are one and cannot be abstracted from each other; and affirms that Śaṅkara's comments on the Second Sūtra, while professing to give upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, do not fail to mention its viśeṣa lakṣaṇa also and without this latter the sense of the sūtra would remain incomplete. As reality and value always go together, so should the upa lakṣaṇa and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa. Neither is negligible, though both are not equally significant. It is the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa which gives meaning and justification to the upa lakṣaṇa. Brahman as creativity is the same as Brahman the Supreme Value, the Unbounded Bliss. "The word Brahman", says Padmapāda, "is not properly used when intended to signify the Supreme Cause of the Universe which is devoid of Bliss."¹ The word Brahman signifies, according to Padmapāda, the Infinite and Unbounded Source of the Universe, and in this he is in entire agreement with Śaṅkara.² But this Brahman is identified by both Śaṅkara and Padmapāda with Bliss. Both of them, like Plato, interpret the world by the Idea of the Good. "From Bliss alone" these beings are born.⁴ The word "hi" in the above passage, which is quoted by Śaṅkara as giving the "final conclusion" (nirṇyavakyama) brings out, says Padmapāda, the unity of the axiological and the cosmological principle i.e. of value and

1 Ibid., P. 81. तस्माद्ब्रह्मपरेवात्रये जन्मादिभर्मवानस्योपलक्षणत्वात् ब्रह्मस्य-
गमिवात्सर्वजंसर्वशक्तिसमन्वित परमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति जन्मादिसूत्रेण ब्रह्मस्वरूप-
लक्षितमिति सिद्धम् । अनानन्दके हि जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मण्यन्वयप्रयोगो न गृह्यते ।

2 Ibid., P. 81. सर्वतोऽ नवच्छिन्नस्वभावं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मण्यन्वयप्रयोगो न गृह्यते ।
S.B., I. 2.1. यत्सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु ब्रह्मण्यन्वयस्यालम्बनं जगत्कारणं इह न 'सर्वं सत्त्वि-
यं ब्रह्म' इति वाक्योपक्रमे श्रुतम् ।

3 Tallit. S.B., III. 6.

creativity. Brahman is the Supreme Value and also the Supreme Creative Principle.

IX

PRAKĀŚĀTMAN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAṬASTHA
AND SVARŪPA LAKṢAṆA : THE DISSOCIATION
OF VALUE AND REALITY

When we pass on to Prakāśātman we find that the centuries which divide him from Śaṅkara and Padmapāda have brought about an extraordinary change in the philosophical perspective of the school founded by the master. The creative period in the history of the Advaita Vedānta seems to have come to an end, and the system gives signs of advancing age with its failing sight, its weakened limbs, and its vanishing cohesive power. There is differentiation, but want of integration makes itself felt. Complexity appears to have crept in, but the power of cohesion has fled away. Thinkers are able to see things at a distance, but things which are near them are blurred and dim. They profess to follow the master and to continue the tradition creatively; they think they have seized the tradition and are living themselves into it. But they are able neither to follow it whole-heartedly nor to develop it. Professing to develop it while remaining faithful to it, they not only arrest it but give it a set-back. The system, instead of moving forward, either moves backward or stagnates. In certain vital respects, instead of progression we have retrogression; and as the tide of evolution proceeds we meet with the tape-worm in its inglorious ease, instead of the lark at heaven's gate.

Prakāśātman appears before us as one who wishes to remain faithful to Padmapāda's axiom of the inseparability of value and reality, but in spite of his wish he is not able to do so and ends by becoming an existential philosopher. He earnestly wishes to belong to the group of value philosophers with Śaṅkara at their head, and tries to be faithful to the view that reality and value are one and inseparable, that Brahman is the highest reality and the highest value. But his faith in this axiom is wavering, and he begins to entertain serious

doubts about value being creativity also, with the consequence that he has to turn attention elsewhere in search of a principle which, when joined to value, should be able to turn it into a truly creative principle. He begins by laying down that Brahman is the highest value, but the way in which he develops his philosophy, especially with reference to the problem of creation and the creative aspect of reality, is virtually an admission that Brahman is mere existence. Thus Prakāśātman's last word turns out to be a contradiction of the first. The problem of creation is the point at which Prakāśātman's allegiance to Padmapāda and Śāṅkara ceases, and the history of the Advaita Vedānta begins an entirely new chapter with his famous pronouncement that creatorship is the *taṭastha* lakṣaṇa of Brahman, which is so constituted that its very nature excludes all possibility of the evolutionary process. In order to understand the change introduced by Prakāśātman in the system of the Vedānta, which brought about the reduction of the value-system of Śāṅkara to an existential philosophy, we must turn our attention to his distinction between the "*taṭastha*" and the "*svarūpa*" lakṣaṇa of Brahman.

Prakāśātman distinguishes between the "*taṭastha*" and the "*svarūpa*" lakṣaṇa of Brahman instead of between the "*upa* lakṣaṇa" and the "*viśeṣa* lakṣaṇa". What Prakāśātman means by *svarūpa* lakṣaṇa is exactly what Padmapāda understands by *viśeṣa* lakṣaṇa, that is, the essential nature of Brahman. Padmapāda, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya all believe that the *svarūpa* lakṣaṇa of Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda. All of them agree that Brahman is the highest value. But while Padmapāda further holds that value is also the creative principle, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya say that because Brahman is mere value, it cannot be creativity also. It cannot be Brahman's nature to be the creative principle, because value and dynamism are incompatible. Creativity is thus foreign to value. It is, therefore, an accidental aspect of Brahman, which is the Supreme Value. It is not grounded in Brahman's nature, it is a mere incident in its existence. Creativity is thus the *taṭastha* lakṣaṇa of Brahman. Brahman in its real nature is powerless to be a self-communicating

principle. But in thus depriving value of creativity, of dynamic activity, or, in other words, viewing value as mere value and not reality also, Prakāśātman reduced value to mere existence. By saying that creatorship is the upa lakṣaṇa of Brahman, Padmapāda simply meant that this way of thinking only points to the reality of Brahman and the necessity of acknowledging such a reality. Borrowing the words of Prakāśātman which he uses in a different context, we may say that according to Padmapāda the upa lakṣaṇa affirms the "bare existence of the Cause" and the viśeṣa lakṣaṇa points out the nature of this Cause, that it is "Truth, Knowledge, Bliss, Infinite, Omniscient, and the Self of every one".¹ But to Prakāśātman the taṭastha lakṣaṇa implies that creation is foreign to Brahman's nature, that is, a matter of indifference to it. Padmapāda, though he does not use the term "taṭastha lakṣaṇa", speaks of "taṭastha Brahman" or "taṭasthamevaja-gatkāraṇam", meaning thereby that the mere knowledge of Brahman being the general cause, unaccompanied by the realization that it is the supreme Bliss and the Self of every one, is not conducive to liberation or summum bonum. It seems that Prakāśātman was misled by the word "taṭastha", which also means "indifferent or unconcerned", and came to regard Brahman as unconcerned with or indifferent about the creative process of the world. The tendency to relapse into the existential view which was making itself felt in Prakāśātman, and the difficulties regarding the origin of multiplicity and variety, natural to the existential view of reality and pressing for solution, may also have hastened the conclusion and brought an easy conquest to him. The price which Prakāśātman had to pay was to utter a mere "Nay"—to deny that there was anything common between Brahman and the creation; or, if a "yea" was insisted upon, to affirm that the relation between Brahman and the world was external and almost accidental. The term "taṭastha lakṣaṇa", had Prakāśātman stuck to its root meaning, could very well have expressed what Padmapāda intended to convey by it. It would signify a "lakṣaṇa" which only takes one to the "bank of the river" but does not place one in the heart of the

1 Pancapadika Vivarana. P. 219, कारणसद्भावमात्रं सिद्धयति नाधिकमिह तु सत्यज्ञानानन्दान्तसर्वज्ञप्रत्यगात्मब्रह्मावगतिविवक्षिता ।

river; in other words, a lakṣaṇa which could point to the "bare existence" of Brahman, but could not let one "in" or "within" Brahman, could not tell what that essence of Brahman is the existence of which is assured by the upa lakṣaṇa.

Prakāśātman's attempt to introduce the conception of Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman in the metaphysics of the Vedānta is an innovation. But in introducing and insisting upon the necessity of an auxiliary metaphysical principle in the form of Māyāśabala Brahman he has not been faithful either to Śāṅkara or to Padmapāda, and has considerably weakened the position of the Vedānta. As circumstances would have it, the axiom of the oneness and inseparability of value and reality which was an article of faith with Śāṅkara, a faith as much illumined by the light of reason as deepened by the warmth of intuition, was lost sight of by Prakāśātman, and Brahman came to be viewed as value merely, value abstracted from reality; and metaphysics was called upon to discover a principle which, when joined to Brahman, could turn it into a really creative principle which could account for the actual and the existent. The task which was assigned to this new principle was the reconciliation of existence to essence by bringing them together.

According to Śāṅkara, for whom essence was one with existence and Brahman the oneness of the two, such a principle was a superfluity. Brahman is the highest value and the highest reality, and what is absolutely real should not find it difficult to bring forth other realities and existents. For Śāṅkara value is creativity also; his Monism of the Good is Creative Monism as well. Because Prakāśātman was not fully alive to the significance of this thought of Śāṅkara he was troubled by the question, how a nirguṇam, nirviśeṣam Brahman can be the creator, because creation requires a plurality of powers and these stand in contradiction to such a Brahman. Prakāśātman first divests value of reality and then attempts to restore what he has taken away by adding a creative power to it. It is not difficult to see that if it is not the essential nature of value to be creativity also, the simple device of grafting a creative power on value from without cannot turn it into creativity. First Prakāśātman says "Value

is not creativity; Brahman is mere value, being pure and perfect Bliss". But then the existence of the universe remains unexplained. Value, then, must be joined to creativity if we are to account for the universe. He is thus led to conclude that "value plus creativity" = "the productive source of the universe". There is identity-in-essence between the Śaktimat and Śakti.¹ If Brahman is the Śaktimat and Māyā is the Śakti, we have to admit that they are identical in essence and it is a misuse of thought as well as language to speak of both as constituting, in cooperation with each other, the upādāna or material cause of the universe.² Prakāśātman begins by disclosing his faith that Brahman is the highest value. It is Satyam, Jñānam, and Ānandam. If he had remained faithful to the standpoint of value, he would have seen that the conception of cause is but a development of the value of reality. Brahman, being sat, is the Mūlakāraṇa also. But in arguing that Brahman, being perfect and changeless (nirvikāra; śuddha), cannot be the seat of the multiplicity of powers which creation implies and presupposes, and we must recognize some other "reality" (vastvantara) which should be able to supply this want, he abandoned the standpoint of value and paved the way for the reduction of the value philosophy of Śāṅkara to an existential philosophy.

Prakāśātman and Vidyāraṇya are at one with Padmapāda in holding that the Second Sūtra, while originally meant to point out the taṭastha lakṣaṇa of Brahman, gives the svarūpa lakṣaṇa also and these two are not mutually inconsistent.³ Though from what they have said about the illogicality of Brahman being regarded as the creative principle, it would

1. Gita. S. B., XIV. 27, शक्तिशक्तिमतोरनन्यत्वात् ।

2. Vidyāraṇya : Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, P. 684, मायाब्रह्म च मिलित्वैकमेवोपादनम् ।

3. Pañcapādika, Vivaraṇa, P. 210, अनेन सर्वज्ञशब्देन.....विज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणं विवक्ष्यत् इत्यविरोधः । P. 208, उपलक्षणत्वेऽपि नाद्वितीयस्वरूपलक्षणविरोधः ।

Vivaraṇaprameya Saṅgraha, PP. 661, 662, अतः प्रपञ्चजन्मादिकारणत्वेन तटस्थेन जिज्ञास्यविशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपं निर्विघ्नमुपलक्षते.....तच्च कारणत्वं तटस्थलक्षणत्वेन यद्यपि लक्ष्याद्ब्रह्मणः पृथग्भूतं तथापि तस्यमिध्यात्वाच्च लक्षस्याद्वितीयत्वविरोधः ।

seem difficult to accept the view that the *taṭastha* and *svarūpa* *lakṣaṇas* refer to one and the same reality, Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya try to justify this, for they are not able to give up the traditional viewpoint that reality and value are one. But as their allegiance to this standpoint is not whole-hearted, the way which Padmapāda had recourse to, namely that of affirming that value is creativity also, was not open to them. The result is that their method of reconciliation bears the stamp of artificiality and their logic that of barrenness. The *taṭastha* *lakṣaṇa* which points to the creative source can, according to them, be the *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, whose essence is constituted by Sat, Cit and Ānanda, in spite of the fact that creativity is denied to it as being inconsistent with its nature, because even false characteristics can very well play the part of a *lakṣaṇa*. The essence of a *lakṣaṇa* consists not in its being true and representing truth, but in its being connected with the thing in an uncommon manner. "That which looks like silver is 'pearl'" — in this instance, though the existence of the silver is false, is very well contained the *upa lakṣaṇa* of pearl. Similarly creatorship, though it cannot be ascribed to Brahman, can very well point to Brahman and be viewed as its *upa* or *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.¹ The abandonment of the standpoint of value which began with Prakāśātman gave birth to a process of thought which revelled in raising false philosophical issues and sought satisfaction in discovering what, to a discriminating eye, would appear to be artificial answers. The artificiality of the answers is seen to have reached its climax in Vidyāranya's attempt to ascertain and fix the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Mayaviśiṣṭa Brahman also. If the Śuddha and the Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman are different their essential nature also must be different. Thus creativity was declared by Vidyāranya to be the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman, while it continued to be the *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* of the Śuddha Brahman, the *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* of the latter being Sat, Cit and Ānanda. The Māyaviśiṣṭa Brahman came to be viewed as the "Real" Material or Constitutive cause,

1 Pancapadika Vivarana. P. 208. 'यद्वज्रतमित्यभावात् सा शुक्तिः' इति वन्मिथ्या भूतेषां प्रपञ्चकारणत्वेनोपलक्षणयोगात् । असाधारणसम्बन्धो हि लक्षणनिमित्तम् न लक्षणसत्यत्वम् ।

and the Śuddha Brahman as the 'Figurative' Material cause.¹ Deussen only carried this teaching to its logical conclusion when he said that the metaphysics of the Vedānta has two forms, an exoteric and an esoteric and made a zealous effort to trace this distinction in all the five provinces of the Vedānta teaching, namely its theology, cosmology, psychology, doctrine of transmigration, and doctrine of liberation. But in Deussen we hear the voice, not of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda, but of Prakāśātman and Vidyāranya. The only thesis to which the Advaitism of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda is committed is that Brahman, the Highest Value, is also the Supreme Creativity; and this position has found its true representative not in Prakāśātman but in Sarvajñātmamuni. Long before Prakāśātman, Śarvajñātmamuni had, in his Śaṅkṣepa Śārīraka, held the view that the Śuddha or Pāra Brāhman is the source and origin of the universe. It is the constitutive stuff of the world as well the directive power behind it.²

X

THE VIVARAṆA IŚVARA AND THE PLATONIC GOD

The modern interpreters of Śaṅkara do not seem to me to be faithful to him when, following Prakāśātman, they feel the necessity of recognizing a Māyāviśiṣṭa Brahman or a Personal God, who is himself phenomenal, in order to explain the phenomenal existence of the world. The line of argument which leads them to recognize the necessity of such an intermediate reality ends in reducing the position of the Vedānta to Platonism, which, too, insists upon the need of a God, who is the supremely good Soul, who is other than the Good and on a lower level of reality than it, who is the intermediate link between the eternal and unchanging world of Ideas and the world in which birth and death, death and birth, succeed one another in a perpetual cycle, and by whose agency the participation of the creatures in the Good

1 Vivaranaprameya Sangraha. P. 643, जन्मादिकारणत्वं मायाविशिष्टब्रह्मणः स्वरूपलक्षणत्वेऽप्यविरुद्धम् । शुद्धब्रह्मणस्तु तत् तदस्थलक्षणम् । P. 686, तत्र मुख्योपादानस्य जगत्कारणत्वं स्वरूपलक्षणम् औपचारिकोपादानस्य तु तत्तदस्थलक्षणम् ।

2 Sanksepa Sariraka, I. 553.

is made possible. In Plato's philosophy God is the "creator" or "maker", the "artisan" or "craftsman", and is other than the Good. God is a Soul; Good is the Supreme "Form". The creator or maker in Platonic philosophy is thought of definitely as a "personal God" whose activity produces a world like the forms. The position of God in Plato's philosophy is dubious and not fully thought out. The current interpretations of Śaṅkara which follow the Vivaraṇa line suffer from the same fault. Both Burnet and Taylor point out that if the description of Plato's God in the "Laws" as a perfectly good Soul is taken seriously, it will mean that God too is only half-real, and belongs on one side to the realm of the mutable. Īśvara in the philosophy of Śaṅkara has been placed in the same perilous position by the modern interpreters of Śaṅkara, who declare him to be phenomenal and even illusory, and to be not above time but subject to time. He is said to be different from Brahman and to have less of reality than it, and, as creator and destroyer, to belong to the empirical world. As I have said above, it is difficult to reconcile such a conception of Īśvara with the religious insistence on the eternal, immutable, perfectly real and absolutely blissful character of Īśvara which meets us everywhere in Śaṅkara. We could not meet the difficulty by supposing that Īśvara is an imaginative symbol of the Absolute Good which is Brahman, since the whole thesis which the modern interpreters intend to prove is that Īśvara is "different from" and "other than" Brahman, "has less of reality" than absolute Being, and is "the mediating principle" between Brahman and the world, sharing the natures of both, the immutability and non-temporality of the one and the ceaseless change and becoming of the other. Thus Brahman, it is said, is not identical with Īśvara. But it seems equally impossible to suppose that Īśvara is merely a "creature" of Māyā. The author of the whole creation cannot himself be a creation. The only conclusion to which one is led is that the modern interpreters, in their anxiety to be faithful to tradition, have not only introduced a dualism into the Vedāntic metaphysics by accepting two metaphysical principles, the one axiological and the other cosmological, but have also created a conflict between the Vedāntic metaphysics and the Vedāntic religion. The way

out of this difficulty in which the Vedāntic position has been landed is not to appeal to different standpoints in the "confusion" of which the difficulty is said to have its genesis, but to return to the standpoint of value and recognize that, Value and Reality being one, Value is Creativity also.

Professor Taylor draws our attention to a similar "unsolved conflict" between the Platonic metaphysics and the Platonic religion, and points out that the adjustment of the two became a cardinal problem for Plotinus and his Neo-Platonic successor. So far as the problem of relation between value and reality is concerned, the last word of the Vedāntic constructive thought was said not by Prakāśātman but by Śaṅkara and Padmapāda, just as on the same point the last word of Greek philosophy was said not by Plato but by Plotinus. In order to understand Śaṅkara and what Śaṅkara stands for, we must not stay with Prakāśātman but must go back to Padmapāda. The age of Śaṅkara and Padmapāda is the golden age of Vedāntic philosophy; the age which saw the rise of the Prakāśātman marks the evening of constructive thought in the history of the Advaita Vedānta. In the former Philosophy is self-conscious, in the latter it begins to forget itself. The stars which twinkle in the sky after the evening shades fall are not able to reveal the Truth in its eternal glory as the Sun at midday did. The difficulty of Thibaut and others that, if we follow Śaṅkara's explanation, it is not possible to explain why the Sūtras should open with the definition of that inferior principle from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, is an imaginary difficulty. It has its source in ignorance of the valuational standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara, for whom Brahman is the highest good, which is essentially and intrinsically creative.

XI

MEDITATION UPON BRAHMAN AS THE CREATIVE SOURCE

Brahman which is a truly creative reality according to Śaṅkara can also be meditated upon as the cause of the

universe including myself. In this case the individual will be performing upāsana, implying a difference between the upāsaka and the upāsya, the meditator and the meditable, a difference in the creation of which time and space and name and form play an important role. But the axiological and ontological truth that Brahman is the Ātman or the cause should be sharply distinguished from the meditation on the same Brahman as the Kāraṇa or the Kārī or the Cause. The former is jñāna, the latter is a variety of karma. In the first Brahman and Self coalesce into one; in the second they stand apart as mutually exclusive though also correlated. The deficiency that clings to the first is a deficiency of language, but the truth that is to be expressed is an absolute truth, namely that Brahman is the Ātman of everything. It is not a deficiency in the realization of the truth, but one in the mode of expression of the realized truth. The deficiency that clings to the latter is a deficiency in the realization of the truth about Brahman's nature.

In the Second Sūtra, the author and the commentator only just begin to give an outline of the realized truth. The progressive way in which this truth has ultimately to be realized is yet to follow. The Saguna Brahman is the embodiment of the progressive realization of the truth which the Nirguna Brahman stands for. The statement that "Brahman is my Ātman" may very well stand for the axiological truth as well as signify a form of meditation or upāsana according to the attitude of the soul towards Brahman. Śaṅkara points out that the statements, "That thou art"¹ and "All this is Self alone"² in the Chāndogya embody absolute realization and express the nature of Nirguna Brahman. But the realization of the same Brahman "as my Self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds, smaller than an ear of corn, than barley, than mustard, than the kernel of the mustard seed"³ is mere upāsana, as it rests upon and presupposes a distinction between the Self and Brahman and is possible only with

1 Chand., VI. 16. 3. तत्त्वमसि ।

2 Ibid., VII. 25. 2. अहमेवैव सर्वम् ।

3 Ibid., III. 14. 3.

the help of the limiting adjuncts which are treated as other than Brahman. It is because Brahman is treated as other than the Self and the manifested universe as other than Brahman, that it is meditated upon as "having all actions, having all desires, having all odours, having all tastes, pervading all this, without speech, without confusion and the Self within the heart". The worshipper hopes that he "shall attain it on departing from this world".¹

Everywhere in Śaṅkara we meet with the distinctions between Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahman, Saguṇa and Śuddha Brahman, Jñeya and Upāsya Brahman, Para and Apara Brahman, Nirupādhika and Sopādhika Brahman. But these distinctions cannot be said to introduce into his metaphysical system any irreconcilable dualism. The Saguṇa Brahman is Brahman conceived as limited by the limiting adjuncts of name and form, whose very existence is bound up with Brahman as a truly creative reality. It represents a view of Brahman taken by the individual for purposes of worship or upāsana and has reference to Śaṅkara's philosophy of sādhanā. According to Śaṅkara Īśvara is the Upāsya Brahman, Brahman worshipped as the Īśvara (Lord), the Antaryāmin (Inner Controller) who controls and rules the worshipper (upāsaka, īśitavya). But, according to Śaṅkara, there is possible a higher state of religious realization wherein the difference between the worshipper and the worshipped (upāsya and upāsaka), the ruler and the ruled (īśa and īśitavya), the controller and the controlled, vanishes. This is the state wherein Brahman is experienced as our inmost self. It is a state wherein one has experience of undivided existence. This feeling of Īśvara being the worshipped and the soul being the worshipper, of Īśvara being the ruler and the soul being the ruled, lasts only so long as the complete realization of the oneness of Reality, that there is no difference either within it or without it, does not take place. This is the reason why Śaṅkara says that the view that Brahman, the ultimate reality which is the Self (Ātman) of every one, is Īśvara, the ruler, controller, governor, is erroneous (avidyātmaka) and will disappear on the dawn of right knowledge. The view

¹ Chand., III. 14. 4.

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that Brahman is *Īśvara*, the controller, or ruler, is erroneous, because it rests upon an unreconciled opposition between Self and Brahman. The fundamental truth of the Vedānta of Śāṅkara, upon which rests the whole system, is the acknowledgement of the identity of the two. The conception of Brahman as the controller and the individual as controlled rests upon the view that there will always remain an unreconciled opposition between the two. But according to Śāṅkara, this view flagrantly contradicts the deliverances of intuition as well as reason. This view of the Real as *Īśvara* or *Īśī* is therefore *avidyātmaka*.¹



1 S.B., II. 1. 14. एवमविवक्षाकृतनामरूपोपाध्यन्रोषोऽत्रो भवति न्यामेव घटकर-
काद्युपाध्यन्रोधि ।

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